272 N.W. 591 | Minn. | 1937
Plaintiff was injured on July 14, 1935, in a collision between his automobile and that of defendant. Defendant admitted liability and litigated only the question of damages. Plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was 22 years of age, in good health, and of more than average intelligence. From 1930 to the time of the accident, he managed and operated his father's farm of 320 acres, of which 55 acres were in pasture. He did most of the work, employing help only for the cleaning of seed and shocking and threshing of grain. His mother helped a little with the milking. He testified that he worked long hours, generally from five a. m. to nine p. m., except on Sundays. As a result of the accident plaintiff was very severely injured. The testimony tended to show that he sustained a basal skull fracture which injured the soft tissue of the brain. He sustained stomach injuries, a hernia, many bruises and lacerations, and severe shock and trauma. His sacroiliac joint and his liver were injured. Plaintiff's doctors testified that he was totally and permanently disabled.
Appellant has 55 assignments of error, which he has divided into 12 groups. Each of them has received our thoughtful consideration. We shall refer only to those which present substantial questions.
1. Error is claimed because plaintiff's doctors were permitted to testify that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. It is urged that such testimony invades the province of the jury, that it left out of account certain disabilities due to prior injuries of plaintiff referred to in the evidence, and that there is no showing that the disabilities in this case were the result of the particular accident involved in this action. The last two grounds of objection may be disposed of by the fact that the medical opinions were based upon evidence that plaintiff had recovered from the previous *528
injuries and was well at the time of the accident, and that his present disabilities were the result of injuries caused by this accident. Medical testimony is received because jurors, being inexperienced in such matters, are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to them without expert assistance. A physician testifying as an expert may give his opinion as to the extent of disability caused by, and the duration and permanency of, personal injuries. 2 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. Supp. 1932) §§ 3325, 3327, note 40; 8 R.C.L. p. 635, § 177; 11 R.C.L. p. 609, § 33; 22 C. J. p. 673, § 763; Peterson v. C. M. St. P. Ry. Co,
It is claimed, however, that such testimony is objectionable because it permits the medical expert to give his opinion upon an ultimate issue, citing United States v. Spaulding,
2. It is claimed that error resulted from admitting the testimony of a Dr. Pierce that plaintiff's disability at the time of trial was due to the automobile accident. It is said that no foundation was laid for this evidence because the doctor had not examined plaintiff prior to the accident and, further, that the opinion was as to an ultimate fact and thus invaded the province of the jury. A foundation for the testimony of Dr. Pierce was laid by showing that he was present in court during the trial and heard the testimony of plaintiff and plaintiff's mother as to the plaintiff's condition and *530 injuries; that plaintiff had entirely recovered from the prior injuries and had thereafter been in good health until the time of the automobile accident. He had also heard the testimony of another physician who attended plaintiff for the injuries resulting from the accident. His testimony was based upon an assumption that the evidence stated was true. Dr. Pierce himself had examined plaintiff and had taken X-ray pictures of him which were introduced in evidence and which he used in testifying. This was a sufficient foundation for his testimony. 2 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. Supps. 1932, 1934) § 3338.
With respect to the testimony invading the province of the jury upon the ground that it stated an opinion upon an ultimate fact or issue to be decided by the jury, it is the contention of appellant that it would have been proper to permit the doctor to state what might have caused plaintiff's injuries but that it was not proper to permit him to state that, in his opinion, this particular accident caused plaintiff's injury. This distinction has been repudiated by the decisions of this court in previous cases as one which is too fine and fanciful as a practical matter. Experts are permitted to give their opinions upon the very issue which the jury will have to decide, but such opinions are not conclusive. 2 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. Supps. 1932, 1934) §§ 3327, 3338; Donnelly v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.
"Neither do we appreciate the fine distinctions sometimes sought to be drawn between asking an expert whether, in his opinion, certain causes might produce certain results, and asking him whether, in his opinion, they did produce such results."
In State v. Cox,
3. Objection is made because plaintiff was permitted to show that he received $800 per year net earnings from his farming operations and one-half of the cream checks, which amounted to $60 to $75 per month, upon the ground that this income represented, in part at least, a return from invested capital and that such evidence is too contingent and uncertain to be taken into consideration in ascertaining the amount of damages. This evidence was received to prove loss of earning capacity, which was submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The evidence did not show that plaintiff had a capital investment in the farm or any property used in operating it, or that any part of his income was a return on capital invested. On the contrary, it showed that plaintiff's father owned the farm and all the personal property thereon, used in the farming operations, and that in 1930 plaintiff "took the business over on half with him." Thereafter, plaintiff operated the farm and he and his father shared equally in the proceeds. Plaintiff and his father and mother lived together on the farm. After plaintiff was injured, his father, and not plaintiff, hired another man to do the work which plaintiff had done.
There is no evidence of a written contract or any other evidence than that which has been stated as to the terms of the contract between plaintiff and his father. It is not necessary to determine the rights of plaintiff and his father with respect to crops and other produce, nor their status as landlord and tenant, master and servant, or joint adventurers. These questions are discussed in Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co.
4. It is also urged that the verdict is excessive. At the time of the injury plaintiff had an expectancy of a little over 40 years. Immediately prior to the accident he was a healthy, able-bodied, and active young man, and immediately afterwards, as a result thereof, was permanently and totally disabled. His injuries have already been stated. The testimony shows that he could not perform *533
even small menial tasks such as sweeping and helping around the house. The plaintiff has sustained not only severe pain and suffering but throughout his life will be rendered incapable of living and enjoying a normal life because of his condition. In addition, he has sustained a very substantial loss of earning power. The measurement of damages in pecuniary terms is a difficult task and is largely in the sound discretion of the jury. The verdict in this case has the approval of the learned trial judge, who states that it is not excessive nor the result of passion or prejudice. It does not appear to us to be excessive. Verdicts awarding comparable amounts for similar injuries have had approval. Crozier v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
We find no error.
Affirmed.
