623 S.E.2d 227 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2005
Pickle Logging, Inc. sued Georgia Pacific Corporation (“G-P”) and Bud Sheffield, a G-P employee (collectively, “the defendants”), for fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of an oral contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Pickle Logging appeals. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
So viewed, the evidence shows that, on May 1, 1998, Pickle Logging and G-P executed a written “Logging and Hauling Contract”
After executing the agreement, Pickle Logging undertook logging operations for G-P on various tracts of land pursuant to purchase orders. The record further shows that, at some point, G-P began preparing property in Providence Canyon known as the Ingram & Legrand (“I&L”) tract for harvesting and logging. One particular section of the I&L tract consisted of steep and difficult terrain on which to conduct logging operations.
In August 1998, John Pickle, the sole shareholder and president of Pickle Logging, met with Bud Sheffield, a G-P foresting harvester, to discuss the I&L property. According to Pickle, at the time of the meeting, his company had been trying out or “demo-ing” a new wood chipper, but had decided to return it. Sheffield asked him about the chipper, and Pickle responded that he did not intend to buy it. Sheffield suggested that Pickle use the chipper to cut the hardwood on the I&L property. Pickle declined, stating that he could not make money cutting wood “in that place,” which he referred to as the “hell hole.” Sheffield then asked Pickle what he would need to make logging operations on the I&L tract lucrative. Pickle responded that if Pickle Logging could haul 60 loads of pine a week for G-P, it would consider working on the I&L tract.
According to Pickle, Sheffield ultimately agreed that G-P would accept 60 loads of pine and 50 loads of hardwood per week in exchange for Pickle Logging working on the steep slope near the canyon on the I&L tract. The pine would be cut from other “timber budget tracts.” Pickle testified that Sheffield then confirmed the deal with Doc Skipper, G-P’s group procurement manager for the Cedar Springs mill, and Skipper indicated that the mill could accommodate the volumes discussed. Pickle believed that the agreement regarding 60 loads of pine per week was “an ongoing permanent deal.” In reliance on Sheffield’s assurances that G-P would accept these volumes, Pickle Logging purchased additional logging equipment, including the chipper.
Almost immediately after Pickle Logging commenced work on the I&L and timber budget tracts, G-P began refusing to accept the
Citing G-P’s refusal to accept the specified volumes of wood, Pickle Logging sued the defendants in August 2002, asserting theories of fraud, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. Each claim revolves around the alleged oral agreement that “if Pickle Logging would cut hardwood [on the I&L tract] at the minimum rate of 50 loads per week, [G-P] would authorize Pickle Logging to cut a minimum of 60 loads of pine per week on level ground.”
The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment on all counts, asserting that no oral agreement existed or — at best — was terminable at will and that the written L&H Contract, which could not be orally modified, imposed on G-P no obligation to accept any particular amount of wood from Pickle Logging. The trial court granted the motion, and Pickle Logging appeals.
We find no error.
The record shows that, even if the parties reached an oral agreement in August 1998, it was indefinite as to duration. Pickle testified that the oral arrangement for logging and hauling services would be “an ongoing deal... permanent work.” He assumed that the agreement would last at least until the I&L tract was harvested, which had to occur within two years because G-P only had a two-year lease on the tract. Such assumption, however, does not establish a definite period of employment,
A jury issue on whether a contract is terminable at will may be created by evidence that the parties agreed to continue an employment relationship through completion of a particular project.
Although Pickle’s affidavit arguably establishes a time limitation as to Pickle Logging’s work with respect to the I&L hardwoods, it does not address the work on G-P’s pine timber, which, Pickle hoped, would continue “at least until [the] I&L [work] was through.”
Moreover, Pickle Logging’s promissory estoppel and fraud claims relate directly to promises surrounding the terms of the alleged oral agreement. And “the principle of promissory estoppel has no application where the promise relied on was for employment for an indefinite period.”
Judgment affirmed.
See Anderson v. Med. Center, 260 Ga. App. 549, 550 (580 SE2d 633) (2003).
See id.
Although the trial court based its summary judgment ruling on grounds other than those discussed below, a ruling right for any reason will he affirmed. See Murphy v. Berger, 273 Ga. App. 798, 801 (1) (b) (616 SE2d 132) (2005).
Ford Clinic v. Potter, 246 Ga. App. 320, 322 (540 SE2d 275) (2000).
See OCGA § 34-7-1.
See Johnson v. MARTA, 207 Ga. App. 869, 870 (1) (429 SE2d 285) (1993).
See Jones v. Destiny Indus., 226 Ga. App. 6, 9 (3) (485 SE2d 225) (1997).
See id. at 8-9.
See Atlanta Dairies Cooperative v. Grindle, 182 Ga. App. 409, 410 (1) (356 SE2d 42)
See Lineberger v. Williams, 195 Ga. App. 186, 187-188 (1) (393 SE2d 23) (1990).
(Emphasis supplied.)
See Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Croley, 263 Ga. App. 659, 662 (1) (588 SE2d 840) (2003).
See id.; Johnson, supra at 870-871.
(Punctuation omitted.) Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 230 (3) (599 SE2d 158) (2004).
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 230 (4).
See id. at 230-231 (3)-(4); see also Simpson Consulting v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga.
