The appellant, Millicent Pierce, was indicted for the July 7, 1991, murder of her husband, Dr. Michael Pierce. Following a trial by jury, she was found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal follows the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial.
1. In her first enumeration of error, Pierce contends that the trial court erred in admitting her statement in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and OCGA § 24-3-50. More specifically, Pierce contends that the trial court erred in ruling that she had not invoked her right to remain silent. She contends that the invocation of the right was not scrupulously honored by the officers prior to the reinitiation of questioning which resulted in the incriminating statement. We disagree.
During the taped interview of July 7, 1991 at approximately 5:20 a.m., with Investigator Keith Lee and Officer Sharp-Parker, Pierce was informed of her right to remain silent and right to counsel, and she indicated that she understood these rights. She further admitted that she killed her husband. Immediately afterwards, she stated that she was in no shape to answer the questions that had been asked of her. The interrogation ceased at 5:27 a.m. after Investigator Lee asked Pierce to submit to blood and urine tests, which she agreed to do. The interrogation resumed at 7:40 a.m., and Pierce was again informed of her right to remain silent and right to representation, at which time Pierce again indicated that she understood these rights. Although Pierce at 5:20 a.m. refused to sign a written form acknowledging that she had been informed of her right to remain silent and right to representation, at 7:40 a.m. she acknowledged in writing that she had been informed of these rights.
During a police interrogation of a suspect, ‘“[i]f the (person in custody) indicates
in any manner,
at any time prior to or
during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.’ (Emphasis supplied.)”
Hatcher v. State,
In the case sub judice, the evidence shows that the officers ceased their questioning of the defendant shortly after she indicated that she was in no shape to answer the questions. However, “[w]e pretermit a determination whether [Pierce] equivocally or unequivocally invoked h[er] right to remain silent. We do so because we conclude that, even if [s]he did equivocally or unequivocally invoke h[er] right to remain silent, any error in admitting the [July 7, 1991] statement would be harmless, as” the statement was cumulative of the testimony given by Pierce at trial. (Citations omitted.)
Tankersley v. State,
2. Pierce further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Investigator Dewey Brown, the chief investigator with the DeKalb County Medical Examiner’s Office, in violation of OCGA § 17-7-211, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution of 1983,' Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I. Although OCGA § 17-7-211 (b) provides, in part, that a “defendant shall be entitled to have a complete copy of any written scientific reports in the possession of the prosecution which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant by the prosecution in its casein-chief or in rebuttal,” the testimony of the investigator was not admitted in the form of a scientific report as defined within the Code section. “It is well-established that the State is not required, under OCGA § 17-7-211, to furnish defendant with its expert’s notes, work product, recordation of data, internal documents, or graphs. [Cits.] Thus, it becomes necessary to distinguish between those documents beyond the purview of the statute and those scientific reports which must be provided to defendant if they are to be admitted into evidence. In determining what constitutes a ‘written scientific report’ it has been stated that the common element is that ‘each includes the examiner’s findings based on scientific analysis or his or her opinion.’ [Cits.]”
Roberts v. State,
“ ‘It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.’ [Cits.]”
Montgomery v. State,
4. Lastly, Pierce contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict. However, a directed verdict is warranted only “[w]here there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal or ‘not guilty’ as to the entire offense or to some particular count or offense. ...” OCGA § 17-9-1 (a). See also
Martin v. State,
Judgment affirmed.