This сause comes to us upon petition to transfer from the Appellate Court under Rule 2-23, the Appellate Court opinion appearing in
The cause of action arises out of an accident resulting from the operation of аn automobile striking a tractor on a highway. The trial was had by jury and a verdict returned for the defendants-appellees аnd judgment entered accordingly. Error assigned by the appellant-plaintiff is the overruling of the motion for a new trial. One of the specifications therein was that the court erred in sustaining an objection defendants made to a question propounded by the plaintiff-appellant during the cross-examination of a witness called on behalf of the defendants. The ruling the judge made excluded the answer of the witness. On direct examination the witness was asked whether or not he had made an inspection of the brakes of the automobile on behalf of the defendants. His answer was “yes.” On cross-examination, aрpellant’s counsel asked: did you do this inspection for the defendant; did you ever talk to her about it; did you ever point оut to her you thought she should have the brakes repaired? In each instance the answer was “no.”
Finally the appellant asked the question:
“Q. And who paid you to do this inspection?
“MR. HATFIELD: To which we object. Emрloyment was made on behalf of the defendant; the inspection was made on behalf of the defendants.
“COURT: We will have а short recess. Jury will leave the Court room.
Following the recess, when court was reconvened, the court stated:
“COURT: The сourt is going to make this ruling. He is going to instruct counsel not to ask any questions in this *451 cause which would elicit from the witness that there is insurance involved in this case.”
Following this statement, the attorney for appellant, Mr. Clouse, asked:
“The court sustains the objections?”
“The court will sustain the objection to the last question.”
Appellees contend that all the jury was entitled to know was that the employment of this witness was оn “behalf” of the defendant, and that it would have been improper for the witness to have given the name of any insurancе company that paid him for his services.
It has long been the law in all jurisdictions of which we are aware that a witness may рroperly be cross-examined with respect to his interest in the litigation in question. He may be cross-examined with reference to his motives, his feelings, friendly or unfriendly towards the parties or other witnesses involved, his employment by either of the parties or some third party, and the contractual relationship with reference to his interest in the litigation and any financial сonsiderations that might have influenced him. 30 I.L.E., Witnesses, § 214.
The appellant cites
Swanson
v.
Slagal, Administratrix
(1937),
It is well settled that evidence of whether or not a defendant carries liability insurance is not admissible оr relevant to the ease in and of itself, and such evidence normally is prejudicial.
Martin
v.
Lilly
(1919),
*452
*451
In
Miller
v.
Alvey
(1965),
A very good example of this situation is the case of
City of Terre Haute
v.
Deckard
(1962),
“It has been suggestéd by appellant in the case before us that it might have been inexрedient for appellant City in the trial of the instant cause before a jury to have offered proof of the pоlicy of liability insurance insuring the City from liability for damages up- to $10',000, as this could have prejudiced the jury.
“However, evidence material to the establishment of a cause of action or defense cannot be considered improper or inadmissible simply because it is prejudicial. While evidence as to the existence of insurance is often inadmissible because irrelevant, there are numerous cases involving situations where evidence of insurance coverage is сompetent. For example, it has been recognized in the great preponderance of jurisdictions in this country, including Indiana, that evidence as to the possession of liability insurance will not be excluded in cases where its suppressiоn would exclude evidence material to the establishment of a cause of action and the liability of a defendant sued for damages. See cases collected in annotation 4 A. L. R. 2d 761, 775; Snider v. Truex (1943),222 Ind. 18 ,51 N. E. 2d 477 .
“It necessarily follows that proof of insurancе if necessary to establish either a cause of action or defense under the issues, is competent and may be shоwn.
“The issue of carrying liability insurance, if appellant desired to take advantage of it, should have been offered by аppellant on the trial of the case, and by failing to do so appellant waived such defense or partial dеfense.”
*453 In other words, proof of liability insurance in and of itself is not admissible, but such a principle may not be expanded to the extent that it serves as a means of excluding otherwise competent evidence which is relevant to the issues involved in the trial. We do not think that a trial court may arbitrarily exclude otherwise competent and relevant evidence merely on the ground that it will reveal an insurance carrier is involved.
In this case, as previously stated, if a party sees fit to present a witness on his behalf, the opposing party has a right to cross-examine that witness with reference to all his interests in the litigation, including who is compensating him or giving him anything of value which resulted in his being á witness or participating actively in the litigation.
This cause is ordered transferred from the Appellate Court to this Court, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to grant the appellant a new trial.
Note. — Reported in