Bryce v. PartinBryce v. Partin
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Andy D. Bennett, D. Michael Swiney, John W. Mcclarty
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded
Andy D. Bennett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and John W. McClarty, J., joined.
OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
On February 27, 2023, Philip Bryce, Debra Bryce, and J&P Advertising (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) filed a verified complaint in the Chancery Court for Anderson County against Nathan and Katherine Partin. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Partin owned property in Anderson County on which Plaintiffs maintained a billboard and that Plaintiffs had previously leased a portion of the property from a prior owner. It further alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Partin interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights under the lease by sending a letter in early 2023, purporting to terminate the lease and threatening to deny Plaintiffs access to the billboard. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the lease remained in effect and was enforceable, as well as damages and injunctive relief to prevent further interference.
By an agreed order entered in March 2023, the parties stipulated that neither would take any action regarding the billboard. In June 2023, Mr. and Mrs. Partin filed an answer in which they asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the leases were either void or had been materially breached by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim and asserted defenses. Mrs. Partin transferred all of her interest in the property to Mr. Partin and was dismissed from the action. In February 2024, the parties agreed to modify the agreed order to allow Plaintiffs to enter into a billboard advertising agreement with a third party and to pay all rent proceeds to the court. Plaintiffs then paid the rent proceeds into the court.
A bench trial was held on May 2, 2024. A large portion of the trial was spent recounting the lengthy ownership history of the land, the billboard, the leases, and the advertising permits for each sign face.1 Testimony was given by a prior owner of the property, James Yarber; one of the brothers who first built the billboard, John Rankin; Mrs. Byrce; and Mr. Partin. Exhibits introduced included the relevant leases and the chain of title for the property.
After the close of proof, the trial court orally ruled in favor of Mr. Partin and later entered a written order on July 22, 2024, including the following factual findings: In 1981, John Rankin acquired a piece of property in Anderson County, Tennessee, for the purposes of constructing and operating a billboard. In June 1983, John2 entered into a “Billboard Ground Lease” (“the first lease“) with his brother and business partner, Robert Rankin,
The trial court also found that the real property had been conveyed numerous times. Although John conveyed the property to another individual, the relevant conveyances began when Josephine Yarber acquired the property in 1991. Ms. Yarber built a house on the property and lived there until her passing in 2001. Upon her death, an 80% ownership interest in the property was devised to her son, Mr. Yarber, who conveyed the property to Mr. Partin in 2022; Mr. Partin continued to own the property at the trial.
The trial court then considered whether the first or second lease governed. The two leases concerned the same subject matter and were between the same parties; however, they provided inconsistent terms in numerous respects. The court determined that, where there were inconsistencies, the second lease would govern because “the terms of [the first lease] merged into [the second lease].” One of the most important inconsistencies between the leases was the term length. On this, the court found thusly:
The leases are inconsistent as to the length of the lease term. [The first lease] provides for a 50-year term, while [the second lease] provides for a 25-year term, with an option to extend it for a second 25-year term. Because the leases are inconsistent as to the length of the lease term, [the second lease] controls, and it provides that the initial lease term of 25 years would expire on December 1, 2008, unless renewed for a subsequent 25-year term. [The second lease] further provides that in order to extend the term “Lessee must notify Lessor in writing within 90 days before the end of this lease as to whether he will exercise his option or not.”
There was no proof [that] the [second] lease was extended by providing written notice of the extension within 90 days of December 1, 2008, to either James Douglas Yarber, who owned an 80% interest in the Partin property in 2008, or to any other owner of the Partin property in 2008. As a result, the term of the [second] lease expired on December 1, 2008, and
since that time the Plaintiffs’ use and possession of the southbound read face of the billboard structure has been as holdover tenants.
The court also found that Plaintiffs had not paid rent after the expiration of the lease but concluded that, even if the property owners had waived strict compliance with the lease‘s rent payment terms, there was no evidence that the lease had been properly extended. Therefore, the court concluded that the lease had expired. However, the court also concluded that the southbound read face4 was the personal property of Plaintiffs and that they had the right to remove it from the structure. The trial court also concluded that the rental proceeds deposited with the court should be paid to Mr. Partin minus the costs incurred to produce and install the advertisement on the billboard.
After the entry of this order, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that the trial court erred by awarding the rental income to Mr. Partin. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that the judgment should be amended to award 75% of the rental income to them based upon evidence that this is the typical allotment of income between owners of a billboard and owners of an underlying property. Alternatively, Plaintiffs requested that the judgment be amended to include various other expenses, thereby increasing the award to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also provided notice of an evidentiary hearing. In response, Mr. Partin asserted that new evidence should not be allowed to be introduced because Plaintiffs had this evidence in their possession at the time of the hearing, and that allowing new evidence would be an abuse of discretion.
A hearing on the motion was held on August 14, 2024. At the start of the hearing, the parties offered competing arguments regarding whether the trial court could hear additional testimony during a hearing on a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that it could hear additional evidence “to prevent manifest injustice,” reasoning that, should Mr. Partin be allowed to receive all of the rental income, this would be a manifest injustice to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the court allowed the evidentiary hearing to continue. Gary Douglas testified that, in his experience, the average percentage of the billboard‘s rental income paid to a landowner ranged from 12% to 25% of the gross proceeds from the billboard rental. Mr. Douglas based the 12% figure on his experience working for a large billboard company in the 1980s, which required all of the lease agreements under his supervision to average out to this percentage. However, Mr. Douglas stated that it was acceptable for leases to provide for a lower or higher percentage. When asked whether he knew if the company continued to use this percentage, Mr. Douglas testified that he did not. Mr. Douglas based the upper 25% limit on his experience working independently, which he stated gave him more room to negotiate. Mrs. Bryce testified next regarding the utility cost of the billboard. Lastly, Mr. Partin testified.
A written order modifying the final order was entered on August 23, 2024. Plaintiffs timely appealed and present the following issues for our review:
- Whether the trial court erred in finding that the December 1, 1983 lease expired on December 1, 2008, implicitly rejecting Plaintiffs’ defenses based on estoppel, laches, and waiver.
- Whether the trial court erred by not dismissing Mr. Partin‘s claims against Plaintiffs based on [the] expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
- Whether the trial court erred in its order disbursing the advertising proceeds paid into court during the pendency of the litigation.
Mr. Partin presents the additional issue of whether the Chancellor erred in reopening the record at the
Standard of Review
In an appeal from a bench trial, we review a trial court‘s factual findings de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence indicates otherwise.
Analysis
I. Waiver or forfeiture of issues on appeal
The first two issues presented by Plaintiffs are that, with respect to the counterclaim asserted by Mr. Partin, the trial court erred by “implicitly” rejecting the equitable defenses of estoppel, laches, and waiver asserted by Plaintiffs (in the role of counter-defendants) and that the applicable statute of limitations bars Mr. Partin‘s claims. In response, Mr.
“It is axiomatic that parties will not be permitted to raise issues on appeal that they did not first raise in the trial court.” Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Tenn. 2010). The burden of proving that the issues sought to be precluded were not raised in the trial court falls on the party asserting waiver. Id. Therefore, Mr. Partin bears the burden of proving that Plaintiffs did not raise these defenses before the trial court. When evaluating whether an issue has been waived, appellate courts should not “exalt form over substance” and should undertake a careful review of the record to determine whether a party is raising an issue for the first time on appeal. Id.
The parties in the present case largely agree on the facts presented to the trial court regarding these defenses. They do not dispute that the defenses of estoppel, laches, and waiver were listed as affirmative defenses by Plaintiffs in their answer to Mr. Partin‘s counterclaim. The parties similarly agree that the defenses were then largely unaddressed by Plaintiffs’ counsel at the trial. The parties disagree on whether the minimal presentation of these defenses is sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.
Beginning with the defense of laches, we conclude that this defense has been waived. In support of their argument that this defense was litigated in the trial court, Plaintiffs assert that the evidence presented could be interpreted as a laches defense “despite not using the word ‘laches’ specifically.” Laches is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded to be considered.
Next, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ statute of limitations defense has been forfeited.6 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding this defense essentially tracks their argument regarding laches, i.e., that although this defense was not presented by name, evidence before the trial court amounted to this defense. This defense was not included in Plaintiffs’ answer. “A statute of limitations defense must be specifically pled or generally it will be considered [forfeited].” Tip‘s Package Store, Inc. v. Com. Ins. Managers, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 543, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Turning next to the defense of estoppel, we find that the issue was raised by Plaintiffs in their answer and argued by Plaintiffs’ counsel at trial. “In other contexts, we have held that waiver does not occur if the opposing party is given fair notice of an argument and an opportunity to rebut it.” Tenn. Dep‘t of Safety and Homeland Sec. v. Shell, No. M2021-00108-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1410643, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2022). In his closing argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated, “I think Mr. Partin and his predecessor[s in] interest[ ] ought to be estop[ped] from asserting that there was an issue with renewal of the lease or receipt of payments.” We conclude that this defense was not waived.
Finally, although Plaintiffs assert that the defense of waiver was “implicitly” denied, the trial court did, at least minimally, rule on this issue. In the final order, the trial court stated:
In addition, there was no proof that the minimal rent payments due under the lease were paid, but even if it is assumed for argument[‘s sake] that the Yarber[s] waived strict compliance with the terms of the lease, then, nevertheless, there was no proof that the Plaintiffs took any action to extend the lease.
II. Plaintiffs’ affirmative defenses to the counterclaim
a. Equitable estoppel
We turn next to whether the trial court erred by not finding Mr. Partin to be equitably estopped from asserting his counterclaims against Plaintiffs.
As noted above, the trial court‘s order did not address Plaintiffs’ estoppel defense. Although Plaintiffs assert that the trial court “implicitly” rejected their defense, we believe the order is better understood as failing to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law under
Determining which option is appropriate comes down to several considerations. An appellate court may choose to soldier on when the trial court‘s decision is “readily ascertainable” or “involves only a clear legal issue.” Bailey v. Bailey, No. M2022-01467-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1517411, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2025) (collecting cases). Remand is the appropriate remedy in instances where a complicated factual predicate exists or witness credibility findings are needed to make a decision. Id. This case falls into the former category. It is implicit in the trial court‘s decision that it did not credit Plaintiffs’ estoppel defense, as it ruled in favor of Mr. Partin. We also do not find this to be a case with a complicated factual predicate regarding the application of estoppel. Therefore, we will soldier on and conduct our own review of the record and Plaintiffs’ estoppel defense.
Our Supreme Court has previously laid out the following elements of a claim for equitable estoppel:
The party asserting equitable estoppel must establish that the other party (1) engaged in conduct amounting to false representations or concealment of material facts, (2) intended or expected that the party asserting equitable estoppel would rely on that conduct, and (3) had actual or constructive knowledge of the real facts. Osborne v. Mountain Life Ins. Co., 130 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tenn. 2004). The party asserting estoppel also must prove that it (1) lacked knowledge of the real facts, (2) relied on the other party‘s conduct, and (3) was prejudiced. Id.
Pandharipande v. FSD Corp., 679 S.W.3d 610, 621 (Tenn. 2023); see also Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315-16 (Tenn. 2009).
Plaintiffs’ argument here ignores the requirements set forth by our Supreme Court and instead presents an oversimplification of the elements of equitable estoppel by omitting the requirements that the conduct amounts to false representations or concealment of material facts and that the other party intended the party asserting estoppel would rely on that conduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that all that is required is for a party to show “reliance upon the statement or actions of another without opportunity to know the truth and (2) action based on that reliance which results in detriment to the one acting.” While we acknowledge that this formulation of the elements of estoppel comes from caselaw, we note that it follows a detailed recitation of the requirements of equitable estoppel and does not provide a comprehensive description. See Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Under the more complete formulation recently given by our Supreme Court, Plaintiffs’ argument fails.
Plaintiffs’ argument for why Mr. Partin should be estopped from asserting that the lease expired is essentially that the passage of time during which Mr. Yarber did not inform
At the outset, we note that Plaintiffs only assert that Mr. Partin is estopped based upon the actions of Mr. Yarber and do not assert Mr. Partin‘s action would support a finding of estoppel. “When parties would be estopped, their heirs and privies in estate are also estopped.” Farley v. Ellis, No. W2000-00354-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1876431, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2000) (citing LaRue v. Greene Cnty. Bank, 166 S.W.2d 1044, 1052 (Tenn. 1942); Heiskell v. Cobb, Tenn. 638 (Tenn. 1872)). Because Mr. Partin purchased the property from Mr. Yarber, they are considered to be “privies in estate.” See, e.g., Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 705 (Tenn. 1880) (“The relation of privies may be created by . . . voluntary or involuntary transfers from one person to another, and denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property“). Thus, we will examine whether Mr. Yarber‘s actions satisfy the elements of estoppel.
Plaintiffs do not assert that Mr. Yarber engaged in conduct amounting to concealment or misrepresentation of Ms. Yarber‘s death. Instead, Plaintiffs only assert inaction by Mr. Yarber. That Mr. Yarber did not actively seek out Plaintiffs to inform them of his mother‘s death does not amount to concealment or misrepresentation. Nor do Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Yarber intended or expected Plaintiffs to rely on any supposed concealment or misrepresentation of Ms. Yarber‘s death. Further, even if Mr. Yarber‘s inaction regarding the passing of his mother did amount to concealment or misrepresentation, he would still not have concealed material facts sufficient to prevent Plaintiffs from asserting their claim under the lease. The mere fact that Mr. Yarber did not reach out to Plaintiffs to inform them of his mother‘s death did nothing to conceal material facts regarding the validity of the lease or its expiration, facts that were ascertainable by Plaintiffs. We are similarly unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that they were deprived of information concerning to whom to send the renewal. The identity of the current property owner was readily ascertainable by Plaintiffs. Therefore, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ estoppel argument fails.
Plaintiffs’ sole remaining affirmative defense to the counterclaim is waiver of strict compliance with the renewal terms. The trial court considered whether a waiver had occurred and concluded that, even if strict compliance with the terms governing rent payments had been waived, no evidence of renewal was presented. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Partin and his predecessors in title waived the renewal provision, resulting in an extension of the lease until 2033. We respectfully disagree.
“‘[P]arties are free to negotiate any number of . . . arrangements for renewal options by including specific and pertinent language in the lease agreement.‘” Jones v. VCPHSC I, LLC, No. W2016-02142-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 575349, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018) (quoting Norton v. McCaskill, 12 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tenn. 2000)). In this case, the second lease provided the following terms for the term of the lease and its renewal:
The term of this lease shall be for (25) twenty-five consecutive years, commencing on December 1, 1983, at the rental sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) per year, being due and payable on December 1st of each year during the term of this Agreement. In addition, Lessee has option to renew this lease for a second twenty-five year period for the rental sum of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per year, being due and payable on December 1st of each year during the term of this Agreement. Lessee must notify Lessor in writing within 90 days before the end of this lease as to whether he will exercise his option or not.
On appeal, Plaintiffs concede that there is no evidence in the record that this renewal option was exercised and, therefore, do not challenge the trial court‘s finding that the lease expired in 2008. Plaintiffs instead assert that Mr. Yarber waived strict compliance with the renewal provision, thus creating a holdover tenancy binding Mr. Partin for the remaining lease term until 2033.
Waiver is considered “‘an excuse for nonperformance of contractual duties or conditions . . . based in large part on the policies against forfeiture and unjust enrichment.‘” GuestHouse Int‘l., LLC v. Shoney‘s N. Am. Corp., 330 S.W.3d 166, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:15 (4th ed. 2009)). Indeed, the defense of waiver is designed to prevent the party waiving compliance from “‘lulling another‘” into the belief that strict compliance will not be required and then suing the other party for that very noncompliance. Id. As is the case here, “waiver is defensive in nature,” meaning that it is raised as a defense to a breach of contract claim. Id. at 202. “The law will not presume a waiver, and the party claiming the waiver has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.” Jenkins Subway, Inc. v. Jones, 990 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Whether a party has waived a contractual provision is a
Waiver must be “proven by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party, showing a purpose to forgo the right or benefit which is waived.” E & A Ne. Ltd. P‘ship v. Music City Rec. Distribs. Inc., No. M2005-01207-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 858779, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007). “Waiver ‘may be proved by express declaration; or by acts and declarations manifesting an intent and purpose not to claim the supposed advantage; or by a course of acts and conduct.‘” GuestHouse, 330 S.W.3d at 202 (quoting Chattem Inc. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 676 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. 1984)). Indeed, “[m]ere silence, acquiescence, or inactivity is insufficient to show a waiver of contract rights when there is no duty to speak or act.” 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:35. “Similarly, forbearance to assert or insist on a right does not, by itself, constitute a waiver.” Id.
In the context of a lease provision regarding renewal, “a landlord may waive notice, [but] our courts generally require evidence of an express waiver or acceptance of rent payments as specified in the renewal provision and other action consistent with the exercise of the renewal option.” Jones, 2018 WL 575349, at *3. In the present case, neither of these conditions is present. Plaintiffs do not assert that Mr. Yarber provided an express waiver of the renewal provision. Plaintiffs also concede that there is no evidence in the record that they paid rent after December 1, 2008. The evidence in the record supports a finding that the billboard largely remained untouched during Mr. Yarber‘s ownership of the property. In essence, it appears the lease expired, and Mr. Yarber did not exercise his right to remove Plaintiffs from the property. Mr. Yarber did not act in a manner that showed an intent to waive the renewal requirements of the contract. Instead, it appears he did not exercise his right to remove the billboard from his property.8
Plaintiffs also attempt to circumvent the requirements for a holdover tenancy by asserting that the rent payments were “nominal.” We find the case cited by Plaintiffs to be inapposite because it discusses nominal consideration for a deed of sale, not rental payments. See Jordan v. Black, 19 Tenn. 142 (Tenn. 1838). We, therefore, decline to find in the first instance that the rent was nominal. However, even assuming for argument‘s sake that the rent could be considered nominal, we do not believe this was sufficient to alter the requirement of rental payments for creating a holdover tenancy. In the case that Plaintiffs cite, the court upheld nominal consideration as adequate for a deed of sale,
The second lease is quite clear regarding how Plaintiffs were to renew the lease, and Plaintiffs failed to comply with its terms or to show a waiver. Our decision comports with general principles regarding waiver. Indeed, “a waiver of a material part of the agreed exchange is ineffective. Only an immaterial part of the agreed exchange may be waived.” GuestHouse, 330 S.W.3d at 202 (citation modified). Similarly, the doctrine of waiver primarily applies to conditions that are procedural or technical in nature. Id. at 201. Here, Plaintiffs are not asserting that a technical or procedural condition of the contract was immaterial such that an implied waiver is appropriate. Instead, Plaintiffs are asserting that “the very object of the” lease was immaterial, i.e., the rent due under the contract.9 See id at 203; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. d (1981). We decline to create an exception for instances when rent is “nominal.”
In the present case, we cannot conclude that Mr. Yarber acted in a manner that resulted in a waiver of the renewal provision or implicitly created a holdover tenancy.10
The remaining issues pertain to the trial court‘s decisions to hold an evidentiary hearing, grant Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment, and reallocate the rental income.11
As stated above, the trial court initially entered an injunction preventing either party from taking any action with respect to the billboard. However, the parties subsequently submitted an agreed order to modify the injunction to allow Plaintiffs to enter into an advertising agreement with a third party, which the trial court then entered. After this, Plaintiffs entered into an advertising agreement, which provided for a one-year rental term with $1,500 due per month as rent, meaning that the total value of the contract was $18,000. These payments were to be paid to the court and then would be distributed based on the result of the trial. In the court‘s final order, the court concluded that “[t]he funds currently being paid into the Court pursuant to the rental of the southbound read face are the property of the Defendant, Nathan Partin, but prior to any distribution to him, the Plaintiffs should be reimbursed $1,310.65 as their reasonable costs incurred to produce and install the sign.”
However, after this, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that the judgment should be modified to “reflect [the] reasonable and just compensation to Plaintiff and Partin out of the rental funds.” After a hearing on the motion, the court entered an order modifying the judgment, stating:
In order to prevent manifest injustice, the Court exercises its discretion and finds that the Judgment should be altered to allow the Plaintiffs to be reimbursed their production expenses of $1,310.65, utility expenses of $100 per month, and $4,500, for the use of their sign face and permit. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Judgment therefore should be altered to provide that Plaintiffs should receive from the rental income produced by the current lease their production expenses of $1,310.65, electric utility expenses of $100 per month (or a total utility expense not to exceed $1,200), and an additional $375 per month (or a total not to exceed $4,500) for use of the Plaintiff‘s sign face and permit.
We are guided in this case by our Supreme Court‘s decision in AHCI, Inc. v. Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. 1995). Lamar concerned two ground leases entered into for the purpose of maintaining billboards. 898 S.W.2d at 192. After the expiration of the leases, Lamar continued to pay the original rent to the lessors as holdover tenants. Id. The properties were subsequently sold, and the new owners demanded increased rent, a demand Lamar refused. Id. The parties attempted to negotiate; however, no agreement was reached, and Lamar failed to pay any rent while continuing to maintain billboards on the properties. Id. The plaintiffs then filed suit for unpaid rent, asserting that Lamar owed the increased rates demanded because they continued to operate the billboard after the holdover period expired. Id. The plaintiffs also demanded that Lamar remove the billboards, and Lamar complied. Id.
Our Supreme Court first determined that Lamar could not be bound to the higher rent term, an issue not relevant to the present case. Id. at 194-95. However, after concluding that Lamar could not be bound to the higher rent term, the Supreme Court concluded:
Having so held, and given the fact that the leases were not extended beyond the holdover periods, the parties had no lease agreements after November 1987 (with respect to the AHCI property) and March 1988 (with respect to the Jacadeda property). In the absence of such agreements, Lamar may, in accordance with the traditional equitable doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, see Paschall‘s Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Tenn. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966), only be held liable for the fair market rental value for the period in which it occupied the premises. See Revlon Group Inc. v. LJS Realty, Inc., 579 So.2d 365 (Fla. App. 1991) (although no valid lease agreement existed between assignor and assignee, assignee was required to pay assignor fair rental value for its occupation of premises); Theriot v. P & R Farms Inc., 527 So.2d 3 (La. App. 1988) (in the absence of an express lease agreement, owner may recover fair rental value under theory of quantum meruit).
Id. at 195. The Court continued to hold that, “Where there is no agreement between the parties, the tenant becomes liable for the fair market rental value for the period that it occupies the premises beyond the term of the lease.” Id. at 196. This reasoning applies in the present matter.
Unfortunately, Mr. Douglas‘s testimony concerned the range of percentages of gross sales that billboard businesses typically paid in rent to the property owner. Additionally, some of Mr. Douglas‘s testimony regarding these percentages stemmed from his experience in the 1980s, and he stated he did not know if this was still accurate. Mr. Douglas‘s testimony also indicated that, while 12% was an average, other percentages were acceptable. While the court acknowledged the 25% figure, it did not make a finding adopting or rejecting this percentage. Without findings by the trial court, this Court cannot make this determination. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the fair market rental value of the property to be paid to Mr. Partin, and for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court is affirmed in all other respects.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally against the appellant, Debra Bryce, and the appellee, Nathan Partin, for which execution may issue if necessary.
/s/ Andy D. Bennett
ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
Notes
Houghton v. Malibu Boats, LLC, --- S.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 2971436, at *6 n.13 (Tenn. 2025). Based upon the differences in how the claims were presented to the trial court, we believe Plaintiffs have waived their laches defense and forfeited their statute of limitations defense.Courts often use the words waiver and forfeiture interchangeably. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004). However, there is a distinction. “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.‘” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.