81 P.2d 279 | Wash. | 1938
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that, on July 6, 1937, the city of Seattle, defendant, was indebted to H.A. Bechtel Son, copartners, in the sum of $808.93, for sand and gravel sold and delivered; *387 and that, on that date, the partnership, for a good and valuable consideration, assigned, in writing, the indebtedness to the plaintiff. Copies of three assignments, aggregating the amounts sued for, were attached to the complaint. The assignments identified the funds assigned by reference to the numbers of the requisitions issued by the purchasing department of the city.
The city answered setting up the existence of adverse claims to the fund owing to Bechtel Son, and alleging that it disclaimed any further interest in the fund and stood ready and willing to abide by the action of the court thereon.
Bruce Bartley, as trustee in bankruptcy of Bechtel Son, intervened in the action and set up a claim, as trustee, to the fund, alleging that the partnership was adjudged bankrupt October 15, 1937; that, at the time the assignments were made, the partnership was insolvent, a fact the plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe; and that the enforcement of the assignment would effect an unlawful preference.
To the complaint in intervention, the plaintiff answered that, on May 15, 1937, Bechtel Son assigned to him one thousand dollars due them from N. Fiorito, Inc.; that, on June 11, 1937, the plaintiff released this assignment and accepted, in its stead, a parol assignment of an equivalent amount of money owing from the defendant, city of Seattle, the consideration for the second assignment being the release of the first; and that the written assignments of July 6th were made in fulfilment of the prior oral agreement. The court made the following findings of fact:
"No. 2651 July 27, 1937 $305.04 "No. 2727 Aug. 25, 1937 438.40 "No. 94740 Sep. 25, 1937 63.25
From these findings, the court concluded that the assignments by the bankrupt partnership to the plaintiff constituted a voidable preference, and that the intervening trustee was entitled to receive the assigned fund and the warrants representing it from the city. A judgment was accordingly entered ordering the city to surrender the warrants in controversy to the trustee; the plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
As no statement of facts has been filed, the question is whether the findings sustain the judgment. The written assignments were made within the four-month period preceding adjudication of bankruptcy and, as the court found, at a time when the appellant had reasonable cause to believe that Bechtel Son were insolvent. It cannot, therefore, be questioned that, if the appellant's right to the fund rests upon the written assignments alone, the judgment of the trial court is correct.
But the appellant contends that the oral agreement made June 11th, some days before the commencement *391 of the four-month period, effected an equitable assignment which was perfected by the written assignments of July 6th. It is the contention of the respondent that there was no present transfer by the oral agreement of any interest in, or control over, any fund in possession of the city, and that the agreement amounted to no more than a promise to pay out of a particular fund as and when available.
[1] The trial court based its decision largely upon our holding in Nickerson v. Hollet,
"The primary and controlling question is one of fact. It is admitted that there was no written or legal assignment of the claim to the appellants, but it is contended that the facts warrant a holding that there was an equitable assignment.
"The law as to what constitutes an equitable assignment is not in doubt, and is well stated as follows:
"`In order to work an equitable assignment there must be an absolute appropriation by the assignor of the debt or fund sought to be assigned to the use of the assignee. The intention of the assignor must be to transfer a present interest in the debt or fund or subject matter; if this is done the transaction is an assignment; otherwise not.' 5 C.J. 909.
"`The assignor of a chose in action must part with the power of control over the thing assigned; if he retains control it is fatal to the claim of the assignee.' 5 C.J. 912.
"See, also, Hossack v. Graham,
"While the evidence is not free from conflict, yet it rather clearly appears that the assignor did not part with control over the account in question, and that the assignees did not even assume to exercise control over it until after the written assignment had been made to the bank, and that no present interest passed to them. The trial court so found, and further found that there was here nothing more than an expressed intention to pay out of a particular fund." *392
In Hossack v. Graham, cited above, the court quotes as follows from 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), 3087, § 1284 (note):
"`The order on a future fund which thus operates as an equitable assignment should be carefully distinguished from amere promise to appropriate an existing or future fund in discharge of an obligation, or a mere promise to give an order on a fund, and the like.'"
We agree with the trial court that the principles announced inNickerson v. Hollet, supra, are controlling in the present case.
It appears from the findings that the sand and gravel, for which the city became indebted to Bechtel Son, was delivered in the latter part of June and during the months of July and August. The fund was not in existence June 11th, when the oral promise was made. While it is true that a fund to come into existence in the future may be assigned by parol agreement, there must be a transfer of present interest in the fund and an absolute appropriation by the assignor to the use of the assignee. The elements requisite for an equitable assignment are not present in the agreement of June 11th. The agreement was not an assignment, but a promise to assign in the future a fund as it became available. That the parties themselves did not consider that Bechtel Son had parted with control of the fund is evidenced by the fact found by the court that the partnership, by a later assignment in writing, transferred a part of the fund owing by the city to the Washington Machinery Storage Company.
In re Great Western Mfg. Co., 152 Fed. 123, the circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Sanborn, states the rule in bankruptcy:
"An agreement to mortgage or to transfer is not a mortgage or a transfer. The title remains in the owner *393 unincumbered by the mortgage until the mortgage or transfer is effected. When the agreement is made before, and the mortgage or transfer within, the four months, the title stands unincumbered by the latter at the commencement of the four months, and the proceeds of that title are pledged under the bankruptcy law for the benefit of all the creditors pro rata. Any subsequent mortgage or transfer withdraws that title or a portion of its value from these creditors, and a just and fair interpretation and execution of the act demands that such a mortgage or transfer should be adjudged voidable if it is otherwise so, and that the mortgagee or transferee should be remitted to his original agreement. In this way the property at the commencement of the four months and its value may be preserved for the general creditors, and the mortgagee or transferee may retain every lawful advantage his earlier contract confers upon him. Any other course of decision opens a new and enticing way to secure preferences, nullifies every provision of the law to prevent them, and invites fraud and perjury."
The appellant cites Terhune v. Weise,
The case of Terhune v. Weise involved the application of the trust fund doctrine. A contract had been entered into to make advances to a corporation for the purpose of enabling it to carry on its business upon the security of the company's lien rights and the assignment of sixty per cent of its accounts receivable. Holding that the contract was not voidable as a depletion of the corporation's assets, the court said:
"This court, in Lloyd v. Sichler,
In Horchover v. Pacific Marine Supply Co., a trustee in bankruptcy sued to recover money paid out by the bankrupt, as being a voidable preference. The payment was made to a company which had furnished supplies to the bankrupt salmon packing company in consideration of a credit of seventy-five cents per case as the salmon was received and bank loans made against it. Holding the agreement not one creating a voidable preference, the court said:
"The supplies furnished and credit extended by respondent to the Packing Co. went to increase the assets of the latter. Without such supplies and credit, the fund from which respondent was paid would never have come into being. Respondent was merely reimbursed from a fund which it helped to create by making it possible for the Packing Co. to proceed with its 1930 operations."
In the present case, the release by appellant of his right under the Fiorito assignment did not increase the assets of Bechtel Son or in any way help to create the fund here in controversy. The appellant released to Bechtel Son an assignment taken to secure a preexisting debt in order that they might satisfy the demands of another pressing creditor. The release *395 of the security in no way redounded to the advantage of the general creditors of the partnership.
The judgment is affirmed.
MAIN, HOLCOMB, BLAKE, and SIMPSON, JJ., concur.