423 Mass. 534 | Mass. | 1996
Lead Opinion
The plaintiffs, former at-will employees of the defendant corporation, seek damages based on their assertion that the defendant required them, as a condition of their continued employment, to work on Christmas Day in contravention of their “creed or religion as required by that creed or religion” in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A) (1994 ed.). The plaintiffs also claim entitlement to relief under G. L. c. 93, § 102 (1994 ed.) (Massachusetts Equal Rights Act). The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to liability. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendant’s motion and denied that of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their application for direct appellate review. We affirm the judgment for the defendant, although our reasoning differs from that of the Superior Court judge.
The following undisputed facts are established by the summary judgment materials: The plaintiffs were employed by the defendant as part-time parimutuel clerks at the Raynham-Taunton Greyhound Track. On December 18, 1992, the defendant posted a notice informing all regularly scheduled employees that they would be required to work on Christmas night, Friday, December 25, 1992. The plaintiffs were regularly scheduled to work on Fridays, but requested Christmas off to observe the holiday. The defendant denied their requests. The plaintiffs failed to appear for work on December 25. The parties differ as to whether they were “terminated” or “suspended.” In any event, they suffered “adverse action” for purposes of c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A).
“Church law forbids servile work on Sundays and holy days of obligation, but exceptions are made for those functions that are necessary for the well-being of society, or for those who must support their family or to maintain their livelihood.”
“Based on the authorities provided by the parties, [the motion judge] rule[d]” as follows: “Catholic dogma does not require worshippers to abstain from working on Holy days. The only requirement the church absolutely imposes upon its followers is to attend mass. Plaintiffs were not denied the opportunity to attend mass, and therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that they were forced to forgo a practice required by their religion. The fact that plaintiffs wished to further observe the Christmas holiday does not constitute a religious requirement. See Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., [397 Mass. 761, 772 (1986)]. As plaintiffs’ claim for violation of G. L. c. 15IB, [§] 4 (1A) fails, so too must their claims premised on G. L. c. 93, [§] 102.” (Emphasis in original.)
General Laws c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), provides in pertinent part the following:
*537 “It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice for an employér to impose upon an individual as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment any terms or conditions, compliance with which would require such individual to violate, or [forgo] the practice of, his creed or religion as required by that creed or religion including but not limited to the observance of any particular day or days or any portion thereof as a sabbath or holy day and the employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of such individual. . . . The employee shall have the burden of proof as to the required practice of his creed or religion.”
This court construed G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), in Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 771 (1986). We held, “The statute does not deal with the full panoply of religious beliefs, practices, preferences, and ideals. . . . The application of the statute is much more narrow. It prohibits an employer from requiring an employee, as a condition of employment, to violate or forgo the practice of her religion as required by that religion. It follows that the threshold showing an employee must make is whether the activity sought to be protected is a religious practice and is required by the religion.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 771-772. Later, in Kolodziej v. Smith, 412 Mass. 215 (1992), in which the plaintiff sought damages and other relief “on the ground that the defendants made her retention of employment conditional on her forgoing the practice of her ‘creed or religion as required by that creed or religion’ in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A),” id. at 216, we held that the judge in the Superior Court had correctly directed verdicts for the defendants on that claim. We reasoned as follows:
“In Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 771 (1986), we observed that this ‘statute does not deal with the full panoply of religious beliefs, practices, preferences, and ideals,’ but focuses instead on required religious practices. The plaintiff produced no evidence that the defendants’ condition for her continuing as controller, attendance at the seminar, required her to miss any religious service or to compromise her faith. There was no evidence that Roman Catholic dogma forbade her attendance at the seminar.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 221.
“To salvage the constitutionality of the statute it must be applied broadly to protect holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion. Applied in that manner, since the plaintiffs have proven that the dictates of their own consciences and their religious beliefs founded on those dictates prohibited them from working on what to them was the most holy day of the year, and since their employer fired them for refusing to violate their religious beliefs, they were entitled to summary judgment as to liability.”
No question concerning the constitutionality of c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), was raised in Lewis or Kolodziej. That question is presented to this court for the first time in this case. As we shall explain later in this opinion, we agree that G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4(1 A), as construed by this court in those cases, and as we construe it in this case, is unconstitutional. We do not agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the appropriate remedy is for us to interpret the statute as “protecting] holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion.” Instead, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ reliance on that statute, unconstitutional as it is, is unwarranted.
“[Statutes are to be construed so as to avoid an unconsti
General Laws c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A), declares unlawful an employer’s imposition on an employee of “terms or conditions, compliance with which would require such individual to violate, or [forgo] the practice of, his creed or religion as required by that creed or religion” (emphasis added). In order to construe 15 IB, § 4 (1A), as protecting “holders of all religious beliefs, not just those who follow the dogma of an established religion,” as urged by the plaintiffs, we would be required to ignore, that is, treat as surplusage, the words “as required by that creed or religion.” It is unlikely that the Legislature intended such a result. See Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85 (1946) (“None of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous . . .”). The effect of the quoted statutory language is to limit the application of the statute to persons whose practices and beliefs mirror those required by the dogma of established
We come now to our discussion of the constitutionality of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1A). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”
A statute that prefers one or more religions over another violates the establishment clause. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985). Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). Also, “in order for a belief to be a protected religious belief, it is not necessary that it be shared by an organized sect or church.” Kolodziej v. Smith, supra at 220. “If [religious] beliefs be sincerely held they are entitled to the same protection as those more widely held by others.” Dalli v. Board of Educ., supra at 758. Thus, G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), which distinguishes between (1) an individual’s sincerely held religious belief that is shared with others belonging to an organized church or sect and (2) a belief that is not similarly shared, violates the establishment clause.
General Laws c. 15IB, § 4 (1A), also offends the establishment clause by promoting excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Courts avoid such entanglement by abstaining from the resolution of controversies regarding religious matters. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
The plaintiffs rely on G. L. c. 93, § 102, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, as well as on G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A). In their brief, the plaintiffs do little more than assert in conclusory fashion that the judge in the Superior Court should have analyzed their c. 93, § 102, claim “under the more strict requirements of art. 2 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights].” The plaintiffs’ treatment of that issue is insufficient appellate argument. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
Judgment affirmed.
We need not consider or discuss the plaintiffs’ assertion that c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A), as we construe it, also violates art. 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting, with whom Liacos, C.J., and Greaney, J., join). Today the court unnecessarily declares unconstitutional a statute designed to protect the religious beliefs of workers in this Commonwealth. As a result, two women have been denied the chance to show that their sincerely held religious beliefs do not permit them to work on Christmas, and they have lost their jobs. Even more regrettably, workers in this Commonwealth have now lost an important State protection designed to preserve their religious beliefs against the unreasonable demands of employers. This unfortunate
The court cites generally correct principles of statutory interpretation, see ante at 538-539, but fails to apply them properly and ignores other applicable canons of construction. Rather than accepting a reasonable, constitutional interpretation of the statute, the court relies on a rigid and overly analytic interpretation of its words which disregards a manifest legislative objective to protect sincerely held religious beliefs.
The court is required to “indulge every rational presumption in favor of [the statute’s constitutionality]” (emphasis added). Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Indus. Accidents, 421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Lammi, 386 Mass. 299, 301 (1982). In 1971, in Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753 (1971), this court held unconstitutional the provisions of G. L. c. 76, § 15, which offered protection only to persons whose religious beliefs were sanctioned by a recognized church or religious denomination. The wording of G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (1A) (1994 ed.), differs from that of G. L. c. 76, § 15, which was held to be unconstitutional in Dalli. However, unlike G. L. c. 76, § 15, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1A), does not specifically limit its protection to adherents to “the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination.” It instead prohibits an employer from requiring an individual to violate or forgo the practice of his creed or
The court should assume that the Legislature in enacting the statute, did not embark on an exercise in futility, but rather intended that the statutory text reflect the teaching of the Dalli case and comply with the First Amendment and art. 2 to the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The statute should be interpreted, as the Legislature intended, to constrain religious intolerance and to provide broad protection to a person’s religious beliefs, as sincerely held by that person, whether officially approved by a recognized church or not.
The case should be remanded to the Superior Court for a determination whether the plaintiffs sincerely believed that their religion forbade them from working on Christmas.
The court’s opinions in Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761 (1986), and Kolodziej v. Smith, 412 Mass. 215 (1992), have not unconstitutionally interpreted G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4 (1A) (1994 ed.). Ante at 538. In Lewis, the court merely stated that to prevail, an employee must show that the activity sought to be protected (in this case, abstaining from work on Christmas night) is a religious practice and is required by a plaintiffs religion. Lewis, supra at 771. The court did not define a plaintiffs religion to mean only those beliefs and practices endorsed by officials of her church. Later, in Kolodziej, the court clarified the plaintiffs burden as one of producing evidence that the complained of employment practice caused the employee to miss religious services or compromise her faith. Kolodziej, supra at 221. While the court did note that “[t]here was no evidence that Roman Catholic dogma forbade her attendance at the seminar,” the court did not require such evidence as proof of the plaintiffs faith and this observation was not essential to the judgment in the case. Id.
Subsection 1A was inserted by St. 1973, c. 929 (approved Oct. 17, 1973).
Such a reading of the statute comports with Federal caselaw under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 703 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000&-2 (a)(1) (Title VII). See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-833 (1989), holding that Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987), all rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that his or her religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question not on consideration that each was a member of a particular religious sect or on a tenet of a sect forbidding such work. The Supreme Court, in Frazee, explicitly rejected the notion that to claim the protection of the free exercise clause one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization. Frazee, supra at 834. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74 (,1911) (noting that 1972 amendments to Title VII defined religion to include all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate without undue hardship).
Remand is necessary because there is a genuine factual dispute as to the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs that they must abstain from work on holy days. The plaintiffs allege in their affidavits a belief that Christmas is a holy day of obligation, that Christmas is the most significant occasion of the Church year, and that working on Christmas offends the requirements of their religion. The defendant, however, asserts in an affidavit that the plaintiffs have worked on other holy days of obligation, thereby questioning the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs.