524 N.E.2d 515 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1987
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas from its award of $1,436 in favor of Physicians' Services, Inc. and against the city of Mentor.
Physicians' Services is a nonprofit Ohio corporation which, at the times material to this action, had a contract with the Board of Trustees of Lake County Memorial Hospitals to provide physicians to render emergency medical care to patients in the emergency centers of the two Lake County Memorial Hospitals. Physicians-employees of Physicians' Services administered medical examinations in the hospital emergency rooms to persons who were allegedly victims of sexual offenses.
Physicians' Services submitted statements for the charges for the examinations to the municipalities in which the sexual offenses allegedly occurred. In this case, the municipalities charged were Willoughby, Eastlake, Painesville and Mentor. Each of the municipalities declined to pay the charges for the examinations based on R.C.
Physicians' Services initiated the instant action to obtain a declaration of who had responsibility to pay for the charges under the circumstances. On September 4, 1985, the lower court held that, under R.C.
The city of Mentor appealed from this finding of responsibility and from the subsequent ruling that it should pay $1,436.
Physicians' Services filed a cross-appeal asserting that the lower court erred by failing to include prejudgment interest in its favor.
The city of Mentor has assigned the following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding that Physicians' Services, Inc., is a private facility within the meaning of Section
"2. The trial court erred in awarding judgment to Physicians' Services, Inc., in the amount of $1,436.00 against the city of Mentor based solely on hearsay evidence."
Mentor argues, in its first assigned error, that Physicians' Services was not a "private facility" within the meaning of R.C.
R.C.
"Any cost incurred by a hospital or other emergency medical facility in conducting a medical examination of a victim of an offense under sections
"(A) Cost incurred by a county facility shall be charged to and paid by the county;
"(B) Cost incurred by a municipal facility shall be charged to and paid by the municipality;
"(C) Cost incurred by a private facility shall be charged to and paid by the municipality in which the alleged offense was committed, or charged to and paid by the county, if committed within an unincorporated area. If separate counts of an offense or separate offenses under sections *132
In determining the appropriate local government to bear the expense of these examinations, the status of the facility which incurred the cost, as county, municipal or private facility, is dispositive. Interpreting the statutorily undefined word "facility" to mean "that which eases the performance of an action," the trial court found that Physicians' Services was a "facility." Since Physicians' Services is a private corporation, the trial court held that R.C.
While neither the Revised Code nor any reported Ohio case directly addresses the question of the meaning of the word "facility" in these circumstances, the question has been considered by the Attorney General in Opinion No. 80-021. The Attorney General concluded:
"In light of the foregoing, it is my opinion, and you are advised, that a private corporation which provides examinations of sexual assault victims at the emergency room center of a county hospital for the purpose of gathering evidence for possible prosecution, and which does not charge the hospital for such services, constitutes a `private facility' as that term is used in R.C.
The opinion of the Attorney General, therefore, supports Physicians' Services' definition of the word "facility," and is given due respect by this court.
In Warrensville Heights v. Bowers (C.P. 1961), 90 Ohio Law Abs. 116, 124, 25 O.O. 2d 101, 105, 188 N.E.2d 85, 90, the court interpreted the meaning of the word "facility" as it was used in the context of horse racing facilities in R.C.
Many dictionaries list one definition of facility as including anything "that permits the easier performance of an action." See,e.g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged Ed. 1973). Thus, the ordinary meaning of the word "facility" supports Physicians' Services' contention that it is a "facility" within the meaning of R.C.
R.C.
R.C.
Giving the opinion of the Attorney General its due respect, and considering the ordinary definition of the word "facility" as well as the context of the word in the statute in question, we find that the trial court correctly interpreted R.C.
Mentor argues, in its second assigned error, that the trial court erred in awarding judgment to Physicians' Services based solely on hearsay evidence. Specifically, Mentor argues that R.C.
A close reading of the statutes in question does not support Mentor's interpretation. R.C.
"Every hospital of this state which offers organized emergency services shall provide that a physician is available on call twenty-four hours each day for the examination of persons reported to any law enforcement agency to be victims of sexual offenses cognizable as violations of sections
The statute does not provide that the victim of a sexual offense must be reported to the law enforcement agency before the emergency services of the hospital are provided. It merely requires that victims of sexual offenses be reported. In the case at bar, after the victims were examined, the results of the examinations were then turned over to the police. We find that this procedure, at the very least, constitutes a constructive reporting of the purported crime to the proper law enforcement agency, thus complying with the requirements of R.C.
Bolstering this interpretation is the fact that either the reported victim, or any peace officer or prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the reported victim, may request an examination. The fact that the victim may request an examination supports the above interpretation of this statute. If the law enforcement agencies had to be notified before an examination took place, the statute would not have this provision in it. Once the law enforcement personnel were notified, they would undoubtedly automatically request an examination; therefore, the provision for the victim requesting her or his own examination would be superfluous. Thus, the statute does not require that the law *134 enforcement agency be notified before the examination.
Nor does R.C.
Finally, Mentor urges that R.C.
For all of the reasons listed above, Mentor's second assigned error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with respect to Mentor's assigned errors.
Physicians' Services has filed the following cross-assignment of error:
"The court of common pleas erred in failing to include prejudgment interest on the judgment in favor of plaintiff."
The assigned error is well-taken.
R.C.
"In cases other than those provided for in sections
The action in the case at bar was quasi-contractual, and the money for the services had become due and payable. Therefore, under this statute, Physicians' Services is entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent per annum.
This result is supported by paragraph two of the syllabus of a recent Ohio appellate case. Nursing Staff of Cincinnati, Inc. v.Sherman (1984),
"A party's entitlement to prejudgment interest turns upon a determination as to whether the underlying debt is liquidated. If the amount of a debt is clear and certain, the prevailing party is entitled to interest from the date the sum became due and owing."
Therefore, as the amount of debt in the present case was certain, Physicians' Services is entitled to receive prejudgment interest on that debt, as it requested in its complaint. The case is hereby remanded for a determination of the amount of interest to be awarded.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded. *135
O'NEILL, P.J., concurs.
CRAWFORD, J., dissents.
CASTLE, J., retired, of the Twelfth Appellate District; O'NEILL, J., of the Seventh Appellate District; and CRAWFORD, J., of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, sitting by assignment in the Eleventh Appellate District.
Dissenting Opinion
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which, in essence, holds that because the county hospitals have a contract with Physicians' Services to perform emergency services in the hospitals, the hospitals are not incurring any cost; and, thus, R.C.
No Ohio court has addressed the question of what is the proper definition of "facility" for purposes of R.C.
It is clear that the legislature in drafting R.C.
The only other legislative provision dealing with medical assistance for victims is contained in R.C.
"Every hospital of this state which offers organized emergency services shall provide that a physician is available on call twenty-four hours each day for the examination of persons reported to any law enforcement agency to be victims of sexual offenses * * *."
In recent years numerous hospitals throughout the country have contracted with various physicians or physician organizations to provide emergency room services. This practice appears to have begun less than ten years ago and subsequent to the enactment of R.C.
"Further, sound public policy demands that the full-service hospital not be permitted to contractually insulate itself from liability for acts of medical malpractice committed in its emergency room. First, the emergency room is an integrally related part of the full-service hospital. The hospital may not pretend that this essential element of its public service treatment facilities is a separate entity. Moreover, the nature of the situation when *136 people turn to the hospital and its emergency room facilities for treatment is one fraught with crisis. People are often highly emotional. There is frequently no time to choose. Indeed, time is of the essence. The chances of going elsewhere for treatment are remote. Given the relationship of the emergency room to the full-service hospital and the crisis circumstances under which people seek emergency treatment, public policy requires that the hospital not be able to artificially screen itself from liability for malpractice in the emergency room.
"Therefore, we hold that when an institution purporting to be a full-service hospital makes emergency room treatment available to serve the public, the hospital will be estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical personnel on duty providing treatment are its agents. Regardless of any contractual arrangements with so-called independent contractors, the hospital will be liable to the injured patient for the acts of malpractice committed in its emergency room, assuming proximate cause and damage are present." Hannola v. Lakewood (1980),
I thus conclude that cities and counties in Ohio cannot avoid their responsibility under R.C.
The city of Mentor's first assignment of error should be sustained.