90 Iowa 541 | Iowa | 1894
On the tenth day of November, 1890, Alford Phillips died intestate. His estate included personal property to the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars after the payment of debts and the expenses of administration, and real estate, not including that in controversy in this action, of the appraised value of ninety-seven thousand, nine hundred and seventy dollars. The defendant Ella 0. Phillips is his widow, and the plaintiffs Sylvester Phillips and Belle 0. Mc-Olaskey, and the defendants Jessie GK Phillips and Bertha M. Phillips, his children. After the death of the intestate, his widow caused her distributive share of his estate to be ascertained and set apart to her, and what was done in that proceeding- is not questioned in this action. In -January, 1887, Alford Phillips conveyed to the defendants Bertha and Jessie certain farms, and in April, 1890, he purchased, and caused to be conveyed to Jessie, another farm. The conveyances so made were voluntary. The plaintiffs contend that they were intended as advancements to the grantees, and that the farms conveyed should be regarded as a part of the estate of decedent for the purpose of division and distribution thereof, and ask that they be so treated. They also ask for the partition of the real estate which belongs to the estate. The appellants deny that the conveyances were intended as advancements, and insist that they were intended to be in addition to their distributive shares of the estate. They also allege that a conveyance of land made by their father to the plaintiff Sylvester Phillips, in December,
I. Objection was made by. the appellants in the district court to the joinder of their mother, the widow of decedent, as a party defendant. Prom an order' of the court overruling a motion they had filed to dismiss the action as to her they appealed to this court before the cause-was heard on the merits. The cause is submitted on the appeal from that order, and on the appeal from the final decree; but as the questions presented on the first appeal, however decided, can not affect the final determination of the cause on the merits, they will not be further considered.
II. The only question we find it necessary to determine is whether the conveyances to the appellants were intended to be advancements. Section 2459 of the Code contains the following: “Property given by an intestate by way of advancement to an heir, shall be considered part of the estate, so far' as regards the division and distribution thereof, and shall be taken by such heir toward his share of the estate at what it would now be worth if in the condition in which it was so given to him.” It is the rule in this state that a voluntary conveyance from a parent to a child is presumed to be an advancement, and the burden of showing that it is not, is upon the person who claims that
After a careful consideration of all the evidence, we reach the conclusion that the presumption of law which arises from a voluntary conveyance by a parent to a child must prevail in this case. The findings of the district court in regard to the advancements and their amount are justified by the record, and we discover no sufficient reason for disturbing the decree of that court in any respect. Affirmed.