34 Wis. 389 | Wis. | 1874
Beyond the repetition of the language of the' condition itself, I do not well see how much, if anything, can be said in favor of the construction which I feel bound to put upon the policy. It strikes me as one of those plain propositions which are understood as soon as asserted, and need only to be asserted to be conceded. The question presented is altogether wide from those discussed and decided in the cases referred to by counsel, though much assistance is to be gained from those discussions in the consideration of it. The words of this condition differ very materially from the words of any of those under consideration in the decisions cited, and neither by the researches of counsel nor by our own has any case been found which presented the question here involved. The question here is not upon the meaning of the expressions, “ commit suicide,” “ take his own life,” “ die by his own hand,” or the like unqualified. ones contained in the various policies upon which the cases cited arose, but upon the construction of a condition much more restricted and particular in its language, and containing words which seem to have been introduced for the especial purpose of obviating the uncertainties and avoiding the interpretations which had been sometimes given to the more general expressions above quoted, and by some of the very decisions to which reference has been made by counsel. The question here is not, as in the cases cited, whether the general words above quoted shall or shall not be held to signify a felonious self-destruction or self-murder, for the reason that the language of this condition is so precise and guarded as to clearly and expressly exclude any such consideration. The language of the condition here is, “shall die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane.” The intention here manifested is so plain as to seem incapable of further explanation, and unless there is something in the
It seems very clear to my mind, therefore, that the construction and effect of the condition must be, the same as that which’ was given by the majority of the court to the exception in the policy in the leading case of Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr., 639 (44 E. C. L., 335); & C., 5 Scott N. R., 418, and 2 Bigelow’s Life and Acc. Ins. Cases, 280. That is one of the earliest, as well as one of the ablest and most exhaustively considered cases upon the subject. The language of the exception there was, “ or shall die by his own hands; ” and, the majority of the court held that it was not necessary, in order to bring the case within the exception, that the act of self-destruction should have resulted from a criminal intention or purpose, or that the jury should find that the deceased was feb de se, or guilty of felony, in order to exonerate tbe insurer; but that it was enough that it was “ the voluntary and willful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own
It has been suggested that the construction here given would necessarily lead to the denial of any claim under the policy, if the assured had come to his death in the manner or by any of the means supposed by way of illustration in Borradaile v. Hunter, and there considered as not falling within the intent of the exception; as for example, if his death had resulted from an act committed under the influence of delirium, as; if he had in a paroxysm of fever precipitated himself from a window, or, having been bled, removed the bandages, or had taken poison by mistake, and death in either case had ensued. It may be
It follows from these views that the court below erred both in its instructions and its refusals to instruct respecting the question first above discussed, and that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial according to law.
By the Court.— It is so ordered.