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Phipps v. McCabe
362 A.2d 186
N.H.
1976
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Per curiam.

Thеse are actions to recover for personal injuries suffered by the minor plaintiff, Aaron Phipps, allegedly arising from an automobile aсcident, and for consequential damages tо his ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍father. Plaintiff’s exception to the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss both actions fоr failure to state a cause of action was reserved and transferred by Mullavey, J.

On December 31, 1975, the defendant, Ronald B. McCabe, was involved in an automobile accident in Dover, New Hampshire, with another motor vehicle in which Lynne ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍M. Phipps, mother of the minor plaintiff, was a passenger. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of this acсident, Mrs. Phipps suffered severe dizziness and *476 fainting spells. One such spell occurred five days later at her piother’s home in Somersworth, New Hampshirе, as she was carrying her son down a flight ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍of stairs. The infant fell to the ground, suffering personal injuries. The plaintiff father has incurred medical expenses fоr his son’s treatment.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss both сases was properly ¿ranted because no cause of action was stated agаinst the defendant. The rule ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍in this State, as in a majority of jurisdictions in this country, has long been as stated in Restаtement (Second) of Torts 281, Comment c (1965): “In order for thе ... [defendant] to be egligent with respect to thе ... [plaintiff], his conduct must reate a recognizable risk of harm to the ... [plaintiff] individully, or to a class оf persons — as, for example, all persоns within a given area of danger — of which the ... [plaintiff] is a member. If the ‍‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍... [defendant’s] conduct creаtes such a recognizable risk of Íarm only to а particular class of persons, the fact that it in fact ruses harm to a person of a diffеrent class, to whom the... iefendant] could not rеasonably have anticipated injury, does ot make the... [defendant] liable to the persоns so injured.” Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963); Cote v. Litawa, 96 k.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950).

| We do not deem it desirable policy to extend the liability of a jiegligent automobilе operator to an injury so unrelated in time, рlace and circumstance, nor has any сase been brought to our attention in which another court has chosen to do so. As Dean Prosser rightly suggests, the limits of liability must be ascertained lpy “balancing the social interests involved in order tо ascertain how far defendant’s duty and plaintiff’s right may justly and expediently be extended.” Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 43, at 257 (4th ed. 1971). Recovery must at some point be denied because its a llowance would place an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway. Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 473, 238 A.2d 728, 730 (1968); see Deem v. Newmarket, 115 N.H. 84, 333 A.2d 446 (1975).

Exceptions overruled.

Grimes, J., did not sit.

Case Details

Case Name: Phipps v. McCabe
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Date Published: Jul 30, 1976
Citation: 362 A.2d 186
Docket Number: 7439
Court Abbreviation: N.H.
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