*1 PRISCILLA R. PIERSMA v. WILLIAM

L. SEITZ September Term, [No. 1970.] Decided November Murphy, C.J., argued before

The cause Orth *2 and JJ. Moylan, appellant. Freeman for

Martin H. appellee. Townes L. Dawson for majority opinion of Murphy, C.J., delivered by Orth, Dissenting opinion J., dissents. Court. Orth, J., page 444 at infra. by appel- 19, 1965, driven April motor vehicles

On in Prince in a collision appellee involved lant and were April appellee on George’s County, a result of which would of limitations 18, before the statute 1968—one personal in- appellant for action —sued have barred the County. George’s juries for Prince in the Circuit Court est appellant was returned issued for The summons 1968, May 17, 25, By dated (moved) April letter 1968. on and appellee’s counsel notified of the so Clerk Court of- instructions to this requested “issue written that he service the Sheriff.” purposes of fice for re-issue respond letter to the Clerk’s Appellee’s did not counsel 14, November not reissued. On and the summons was Subsequently, 1968, stet docket. placed on the the case was living in 1969, appellant appellee located in March Appel- upon her. Pennsylvania effected and service was defense held without pleaded lant limitations. That jury eventually tried before case was merit and the $15,- judgment amount of appellee awarded which filed appeal that while the suit was Appellant on claims limitations, statutory period the action was within the appel- limitations because discontinued as barred non est be- lee did not obtain two successive returns on allowing lie dormant. He relies fore the summons to Co., 34; Mary- Fly Mfg. 187 Md. Neel v. Screen Webb Rules 108 of the land Rule and Rule Seventh Judicial Circuit. preventing purpose for the is well

It settled that impetration of running of of limitations the statute of the suit. the commencement writ deemed Nesbitt, State, Md. 177. At common Logan v. Use of pe law, within party instituted the suit where the proved ineffectual riod of limitations but necessary, court, bring into it was the defendant reg alive, keep that such summons order suit the defendant was ularly to term until term renewed from operated as a dis served; to renew so and the omission Morris, 28 Md. v. Hazlehurst of the action. continuance declaratory enacted common law were 67. Statutes 1888; “they merely more established days’ monthly finally in lieu of frequent —‘return —and *3 ” days.’ Process and yearly Renewal ‘term the thrice of Limitations, Subsequently, 76. 9 M.L.R. the Statute of provided by Chapter of it was 180 of Acts the Baltimore, City of where in the courts of the summons executed, may re “the same be been returned had any original newed,” two writ and that “after returns days succeeding return after not executed at the two issued, permitted same shall be to lie dor writ is first * * Substantially mant, provisions identical were sub sequently for the various Circuit Courts enacted by Chapter 240 of the counties Acts Co., supra, Fly Mfg. Neel v. In Webb Screen decided interpreting Appeals, in these stat- modifying rule, held that the common law after two utes (at two successive re- ineffective summons issues days) by kept and not limi- the suit alive barred turn to renew summons. The tations failure thereafter interpreted repealed Chapter in Neel statutes were 1957; they superseded in effect 399 of the Acts of were — by Maryland “Renewal entitled Process Process,” follows: Dormant which reads as Course, Clerk. “a. Once as of a Upon party the return of the summons est, endorsed shall same be renewed course, as a Clerk matter of return- day. next able to the return Ests, b. Non Two to Lie Dormant. After est, After of non two returns summons party permitted dormant, to a shall be to lie only renewable on the written order of the plaintiff to such future return as’ the may plaintiff direct.

c. Further Renewal.

Thereafter, upon a return further of non est, again said summons shall be dormant, only aforesaid, to lie renewable as right having the said to renew many subsequent said summons as days, procedure under the same mode proper, deemed until same is ex- ecuted.” requirement that the Clerk renew the “as

a imposes him, matter of upon course” as matter law, non-discretionary, wholly duty, automatic re- est, issue the summons so returned non returnable to day. next return The Rule interpreta- can bear no other tion; duty not, appellant suggests, Clerk’s de- pendent request party seeking service the summons. Circuit,

Rule 108 of the Seventh Judicial under which asking appellee’s Clerk provide acted counsel to *4 written summons, instructions for reissuance of the reads: promptly

“The shall Sheriff make his return to process the Clerk Court. If has not been served, the return why shall the state reason of and the notify Clerk Court shall forthwith accordingly.” counsel inconsistency Mary-

We see no local between the Rule and per- purports to Nothing in local the 112.1 land Rule County ignore George’s to Prince in mit the Clerk he reissue such requiring that plain mandate of a reissuance That such of course.” “as a matter en- of the summons likely another return in result would to renew he can refuse est mean that not dorsed does indeed, address; another provided he is it unless est of non as Rule, requiring returns two in successive limitations, con- of precedent to inhibit the bar condition check as double procedure will act templates that such undertaking to his initial performance in on the Sheriff’s of directing By automatic reissuance such effect service. 112 to summons, plain purpose of Rule one it was was filed within the suit assure that once the that limitations, further concern need have no counsel against on his client failure his limitations would run connection, the Rule In this part the summons. law, repealed court, or the common now unlike the mandatory responsibility for reis- statutes, imposes the Clerk, optional respon- an upon rather than suance counsel; not be sibility upon we counsel should think Clerk, on superintend but the duties called circumstances, wholly contrary, mechanical in these rely upon performance proper should be entitled to Indeed, ease, duty. record discloses the Clerk’s this appellee appellant address for did not have better originally supplied; she than that had moved 1966; Pennsylvania August of and had the summons Rule, reissued, required automatically under the been again non est. have it would been appellee’s appellant’s claim that action The thrust of when, barred the statute limitations under “was request Court, he did not a matter course Rules May 17, letter response a reissue Clerk’s dependent upon coun- 1968.” the reissuance Since request therefor, and statute of limitations sel’s since the tolled would have remained had Clerk followed inconsistency, Rule would 1. Were there such an local Maryland yield. Rule If. *5 444 law,

clear mandate of the appear plain it would to be a perversion purpose underlying and intent 112 to invoke litigant the bar upon solely by of limitations neglect reason of the and of per- omission the Clerk to wholly form perfunctory duty compelled the Rule reissuing Hillman, summons. Bertonazzi v. Cf. Adm’x, 241 Md. 361. thinkWe Rule 112 is so structured permit hold, as to facts, us to on these and under these circumstances, requisite that the achieving conditions to dormancy state process were, effect, met in this case.

Judgment affirmed; appellant pay costs. Orth, J., dissenting.

In Lewis v. Company, Germantown Insurance 251 Md. Appeals 536 the Court of “if wondered the bar ever why reflects adopted reasons pro- we have mulgated practice procedure.” rules of In Isen et ux v. Phoenix Company York, Assurance New 259 Md. “* * * , spelled by reminding out the reasons all guides hands that are not practice [the rules] precise law but promote rubrics ‘established to the or- derly justice and efficient administration and [that they] Fraley, are to be read and v. followed.’ Brown 222 (I960).” Maryland Md. provides 483 Rule 112 b est, inter alia: “After two non returns of the summons to * * party permitted shall be to lie dormant That precise signifi- this rubric be followed is of the utmost ; dormancy cance the vel non of a summons a defendant may determine whether or not the statute limitations may against be to bar invoked him the action him. filing

An action at law shall be commenced a decla- only plain- It is then “renewable on the written order plaintiff may tiff to such future return “Thereafter, upon as the direct.” Id. est, a further return said shall again dormant, aforesaid, only to lie as renewable plaintiff having right the said said summons many days, subsequent procedure under the mode of same proper, until he the same is executed.” deemed c. *6 ration, by original pleading. case consent or other appli- 140 a. The commencement of an action within the period cable tolls limitations the statute limitations. Logan State, Nesbitt, See v. Use 39 Md. 190. But thereby the statute is not a forever removed. When sum- mons to a defendant does not lie dormant the statute is brought back, if the time within which the action brought elapsed, can be has the action is barred when properly challenged. looking by This is made clear history of the Rule.

At the common law the writ of summons had to be re- uninterruptedly newed and without omission to each suc- ceeding day. was, finally If it then when it was original asking, executed it related back to the and if that period, had been within the limitation the bar of limita- tions did not lie. Logan State, so stated v. Nesbitt, supra, Use at 190:

“It is purpose well pre- settled that for the venting running of the Statute of Limita- impetration tions the writ suit, deemed the commencement of the and if proves bring ineffectual to the defendant by sheriff, into court and is returned the suit kept regu- alive writs of summons larly uninterruptedly renewed from term to term until the defendant is taken.” Morris, And it said in Hazlehwrst v. (1868), 28 Md. 67 75, explaining unreported at its case of Dennison v. Trull (1823) : regular

“The renewal of the writ from term term, any omissions, without kept the action * * prevented alive and the bar of limitations *. plaintiff, return, When the after the first had regularly renewed, his writ he did all that was do, power required his and all that was * him law* *.” hand, On the other if one renewal of the writ of summons omitted, to the next return a there was discon- tinuance of a the action. Then reissuance of the writ was new action and if it was after the limitation had elapsed, applied the statute of limitations could be to bar Hazlehurst, the action. The Court said at 75: party institutes a suit and the “Where sum- proves bring mons the defendant ineffectual Sheriff, into court and is returned in or- alive, keep der to the suit the summons must be regularly renewed from term to term until the defendant is taken. The omission so operates discontinuance of action.” “Statutory enactments in 1886 and 1888 did not *7 change respect; they merely the common law this es- — frequent finally monthly more tablished ‘return —and ” days’ yearly days.’ in lieu of the thrice ‘term Renetoal Limitations, 74, Process and the Statute 9 M.L.R. option 76. See Rule 102. Until 1894 there no for a plaintiff day skip suffering a renewal without a dis- opening way again and continuance for limitations however, 1894, Assembly to run. In the General enacted public applicable City. 1894, a local law to Baltimore Acts 180, 4 codified as 160 of Art. Ch. Code of Public § Maryland, provided: Local Laws of original writ, the return of an “On not exe- either of cuted in said Courts law courts [the Supreme Bench], may same re- be newed, day returnable next return there- after, any original after and two returns of writ succeeding days not executed at the two return expressly rejected practice gen- 2. In the Court Hazlehurst erally English followed under and American Law that did not re- quire original of successive writs the issuance between the and writ, by continuances, allowed them to be final is entries practice and are when nite but connected of the award of fictitious writs. “We know no such State, applicable executions, in this as that to either suits or opinion only practice this court announced the judgment might kept it stated be alive for an indefi- time, by issuing having returned, writ fieri facias regularly renewing it from term and then to term.” At 73-74. issued, shall the writ is the same be after first only dormant, on to lie renewable attorney plaintiff written order of the or his day record to future return as said such elect, plaintiff attorney may or his executed, further return of said writ shall again permitted lie, only as renewable aforesaid, attorney plaintiff the said or his hav- ing right many to renew said writ to as sub- sequent days, under the same mode of procedure proper, be deemed until same is executed.” By 240, Ch. Acts later codified in the 1951 Code as provisions Art. appli- identical were enacted § any cable “to of the Circuit Courts of the State.” Fly Mfg. Co., In Neel v. Webb Screen 187 Md. 34 (1946) presented the Court was with the effect of these statutes on the common law rule. The writ was issued and non est to the first rule after the action was commenced. It was renewed to the next three succeeding days rule and returned non est each time. The lay years suit dormant for over when the ap- plied for a renewal the writ which was issued and served. elapsed The limitation had then and the pleaded defendant limitations. The lower court found that if a writ allowed to become dormant the failure to provided by after non ests two statute, there *8 was a discontinuance of the request action. Therefore the subsequent for renewal of the writ to the action becom- ing equivalent dormant was the to commencement of a having new in the suit. Limitations meantime intervened, plead the defendant could limitations to bar the action. agree. Appeals recognized The Court of did not It that the State, rule in this until 1894 as to City Baltimore and un- “original writs”, 3. For a discussion of commencing mode of days England, development actions in the ancient of mod legislation ern forms of actions and the effect of Maryland pleading (5th the old see Poe on forms Practice 1925) Ed. §§ 54-58. counties, legal til as to the that the renewal of the unexecuted writ of from summons term to term with- any kept prevented out omissions the case and alive Or, reverse, applying "bar of limitations. if suit was period filed within the limitations thereafter expired, an limitations omission to renew the n unexecuted writ of n operated discontinuance

the action and the bar of limitations. 187 Md. at 37. The Court found that the statutes modified the n commonlaw rule only had times writ to be re- necessity reg- newed. Rather than the to renew the writ ularly from term to term without omissions until it was executed, required only the statutes that it be renewed succeeding day once to the next return from that of the n original words, summons. In other under the statutes writs did not have to reissue each term in order to re- asking. late back to the first So when an sum- mons was returned non est and its renewal to the next (cid:127)succeeding est, was returned non then when subsequent renewal, the writ was served on a it related asking, back to the time of the first and if this was with- period, in the limitation the statute of was no limitations proceedings. holding bar to further In so the Court rea- argument lized that the that an action should not be al- forever, lowed holding to continue may pro- that its result,4 “persuasive duce that had elements which are in line with principles justice,” well established but, .said, at “Nevertheless we are adopt unable to that thought It legislature view.” intention of the upon compliance statutes, could let his suit remain on the regular records without the re- writ, doing newal of the and in so he would lose none of rights previously acquired. he had It was led to the n conclusion that, might “however desirable it place be to some limitations on the time within which cases re- dormant, main we cannot now do judicial this belated among 4. The “two ests” statute was the causes for build up survey. in a of docket load found See Judicial Administra Maryland, Brune, Frederick tion in W. 16 M.L.R. *9 clearly- in Neel At The act.” 43. construction this out as set affirmed the common law rule the substance of agreed, in 2 Logan. In stated Hazlehurst and It as was Poe, 67, Pleading Practice, Ed., that the ob 5th § ject re “to of constant the was save the costs statutes newal, losing legal without effect the the Statute original did Limitations of the All the statutes suit.” requisite keeping suit, as a ease alive the was to by substituting any the common law rule two returns of original succeeding writ not at the executed two return days issued, after the first writ is common law requirement original writ unexecuted succeeding term, on, had to renewed to next and so break, without until the defendant found was and sum they patent moned. But no is went further. It summons would not be lie dormant if the original succeeding were writ not renewed to the next re day turn compli and returned “non est.” Such lack of statutory requirements ance operated with the as a dis (1951), 75, continuance action. Code Art. § repealed by 399, Acts Ch. 1.5 Editor § Maryland Rules in a note Rule 112 observed that provisions stated substance the repealed statute and change stated: “It would seem that no change intended.” If the Rule intended no from the sub statutory provisions, stantive the construction of stat ute in Neel controls the construction of the Thus Rule. Rule, it is clear that under the statute, under when succeeding the renewal to the orig next return inal unexecuted, unexecuted is summons it lies dormant. No discontinuance is effected the failure thereafter succeeding days renew the summons on and when subsequently renewed it relates back to summons. The result is that when there is compliance statute of limitations acts However, Art. 160 of the Code of Public § Local has Laws expressly repealed. appears, not been It as enacted in as § City, 22-64 Code Public Local Laws Baltimore Everstine (1969). *10 though period to action even the limitation

as no bar the finally original the expired summons and the between executed summons. change no from

Although it to the Editor that seemed there is distinc the statute intended public the Each the and Rule. tion between the statute general provided that the return the statute on local and * “* * executed, may same original the 7not writ6 renewed, day thereafter to the next return be * * returnable (emphasis supplied) But Rule 112a provides: party endorsed “Upon the to the return of renewed the Clerk as mat est, shall be the same day.” course, The to the next return returnable ter obligation imposed on sua no the Clerk statutes have writ; original appears it sponte unexecuted to the question effect when is the The what Rule does. the pro summons as unexecuted does not renew the the Clerk the it is in resolution this a of Rule and vided in the § panel majority part. I question that the by the tort commenced law in the action at Here for Prince filing in the Circuit a declaration Seitz, appellee-plaintiff, George’s County by L. William by the statute day have been barred it would one before given in the defendant was name of The of limitations.8 provide issuance of present rules 6. The writ: commenced, shall forthwith clerk action is “When an against defen- a summons thereon each course issue as of necessity any prayer without the State dant therefor, it the sheriff for service. deliver the first shall be made returnable at “The summons 103 b. directs, issuance, day if so or after its return at the day its issuance.” Rule 103 c. after second return any original writ not executed two returns of It after the 7. was lie dormant. that was damages personal injuries aris As suit was a claim of 8. alleged negligent acts, ing was three limitation from !|! * * * * * commenced, on case shall be years. sued accrued the declaration “All actions years from the time the cause action within three or issued ** According allegations Code, Art. *.” § April on by 1968 the cause of action accrued filed 18 negligent April driven in when an automobile manner 19 appellant by appellee. due care an automobile driven with struck Crosby Pricilla R. and her the declaration as address as Road, Riverdale, Maryland. A 5409-D sum- Riverdale April mons to her was on 18 directed issued Clerk Monday May, on returnable the first re- first turn after its issuance. Rule 102. Sheriff April it on 25 “Non Est” and endorsed notation Crosby “Pricilla 108 of the Moved.” Rule Rules of Court provides: of the Seventh Circuit Judicial promptly “The his Sheriff shall make process If Clerk the Court. has not been served, why the return shall state the reason *11 notify and the of Court shall Clerk forthwith accordingly.” counsel not appel- Clerk did renew the summons but notified by

lee’s May counsel process letter dated that had not why been served and informed him it had not been served. He please stated the letter: “You will issue written in- purpose structions to this for office reissue and service by the But Sheriff.” there were no written instructions to request or to Clerk reissue the summons until 18 time, appellee’s March Then for the counsel, first letter, requested the Clerk to “reissue service on Pricilla Crosby, R. Crosby also known as Pricilla Piersma, R. at Gulph Road, new Apt. King address: 606 Prussia, Pennsylvania. She now is married to Dr. Bernard J. Pi- ersma.” The Clerk issued a writ of summons to the Sher- County iff of Anne Arundel on 20 March 1969 for service Secretary State, Code, on the Art. 66§ and it — was served on that official.9 In posture this factual commencement of the action one before it would by limitations, by have barred been a declaration which gave the maiden name rather than the married name of the defendant and stated as her place address a from placed 9. On November 1968 the case had been on the stet petition Upon appellee docket. filed 26 March 1969 and order date, was the same it from the appellant’s removed stet docket and Crosby name was amended to read “Priscilla R. Also Known As R. Priscilla Piersma.” brief,

which, according appellee’s to she statement his. August years before, had moved in almost two appellee’s that notification the Clerk of counsel n ample non est in summons had been returned time it returnable next return for to be réissued at request day, comply to the failure Clerk’s purposes of written instructions for the reissue 10 months— summons and service the Sheriff for some required majority appellee did all that find that was sole him under Rule 112 the Clerk’s ob- because was ligation They hold to then reissue summons. duty to the renewal since it the Clerk’s to issue was day, he not do was im- next return the fact that did so They as the consider he should have done material. what done, equivalent he is should have of what since the summons it shall be considered renewed renewed Only by finding that should non est. what done, of uncon- have was in fact face been done done, can it be evidence that it in fact tradicted required by ests the two non considered that there were only permit lie And dormant. rule summons permitted lie dormant can the stat- if the is so not to the ac- remain tolled bar ute of limitations inescapable conclusion that sum- me it is an tion.10 To only after the party lie dormant mons to *12 prescribed. are not est as there of non When two returns I find law over. the common rule takes two such ests unambiguous only in manner which this to be present and Rule can language statute of the former leg- simply that construed; no indication there is be Appeals enacting law and islature in No alternatives adopting intended otherwise. the Rule out; exceptions are provisos are no given; set are no Neel, import of is the clear I that this And think made. point appellant the action raised the below that that 10. We note specially, summary by pleading by it limitations statute of was barred making for (a), by it basis of a motion 342, c, 2 asserting ground by for a for a di- motion judgment, and issue, general to no all avail. on the at trial rected verdict applied Logan Hazlehwrst; which I their believe that holdings, findings, permit and rationale no other result.11

Nor Ido believe that the can be construed in terms of assessment comply pro- for blame failure to with its degree considered, visions. And if of blame is to cer- be tainly appellant way in no to contributed the failure to obtain two non ests or to the to her. failure serve There nothing is attempt- record to indicate that she was ing service, or, fact, to evade any that she had knowl- edge proceedings of the through until service was had Secretary of State in March 1969. On the other hand appellee only brought the action one before it would original have been barred but knew that the sum- ignored mons had been spe- unexecuted and request give cific the Clerk instructions for its reis- suance which he compli- could have done and obtained ance with the provides: Rule. I note “Up- that Rule d request on of the an additional summons shall against any issue defendant,” appellee and so had au- thority request an simply additional I summons. can- not read into the Rule under the in this circumstances imposed case the sanction majority. general purpose of a statute of limitations is to prompt

insure Many assertion of a claim. states have sav- ing prevent perversion statutes to policy pur- pose of a statute of limitations. provide These statutes if an good action is “commenced” within time but is technicality dismissed some merits, unrelated to the example, improper venue was or the court jurisdiction, lacked “a brought new action within specified time, usually certain six year, months or a and that the second action is to be treated as a continu- first, ation being the effect that the stat- ute of suit, limitations tolled the first ineffectual avoid dismissal as it was.” Hillman, Bertonazzi v. Admx., 11 It Appeals seems that the Court of Jarrett, in Gore v. 513, 516, Md. appeal timely determined that an taken because of what a clerk in fact did rather supposed than what he was *13 neglected do in fact to do.

454 “designed 361, are to in-

241 Md. But 368. such statutes hearing right a in diligent sure the suitor court the * * * judgment im- till he merits. a on the reaches aid, invoking a that, by judicial portant is consideration litigant gives timely adversary present aof notice to his rights purpose courts. When maintain his before the has done, court that has a mistaken belief that the been jurisdiction plane any mis- other stands on the same * * * good the take A invokes in faith of law. suitor who proceeding justice, a aid of and who initiates court of process, held to commenced service must be have of meaning an of this statute action within [identical English of prototype, in act with its substance 16, 4], though forum.” 21 1 he has mistaken his Jac. c. § York, City (emphasis supplied) v. New Gaines of 594, 596, quoted approval Bertonazzi at N. E. in savings Maryland such a statute not enacted has here, appellee but even a statute would not benefit such diligent say any that he for I cannot event adversary. gave timely suitor notice to his who possibility of the Mr. not of Poe was unaware Although did renewing- he writ. not an unexecuted Clerk light that provision of a not matter in the consider the course,” “as matter the summons Clerk reissue perhaps that it was he did it with the idea consider duty writ without instructions Clerk the. obviously attorney. also felt: plaintiff’s He is “[I]t from that attorney see encumbent pos guard against duty performed, in order to such is injury consequent being neglected, sibility and the of its Bertonazzi, 370-371, Appeals at said 12. The English act, 1 c. § 21 Jac. the fourth 4, limitation section Maryland. “Kilty, Report his part law became proper (1811), ‘applicable English it as classified Statutes State, incorporated’ as did 2 Alexander’s into the law to be 1912).” (2 not the statute It did hold that ed. British Statutes 600 controlled applicable case before it but felt or posture case spirit. the instant I feel that in its factual followed its liberally or it was the literal terms within § does fall readily nor, dis- English Courts, since it construed _ spirit of factually tinguishable from is it within Bertonazzi 4. § *14 Poe, Practice, Ed., plaintiff.” Pleading the 5th may duty 67. That been the Clerk here have § ministerial, “wholly perfunctory” or “mechanical” or did attorney appellee responsibil all not divorce or from his ity timely of was see that the renewal the summons supply, by or mere issued the fact that the Clerk did not perform duty, required by returns est the two of non permit If the summons to lie dormant. permit 112 is to be eased to to lie dormant prescribed, for other reasons than now if the or rule respect appli law established in this State with cability changed, statute limitations is to it making power must be under the rule the Court of Appeals by legislative be, may or not action. It majority done, by judicial have our fiat. belated majority no need to rea- have consider other sons appellee why advanced as to should his action be barred I have them and limitations. considered find them without merit.

1) The Amendment the Declaration

It is correct that as of limitations had not elapsed commenced, when the action was the amendment respect declaration appellant’s name would filing plea not warrant of a though of limitations even statutory period intervened between time the cause of action accrued and making time amendment, change for the amendment did not the cause Lichtenberg Joyce, of action. See v. ap- 183 Md. 689. But pellee could not died, resurrect an action that had as this had, by amending one the declaration to the name of say, although the defendant. is to That the amendment ordinarily declara- have related back to the tion, prayed at the time the amendment and ordered already there had been a the action. In discontinuance of prevent amendment “the circumstance the could not being defense of the of limitations a bar to statute from the suit.”

2) The Stet

According the case was stetted to the docket entries original summons had been about months six after appellee Upon petition or- returned non est. docket” on 26 March dered removed from “stet reinstating Appellee the case for claims that the order disposition prevented plea of limitations. But in a valid my opinion had been a discontinuance the ac- there placing neither tion before the case was stetted *15 removing of on the stet docket nor the it there- the case it or isolate it from the effect of the from could resurrect statute of limitations.

3) Filing within Limitations Period The Suit of filing urges Appellee mere of the suit within required all that period of limitations was prevent of the statute of limitations- effect forever majority in accord that this was not and I are The jurisdic and is not now the rule in this common law rule an of action within the the commencement tion. While statute, tolls the limitations Vin applicable of see Palmer, when there is a discon 179 Md. cent v. again action, may the statute runs tinuance brought. action to a new serve as a bar Absconding 4) Debtor Statute The pertinent part that no' Code, provides 4 Art. § any of limitation of action the benefit person shall have Maryland any “after debt con- from himself who absents may uncertainty whereby at an creditor tracted argues Appellee finding person or his effects.” of out such appellant pleading limi- prevented from statute that this debt, applicable. There no not statute is The tations. Paper v. Union Mills And Mason see here contracted. Co., Mfg. 81 Md. Appeal to Take an Immediate

5) Failure from Summary Judgment the Motion Denial for right appellate her review of not lose Appellant did summary judgment for denial the motion when she appeal did not an from the order take immediate pro appeal denial. The order was and such would forma by prematurely have been us as and dis- treated taken missed. Rule 1. And while the have matter adjudicata been res considered trial court after denial, its propriety order order was sub- ject judgment against to review this Court after the appellant timely absolute, on trial of the merits became appeal question properly presented ap- taken and the on peal, as was here done.

I denying ap- would hold that the lower erred court pellant’s summary judgment motion for réverse the judgment appellee. favor agree

I majority with the 108 of the Seventh Maryland Judicial Circuit not inconsistent with emphatically 112. And I suggest would that henceforth George’s Clerk of County, the Circuit Prince only comply with the Seventh Judicial Circuit’s Rule Maryland but also with Rule 112a so that when the est, summons issued him is he it, day, returnable to the next return “as a matter course”, necessity any therefor, without the prayer *16 request or or instruction or otherwise from the plaintiff’s or attorney. And if the clerks of the other Maryland Circuit Courts of and the clerks of the various courts of Supreme City Bench of Baltimore are not complying now 112a, suggested they with Rule it is do so forthwith.