126 Iowa 170 | Iowa | 1904
There was absolutely no evidence, so far as the record shows, of a combination participated in by the three defendants, as to whom plaintiff’s action was dismissed, to in any way delay or defraud plaintiff in the enforcement of his judgment against Herman Lightfield; but counsel for appellant insist that under the allegations plaintiff was entitled to recover against the defendants separately for any wrongful act in assisting Herman Lightfield to put his property out of his hands to prevent the enforcement of plaintiff’s judgment. Conceding this to be true for the purposes of this case, we find the facts,’ as shown without dispute in the record, to be that, during,the pendency of the
As to Mary C. Lightfield, the wife of Herman, the evidence, shows that, on the same day on which the mortgage was given to Bales,- her husband executed to her a bill of sale of substantially all of his personal property, consisting of live stock, oats, and hay, in consideration of an alleged previous indebtedness of the husband to the wife for money advanced by the wife to the husband and personal property previously delivered to him. The advancement of money was evidenced by notes which were surrendered when the bill of sale was executed, and there is no evidence impeaching the testimony of the, wife that the personal property had been turned over by her to her husband on their marriage.
As to defendant John Lightfield, father .of Herman, there is no claim of wrongdoing, except that he received, out of the money borrowed from Bales, payment of an indebtedness* due to him by his son, with knowledge at the time that the action of plaintiff was pending against his son; but this fact alonte would certainly not constitute an actionable wrong so far as plaintiff was concerned. Even if plaintiff had already secured a judgment against Hennan* Lightfield, there would be no actionable fraud on the part of his creditors, even though they were his relatives and had knowledge of the judgment,- in accepting out of his available resources payment of their claims, though the effect of such payment would be to leave insufficient resources in the hands of the judgment debtor to enable him to satisfy plaintiff’s judgment. The acceptance of payment of a debt from an insolvent debtor is not in itself a fraud on' other creditors.
It may be that plaintiff was unfortunate in being compelled to rely entirely on the testimony of the defendants for the purpose of establishing his case. However this may be, in the absence of any evidence of facts or circumstances constituting fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendants, plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and his action as against the three defendants named, who are appellees, was properly dismissed.
The judgment of the trial court, so far as it is attacked on this appeal, is therefore affirmed.