255 Pa. 613 | Pa. | 1917
Opinion by
This was an action in trespass. In the plaintiff’s statement of claim it was averred that the defendant, in operating a coal mine on a tract of land adjoining a tract be
The considerations which influenced the learned court to take the action it did are thus stated in the opinion filed in the case: “The trespass complained of was committed by H. E. Gray, lessee and independent contractor, and not the agént of the defendant, Wills. There was no evidence in the case to show that when the trespass was committed Gray was the agent of the defendant, though the burden rested on the plaintiff to show it. The mining was done by Gray, without any direction of control of the defendant. Gray was the defendant’s lessee, and the defendant, without knowledge or consent, is not liable for Gray’s trespass.” What the relation between the defendant and Gray really was is of no present concern. The jury found that it was that of principal and agent, or employer and employee; the court found that Gray was an independent lessee. The question in the case then is not which of these two conflicting findings has the stronger support in the evidence, but, having regard to the evidence produced by the plaintiff, and that alone, the question is, would that evidence warrant a reasonable inference that Gray was acting under the defendant as his agent or employee? In other words, was the evidence produced by the plaintiff, on this branch of the case, sufficient to make out for him a prima facie case? If so, the case was for the jury, and if the jury went so far astray that the court in good conscience could not give its approval to the verdict, it should have sustained the motion for a new trial. The entry of judgment for