9 Me. 54 | Me. | 1832
The opinion of the Court was delivered at a subsequent term, by
For the maintenance of this action the plaintiff relies on the sixth section of the act passed on the ninth day of March, 1832, entitled, “An Act regulating the survey of lumber in the county of Penobscot.” That part of the section on which the action is founded, is in these words : — “ And if any person, not "being the Surveyor general or one of his deputies, shall take an account of, or survey any of the aforesaid descriptions of lumber, sold or purchased as aforesaid, he shall forfeit not less than two, nor more than ten dollars for every ton of timber and every thousand feet of said other timber which he shall survey or take an account of.” The constitutionality of the act, and more especially of the above provision, taken in connexion with certain other parts of theP act, is denied by the defendant; and on the assumed ground of unconstitutionality', the defence has been placed. The first section provides that the Governor with advice of Council, may appoint some suitable person to be Surveyor general of lumber in the county of Penobscot, who shall reside at Bangor, and .appoint not less1 than ten deputies. The second and third sections require a division of lumber into four classes, and prescribe the mode of surveying. The fourth directs the mode of marking the several kinds; and requires that all lumber shall be received and sold according to such marks, and prohibits all persons from selling or purchasing any such lumber, within said county, unless surveyed and marked as aforesaid, excepting such as is purchased for home consumption. The sixth section contains, in addition to the above quoted clausg-on-which the present section is founded, the following provision,viz. “ that if any person shall sell or purchase any of the aforesaid descriptions of lumber, not surveyed and marked as this act pro
We have had several occasions for observing or considering the effect of Resolves, passed for the express purpose of granting some especial privilege to certain individuals, to which, by the standing laws of the State, they were not entitled; as appears in the cases of Holden v. James, ad'r. and Lewis v. Webb, cited by the counsel for the defendant; and also in Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; in all of which eases the Legislature was pronounced to have exceeded its constitutional powers. In the above case of Holden v. James, adm’r. a learned opinion was delivered by Jackson J. in which the subject of such legislation is luminously considered. He observes, “ It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages, which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that any one should be subjected to losses, damages, suits or actions, from which all others, in like circumstances are exempted.” The legislatures of Massachusetts and of this State, have repeatedly recognized the distinction between such resolves, granting personal privileges or exemptions to certain individuals by name, and laws of a local character of the kind before mentioned in this opinion. The former are considered as unconstitutional; the latter are not so considered.
But it has been urged that if such local legislation as that which is manifested in the act in question, is to be sanctioned, it will lead to dangerous consequences, and may be used for purposes of oppression or partizan management. The answer to this objection is, that the great political interests of the people are secured by express