48 Ga. App. 232 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1933
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff sued the defendant hospital for damages because of the alleged negligence of one of its nurses, by which plaintiff was injured. The defendant contended that, the plaintiff having been injured in an automobile wreck and being in the hospital for treatment, the fact that it had negligently treated her would
The proper decision of this case hinges on the question, what was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff by reason of certain burns inflicted upon her, — that is, whether it was the negligence of the original wrong-doer or the intervening negligence of the defendant hospital that caused her injuries. In such a case the question of what was the proximate cause of an injury is generally a question for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case, upon proper instructions from the court. Sparta Oil Mill v. Russell, 6 Ga. App. 293 (4), 296 (65 S. E. 37); Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530 (4), 537 (106 S. E. 585); 22 R. C. L. 148, 150, §§ 31, 32; Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (24 L. ed. 256). To warrant a finding that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence, and that it ought to have been foreseen, in the light of the attending circumstances. Hardwick v. Figgers, 26 Ga. App. 494 (106 S. E. 738). A prior cause can not be made the basis of an action because it furnished the condition and gave rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, where there intervened an unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, it will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury. St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 139 U. S. 223 (11 Sup. Ct. 554, 35 L. ed. 154); Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176 (19 L. ed. 909); Perry v. Central R. Co., 66 Ga. 746; Montgomery v. East Tenn. &c. Ry. Co., 94 Ga. 332 (21 S. E. 571); Henderson v. Bade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 (28 S. E. 251, 40 L. R. A. 95); Central Ry. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176 (32 S. E. 77, 43 L. R. A. 402, 71 Am. St. R. 246); Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (42 S. E. 395, 59 L. R. A. 109); Mayor &c. of Unadilla v. Felder, 145 Ga. 440, 444 (89 S. E. 423); Bowers v. Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App. 367 (73 S. E. 677); Spires v. Goldberg, supra; Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Reese, 28
The doctrine that “Where one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of the negligence of another exercises reasonable care in securing the services of a competent physician or surgeon, and his injuries are thereafter aggravated or increased by the negligence, mistake or lack of skill of such physician, the law regards the negligence of the wrong-doer in causing the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent or unskillful treatment thereof, - and holds him liable therefor” (note, 8 A. L. R. 507), is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the instant case the plaintiff was injured by reason of an automobile collision. She suffered severe injuries, including an injury to her vertebra. She was removed to a hospital, where she was treated by her physician. This physician prescribed treatment of her spine with an electric pad, and instructed the nurse, of the
Applying the above principles, the court did not err in overrul
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
Counsel for the plaintiff in error insist that the decision of this court in this ease is in conflict with its decision in Edmondson v. Hancock, supra. It will be noted that the present case was one by the plaintiff for separate and distinct injuries to her caused by the alleged negligence of one of the defendant’s nurses, and was not one seeking recovery for any aggravation of her original injuries caused by the negligent conduct of the defendant hospital, or any pain and suffering flowing directly or indirectly from the original injuries received by her in the automobile accident. The judge in his charge to the jury specifically limited the plaintiff to a recovery for injuries caused by the burns inflicted upon her, and expressly stated that the defendant would not be liable for any injuries resulting directly or indirectly from the automobile accident or for any aggravation of the original injuries caused by the defendant’s negligent treatment thereof. He charged them that the release executed by plaintiff was a satisfaction of all injuries caused by the automobile accident, and that she could only recover for the injuries caused her by the burns. We think that the present case is clearly distinguishable from the authorities relied on by the plaintiff in error. It could hardly be said that, if it were not for said release signed by the plaintiff, she could have maintained an action against the person injuring her in the automobile accident for the injuries sustained by her by reason of said burns. In the opinion in this case, where this court said "There was no question of a separate independent injury by the hospital, and an action to recover for such injury alone brought by the injured person,” this court was referring to the case just previously referred to in the opinion, to wit the Edmondson case, and was not referring to the case at bar. In fact in the case at bar it was solely a question of a separate independent injury by the defendant hospital, and an action to recover therefor alone brought by the injured person.
Plaintiff in error contends that this court overlooked the fact that a demurrer to the amendment to its answer, in which it set up that the plaintiff had signed a release which was in satisfaction of all injuries sustained by her, directly or indirectly caused. by said
Rehearing denied.
