17 Vt. 470 | Vt. | 1845
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The rules of pleading, in the action of account, were correctly laid down, we think, in the case of Bishop v. Baldwin, 14 Vt. 145.. If the rule there laid down admits of any farther qualification, than the exception there named, it does not now occur to us. It is there said, that “ what may be pleaded in bar must be so pleaded,” and that “ all defences, which might be pleaded in bar, if not pleaded.are considered as waived,” — which are only identical propositions in different terms. It is there determined that the judgment to acccount establishes all the facts in the declaration, except the defendant’s being in arrear. See Taylor v. Page, Cro. Car. 116, as fully confirming the rule laid down in Bishop v. Baldwin.
This, then, would seem to be the only inquiry in the 'present case, — Was the defendant in arrear to the plaintiff at the time of the accounting before the auditor ? This is, I am aware, almost precisely the same inquiry, which might have been raised, before the court and jury, upon a plea of plene computavit, but not precisely the same, perhaps. The defence of plene computavit seems to rest, upon the ground of an express settlement of the dispute and the surrendering of all the property pertaining to the trust, while that of nothing in arrear goes upon the ground that there is nothing now in the defendant’s hands, which he is liable to account for. This
There seems to be no question in the case, except as to the Towanda money received of Chickering.. There is no pretence for charging the defendant with the note of Chickering, taken for the balance of the former note; — for it is as good as the former note, to that amount, and it was accepted by the plaintiff, and was treated as his own up to the time of the trial before the auditor. In regard to the Towanda money, we think the defendant is not in arrear. The obligation of the defendant, in regard to the matter, must be according to the contract, as he understood it. He was only bound by the contract according to his own understanding, unless there was fraud, or some fault on his part, in not comprehending the plaintiff’s instructions, — which is not shown, and will not be presumed. Perhaps it ought, rather, to be supposed that the plaintiff was deficient, in not fully expressing his meaning. Taking the defendant’s obligation in this sense, it seems to us, that he cannot be made liable in this action.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendant, upon the report