*1 658 such, is to itself degree Court confine
As tо allowed, I appeal which the would to the question a supplemental I would issue Alternatively, affirm. simply of question on the permit briefing order and additional grant a beneficiary represents gift a of also change whether rules, and whether the special of Section 5601.2’s purposes required of what is interpretation erred its Superior Court a power attorney satisfy included in Section Notably, such matters were raised requirements. 5601.2’s appeal, they for allowance of albeit Appellants petition their order. way existing grant make their into the allocatur did not join this Chief Justice and Justice TODD CASTILLE opinion. dissenting 146 A.2d Piehl, PIEHL and William husband and wife v.
Linda CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Commonwealth Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania.
Appeal of: Commonwealth Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of 22, Argued Oct. 2008.
Decided Dec. 2009. Assembly argument can be advanced that the General in- reasonable "gift” in Sexton v. tended to define a the broadest sense of term. Cf. Cornett, (2006) ("The designation of 271 Va. 623 S.E.2d person insured, beneficiary policy gift is as under a life insurance though gift enjoyment post- revocable and its is even reasoning applies designation person poned. The same (citation omitted)). beneficiary of retirement benefits.” vested *3 Greeley Knorr, Howard Hopkirk, John G. PA Office General, Koons, Attorney R. Calvin for Harrisburg, Common- of Pennsylvania. wealth
Kwame Owusu Law Agyeman, City Philadelphia Depart- ment, City for of Philadelphia. Pierce, Berk,
Christine M. Philadelphia, Godwin Todd Linda and Piehl. William CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, BAER, EAKIN,
BEFORE: TODD, McCAFFERY, GREENSPAN, JJ.
OPINION Justice BAER. granted
We allowance of appeal this case to determine whether the Commonwealth Court by reversing erred the trial court and concluding that it should have permitted Appel- lees, (hereinafter “Piehls”), Linda and Piehl William plaintiffs below, to amend the to their complaint alleging negli- gence against the City Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania after the statute of limitations had expired to where, include the Department Transportation in the cap- tion, the complaint named the Commonwealth of Pennsyl- dеfendant, where, vania as a generally but complaint, (hereinafter the Department of Transportation “DOT”) was a defendant. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court properly allowed Piehls to amend the caption to their complaint to include DOT as defendant in the case. facts are as follows. On March Piehls com- present
menced the action filing complaint the Court of *4 Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The caption of the complaint City named the of Philadelphia and the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania as defendants.1 Next to the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania, in the caption, Piehls indicated its address Street, as follows: “1400 Spring Garden Philadelphia, PA 19130.” The of body 4, the in complaint, paragraph indicated as follows: Defendant, City Philadelphia
1. of was dismissed as a to the case by stipulation agreement parties and participant of the and is anot appeal the current to our Court.
662 Defendant, of the Com- Transportation of Department
4. (hereinafter to as “De- of referred Pennsylvania, monwealth Commonwealth”) agency is a with governmental fendant Street, Spring of at 1400 Garden place business principal PA 19130. Philadelphia, ¶
March, at with this noted Complaint keeping 4. DOT, referred to the of the complaint for shorthand Specifical- as “Defendant Commonwеalth.” that Piehl suffered the thereafter Mrs. ly, complaint alleged 13, 2003, ankles March injury in the form of two broken on an fell while slipped disembarking when she and SEPTA and Avenue Allegheny Aramingo near the corner of bus large of uneven Philadelphia stepping result onto alleged The further that roadway. portion design, because of the con- improper the incident occurred struction, it ap- and defects area where deterioration roadway to the had initiated but repairs that been peared Thus, to the the fall according complaint, never completed. the “the injuries negligence were result of resulting and their City and because of failure Defendants Commonwealth” here, area in to maintain the a safe condition. As is relevant Department the was served on both the Trans- the Attorney and the Office of General.2 portation 22, 2005, after March 2005 statute of On March the despite Piehls’ action the fact expired limitations tort charged the General with Attorney Office agencies pursuant such representing Commonwealth as DOT 732-204(c), § the Attorney to 71 the Office of P.S. an the complaint solely filed answer new matter to answer, of the Commonwealth.3 In the regarding behalf 8523(b) regard, 2. In this the Commonwealth Court noted that Section Code, 8523(b), requires § 42 Pa.C.S. that service of Judicial against process, аn action "be at the made principal being that is or local office of sued Attorney City Philadelphia, Piehl and at the office of General." v. (Pa.Cmwlth.2007). A.2d n. 2 court further noted that court, parties, argument agreed Appellants at oral before the Attorney their with both DOT and Office of served General. Id. 732-204(c), provides part: § P.S. relevant 3. 71 *5 defendants, referenced Attorney indicated “admit- General ted” to the reference to City Philadelphia as a defen- dant in 3. paragraph Regarding 4 of the paragraph complaint defendant, naming DOT as the Attorney General indicated that the allegations in this paragraph complaint “consti- tute conclusions of law to which pleading no ...” required and “to the extent that portions this could be paragraph construed as factual allegations, proof strict thereof is [ ] [ ] ¶ demanded at the time of trial.” March at Answer 4. The balance of the answer denied the allegations substantive regarding negligence set forth that were DOT, addressed to referred as matter, “Defendant Commonwealth.” In new the Attor- alia, ney Commonwealth, General inter that alleged, as a sovereign entity, was immune from pursuant suit to 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310.4
Thereafter, 20, 2005, on April the Attorney General filed “Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,” that it was asserting entitled tо judgment its favor based upon sovereign immunity in 1 specified § 2310. The Attorney Pa.C.S. recog- nized that the body DOT, a Common- defendant, wealth agency as a but noted that the Thus, named the Commonwealth Pennsylvania.5 it asserted (c) litigation; Civil Attorney collection of debts.—The General shall represent agencies.... the Commonwealth and all Commonwealth § provides: 4. 1 Pa.C.S. 2310 Pennsylva- Pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of nia, hereby it is declared Assembly to be the intent of the General employees acting and its officials and within the duties, scope enjoy of their sovereign immunity shall continue to immunity official except and remain immune from suit as the Gener- Assembly spеcifically al immunity. shall waive the When the General Assembly specifically sovereign immunity, against waives a claim employees brought only and its officials and shall be in such manner and in by such courts and in such cases as directed provisions (relating judiciary judicial procedure) of Title 42 (relating procurement) specifically or 62 unless otherwise author- ized statute. DOT, significance
5. The agency, of the need to name a Commonwealth enjoy suit is while the Commonwealth itself continues to *6 determining in relevant complaint is caption to only that caption and because to the lawsuit parties was in its favor judgment Pennsylvania, of the Commonwealth warranted, liability. immune from as it was to in opposition of law and memorandum response
In their
the pleadings,
for
judgment
motion
Attorney
General’s
DOT, a Common
intent was to sue
that their
Piehls noted
and
their
complaint,
in the
of
as indicated
agency,
wealth
inclusion,
and the
caption,
of
in the
that the omission DOT
an inad
Pennsylvania,
of
was
instead, of the Commonwealth
Further,
out that the
pointed
Piehls
clerical error.
vertent
did not
General,
complaint,
in
answer to the
its
Attorney
in
4 of the
paragraph
deny
allegation
specifically
therefore,
this
defendant,
they claimed
as a
naming
to Pa.R.C.P. No.
pursuant
admitted
was deemed
allegation
1029(b)
responsive plead
to which a
that averments
(providing
specific
when not denied
are deemed admitted
ing
required
is
DOT, who was served
Thus,
maintained that
ally).6
Piehls
General,
put
was
Attorney
with the
complaint along
with the
by
prejudiced
claims
it and was not
against
on notice of the
naming only
error of
the Com
typographical
the inadvertent
Finally, citing
Pennsylvania
caption.
of
monwealth
Bank
Philadel
Bata v.
National
our case of
Central-Penn
(1972),
Piehls noted that where
448 Pa.
The trial order dated by granted motion for on the Attorney judgment pleadings General’s 1925(a) Piehls’ In its complaint. opinion support dismissed decision, the trial court concluded that the its Common- wealth sued Piehls as set forth in the Pennsylvania, and, to their immune from suit there- complaint, was fore, in its favor was warranted. The court declined judgment to address whether amendment of the was appropriate as it not view such issue as within the encompassed did motion for on the judgment pleadings. Commonwealth’s however, this the court stated that it could not infer regard, *7 sued, Piehls’ intentions who have rath- regarding should been er, the that the against court conсluded suit was the Common- wealth, specified caption, and that the Common- wealth was entitled to dismissal of the suit against based upon immunity. Court, appealed
Piehls
to the Commonwealth
which re-
outset,
versed the trial court’s decision. At the
the court
noted
permits
that Pa.R.C.P. No. 1033
a
to correct the
party
name of an adverse party
pleading
or amend a
at
time
any
either by consent of the adverse
or
leave of court.7
party
by
amendment,
rule,
The court noted that
pursuant
to this
even after the
permitted
statute of limitations has run. Piehl
607,
(Pa.Cmwlth.2007).
City
Philadelphia,
v.
930 A.2d
court, likewise,
acknowledged the well-settled principle
that a new party mаy
brought
not be
into an action after the
statute of limitations has expired.
(citing
Id.
Cianchetti v.
(1976)).
Kaylen,
Pa.Super.
name of or amend his The amended happened aver transactions or occurrences which have before or filing original pleading, though they give after the even rise to a may new cause of action or An defense. amendment be made to pleading conform to the evidence offered or admitted. correct the name of a determining whether amendment to party is whether the was sued permitted right should wrong party a or whether the wrong designation,
but under
the amendment was
to substitute
designed
was sued and
v.
party.
(citing
another distinct
Id.
Pleasant
Gozdonovic
(1947)
Co.,
357 Pa.
Recognizing many permitting cases amendment expired after the statute of limitations has arose pleadings party’s in cases where a business to be designation sought changed,8 examining the court turned to cases where amend- ment involved the Commonwealth and its agencies.
First,
prior
the court examined our
decision in Tork-Hiis v.
Commonwealth,
(1999). There,
558 Pa.
The court then examined its own cases
amend-
ment to
pleadings where
Commonwealth is named and
seeks to
its
after the statute of
plaintiff
pleadings
amend
has run
name a
agency.
limitations
to
discrete Commonwealth
v.
Specifically,
prior
court considered its
decision Glover
SEPTA,
(Pa.Cmwlth.2002). There,
The final case that the Commonwealth Court examined was
Markets, Inc.,
its
in Hall v.
prior decision
Acme
110 Pa.
(1987).
Hall,
Cmwlth.
the same assets were before and after the amend- ment. *9 in the from the moment the suit litigation been involved Therefore, the court concluded that the omission filed. was a technical defect that could be caption DOT corrected. cases, examining
In
these three
the Commonwealth Court
Hall,
was more like
where it conclud-
concluded
this case
of the
after the statute of limita-
caption
ed that amendment
tions had run was the correction of a technical defect rather
rejected
of a new
The court
party.
than the addition
gov-
assertions that
and Tork-Hiis
Commonwealth’s
Glover
required
Spеcifically,
erned the case and
a different outcome.
Tork-Hiis,
distinguished
noting,
the court
inter
Glover
alia,
Glover,
that in
there was a
reference to
single
Tork-Hiis,
body
of the
and that
there was no
any
reference to
either the
agency
contrast, here,
or the
of the
body
complaint.
DOT was
body
named in the
of the complaint
continually
refer-
enced,
DOT,
by way of Piehls’ defined term for
“defendant
Commonwealth”,
throughout
complaint.
lines,
Along
rejected
these same
the court
the Common-
wealth’s argument
bright-line
that Tork-Hiis established a
rule that the
way
exclusive
to establish party
Instead,
status after the statute of
has run.
limitations
where,
here,
court сoncluded that
party
correct
is sued
(in
case by being
complaint)
this
referenced
(here,
wrong
but under a
to name the
designation
failing
agency of the
in the caption),
correction to the
Piehl,
name
party
should be allowed.
We the Commonwealth’s for allowance of to resolve the appeal question whether a which names the may Commonwealth as a defendant the caption amended substitute Commonwealth as a after the statute of run. question limitations has before us is one of first impression factually as our Court has never determined whether the to a be amend- complaint may *10 ed to include a where the Com- only Commonwealth in caption, monwealth was named the but where the agency named the body complaint and served with process. below,
In its as it did the advocates appeal, Commonwealth only complaint that the to a is relevant for purposes determining whether a has been sued and that the party mention of a in the party body complaint is irrelevant. The Commonwealth relies No. 1018 which upon Pa.R.C.P. mandates that the of a shall set forth the “caption complaint Thus, parties.”10 form of the action and names of all the where, here, argues the Commonwealth that Piehls named in the fact caption, Commonwealth that DOT was in the body complaint named is of no moment. this Tork-Hiis, our regard citing and decision the Common- DOT, it and agencies, wealth asserts that its various such as Thus, legal are distinct that are not parties interchangeable. DOT, argues the Commonwealth that Piehls’ failure to include a agency, discrete Commonwealth to its com- plaint prior to the of the statute of running limitations was fatal, Commonwealth Court erred in permitting stage, amendment at this which unfairly allowing resulted party addition of new to the lawsuit after the limitations period expired. had
Moreover, the argues permit Commonwealth that to amend- ment, here, as the Commonwealth Court did will lead to placing an undue burden on the by forcing it to investigate decipher any served complaint upon any determine whether parties might be add- ed as defendants in the future upon based information buried of a complaint. Such a result is unwarranted and entirety, provides 10. Rule its as follows: Every pleading court, caption setting shall contain a forth the name of the pleading. the number of the action and the name of the of a shall set forth form of the action and the parties, pleadings names of all the but in other it is sufficient to state the name of the first on each side in the with an appropriate parties. indication of other need not follow the rules of litigants that suggest
would drafting complaint. when procedure lines, these same the Commonwealth advocates Along decided, another case we Saracina v. case is similar to this Cotoia, (1965), plaintiff, where the 417 Pa. 208 A.2d Cotoia, minor, car Robert by was hit driven who Cotoia, Robert’s father as the incorrectly Anthony There, in her lawsuit. we concluded defendant her after the statute of could not amend plaintiff Anthony the name of the change limitations to defendant Robert, that thеre indications despite strong the fact were *11 Robert. complaint plaintiff in the that the intended sue the of the described the example, caption complaint For that of negligence alleged defendant as “a minor” and the was vehicle, was, fact, of the rather operator the who Robert Anthony. than We concluded that to allow amendment circumstances would amount to in a new and bringing these to the lawsuit after the limitations has period distinct run. assertions, the argue Commonwealth’s Piehls response the allowed amend- appropriately Commonwealth Court
ment of the of their to correct the technical caption where, here, to name in the failing defect DOT body complaint, named DOT the of its it served notice, prejudice with and no resulted to the Common- aware, wealth as Commonwealth was at the outset of the that DOT was named defendant the lawsuit. litigation, that the argue properly Piehls Commonwealth Court conclud- that our decision in a bright- ed Tork-Hiis did not establish only line rule that is relevant Rather, parties when to the lawsuit. Piehls determining Court deter- argue appropriately mined that amendment was warranted under these circum- was in the stances because DOT as a defendant from the outset of the lawsuit and that in the after the amendment include DOT statute of merely limitations was the correction of a technical expired defect.
671
before us involves whether
Com
The question
grant
reversed the trial court’s
erroneously
monwealth Court
judgment
pleadings.
motion for
on
of the Commonwealth’s
request
judgment
a court reviews a
The standard
which
on the
judgment
A motion for
on the
is limited.
pleadings
where,
averred,
facts
on the
granted
will be
pleadings
American
recovery
possible.
no
says
certainty
law
with
Inc.,
473,
Pa.
769
Real Estate
564
Appliance
Mgmt.,
v. E.W.
444,
(2001).
law,
concerns a
question
A.2d
446
As this issue
is de
pleadings
on the
entry
judgment
our review of the
id.;
Assembly,
v.
Stilp
novo. See
(Pa.2009).
491,
A.2d
500
judgment
pleadings
It is fundamental that a
are unknown or disputed
not be entered where there
should
Co.,
Waverly
of fact. North
Coal Co. v.
Oil Works
issues
Star
(1972).
The court must treat the
447 Pa.
As the trial court pleadings appropriately granted by on the *12 not include because the to Piehls’ did and, the the is according to the to a determining parties relevant for of lawsuit. purposes disagree. We that, requires it is true that Pa.R.C.P. No. 1018 “[t]he
While of a shall set forth the form of the action all No. 1033 states parties,” and the names of Pa.R.C.P. eithеr filed consent of the adverse or party, by party “[a] action, court, at time the form of by may any change leave of the name amend his party pleading.” correct of or 1033, to Rule should be lib pursuant
Amendment unless there is erally granted any stage proceedings at party. to an adverse resulting prejudice an error of law or 306, Pa. 461 Allegheny Hospital, v. 501 A.2d Connor 672 (1983).11
600, prejudice, 602 The “must be more than a mere detriment to the any request- other because amendment certainly designed strengthen ed will be the legal position of amending party correspondingly posi- and weaken the Inc., tion party.” MacGregor Mediq of adverse v. 221, (1990). 1123, Pa.Super. 576 A.2d has Our Court following noted the amendment of the regarding pleadings: All they amendments have this common: pleadings] [of are offered later in time pleading they than the which seek If the allegations amend. amendment contains which would have been allowed original pleading inclusion (the case), question usual then the prejudice presented the time at by which is offered rather than substance of what is offered. The possible prejudice, words, other must stem fact from the that the new allega- tions are offered late rather than in original pleading, and not from the fact that the opponent may lose his case on the merits if the pleading is allowed....
Bata v. Central-Penn Nat’l Bank Philadelphia, 448 Pa. (1972) James, 293 A.2d (quoting Fleming, from Jr., (1965)). Civil Procedure 158 A plaintiff may prevented amending complaint once the statute of limitations has when such expired amendment would add a “new and distinct to the party” case. Torkr-Hiis. noted,
As
the Commonwealth claims that the addi
tion of
caption,
DOT the
to the
amounted
addition of a new
Tork-Hiis,
party, just
and, therefore,
distinct
as in
trial court’s
grant
its motion for
judgment
pleadings
Tork-Hiis,
was appropriate.
earlier,
as noted
we conclud
ed that a complaint naming only the Commonwealth could not
be amended to include a discrete
after the
statute of
expired.
limitatiоns had
We reasoned that
the Common-
pursuant
keeping
11. Liberal amendment
to Rule 1033 is in
with general
procedure,
requiring
rule of
Pa.R.C.P. No.
rules
"[t]he
liberally
just,
shall be
speedy
inexpensive
construed to secure the
every
proceeding
they
determination of
action
applica
or
to which
are
eveiy stage
any
proceeding may
ble.
court at
such action or
*13
disregard any
procedure
error or defect of
which does not affect the
rights
parties.”
substantial
of the
same,
are
agencies
wealth and its
not one and the
but rather
separate
constitute distinct and
entities that are not
legal
Thus, an
of the
can-
interchangeable.
agency
Commonwealth
not be substituted into
lawsuit for the
after
the limitations
run
in
period has
as this would result
which,
turn,
party,
addition of a new
in
would result
in
to the
prejudice
Regarding prejudice,
Commonwealth.
and in
rejecting
lower court’s conclusion that an
agency
Commonwealth could be
substituted
the Commonwealth
after the limitations
fact
period
money
based on the
that their
noted,
flows from the same asset
we
pool,
case,
this were the
then an
aggrieved party
[i]f
a suit
involving
merely
commonwealth
would
need to
agency
name the immune commonwealth or an unascertained John
Doe
party and not
concerned with
determining
correct party to sue even after the statute of limitations had
run.
aggrieved party’s
counsel would be under no
to act with
compulsion
diligence
determining
due
correct
party, regardless
fact that the correct party
would have neither notice of the suit nor repose from it.
Tork-Hiis,
Here, however, unlike the facts discrete enjoy that does not the same sovereign immunity as the was named body of the was served with Moreover, process along with the Commonwealth. we cannot prejudice conclude that will result to the Commonwealth if General, amendment is permitted because the Attorney who is charged representing DOT, with both the Cоmmonwealth and served, but, was aware of being suit and DOT, rather than enter an on behalf appearance chose to addition, on behalf of the appear solely Commonwealth. the Attorney sought to have the case dismissed ground non-substantive technical rather than on the merits of Likewise, court, against the claims the trial DOT. rather than Piehls’ motion to considering amend its to correct the pleading technical error of failing name DOT also caption, disregarded request and, instead, Piehls’ for amendment *14 the the We conclude that judgment pleadings. on
granted in this reversed the trial court properly Court where, as have been permitted as amendment should regard here, of the body complaint, was named DOT entity charged with process with and where was served was aware of its status as defendant representing DOT the lawsuit. Court, the facts of this case by
As found the Commonwealth Tork-Hiis, are where distinguishable lawsuit, in the in both the was the defendant named there was no body complaint, way and the and to determine which discrete for the Commonwealth Common- Thus, in any, sought if to sue. agency, plaintiffs wealth Tork-Hiis, proper party it was clear that the was not sued therefore, and, to be permit party amendment to correct the suit after the limitations had run would period added to Here, DOT, appropriate. equally not be clear was named at the outset of the lawsuit in the party, correct merely and that amendment to correct omitting the technical defect of in the appropriate.
Contrary argument to Commonwealth’s further that our decision Saracina dictates that amendment should not have we conclude that such decision is consistent permitted, been There, supportive our decision this case. as indicat- previously, plaintiffs request ed we denied the to amend her vehicle, incorrectly where she named the owner of a Cotoia, Anthony as the defendant in a lawsuit which she vehicle, from the driver of the who was sought damages son, Robert Cotoia. the fact that it was Anthony’s Despite Robert, that the fairly plaintiff obvious intended to sue we her to amend after the statute of limitations request denied that to noting had allow amendment would expired improperly plaintiff party add new and distinct after the permit had In this we further period expired. regard, limitations that, right because the was not into the brought noted from the outset as the result of service of process, suit defendant could not be made. change designated Spe- we noted: cifically,
If the was in court as the result of service of right party and it was his or its which was process merely designation to be we would be sought changed, prone permit Hоwever, in the case at bar service was made amendment. defendant, ... “Anthony Cotoia the within named ... an handing copy true attested his father adult ” household, at place member of his his of resident [sic].... *15 The return in way no indicates that Robert Cotoia was properly served and is now before the Court.
Saracina,
Here, Saracina, unlike in Piehls named DOT as a defendant and, throughout the importantly, more served with process. Although DOT DOT did not file an answer, as the Attorney appeared only on behalf of Commonwealth, Piehls, nevertheless, in the included DOT Thus, lawsuit from its inception. presumably, right party was included the suit from the outset upon based Piehls’ inclusion of in the body DOT and from having served with process. DOT
Under liberal policy permitting plead- amendment to case, under the ings, and facts of this we conclude that the Commonwealth properly permitted Court Piehls to correct the technical defect failing to name in the to its DOT complaint where in the complaint DOT and served with process. reasons, For the foregoing we affirm the order of the permitting Court Piehls amend complaint. to their CASTILLE, TODD,
Chief Justice Justices McCAFFERY join opinion. and GREENSPAN
Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion. a dissenting
Justice EAKIN files opinion. SAYLOR, dissenting. Justice position favoring bright-line I Mr. Eakin’s support Justice appropriate rule to name an requiring parties of a when defendant or defendants money damаges against sovereign actions for pursuing has manifested its clear intent entity. Legislature public by providing statutory sovereign fisc protect immunity only targeted immunity exceptions and crafting § see 42 agencies, relative Commonwealth Pa.C.S. intention such by construing this Court has honored this See, Dean v. exceptions narrowly. e.g., Dep’t (2000). 503, 508, 561 Pa. 751 A.2d In Transp., case, majority of this I with the agree circumstances there is a fair likelihood that PennDOT was on actual notice of arena, it. Appellees’ proceed against intention to this however, I not an support fashioning do evaluative when determining timely scheme of who has failed to necessary name a Commonwealth defendant nevertheless can proceed against sovereign. EAKIN, dissenting.
Justice
*16
I
the learned
adopt
Judge Simpson’s dissenting opin-
would
ion
disposition
Commonwealth Court’s
of this matter.
(Pa.Cmwlth.
City
Philadelphia,
See Piehl v.