KELLY SHANE PIFFERINI v. CITY OF EUREKA, et al.
Case No. 24-cv-09191-RMI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EUREKA DIVISION
August 4, 2025
Re: Dkt. No. 16
Now pending before the court is the motion (Dkt. 16) of Defendants City of Eureka, Brian Stevens, Victoria Graham, and Jon Omey1 to dismiss Plaintiff Kelly Shane Pifferini‘s complaint (dkt. 1), and for clarification. Pursuant to
I. Background2
Plaintiff is an unhoused resident of Eureka, California (“the City“). (Dkt. 1, p. 2). He “ha[s] no access to anywhere but public areas at all times” and cannot access indoor shelter or available public storage. Id. Accordingly, he and his possessions must be in public at all times. Id.
However,
Further, Plaintiff alleges that “police treat more than just the prohibited areas as unlawful for camping[]” and “enforce [camping in] all public areas as unlawful.” (Dkt. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff claims that to prevent officers from directing campers to legal camping sites, the City refuses to
Plaintiff states that Officer Graham “harassed” him for violations of
Plaintiff also takes issue with another Eureka ordinance,
Both pre- and post-removal notices under
Plaintiff alleges that
Plaintiff claims that City police issue notices and seize property under
A housed citizen with a baby stroller out in public with a baby in it is allowed, but a baby stroller full of an unhoused citizens [sic] possessions is unlawful and can be seized immediately as a bulky item, without any notice, and immediately discarded as trash. Whether the item is accompanied by its owner, or left unattended.
Id. at 20. When notices are issued, Plaintiff says they are often “confusing[,]” giving a 72-hour removal period instead of the statutory 24-hour period and omitting information about the length of time property will be held and how to reclaim it. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff alleges that he has “had a loss of property of more than $8,000 at the hands of”
Plaintiff specifically names Officer Graham as an officer who gave him these defective notices. (Dkt. 1, p. 12). He states that she gave him five such notices during three encounters in late 2023 and early 2024. Id. at 13. In at least one instance, Graham “hand[ed] a notice directly to me the owner, while my personal property was in my possession the entire time.” Id. at 26. Ultimately, he alleges that Officer Graham had an arrest warrant issued for him “under false pretenses, resulting in my arrest on” February 12, 2024. Id. at 13.
On that day, Plaintiff was at a picnic table in the park when Sergeant Omey arrested him “for two fish and game codes for having my bike and trailer parked close to the water.” (Dkt. 1, p. 12). Before his arrest, Plaintiff left his belongings with a friend. Id. However, Plaintiff says that Omey “forced my friend to leave the area and would not let him take my things with him as I wished him to.” Id. Omey seized Plaintiff‘s property without a homeless liaison or supervisor present, a violation of City police policy. Further, the property was not stored for the required 90 days. Id. Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges that Omey discarded Plaintiff‘s possessions at the dump, although it is unclear whether these were the possessions seized after the February 12 arrest or other items of Plaintiff‘s seized at another time. Id. at 27. Plaintiff also alleges that Sergeant Omey “entered my home without probabl[e] cause, and without a search and seizure warrant.” Id. at 26.
Plaintiff alleges that Chief of Police Brian Stevens and the City Council have directed “all
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]n unknown city worker violated my 1st amendment by stopping my protest and destroying my signs impeding on my freedom of speech and my right to assemble.” (Dkt. 1, p. 29).
II. Standard
III. Anti-Camping Ordinance (E.M.C. § 93.02 )
Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claims regarding Eureka‘s anticamping ordinance should be dismissed in light of the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U.S. 520 (2024). The court agrees.
In Grants Pass, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit‘s Martin decision in relevant part. Id. at 542. Specifically, it held that “[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] focuses on the question [of] what ‘method or kind of punishment’ a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on the question [of] whether a government may criminalize behavior in the first place[.]” Id. (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) (plurality op.)) The Supreme Court determined that a law against camping on any public property within the City of Grants Pass did not criminalize the mere status of being homeless because under that law, “it makes no difference whether the charged defendant is
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that
Plaintiff also argues that
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‘s challenges to
IV. Storage of Personal Property (E.M.C. § 130.14 )
For purposes of this motion to dismiss, Defendants do not contest Plaintiff‘s claims that
(1) The ordinance [§ 130.14] is enforced differently against housed and unhoused citizens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) The Bulky Item‘s [sic] provision permits unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; or that (3) The Bulky Item‘s [sic] provision does not require notice in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Dkt. 16, p. 12).7
Defendants do, however, argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim relating to this ordinance. First, Defendants appear to claim that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge
The court agrees with Defendants in part, specifically as it relates to Plaintiff‘s ability to seek money damages for a due process violation relating to the notice provision. Plaintiff does not allege that the notice provision is unconstitutional as written. It is true that even if the procedures set forth in an ordinance comply with due process, the actual procedures used by officers can violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Sanders v. City of San Diego, 93 F.3d 1423, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding “that the statutory procedures [at issue] satisfy due process” but “find[ing] that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether the City in fact
However, Plaintiff‘s allegations do make out a case for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has sometimes “found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int‘l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n. 5 (2013). In these circumstances, “a person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 435 (2021). Here, Plaintiff has alleged facts which indicate there is a “substantial risk” that his property will be seized without due process. He alleges that if he ever needs to set property on the ground or leave it momentarily unattended to enter a building, it “can and will be seized by the city.” He further alleges that he is forced to carry all of his property with him at all times, which results in him having to “forfeit my entire life agenda” to prevent the property‘s seizure, thereby incurring costs in order to mitigate the risk of harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff may pursue injunctive relief to prevent the city from using inadequate process when seizing his belongings.
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that the health-and-safety exception to
Therefore, Plaintiff‘s complaint does not show that he has standing to challenge it, so the claim about the health-and-safety exception must be dismissed.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that the bulky items exception is “unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 16, p. 20 (some capitalization omitted)). Despite the phrasing, Defendants appear to actually be arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge this provision. See id. (“Plaintiff has not alleged that he had any property seized without notice pursuant to this section.“); cf. supra n.8. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that any of his items were seized under the bulky items exception. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s claims about this exception must be dismissed.
Finally, Defendants say Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence-of-a-crime exception is unconstitutional. Their argument on this front is twofold. First, they claim that the statute has never unconstitutionally been applied to Plaintiff. The court‘s review of the complaint shows no plausible allegations that Plaintiff‘s property was seized under this provision. To be sure, it is possible that Plaintiff‘s bike and trailer were seized under this provision when he was arrested, as they could have been considered “evidence” of the parking violation. However, the complaint does not allege this, and the bike and trailer could have been confiscated for any number of other reasons. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that he has suffered damages from the evidence-of-a-crime exception. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (plaintiffs must state factual allegations sufficient to raise their entitlement to relief “above the speculative level[]“).
As discussed above, a plaintiff who has not yet been damaged by a law may seek to enjoin it if they are at an “imminent and substantial” risk of being harmed by it. Plaintiff argues that he is in constant danger of having his belongings seized without notice pursuant to this exception because it is illegal to store property in public areas, meaning that any property stored in public areas can be seized without notice as evidence of that crime. However, this would render
In a similar vein, Plaintiff argues that having to constantly carry his possessions puts him in perpetual violation of the public camping ordinance. To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that this may cause authorities to seize his belongings without notice as evidence of a crime, the court disagrees. The plain language of
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‘s constitutional claims regarding the Ordinances must be dismissed, except for Plaintiff‘s claim for injunctive relief against the City‘s violations of due process when seizing items under
V. Liability of Individual Officers
a. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants should be dismissed because they are redundant of Plaintiff‘s claims against the City. Defendants are correct that “[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). For his part, Plaintiff does not object to dismissing the individual defendants in their official capacities “as long as the liability is transferred over to the city.” (Dkt. 23, pp. 9, 11). And the liability, if Plaintiff is successful,
b. Officer Graham
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a claim against Officer Graham regarding the confiscation notices because Plaintiff has not alleged that his property was ever confiscated pursuant to such a notice. As stated above, because Plaintiff has not alleged that his property was actually confiscated under such a notice, the only relief he has standing to obtain is an injunction prohibiting Officer Graham from confiscating his property without adequate notice.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Officer Graham “harassed” him while enforcing the anti-camping ordinance. The court agrees. Plaintiff has not detailed exactly how Officer Graham is supposed to have harassed him. Simply stating that Officer Graham committed harassment pleads a legal conclusion, which is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated the “false pretenses” underlying his arrest warrant. The court agrees with this assessment. While Plaintiff‘s response to the motion to dismiss includes more details about the alleged falsehood, the court is not allowed to consider Plaintiff‘s response when evaluating the adequacy of his complaint for purposes of a motion to dismiss. City of Royal Oak Retirement Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A] court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment and giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond.“). This is a problem for Plaintiff because “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
c. Chief Stevens
Here, it appears that to the extent a claim can be stated against Chief Stevens in his individual capacity, a claim could also be stated against the city. “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, a municipality can be held liable for omissions such as failing to train or supervise officers, as well as for constitutional injuries inflicted by its “official policies or established customs.” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016). Importantly, a municipality is also liable when an official with final policy-making authority either commits or ratifies the constitutional violation. Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1250. “As to matters of police policy, the chief of police under some circumstances may be considered the person possessing final policy-making authority.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 1996).
Because it appears that Plaintiff‘s claims against Chief Stevens could also be brought against the City, the Court will grant Plaintiff‘s request to voluntarily dismiss Chief Stevens from the case.
d. Sergeant Omey
Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff does not contest that he violated the fish and game code or that his property could be seized when he was arrested, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Sergeant Omey. However, “even when supported by probable cause, a search or seizure may be invalid if carried out in an unreasonable fashion.” Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1994). For example, “a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.” U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the fact that Plaintiff‘s property could legally have been seized does not mean that the particular way in which it was seized did not violate Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendants are, however, correct that Plaintiff does not argue or allege that the actual confiscation of his property at the arrest was unreasonable. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that this property was actually confiscated or that, if confiscated, it was destroyed. While Plaintiff argues that Sergeant Omey‘s actions violated City law and policy, the “reasonableness” standard for searches does not take account of local laws. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“[I]t is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law.“) Accordingly, Plaintiff has not proffered enough facts to indicate beyond a speculative level that the seizure violated Plaintiff‘s rights.
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff does not allege the ultimate fate of his belongings (i.e., whether they were seized, stored, destroyed, or left in Plaintiff‘s possession), Plaintiff has not stated a Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. While Plaintiff does allege that Omey “discarded my items at the dump” (dkt. 1, p. 27), it is unclear which items Plaintiff is talking about. Even assuming that Plaintiff is talking about the belongings seized at this arrest, Plaintiff does not allege that the belongings were discarded without notice or an adequate waiting period. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim on this theory, either.
Defendants further argue that because Plaintiff alleges that Omey entered his home without a warrant but arrested him pursuant to a warrant, and because Plaintiff does not allege more than one interaction with Omey, Omey permissibly entered Plaintiff‘s home to arrest Plaintiff. Id. As Plaintiff states that he is unhoused and that Omey arrested him in the park, the court cannot infer that these interactions were the same incident. However, because Plaintiff provides no detail about the home-entry incident besides the fact that Omey lacked a warrant and the legal conclusion that Omey lacked probable cause, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient detail to give
The court notes that, as with his claims against Officer Graham, Plaintiff provided more detailed allegations against Officer Omey in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, as discussed above, in order for the court to consider this additional information, it needs to be incorporated into a complaint.
Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s claims against Sergeant Omey in his individual capacity must be dismissed.
e. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “[d]etermining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special problems for legal decision making.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiff‘s allegations of fact are barebones and will generally need to be repleaded if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with most of his claims. In order to ensure an informed and accurate ruling, the court will defer consideration of qualified immunity until more fulsome factual allegations are put forth or a factual record is developed.
VI. Manner of Dismissal
When dismissing a claim, a court “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). This court concludes that Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment challenge to
VII. Motion for More Definite Statement
Defendants assert that “Plaintiff‘s Complaint is so deficient that Defendants cannot
“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 4, 2025
ROBERT M. ILLMAN
United States Magistrate Judge