SEANTAE PIESTER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SANJUANA ESCOBAR, Respondent-Appellant.
Docket No. 3-14-0457
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
June 26, 2015
2015 IL App (3d) 140457
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, No. 13-OP-281; the Hon. Michael R. Albert, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel:
OPINION
¶ 1 Petitioner Seantae Piester filed a petition seeking a stalking no contact order against respondent SanJuana Escobar. Attached to the petition was an addendum and several pages of “screen saves” of social media postings Escobar had written. Piester‘s petition was heard and the trial court entered a plenary stalking no contact order. We affirm.
¶ 2 FACTS
¶ 3 In December 2013, petitioner Seantae Piester sought a stalking no contact order against respondent SanJuana Escobar. Piester asserted in the petition that Escobar was “considered armed and/or dangerous.” Attached to the petition was an addendum in which Piester described Escobar‘s alleged stalking conduct. It set forth numerous examples, such as, on one occasion, Escobar watched Piester at her workplace from a public location across the street and recorded Piester‘s actions on her cellular phone. The police responded, but Escobar subsequently recorded Piester leaving her workplace. Piester thereafter required a coworker to walk her to her car because she feared for her safety.
¶ 4 The addendum also stated that Piester altered her lunch times because Escobar monitored her actions and that Escobar would show up near Piester‘s
¶ 5 The addendum also includes information regarding Escobar‘s purported harassment on social media. The addendum sets out several specific examples of harassment on social media sites as well as Piester‘s unsuccessful attempts to block Escobar from accessing her online information. For example, according to Piester, if she would post that she was going to lunch at a specific site, Escobar would show up there too. Piester stated her motion detector lights go off at night and she is afraid that Escobar is outside her house. She has asked the neighbors to watch out for her. Finally, Piester described a threat Escobar made in 2011 and said she has not felt safe in Escobar‘s presence since then. Attached to the addendum were screen saves from social media demonstrating Escobar‘s postings.
¶ 6 On January 30, 2014, a hearing took place on Piester‘s petition. The record on appeal, however, does not include either a report of proceedings or a bystander‘s report. The trial court entered a plenary stalking no contact order, which remains valid until January 30, 2016. The order prohibits Escobar from threatening to commit or committing stalking directly or through a third party and from contacting Piester in any way and orders Escobar to stay 25 feet away from Piester, her home and her workplace. In addition, Escobar is prohibited from posting anything on social media concerning Piester, using audio when recording Piester, and entering any business or government agency where Piester is located.
¶ 7 In February, Escobar filed a pro se motion and accompanying affidavit seeking to vacate the stalking no contact order. Counsel filed an appearance for Escobar and an amended motion to reconsider and vacate the stalking no contact order. In the amended motion, Escobar argued that she had sought and was denied a stalking no contact order in June 2014 in another Whiteside County case (No. 13-OP-96), her motion to reconsider the denial was pending, and mutual stalking no contact orders are prohibited. See
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it entered a plenary stalking no contact order against Escobar. She argues that the pending motion to reconsider the denial of her petition for a stalking no contact order in Whiteside County case No. 13-OP-96 prevents the trial court from entering the stalking no contact order in this case; that the plenary order was not supported by the evidence; and that the plenary order violated Escobar‘s free speech rights.
¶ 11 Under the Stalking No Contact Order Act (Act), a victim of stalking may seek a civil remedy requiring the stalker to stay away from him or her.
¶ 12 A petitioner is required to prove stalking by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 13 As an initial matter, Escobar complains the report of proceedings does not support Piester‘s claims. Regardless of her complaint, Escobar failed to provide a complete record on appeal. Foutch v. O‘Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) (appellant has burden to provide a complete record on appeal). There is no report of proceedings or bystander‘s report in the record. Accordingly, in the absence of a transcript of the hearing, we presume the trial court‘s determination had a factual basis and was in conformance with the law. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Moreover, we find that the record includes ample evidence sufficient to support Piester‘s request for the issuance of a stalking no contact order.
¶ 14 The addendum attached to Piester‘s petition establishes the trial court properly entered the stalking no contact order. Per the addendum, Escobar engaged in a course of conduct in which she followed, monitored, observed, surveilled, and threatened Piester. In addition, Escobar harassed Piester on social media and caused others to also post harassing and
¶ 15 Contrary to Escobar‘s assertion that she was unaware her actions scared Piester, the parties have a history of confrontations, including attempts by both Escobar and Piester to obtain prior stalking no contact orders. In her petition, Piester maintained that she had told Escobar three years earlier to stop verbally harassing her and had called the police regarding Escobar‘s behavior on other occasions. The information set forth in Piester‘s complaint unequivocally establishes that Escobar knew or should know that a reasonable person in Piester‘s position would be scared and threatened by Escobar‘s conduct of monitoring, surveilling, threatening and communicating to and about Piester over a several-year span. We find the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court‘s issuance of a stalking no contact order.
¶ 16 We next consider Escobar‘s challenge to the trial court‘s issuance of the plenary stalking no contact order based on a supposed pending motion to reconsider in another Whiteside County case where Escobar sought a stalking no contact order against Piester. Escobar is correct that mutual stalking no contact orders are prohibited.
¶ 17 Lastly, we examine Escobar‘s free speech challenge. She argues that the stalking no contact order violates her right to freedom of speech.
¶ 18 A party‘s exercise of free speech is expressly excluded from the stalking statute and may provide a defense.
¶ 19 Escobar‘s social media postings and other online comments were part of a course of conduct of stalking. For example, screen saves attached to the addendums show Escobar monitoring Piester‘s daily activities and making degrading, threatening and harassing comments about her. This speech is not protected under the first amendment. Accordingly, Escobar‘s claim that her free speech rights were violated must fail and we need not consider her challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.
¶ 21 Affirmed.