OPINION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal by allowance from the opinion and order of the Superior Court vacating the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, and entering a judgement notwithstanding the verdict (“j.n.o.v.”) for Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation (“Appellee”).
Floyd Phillips (“Appellant-Husband”) was employed as a foundry worker from 1951 to 1981 by United States Steel Corporation (“Employer-U.S. Steel”). Throughout his career, Appellant-Husband performed various tasks which brought him into contact with silica sand.
A chest x-ray taken March 4, 1985 revealed that Appellant-Husband had contracted silicosis. In 1986, Appellant-Husband and his wife commenced suit based on both strict liability and negligence theories of recovery. Appellants’ strict liability claim against Appellee asserted that Appellee was liable because it had failed to warn Appellant-Husband that exposure to silica sand could cause silicosis.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on the negligence count, but afforded relief to Appellants on the striet liability claim. Appellee filed a motion for post-trial relief, requesting the entry of a j.n.o.v. on the strict liability count. This motion was denied and Appellee appealed.
The Superior Court vacated the order of the trial court and entered a j.n.o.v. in favor of Appellee. The Superior Court determined that Appellee could not be held liable on the strict liability claim as a matter of law, and gave two reasons to support its determination. First, the Superior Court decided that silica sand was not an “unreasonably dangerous” product, and thus Appellee could not be held strictly liable as a matter of law. The Superior Court’s second reason was that Ap-pellee was shielded from liability by the negligence-based defense of § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a defense which is commonly referred to as the “sophisticated user” defense.
In reviewing this entry of a j.n.o.v., we note that
[t]here are two bases upon which a judgment n.o.v. can be entered: one, the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first a court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. ...
Moure v. Raeuchle,
In this case, our first inquiry is whether the Superior Court correctly determined that Appellee, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable on the strict liability failure to warn claim. We conclude that the result reached by the Superior Court was correct, although our reasoning in support of this holding differs from that offered by the lower court.
Strict liability allows a plaintiff to recover where a product in “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer” causes harm to the plaintiff. Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts. See also Webb v. Zern,
As with the other two types of strict liability claims, a plaintiff raising a failure-to-warn claim must establish only two things: that the product was sold in a defective condition “unreasonably dangerous” to the user,
In this matter, Appellants failed to carry their burden: regardless of whether Appel-lee’s silica sand was defective due to a lack of a warning, Appellants cannot recover because they have failed to establish causation.
Appellants did attempt to establish that the alleged defect, Appellee’s failure-to-warn, caused Appellant-Husband’s injury. Appellants introduced the testimony of Appellant-Husband that he had never been told of the health hazards of silica sand, and did not know that he could injure his lungs due to exposure to silica dust. See, e.g., R.R. at 464 and 466. Appellee introduced rebuttal evidence that Employer-U.S. Steel provided dust masks to its workers and also had an extensive employee training program to educate its workers about the dangers of silica sand. See, e.g., 879, 1017-1019. Also, Appel-lee introduced into evidence that Appellant-Husband had stated during a deposition that he knew exposure to silica sand was harmful. See, e.g., R.R. at 487-488. The jury found Appellee’s version to be the more credible; it specifically determined that Appellant-Husband knew that he could contract silicosis by exposing himself to respirable silica dust, and voluntarily proceeded to expose himself to the product. Special Verdict Form RE: Floyd Phillips, R.R. at p. 1666. Thus, Appellants did not and cannot establish that Appellee’s alleged failure to warn about the dangers of silica sand caused Appellant-Husband’s silicosis because, as the jury found, Appellant-Husband knew of that risk about which the missing warning would have cautioned.
This holding is consistent with prior case law. In Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, supra, plaintiffs decedent was killed when a friend of the decedent fired a BB gun at the decedent’s head. Plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer should be held strictly liable because it had failed to warn the user of the dangers of a BB gun. It was established at trial that the user actually knew of the dangers of the BB gun even absent the warning. Based on this actual knowledge of the danger on the part of the user, Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the opinion announcing the Judgment of the Court, reasoned that the manufacturer could not be held strictly liable since the alleged deficiency in the warnings was not the cause of the accident.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the disposition of the Superior Court.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.
MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation.
Notes
. In both the trial court and the Superior Court, this matter was consolidated with another case, Harmotta v. Walter C. Best, Inc., et al. The Harmotta matter is not before this Court and thus it will not be discussed in this opinion.
. The foundry industry employs silica sand in the production of molds from which steel castings are made. For more than half a century, exposure to silica sand has been linked with the
. As the learned Judge Hudock noted in his concurring opinion below, such discussion of a possible defense for Appellee was dicta as the majority had already determined that Appellee could not be held strictly liable as a matter of law. Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories Co.,
. We granted allocatur on two separate dates. We first granted allocatur on May 11, 1994, and limited review to the "sophisticated user” issue. Subsequently, we granted allocatur on March 8, 1995 to determine whether the Superior Court properly held that Appellee was not strictly liable as a matter of law.
. The determination of whether an alleged defect would render a product "unreasonably dangerous” is a question of law. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, Inc.,
. See also Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products Co.,
.We note that while we come to the same conclusion as was reached by the Superior Court, our reasoning differs from that offered by the lower court.
The Superior Court determined that Appellee’s product was not in a defective condition unrea
Although we do not approve of the Superior Court’s analysis of whether Appellee’s product was defective, neither do we mean to intimate that their ultimate conclusion on this issue was necessarily incorrect. We need not and do not here determine whether Appellee’s product was indeed defective absent a warning; rather, our decision is based upon the determination that entry of a j.n.o.v. in Appellee's favor was appropriate because Appellant had failed, as a matter of law, to establish causation.
Finally, we emphasize that this opinion does not speak to the doctrine that the duty to warn is non-delegable. See Walton,