118 Ala. 143 | Ala. | 1897
At the 1896-97 session of the General Assembly, an act was passed and approved February 18, 1897, entitled “An act to amend the revenue laws of the State of Alabama.” The fifteenth subdivision of the thirty-fifth section requires- all corporations, foreign or domestic, doing business in this State, except banks and banking institutions regularly organized, not otherwise specifically required to pay a license tax, to pay an annual privilege tax, graduated by the paid-up capital stock of the corporation. The appellant, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of this State, doing business in the City of Birmingham, having a paid-up capital stock of five thousand dollars, on information filed in the Criminal Court of Jefferson county, was convicted of a violation of the sub-division, and from the judgment of conviction this appeal is taken.
The argument of the counsel for appellant, proceeds on the hypothesis, which we are inclined to adopt, that three questions are presented by the record for- consideration and decision, Avbich they state in the following order: 1. Is not the sub-division violative of the first and sixth sections, taken in connection, of the eleventh article of the Constitution? 2. If not violative of the Constitution, did the sub-division take effect from the day of approval of the act, or is it postponed in operation until the first day of January next? '3. By force of the general revenue laws, is a county tax added to the State tax?.
The tax imposed by the sub-division, has the properties and quality of a franchise tax — it is measured or graduated by the amount of the paid-up capital stock of the corporation, and this distinguishes it from a tax on property. Speaking in reference to this inquiry, it was said by Clopton, J., in State v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 89 Ala. 338: “The usual and most certain test is, whether the tax is upon the capital stock, eo nomine, without regard to its value, or at its assessed valuation in whatever it may be invested; if the former, it is a franchise tax; if the latter, a tax upon the property.” Reference was made to Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners, 2 Black, (U. S.) 620, in which it ivas said by Nelson, J., speaking of a franchise tax: “The tax was like one annexed to the franchise as a royalty for the grant.” The tax may be imposed on the creation of the corporation, but if the charter or grant of incorporation does not expressly exempt it from taxation, a tax on the franchise may be subsequently imposed at the will of the legislature. — Burroughs on Taxation, §85; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514. Taxation is a legislative power, comprehended in- the general grant to the General Assembly, except as it is specially restrained or limited by the Constitution, or by the relation of the State to the general government; and in its exercise the General Assembly, is not under the superintendence and control of the judiciary. “It is enough for the courts,” said Brewer, J., in the City of Newton v. Atchison, 47 Am. Rep. 488, “that both occupations and property are legitimate objects of taxation; that they are essentially dissimilar; that constitutional provisions regulating the taxation of one do not control that of the other, and that there are no constitutional inhibitions on the taxation of business, either by the legislature directly, or by municipal corporations thereto empowered by the legislature.”
We may concede, that when a tax is imposed on avocations, or privileges, or on the franchises of cor
2. Unless a different time is specified, statutes take effect and become operative from the day of the approval by the Governor. — Sedg. Stat. & Const. Law, 67; Sutherland on Stat. Constr., §104; Taylor v. Hand, 31 Ala. 383; Br. Bank Mobile v. Murphy, 8 Ala. 119. This general principle is not denied, nor is it contended that there are any words in the sub-division, or in the act of which it forms part, indicative of a legislative intention to postpone its operation to a future day. The contention is, that such intention must be implied or the sub-division will be inharmonious with the statute, (Code of 1886, §634), which declares that all licenses shall be for one year, and shall expire on the thirty-first December, unless the business commences after the first of July, in which case the price of license shall be one-half of the year’s license. The statute referred to has relation only to the licenses designated in other sections of the Code, and it cannot be. ref erred to licenses and taxes exacted by subsequent statutes. There is no wrant of harmony in the operation of such statutes — each has its own field of operation, and the two can never collide or conflict. The subdivision exacts the tax and license from the corporation doing business in this State, after the . day of approval of the act. It is an annual tax the corporation is required to pay, and from the day of its payment, the corporation having obtained the license, is entitled to do business. It is a new' license and tax exacted by the legislature, having no relation to or connection with the taxes imposed or licenses exacted by pre-existing legislation, and is governed by the terms of the statute creating it.
3. Counties have no inherent power of taxation; they have only such powrer as is delegated to them, and must have express authority of law to sanction the taxes they demand.- — Cooley on Taxation, 678; Burroughs on Taxation, §138. The Constitution recognizes the power of the General Assembly to confer on them authority to levy direct taxes on property, but
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.