In this wrongful death action, Jean Pierrot appeals the trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice the count of his complaint against Osceola Mental Health, Inc., d/b/a Park Place Behavioral Health Care (Park Place).
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a question of law is reviewed de novo. Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co.,
Pierrot’s complaint alleged the following facts. Farrah Krystle Jean, a 25-year-old pregnant woman, went to a hospital in the afternoon with complaints of pain. That evening, the hospital “Baker Acted”
Park Place moved to dismiss Pierrot’s wrongful death claim, arguing that the claim was one for medical malpractice and that Pierrot had failed to comply with the presuit requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. These requirements include investigation by the parties and notice to the prospective defendant. See §§ 766.104, .106, .203, Fla. Stat. (2010).
On appeal, Pierrot argues that a plaintiff claiming only violations of a mental health patient’s rights under the Baker Act is not required to comply with the medical malpractice presuit requirements. Additionally, Pierrot contends that the presuit requirements do not apply to his claim because Park Place was not a health care provider. We agree with both arguments.
The presuit requirements of Florida’s Medical Malpractice Act restrict plaintiffs’ constitutional right of access to courts, so the requirements’ applicability must be construed narrowly in favor of access. See Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway,
First, Pierrot’s claim was not for medical malpractice. The primary test for whether a claim is one for medical malpractice is whether the claim relies on the application of the medical malpractice standard of care. See Weinstock,
In Integrated I, the plaintiff sued a nursing home, alleging a claim for violation of nursing home residents’ rights under section 400.022, Florida Statutes. The complaint alleged that the decedent suffered from pressure sores while residing at the nursing home. He ultimately had his left leg and right big toe amputated. The relevant portion of section 400.022 gave residents
[t]he right to receive adequate and appropriate health care and protective and support services, including social services; mental health services, if available; planned recreational activities; and therapeutic and rehabilitative services consistent with the resident care plan, with established and recognized practice standards within the community, and with rules as adopted by the agency.
§ 400.022(1)(Z), Fla. Stat. (1997). The nursing home moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff was required to comply with the medical malpractice presuit requirements. The Second District disagreed, holding:
[A] plaintiff who chooses to allege only a statutory claim under section 400.022 ... is not required to comply with the presuit requirements of section766.106.... Although there may be some overlap between the [section 400.022(1)(£) ] statutory right to “receive adequate and appropriate health care” and the common law claim for medical negligence, we conclude that the presuit requirements of chapter 766 must be narrowly construed to apply only to common law medical negligence claims and not to the separate statutory rights created by chapter 400.
Id. at 1109. The court explained:
Florida’s policies favoring access to courts ... weigh against interpreting the presuit conditions in chapter 766 to regulate statutory rights not mentioned in chapter 766. Nothing in section 766.106 compels this court to read that statute in an expansive manner to include claims filed under section 400.022(l)(i).
Id. at 1111. The Florida Supreme Court approved the Second District’s decision, agreeing that the presuit requirements did not apply because the claim did not rely on the medical malpractice standard of care. Integrated II,
Similarly, the Baker Act provides several statutory standards of care applicable to specific patient rights. See § 394.459, Fla. Stat. (2008). Pierrot’s claim against Park Place relies exclusively on these standards. Although there may be some overlap between the medical aspects of Baker Act patients’ rights and a cause of action for medical malpractice, the presuit requirements must be construed narrowly to apply only to malpractice claims, not to separate statutory claims.
Second, the trial court erred in dismissing Pierrot’s claim because Park Place was not a health care provider. A defendant is a “health care provider” for purposes of the presuit requirements only if the defendant is included within the applicable definitions of that term within the Medical Malpractice Act. See Weinstock v. Groth,
The presuit requirements are set forth in sections 766.104, .106, and .203. Sections 766.104 and .106 do not contain a definition of health care provider.
Section 766.203 is governed by the definition of health care provider in section 766.202(4). See § 766.202. Section
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
.Appellate jurisdiction is proper because the court dismissed the only count against defendant Park Place. Robert Granoff Corp. v. United First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Sarasota, Fla.,
. The Baker Act provides for involuntary commitment of persons based on mental illness. See Ch. 394, Pt. I, Fla. Stat. (2008).
. See § 394.459.
.Chapter 766.
. Although the Supreme Court limited its holding to claims under section 400.022, id. at 980 n. 9, we conclude that the same rule applies to claims under other statutory standards of care.
. Subsection (3) of section 766.104 references section 456.00 l’s definition of "health care practitioner.” However, subsection (3) references that definition not for the purpose of defining the types of defendants to which the plaintiff's presuit requirements apply, but for the purpose of defining the types of entities that must make available medical records of a decedent. In any event, section 456.001(4)'s definition does not include a mental health facility licensed under chapter 394, which is what the complaint alleged Park Place was here.