271 S.W.2d 294 | Tex. App. | 1954
This is a workman’s compensation proceeding by employee Skinner against appellant as insurer of Shedd-Bartush Foods, Inc., growing out of an injury received by Skinner in course of his employment on February 8, 1952, with recovery in prayer limited to $3,000 for temporary total and permanent partial incapacity. On the trial on the merits the jury in answer to special issues found appellee Skinner’s weekly wage at $65 (he pled $63.50); that he sustained 18 weeks total and 200 weeks of 50% partial disability. On the verdict the court deducted $275 (the amount theretofore paid him in weekly installments) from the $3,0(X> sought and rendered judgment against appellant for $2,725; and it is from that judgment that this appeal has been duly perfected. Appellant here briefs three points. Points 1 and 2 briefed together in substance assert error in refusal to set aside the verdict (1) because the jury’s findings on disability are so against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong; and (2) the jury having found disability as above set out and the overwhelming evidence showing plaintiff went back to work for his same employer, worked 51 hours, part of which was overtime, at the same rate of pay, during the week preceding June 17, 1953, and' that he h,ad worked continuously thereafter,, taking off from work to attend the trial, for the same employer, putting in the usual hours,, and that he had received one raise in< pay since the accident and before the trial;, therefore the jury’s findings were so against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong, and unjust. Appellee counters (1) the extent and duration of disability and (2) finding of 18 weeks total followed by 200 weeks-partial disability were each amply supported' by the evidence. These points require that we summarize the evidence. Appellee testified in substance that he was 43 years old; had farmed, then worked for his present employer, then returned toL the farm for a while, returning back to work for his present employer; that he sustained the
The plant superintendent testified as to payment of salary since the accident. Skinner went back to work and received his first payroll check June 10, 1952, and additional checks fairly regular thereafter. Skinner,, taking the stand the second time, testified the accident was on Friday; that he worked until Saturday noon; he began feeling worse on Sunday; went back to work on Monday and was sent to the doctor about
After considering the evidence as a whole we have reached the opinion, that plaintiff’s evidence on his ability, or. lack of abjlity to work, labor, and earn money since the accident, having been believed, by the jury,- was, sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment, and that it-was not so against the great weight of the evidence as to require a new trial. Points 1 and 2 are overruled.
Point-3 asserts that under the evidence the' court erred in permitting Skinner’s counsel in his closirig argument to state that Skinner’s employer “ 'comes and hugs up with the insurance company’; he (the plaintiff) 'hasn’t sued for a mint of money’- — -‘he sued for only $3,000.00’; that they did an operation on him ‘taking out part of that organ there and eliminating his sexual power’ ; that now ‘sexual power cut off at 43 years old’; that ‘This man to my mind, under this evidence, is in worse -shape with the condition that he’s in, in worse shape than he would be if he was confined in bed with a broken back. He can just think about things arid that’s all.’ ” Also erred in refusing, to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial since the findings to issues 2 to 5 inclusive are against the great preponderance of the evidence and were influenced by the cumulative effect of such prejudicial and inflammatory argument.
Our examination of the record shows that appellant’s bills of exception material to this point were each qualified by the trial court to the effect that the argument in each instance complained of was not objected to at the time it was made and that there was no request thereafter to instruct the jury not to consider it. The record fails to, show a motion for mistrial by appellant either separately to each portion of the argument shown by the bills of exception, or because of the cumulative effect of the argument as a whole. While we are doubtful as to reversible error if properly objected to and such objection overruled by the court, we have, reached the conclusion that, under the authorities, failure to move for a mistrial and thereby taking their chances with the jury before objecting thereto waived their right to complain of the argument separately as to the evidence shown by each bill, or thereafter as to the cumulative effect of all said argument, waived the error, if any, in the argument had it been properly taken advantage of at a proper time.
The party cannot now, as they were permitted to do in the past, fail to object and move for a iriistrial and wait and take a chance with the jury and after a verdict is rendered against it, complain of -improper argument. Safety Casualty Co. v. Bennett, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W.2d 596, syl. 8, by this Court; Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558, syl. 3, by our Supreme Court. Point 3 is overruled.
Finding no reversible error in appellant’s points, the judgment below is
’ Affirmed.