86 S.E. 187 | N.C. | 1915
After stating the case: The court held that this was a sale of goods by sample, ignoring the express terms of the written contract, which warranted that the goods would be of a certain kind, or caps, that (383) would fit any Mason jar. The prior negotiations of the parties were merged in the written contract, which provided that the sellers would ship the goods "on terms and conditions specified below," one of which was that the caps would fit any Mason jar, and another is, that "No promise or agreement is valid unless specified on this order," and still another, that "No salesman has authority to alter terms or conditions printed on this contract, or to promise anything that is not printed on our contracts." This was the contract, and the only one between the parties recognized by the plaintiff. It is well settled that where parties have reduced their contract to writing, the written instrument itself is the exclusive evidence of it, and neither of the parties will be permitted to vary or contradict its terms by parol. 9 Cyc., 763; Moffitt v. Maness,
There was some evidence of the breach of the contract or condition that the caps would fit any Mason jar. It is stated in the record that plaintiffs' witness "proceeded to seal the jars in question with the White Crown jar caps sold by the plaintiffs," but this expression is not very clear, and he may have referred, and perhaps did refer, to jars known as Mason jars and of the same kind as those kept by defendants in their stock for sale, and did not intend to say that he fitted the caps to the particular Mason jars which defendants then had in stock. But whatever his meaning was, and whether or not the caps used by the witness did fit the jars also used by him, which is not clearly made to appear, there was some evidence that the caps shipped to defendant did not fit the Mason jars in defendants' stock, as plaintiffs sent out a lot of samples, upon the implied representation, at least, that they corresponded exactly with those to be shipped, and for the purpose of testing the truth of their representation or warranty that those to be shipped would fit any Mason jars.
But apart from this consideration, it is not to be assumed that every sale where a sample is shown is a sale by sample. There must be an *450
understanding of the parties, express or implied, that the sale is by sample. Tiffany on Sales, p. 174. The Court in Gunther v. Atwell,
There is evidence in this case that the caps were used by plaintiffs' agent in the beginning of this transaction, not for the purpose of selling other caps by them as samples, but for quite a different purpose, and that was to demonstrate to the defendants that the White Crown caps would fit any Mason jar. This will appear from the testimony of defendants' witness N. T. Peele, who said: "Plaintiffs' salesman represented that the White Crown jar caps sold by the plaintiffs, as jobbers, would fit any Mason jar. He then and there proceeded to demonstrate this fact by sealing a number of Mason jars taken from defendants' *451 stock with the White Crown jar caps in his possession. After witnessing the demonstration aforesaid, defendants' employee, N. T. Peele, signed an order on a printed order form in which the terms and conditions of the purchase were set forth." But when the sale is by sample, it is implied in law that the bulk shall correspond in kind and quality with the sample, and the reason for this implication is that there is no opportunity for a personal examination of the bulk. (385) Tiffany on Sales, p. 174. There was evidence that the caps exhibited and used by plaintiffs' agent for the alleged demonstration of their quality and fitness for the particular use mentioned at the time did not correspond with the standard of comparison so used, for the plaintiffs' witnesses testified that many of the caps sent out by the plaintiffs were tried on the Mason jars of the Ball Brothers type, which were carried in defendants' stock of goods, and they did not fit, nor would they seal perfectly or as the agent of plaintiffs represented they would.
The demonstration by plaintiffs' witness at the trial may have been very impressive, and (perhaps) convincing, but its weight as evidence was for the jury, and, besides, it should not have been considered to the exclusion of other evidence in the cause.
In this state of the evidence we are of the opinion that there was a conflict, and it was erroneous to charge the jury that, even if they believed the evidence, their verdict should be for the plaintiff.
There was error, therefore, in the trial of the case.
New trial.
Cited: Anderson Co. v. Mfg. Co.,