Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Shamblin (In re Shamblin)Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Shamblin (In re Shamblin)
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Company, Stanford D. Marks, and DeBois Investment Group, Inc., appeal the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. The panel reversed the bankruptcy court’s refusal to set aside the tax sale of Grace. Shamblin’s real property. The panel also granted the tax sale purchaser a lien on the property to the extent of present equivalent value given. We reverse the panel’s grant of a lien to the tax sale purchaser. We affirm the panel’s decision in all other respects.
FACTS
Grace and William Shamblin filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in California on February 2, 1982. When the Shamblins filed for bankruptcy, Grace Shamblin owned an apartment building in Cook County, Illinois, on which she owed back taxes. The Shamblins fаiled to notify the Cook County Recorder’s Office of their bankruptcy, although they later amended their bankruptcy schedule to include the Cook County Assessor as a creditor.
Stanford D. Marks is principal shareholder and principal operating оfficer of Phoenix Bond & Indemnity. Marks is also the managing officer and a director of DeBois Investment Group, Inc. The two firms share office space.
On February 22, 1982, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered judgment against Grace Shamblin’s apartment building for back taxes. The Cook County Treasurer conducted a tax sale on May 19, 1982. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity paid $24,430.85 in back taxes, interest, and costs and received a Certificate of Purchase. Neither the Cook County officials nor Phoenix knew of the Shamblins’ bankruptcy at that timе.
A Phoenix employee received notice of the Shamblins’ bankruptcy no later than May 22, 1984. Illinois law provides a two year redemption period for property sold at tax sales. This period expired on May 21, 1984. On May 22, 1984, Phoenix assigned its Certificatе of Purchase to Debois. After discovering the pending bankruptcy, the Cook County state’s attorney demanded that DeBois return the Certificate of Purchase. DeBois refused. On May 30, 1984, Phoenix, through Stanford Marks, filed an application for an order directing thе county clerk to issue a tax deed. Although it is unclear exactly when Marks personally received notice of the bankruptcy, he knew unequivocally of the Shamb-lins’ bankruptcy by June 25, 1984, when he received the Shamblins’ complaint in their bankruptcy court aсtion to set aside the tax
The Shamblins filed this action in bankruptcy court on June 13, 1984 requesting that the court set aside the tax sale. Phoenix and Marks filed a joint answer on July 18, 1984. The bankruptcy court refused to set the sale aside, holding that the Shamblins’ action was untimely under 11 U.S.C. § 549(d)(1). Thе court held also that even though the sale violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362, the sale was voidable only during the two year redemption period for tax sales under Illinois law. The bankruptcy appellate panel reversed, holding that both thе tax sale and the tax deed violated the automatic stay and were therefore void. Finding that Phoenix was a good faith purchaser for value, however, the panel granted Debois, Phoenix’s successor in interest, an 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) lien against the proрerty.
I. Mootness
Phoenix, Marks, and DeBois argue that the Shamblins’ failure to obtain a stay pending appeal from the bankruptcy court order makes the appeal moot. “Bankruptcy’s mootness rule applies when an appellant has failed to obtain a stay from an order that permits a sale of a debtor’s assets.” In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.,
The tax deed was not obtained in good faith. Phoenix, Marks, and DeBois all had notice of the bankruptcy before the tax deed proceeding. They refused to return the Certificate of Purchase to Cook County authorities, they did not attemрt to resolve the possible violation of the bankruptcy stay until after the deed was issued, and they made misleading statements to the court to obtain the order to issue the deed. The mootness rule does not apply.
II. Section 362 Automatic Stay
A. The May Tax Sale
The BAP held correctly that the tаx sale was void from the outset. 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides that a petition in bankruptcy operates as a stay on any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the bankruptcy estate. Judicial proceedings in violation of this automatic stay are void. In re Stringer,
Because that State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or power to proceed with the foreclosure, the confirmation of sale, the execution of the sheriff’s deed, the writ of assistance, and the ejection of appellants from their property— to the extent based upon the сourt’s actions — were all without authority of law.
Numerous federal courts have followed Kalb and held tax and foreclosure sales in violation of the automatic stay to be void. See Richard v. City of Chicago,
Even if the bаnkruptcy court had annulled the stay retroactively, the BAP correctly held that the court would have abused its discretion by doing so. We need not decide whether equitable principles may, in a proper case, justify retroactive annulment of thе automatic stay.
The appellants’ behavior regarding the tax deed proceeding borders on bad faith. The equities therefore favor the Shamblins. Appellants claim that the stay should be annulled retroactively for purposes of the tax sale alone, which they claim was accomplished in good faith. However, issuance of the tax deed was inextricably intertwined with the tax sale proceeding. We decline to view separately the behavior surrounding these two events.
B. The Tax Deed Proceeding
The BAP correctly held that the tax deed proceeding was void due to the invalid tax sale. We agree with the analysis of this issue in Richard v. City of Chicago,
The decisions cited by Phoenix, Marks, and DeBois and relied on by the bankruptcy court involve facts different from this case. All involve situations where the bankruptcy petition was filed during the statutory redemption period. See, e.g., In re Tynan,
The equities surrounding the tax deed proceeding also weigh against the appellants. They could have sought relief from the automatic stay before committing acts that viоlated it. See Richard,
III. Section 549
Appellants claim that, under 11 U.S.C. § 549, the tax sale should be allowed to stand despite violation of thе automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) states a
Postpetition transactions.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate:
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and ...
(2) ... that is not authorized under this titlе or by the court.
(emphasis added). The remaining subsections provide exceptions to the general rule that unauthorized transfers of property may be avoided. Appellants claim the tax sale falls within the exceptions in § 549(c) and (d). Subsection (с) provides an exception for certain good faith purchasers. When the good faith purchaser has paid less than present fair equivalent value for the property, subsection (c) grants the purchaser a lien on the property to the extent of present equivalent value given. Subsection (d) precludes the commencement of § 549 actions beyond the earlier of two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided and the time the case is closed or dismissеd.
Section 549 does not apply.
CONCLUSION
The tax sаle and subsequent tax deed violated the automatic stay and are void. Section 549 does not apply to the tax sale because it is not a “transfer of property of the estate” under subsection (a). Because we conclude that § 549 does not apply, we REVERSE the BAP’s determination that DeBois has a lien on the subject property under § 549(c). We AFFIRM the panel’s decision in all other respects.
Notes
. The mootness rule also does not apply to the May tax sale because of a two-year redemption period under Illinois law. See In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.,
. The case arose under the predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
. Whether the bankruptcy court may annul the automatic stаy retroactively is an open question in this circuit. Compare In re Mellor,
. Mrs. Shamblin, a debtor-in-possession, is regarded as a trustee for § 549(a) purposes. See In re Dant & Russell, Inc.,
. The Shamblins argue that § 549 should not apply because the tax sale and tax deed issuance are void for violating the automatic stay. Because we decide that § 549 does not apply for other reasons, we need not resolve that difficult question. Cf. In re Brooks,
. The Code in effect at the time of this case defined "transfer” as: еvery mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest, (emphasis supplied)
.This court has consistently treated the creation of liens on the debtor’s property as a transfer. See, e.g., In re Wind Power Systems, Inc.,