181 Mo. 463 | Mo. | 1904
This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s petition. The plaintiffs declining to plead further, final judgment was. rendered against them.
"Plaintiff states that on the twenty-fifth day of February, 1888, George Phillips was the owner and in possession of the following described real estate situated in Moniteau county, Missouri, to-wit: all of the northeast quarter of section 31, township 43, range 15, except five acres in the southwest corner of said quarter section, and also except fourteen acres, being a strip on the north side of said quarter section; and all of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said section 31 ¿xcept ten acres in the northwest corner of the said last described quarter section, containing in all one hundred and seventy-one acres; and being so the owner in possession thereof the said George Phillips joining with the plaintiff Nancy Phillips, who was then and there his wife, by a deed of trust, a certified copy of which is herewith filed, the original not being in possession of plaintiffs.
“That the deed made by the defendant A. D. Snyder; as trustee, to the' defendant, S. W. Harden-burg, as aforesaid, is not in the possession or under the control of these plaintiffs and can not be filed herewith, but a certified copy thereof is herewith filed. At the time of said sale, the plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips, was in possession of said real estate and has ever since been in possession thereof.
“That on the third day of April, 1900, the defendant S. W. Hardenburg instituted a suit against the plaintiff Charles M. Phillips in the circuit court of Moniteau county, Missouri, for the possession of said land. The said suit was compromised and settled upon the following terms, to-wit: that in consideration that the plaintiff Charles M. Phillips would pay the costs of said suit and would pay the said defendant Hardenburg the sum of three hundred dollars on said note on or before the first day of November, 1900, and would execute a lease for said land agreeing to give one third of the crops grown on the premises as rent if he should fail to make such payment, the said Hardenburg agreed to accept the three hundred dollars as a part payment on the note and cancel the old note and mortgage and convey the land to Phillips and take his note secured by a deed of trust on the land for whatever might be due on the old note. That a paper purporting to contain the contracts and agreements aforesaid was drawn up by the attorney for S. W. Hardenburg, and signed by the plaintiff Charles M. Phillips and said S. W. Harden-burg. That, at the time of signing the paper, plaintiff
“Plaintiff further says that before the first day of November, 1900, plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips, tendered to the defendant, S. W. Hardenburg, the three hundred dollars that he had agreed to pay him as aforesaid on said note and that the defendant Hardenburg refused to accept the same. The plaintiff, Charles Phillips, has performed all conditions of the contract with the said Hardenburg, but the defendant Hardenburg has refused and still refuses to convey said land to him, the defendant Charles M. Phillips, or to perform any of the matters agreed by him to be done.
‘ ‘ That on the twenty-ninth day of September, 1900, plaintiff Charles M. Phillips tendered to said Harden-burg the full amount due on said note, the amount of taxes and costs of making conveyances of said land to said plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips, but the said Harden-burg refused to accept same or to convey said land to plaintiff, and the plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips now offers' to pay defendant Plardenburg the full amount due him on said note, together with any costs which may have accrued to him and chargeable against this plaintiff.
“That said defendant, S. W. Hardenburg, by his deed dated July 30, 1900, and acknowledged August 7, 1900, and recorded on deed book 17 at page 328 of the records of Moniteau county, conveyed said real estate
“Wherefore plaintiff prays that, at the trial of this cause, the defendant, S. W. Hardenburg, be required to produce the instrument of writing, and lease aforesaid signed by him and the plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips, as aforesaid, and if said instrument of writing when so produced does not clearly set forth the terms of said contract and lease as hereinbefore set forth, that the same be reformed so that it shall express the contract and agreement of the parties and their intention in so making it, .and that the court will adjudge and decree that the said S. W. Hardenburg held the title to said land in trust for the payment of whatever might be due on the note made by G-eorge Phillips to him with the remainder for the use of the plaintiff, Charles M. Phillips, and that the defendants A. D. Snyder and E. C. Williams hold the legal and equitable title to said land for the same use, and that upon the payment of the amount due upon the said note from said date of said tender, which the plaintiffs now bring into the court and offer to pay, the' court will declare the legal title to said land in plaintiffs, or if the court should be of the opinion that the defendant E. C. Williams is an innocent purchaser
The demurrer was as follows:
“Now comes the defendants and demur to plaintiff’s petition for the following reasons to-wit:
“First. Because said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“Second. Because there is a misjoinder of causes of action, in that several causes of action have been improperly united.
“Third. Because there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, in that said plaintiffs have no unity of inter-, ests, or interest in the relief sought, and the different reliefs asked are inconsistent and do not affect both plaintiffs.
“Fourth. Because the petition is multifarious in that matters distinct and separate are improperly united.”
I. The objection that the petition seeks to establish an express trust in real estate and, therefore, must be in writing is not tenable, for two reasons. The peti
But we think the defendants have misconceived the purpose of the bill.' It is obviously a bill to be allowed to redeem from the deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage executed by George Phillips and wife in favor of defendant -Hardenburg. The petition alleges that one George Phillips on the twenty-fifth of February, 1888, was the owner of the real estate in suit and was in possession thereof and executed a deed of trust thereon to secure defendant Hardenburg a note of $1,400 executed by said George Phillips’ to said defendant Hardenburg; that said George Phillips contracted and sold said land to Charles M. Phillips, his son, one of the plaintiffs, and placed Charles in possession; that on the third of February, 1897, said George Phillips died intestate, leaving certain children and grandchildren and his widow, Nancy Phillips, and that all of said children confirmed said sale to the plaintiff, Charles Phillips, and they claimed no interest in said real estate; that plaintiff Charles .Phillips assumed the payment of said note, secured by said deed of trust and this was known to defendant Hardenburg and Snyder, the trustee in the deed of trust; that on November 23, 1897, said Snyder, as trustee, advertised said real estate for public sale to satisfy said debt of $1,400 and prior to the date of said sale said Hardenburg and Charles Phillips entered into an agreement whereby it was agreed that said Charles Phillips should bid off said real estate and execute his note for the said debt and that said agreement was known to the persons assembled at the
It was ruled at an early day in this State that where a creditor purchased lands at an execution sale under an understanding with a mortgagee of the same property that he would on the payment of his debt by the mortgagor convey the property to the latter, equity would compel the performance of such contract. [Rose v. Bates, 12 Mo. 30.]
In Slowey v. McMurray, 27 Mo. 113, Judge Scott, speaking for the court, observed: “ If a purchaser, by means of a promise to re-convey to his debtor, should induce a relaxation of the efforts on his part to prevent a sacrifice of his property and thereby obtain it at an under price, or, if the purchaser, taking advantage of that reluctance invariably manifested by those attending public sales to interfere with any arrangement a ■debtor makes to save his property, should create an impression that he was buying for the debtor, thereby preventing competition, .... such conduct would convert the purchaser into a trustee for the benefit of those who were defrauded by his conduct. Such cases go upon the ground ,of fraud, and courts will relieve without regard to the circumstance, whether the agreement was a written or verbal one, or whether it was supported by a consideration or not.” [Berlien v. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491; McNew v. Booth, 42 Mo. 189; Leahey v. Witte, 123 Mo. 207, and cases cited; Richardson v. Champion, 143 Mo. 545.]
31. But it is further urged that there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, in that Mrs. Nancy Phillips has no interest in common with her son Charles Phillips, the vendee of her husband, and that the petition is multifarious.
It is a general rule of equity pleading that all parties interested in the subject-matter of the suit are proper parties. The purpose of this suit is to redeem the lands in suit from the mortgage of the defendant Hardenburg. Mrs. Nancy Phillips, the widow of ■George Phillips, the original mortgagor, has the right to redeem her dower interest upon a proper showing, .and Charles Phillips, as vendee of his father, George
III. As to the claim that the petition is demurrable because it is not alleged that George Phillips, the mortgagor, was seized of an estate of inheritance and therefore the widow does not show herself entitled to' dower, it will be observed that the allegation is that her husband, George Phillips was “the owner and in possession of said real estate and conveyed it by mortgage to Hardenburg.”
The word “owner” standing alone signifies absolute owner or owner in fee simple, not a qualified or limited estate in the land. Our statute requires words.
Moreover, our statute does not restrict a widow to dower merely in an estate of inheritance. Section 2933, Bevised Statutes 1899, gives her dower in a leasehold estate for a term of twenty years or more, as in real estate, and for a less term than twenty years it is granted as in personal property.
The demurrer should have been overruled, and the judgment sustaining it is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.