20 S.E.2d 256 | Ga. | 1942
In the circumstances as stated in the certified question, an insurer, in calculating indebtedness by loan on a life policy, had the right, on December 31, 1939, or on February 5, 1940, to include interest that had accrued after July 17, 1939, although not payable until July 17, 1940.
This question assumes that there is a debt, and that the debt bears interest, and that the interest is payable annually July 17; also that on July 17, 1939, the amount of the debt did not equal the guaranteed cash value of the policy, but that on December 31, 1939, the debt exceeded the value. On such assumption the inquiry is, "Did the company, in calculating the indebtedness against the policy, have the right, on December 31, 1939, or on February 5, 1940, to include the interest on the loan which had accrued subsequently to July 17, 1939?" The plan is for the insurer to advance money to the insured on "sole security" of the policy, limiting total indebtedness within the bounds of the "cash value guaranteed" of the policy. Total amount of the debt may be diminished by payment in part, or increased by additional advances, or accumulation of interest. Cash value of the policy may increase by mere lapse of time. If a time comes when the total debt equals or exceeds the guaranteed cash value of the policy, the company may elect to proceed as provided in the policy. There is no contemplation that interest shall cease to run at any time. Consequently, in the stated circumstances the company, in calculating the indebtedness against the policy, would have the right, on December *838
31, 1939, or on February 5, 1940, to include the interest which had accrued after July 17, 1939. This result would not be affected by the mere fact that such accrued interest might not have been payable until July 17, 1940. Considering the assumptions therein contained, the question as propounded by the Court of Appeals does not involve application of the principle that in mutual accounts a debt for advancements does not arise so long as the advancements do not exceed the demand of the party making them, as applied in Board of Assessors v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
All the Justices concur.