Philip Gregory Byrd, Lucy Leasing Co., LLC, and PGB Air, Inc. v. Vick, Carney & Smith LLP, Cantey Hanger LLP, and Nancy Ann Simenstad

BYRD, Lucy Leasing Philip Gregory Air, Inc.,

Co., LLC, and PGB

Appellants LLP,

VICK, & SMITH CARNEY LLP, Simenstad, Appellees.

Ann

No. 02-11-00468-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court

Fort Worth.

Aug. 2013. Sept.

Rehearing Overruled Barton, Johnson, K.

Russell R. Roland Harris, Burt, Finley Zach & J. Johnson P.C., Lumley, Joseph V. W. Bogle, Lisa Shannon, Gracey, M. Keith Spence Ogle, & TX, Miller, LLP, Worth, for & Fort Ratliff Appellees. Aledo, TX, Simenstad, pro

Nancy Ann se.

PANEL; C.J.; LIVINGSTON, MEIER, JJ. GARDNER OPINION LIVINGSTON, Justice. TERRIE Chief appeal is an the trial court’s This from incorporating partial judgment final summary judgment an order of dis- part We reverse remand missal. part. and affirm

Background ap- Philip Gregory Byrd and Appellant Ann di- Simenstad pellee were Texas, August County, Parker vorced 2008; judge of the 415th District Court signed agreed August decree on No- pro and a decree nunc tunc on 17, 2008. At times dur- vember different proceedings, appellees divorce ing the Vick, Carney Smith LLP and represented Nancy. LLP In Au- Co., LLC, Philip, Lucy Leasing gust Mr, bringing appellees, and PGB Inc. sued alleged ac- arising appellees’ claims proceed- during tions and after the divorce Leasing Air were ings. Lucy and PGB formed before the companies by Philip title, divorce; majority “right, in both was awarded companies interest” agreed Appel- Philip in the decree.1 Firm, Rames, aiding and abet- Lindsey brought M. Rames Law lants (child P.C., Dallas, TX, family 42.008 ting under code section Appellants. parties in the companies 1. The interest in the was not con- nies was divided between the instead, Nothing Philip's separate property; agreed decree. in the record shows firmed as title, compa- ownership companies. "right, structure of these all and interest” in both interference), fraud, custody and IIED. their conspiracy, In sixth through ninth conversion, defamation, unfair debt collec- points, they contend that the trial court tion infliction practices, intentional of emo- by granting summary erred judgment for (IIED), enrichment, unjust tional distress on their claims for temporary and violations of the orders and conspiracy, aiding abetting, and IIED. final decree. Although appellants’ notice of appeal indi cates the to appeal intent the summary 27, 2011, January

On for Vick Carney, appellants’ filed a motion motion to dismiss and prayer asks this court only to reverse appellants’ all of Cantey Hanger Carney Vick claims. filed a motion for and the dismissing order the claims judgment, or in summary the alternative a Therefore, against Nancy. we will review dismiss, motion to in March 2011. only orders for Hanger and pro filed a se motion to dismiss and for Bros., Nancy. Malooly See Inc. Napier, v. judgment. summary (Tex.1970); S.W.2d Murphy Appellants peti- filed a second amended Gruber, v. 700 (Tex.App. May tion they in in which removed denied). -Dallas pet. custody their section 42.003 child interfer- allegation ence aiding their and Motion to Dismiss abetting claim and their removed claims Appellants not challenge did the trial regarding violation of the decree and tem- court’s unjust dismissal of their enrich- porary June orders. On the trial court claim; thus, ment we pro- will review the summary heard the judgment motions priety the dismissal order their as to granted and the motions of Han- fraud, conversion, claims for conspiracy, ger Carney Vick appellants’ and on all of defamation, only. IIED and claims. The trial court Nancy’s denied motion, however. Nancy’s motion contends that be appellants’ cause are claims based Nancy filed a second motion dismiss final decree—and thus are more properly summary judgment, the trial which in brought an enforcement they ultimately court action— granted, dismissing all must be brought the divorce court. Ac appellants’ against Nancy claims and mak cording Nancy, all of the claims ing all appealable. orders final and her are on appellants’ allegations based Corp., Lehmann Har-Con that with comply property she failed 191, 195 (Tex.2001).

division the decree and that she failed to Appeal comply provisions with the decree’s re Points garding possession of and access Appellants nine In bring points. their couple’s children. points, they first five contend the trial court concluding juris erred it had no Although Nancy characterizes the suit action,2 against Nancy diction over their claims appellants, by as an enforcement conversion, defamation, claims, conspiracy, their do seek enforce the Const, V, 8; decree."), § § 2. See Tex. art. Tex. Gov't Code court rendered the 9.002 (West 2004); § ("The Ann. 24.008 see also Tex. court that of di- rendered decree (West 2006) ("A § Fam.Code Ann. 9.001 power vorce or annulment retains the to en- may request affected decree divorce ... property provided force the division as by filing enforcement of that decree a suit to 7."). Chapter provided by chapter enforce this in the Therefore, we decree; rather, only. and IIED claims they ting, seek provisions summary con alleged wrongful propriety based on will review damages di during only. claims by Nancy judgment after on those duct Easton, See James v. proceedings. vorce of Review Standard (Tex.App.-Houston denied) (holding de pet. review a [14th Dist.] We wrong Joachim, litigant for against opposing Ins. novo. Travelers Co. brought (Tex.2010). ful need be lawsuit We consider in which the conduct occurs the suit light most presented the evidence tort). independent can the basis of an be nonmovant, crediting evi- favorable to the conspiracy claims Appellants’ fraud and if rea- to the nonmovant dence favorable allegations on their are based could, jurors disregarding evi- sonable falsify an conspired with contrary to the nonmovant unless dence airplane bill of sale after divorce not. Mann jurors reasonable could money large withdrew amounts she Advisors, Lipp Stein & Inc. Frankfort she did knowing from bank account a PGB (Tex.2009). 844, Fielding, 289 S.W.3d authority to so. The not have the do every inference and indulge We reasonable on claims are likewise based conversion fa- resolve doubts the nonmovant’s alleged money Nancy’s withdrawal Parker, 20801, Inc. v. 249 S.W.3d vor. Lucy account. Leasing and PGB’s bank (Tex.2008). A who conclu- defendant IIED claims are The defamation and sively ele- negates at least one essential alleged occurring after actions based is to ment a cause action entitled attempt are not claims decree. These summary judgment on that claim. Frost decree. ing to enforce the terms Fernandez, 315 Nat’l Bank v. Fernander, No. 03-08- See Fernander v. 166a(b), (Tex.2010); P. see Tex.R. Civ. 00222-CV, *3 (c). The required defendant meet no May pet.) App.-Austin plaintiffs pleaded case as to demonstrate Solares, op.); Solares prevail. that the cannot Cook plaintiff 2007, no (Tex.App.-Dallas pet.). Churchill, Fountain, Brundidge, Elliott Nancy’s hold conclude and that (Tex.1976). We 751, 759 for are enforcement claims Applicable Facts exclusive, has con- which the divorce court and, thus, the tri- jurisdiction3 tinuing Appellants alleged in their second motion to by granting al court erred Cantey Hanger amended and petition ap- ground.4 on that We sustain dismiss Piper a bill of sale for a falsified fifth pellants’ through first issues. by Lucy N21113 owned Seminole No. manag- Leasing to show was a Cantey Hanger Summary Judgment Leasing authority to Lucy er of and had ownership airplane. transfer Accord- challenge trial court’s Appellants and appellants, summary judgment fraud, abefc- did so to shift tax conspiracy, aiding their and McNeely, We 4. do not address the Chavez Nancy’s (Tex.App.-Houston part of because the trial [1st motion Dist.] court, dismissing her pet.) (holding and 9.002 her claims based on that sections 9.001 arguments, jurisdictional did not rule on the provide do divorce court with exclusive actions). jurisdiction enforcement motion. even over Lucy airplane Leasing. Appellants sale to to her in the by signing Decree as “Nan- also “purpose- cy Byrd” listing her title as “Man- fully notify [Philip] ager” LUCY, failed and the of Plaintiff though [trial] even changes of their Court the Final Decree Defendant CANTEY HANGER and SI- grant Divorce so that the Court would MENSTAD were aware that Defendant for Judgment Motion Nunc Pro officer, Tunc SIMENSTAD was never an effectively change the division of manager debts owner or of Plaintiff LUCY past the date allowed for modification of changed and that she her last name the Decree.” Appellants challenge do not back to “Simenstad.” Defendants CAN- allega- on the second TEY HANGER and SIMENSTAD did tion, only relating the first to alleged falsi- so to fraudulently liability, avoid tax sale, airplane fication of the bill of shifting which is it to Plaintiff LUCY.

the basis of their conspiracy, and Finally, action, under their fraud cause of aiding abetting claims. they claimed that Specifically, appellants alleged as their Defendants CANTEY HANGER and aiding abetting claim that SIMENSTAD, with the intent to avoid

Defendant CANTEY HANGER as- paying taxes and with the intent to shift sisted Defendant SIMENSTAD to com- LUCY, tax liability to Plaintiff falsified mit fraud in the sale of belong- (a aircraft an aircraft bill of sale federal docu- ment) ing to Plaintiff LUCY. Defendant properly refused to change CANTEY HANGER aided Defendant registration of the aircraft. Defen- by falsifying SIMENSTAD the bill of dant SIMENSTAD was not allowed by sale for the listing aircraft Defendant law to sell the directly aircraft to a manager SIMENSTAD as a of Plaintiff purchaser on behalf of Plaintiff LUCY. having LUCY Defendant SIMEN- Cantey Hanger moved for summary STAD sign manager as a of LUCY. judgment on the aiding and abet- Defendant CANTEY HANGER further ting, conspiracy ground assisted Defendant SIMENSTAD to that duty it had no to Philip as it was not evade tax liability for her sale of the privity divorce, him in with that it aircraft shift the tax liability to was immune from for actions tak- Plaintiff LUCY. en in its representation Nancy in the conspiracy Their claim is that divorce, and that for those reasons its al- Defendant CANTEY HANGER con- leged actions were not fraudulent as a spired with Defendant SIMENSTAD to matter of law.5 According Cantey Han- (a complete a ger, fraudulent bill of sale fed- alleged all of the actions it took were document) eral for an airplane awarded in the representing Nancy course of fore, “Reply Support In its In Of Motion ... For we argu do not consider its additional Summary Judgment,” Cantey Hanger con grounds ments that document as additional See, tended that as a summary judgment. matter of law it could e.g., Reliance Hibdon, have committed fraud in the sale of the air Ins. Co. v. Dist.j 2011, Nancy denied) craft it App.-Houston because was awarded to pet. [14th ("A Additionally, Cantey Hanger divorce. (op. reh’g) con movant is not entitled to appellants tended any reply “did not take summary ac use its to amend its motion for tion in reliance on the ‘false bill of independent or to raise new and ” sale.' specifical summary-judgment grounds.”); But did not Garcia v. ly Garza, amend its motion for (Tex.App.-San Anto grounds denied). reply. raise additional pet. its There nio pro decree nunc evidence, Hanger The November suit.6 As divorce decree, provisions of the same pro decree nunc contains most tunc attached attorneys. tunc, August of two of its 2008 decree.8 and affidavits as the Hanger allege did not Importantly, Cantey affidavits, an In of the one in motion for sum- grounds its no-evidence Nancy in the represented that he averred mary judgment. divorce, pro- enforcement post-judgment enti- agreed decree part In the of the bankruptcy Byrd’s personal ceedings, and Estate,” Philip tled, of Marital “Division ac- He also stated that proceeding. “[a]ll title, and interest right, “[a]ll was awarded re- by Cantey with tions taken Co., Air, Lucy Leasing Inc. and in PGB in the course to Plaintiffs were made spect LLC, set forth in except specifically Nancy. He scope representing” IX(B)(4)” the decree. That sec- Section Byrd that “Plaintiff further averred proper- Nancy separate as her tion awards entities, Lucy defunct business his two No. Piper Seminole ty airplanes: three Air, Inc., Co., PGB have Leasing LLC and N21113, number Piper Seminole relationship attorney-client never had N2950A, numbered and an aircraft always but have been with also states that That section N2816R.7 client,” former Cantey Hanger’s adverse any part of said “shall not remove Philip attorney averred that Nancy. The other condition.” alter their planes or otherwise Nancy in the divorce and represented she to exe- ordered each The decree the firm were in actions taken that all nonsigna- for the attorneys cute—and representing Nan- scope the course and to trans- to draft —documents tory parties cy. airplanes ownership fer of the to their Appellants attached days ten of the date decree. within Philip an affidavit from judgment response Nancy is not liable The decree states that he had never in which stated but airplanes, on the encumbrance officer, “owner, manager or di- been an responsi- provides it further Air.” He Lucy Leasing or PGB rector of “liens, taxes, as- any ble for ad valorem as follows: further averred sessments, to be- charges or other due or airplanes Nancy ... sold one of the personal property on the come due her in the Divorce that was awarded to or- her. The decree also awarded to” to draft Cantey Hanger was Decree. file 2007 and party dered that each should the transfer the to effectuate documents individually and would 2008 income taxes sign for me to on behalf airplane of the refund percent be entitled to 100 Leasing. I never received the Lucy agreed that he Philip received. admitted sign. for me to La- 2008 decree. transfer documents August to the terms of the pro 8.Philip disputes decree nunc grounds that the Cantey raised other error; specifically at the merely directed a clerical how tunc corrected claims, appellants ever, which challenge enforcement the sum because he did not petition; dropped from their second amended allegations mary judgment as to his related to therefore, grounds. not address those we do tunc, entry pro we will of the decree nunc Bros., Malooly dispute. not address Philip planes awarded to 7. Two other were 119, Napier, 461 S.W.2d Inc. v. Marital Estate” section of the the "Division of Gruber, 689, 1970); Murphy v. decree; a agreed a No. 7295E and Cessna 2007, denied). pet. (Tex.App.-Dallas 3340S; nothing the record Cessna No. planes name those were indicates in whose registered or titled. ter, I ... 01-06-00696-CV, 746548, found out that had sold No. 2008 WL plane directly purchaser. to another *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. signed “manager” denied) (mem. She the bill of sale as pet. op. on reh’g). An Lucy Leasing when she was never a attorney who could be held liable for state manager Lucy Leasing I and was the ments made or actions taken in the course manager Lucy Leasing. By

sole do- of representing his client would be forced this, Lucy Leasing she made constantly to potential balance his own ex seller of the aircraft purchaser posure against his client’s best interest. responsible for sales tax. Neither Crain, Alpert James, P.C., Catón Cantey she nor ever transferred 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st airplane Nancy.... they And did denied). pet. Dist.] Such a result complete registration for the would act as a severe crippling deter airplane they when sold it. The aircraft rent to justice the ends of because a liti is still improperly registered Lucy gant might be denied a full development of 26, 2011], Leasing [May to date rights. Servs., Ltd., Dixon Fin. Nothing the record at *7. indicates whose name the other planes registered two were promote To representa zealous or titled at the time of the divorce or tion, courts have held that an attorney has summary judgment proceeding. “qualified immunity” from civil liability, Appellants also produced bill of sale respect nonclients, with for actions tak Piper for the Seminole No. N21113 dated inen connection with representing a client November 2009. The trial court struck litigation. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405. of sale on Hanger’s hearsay bill qualified This immunity generally applies objection. Because appellants do not chal even if conduct wrongful in the context lenge the trial ruling court’s Id.; underlying Renfroe, lawsuit. Hanger’s objections, may we not consider 947 S.W.2d at 287-88. example, For the bill of sale. See v. Islamic Kaufman third has independent right Soc’y Arlington, 291 S.W.3d 137 n. recovery against filing mo (Tex.App.-Fort pet. Worth de lawsuit, tions in a even if frivolous or with nied). merit, out although such conduct is sanc- Applicable Law tionable contemptible enforced

Texas law attorneys authorizes the statutory or powers inherent to “practice their profession, court. Alpert, advise 178 S.W.3d at 405. Courts clients, their interpose any and to defense have acknowledge refused to an indepen defense, supposed without making dent cause of action in such instances “be themselves for damages.” liable Kruegel making cause motions is conduct an attor (Tex.Civ. 343, v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 345 ney engages in part discharge as of the 1910, ref'd); App.-Dallas writ see his duties in representing party a in a Renfroe Assocs., 285, v. & Jones 947 S.W.2d 287 lawsuit.” Id. Under the same reasoning, 1997, denied). (Tex.App.-Fort Worth attorney writ an opposing party may an not purpose behind this well-established merely-for be held liable for fraud making rule attorney is allow an representations to fulfill his opposing party to the duty zealously represent his clients litigation that further the best interests of without subjecting himself to the threat of his own clients. E.g., Hong, 249 Chu Servs., liability. 441, Dixon (Tex.2008); Fin. Ltd. v. Green S.W.3d 446 & n. 19 Peden, Oshman, berg, P.C., McCamish, Martin, Siegmyer & Brown & Loeffler 780 787, be held liable for Interests, during trial could lawyer 991 S.W.2d Appling

F.E. Bradt, at 72. 892 S.W.2d (Tex.1999). conduct that act. See attorney’s If an 794 responsibility, professional violates his attorney personally who “An Renfroe, public, private. not remedy is behalf lies on a client’s goods steals or tells at 287. 947 S.W.2d ... fraud in some cases.” may be liable for immunity qualified added); rule of Chu, This (emphasis 249 at 446 Brown, in which the type of conduct McCamish, Martin, focuses on Loeffler, see than on whether rather attorney engages priv (noting that the 991 S.W.2d at 793-94 in the context meritorious the conduct was party a third ity requirement prohibits at underlying lawsuit. Id. attorney legal malprac suing from an con the kind —not nature —of is “[I]t torts, negligent tice but not other such Fin. controlling.” Dixon duct Likover v. misrepresentation); Sunflower 746548, *7; Servs., Ltd., at see 2008 WL II, Ltd., Terrace Cracken, F.Supp. Corp. Bell Taco writ) 1985, no App.-Houston Dist.] [1st (N.D.Tex.1996) op. and attorney if he (holding that is liable “[a]n order). Thus, cannot be held attorney an act that knowingly commits a fraudulent party to a third for conduct liable knowingly or if he injures person, a third office, training, requires professional “the a third conspiracy into a to defraud enters skill, authority attorney.” an Dix representing his person” in the course of Ltd., Servs., 2008 WL on Fin. client). conspira To be held so liable for Stonehenge/Fasa- (quoting Miller v. *7 agreed have cy, must Texas, JDC, L.P., F.Supp. merely injury accomplished, to be (N.D.Tex.1998) (order)). Incorrect, merit- ultimately resulting injury. less, not ac and even frivolous conduct is Chu, at 446. 249 S.W.3d satisfies this standard. Id. tionable if it Analysis attorney’s An protection Here, Cantey Hanger’s prepara boundless, Id. at

liability is not however. to facilitate transfer of tion of a bill of sale can be held liable *8. An its client in an airplane awarded to part that are not third-party for actions was conduct agreed to his client. divorce decree discharge of his duties 406; discharge his attorney engages v. which an 178 S.W.3d at Bradt Alpert, Servs., West, client. See Dixon Fin. (Tex.App.-Hous duties denied). Ltd., pled at *8. But as If a 2008 WL ton writ [1st Dist.] complained of is by appellants, in fraud the conduct lawyer participates independently activities, misrepresentation of Nan “foreign his action is the intentional ulent cy’s in the bill of sale to third attorney.” Alpert, of an status duties Leasing for 406; “Manager” Lucy as a Ry. Poole v. Houston & T.C. see (1882). Co., unlawfully relieving Nancy purpose In 58 Tex. other words, shifting for the sale and provide absolute of tax the law does Leasing. The focus of by liability Lucy a tax immunity every for tort committed kind—not the na analysis related to our is on the may tangentially that- be lawyer conduct. attorney’s alleged ture —of the may role or which occur professional Bradt, *8; at 288. Renfroe, Id. at 947 S.W.2d during litigation. See 71-72; Miller, preparation of a bill of sale F.Supp. Although 993 at at see also not conduct “for airplane at to transfer an By way example, of extreme 464. attorney,” of an party eign to the duties torney opposing who assaults the

781 knowing Inc., of reh’g); intentional and inclusion false v. Tigers, Brocail Detroit in a of a information bill sale assist 90, S.W.3d 109 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th avoiding client in tax is. Es 2008, denied), denied, pet. Dist.] cert. Cf. Butts, tate Stonecipher Estate of 877, of U.S. 130 S.Ct. 175 L.Ed.2d 131 (Tex.1985); Likover, 696 (2009). the reasoning Under of the above Servs., S.W.2d at 472. Fin. But Dixon cf. cases, actions, alleged true, such if would Ltd., (“Even 2008 WL at *9 when not shield an liability simply broadly, taken true and construed Dix because he or she undertook those actions petition alleges Financial’s that the un representation the course of of a client. derlying purpose of the communications Toles, Toles v. Cf. attorneys was for the to secure satisfaction (Tex.App.-Dallas pet.) no (holding award.”) of their clients’ arbitration argument by similar defendants —that alleged The here did not occur they could not be liable their because ac Nancy in an a adversarial context vis vis were during representation tions taken of and Lucy Leasing. subsequent sale client—was not sufficient to support sum of the airplane to a third after it had mary judgment on aiding claim for and already Nancy been awarded to in the abetting, fiduciary duty, breach of and con agreed not required by, decree was and spiracy). with, nothing had to do the divorce dec ree.9 Because of the Accordingly, whether allegations are review, of standard we are not concerned true or not—and we must consider them with whether appellants proved or even true for purposes reviewing of the sum- provided allegations evidence of their re mary judgment10 alleged actions are —the bill sale garding Cantey of because scope outside the of representation of a did raise that issue its mo and, thus, client the trial court should not See, tion summary judgment. e.g., granted have summary judgment Combs, 07-11-00273-CV, Delgado No. fraud, conspiracy, and aiding abetting and *2 (Tex.App.-Amaril that reason. We conclude and 15, 2012, pet.) lo Oct. op.). In hold that the trial court erred granting stead, must of we address the narrow issue Cantey Hanger on Cantey Hanger whether is immune as specific grounds raised its motion as matter of law for alleged by its actions as appellants’ conspiracy, aiding appellants. City Nat’l Bank Ind. Ortiz, abetting appel- claims.11 sustain 878 n. 4 We (Tex.App. Houston no pet.) (op. through points. [14th Dist.] on lants’ sixth eighth reason, Hanger’s giving Nancy 9.For the same alter- no intention her share only money. native claim that the divorce court had See, jurisdiction appellants’ over claims fails. supra, We 775-76. note that Han- 10. Our issues discussion these is dictated ger represented post-divorce review, suit the standard and should not be Philip’s attorneys one divorce commentary viability considered a on the attorney's alleged grounds, his law negli- appellants’ firm for the especial- claims on other suit, gence during ly considering appellants, divorce. In the which in their brief- court, in this filed 96th District Court of accuse Tarrant of a County, ”[t]he commission crime.” that the negligently Southside Bancshares allowed Philip consisting to obtain and cash a holding check very is limited to these Our narrow funds, community knowing of Philip grounds. that had second third alle Philip’s and peti- amended appellants’ Also in second occurring are to conduct related gations his tion, as facts Philip alleged supporting Cantey during the and after divorce. both (1) and Cantey Hanger that IIED claim that other causes of ac Hanger contends as “bait” couple’s used the children peti alleged in the second amended tion at making pick up to them by Philip wait a IIED action. IIED is preclude tion an process a server Nancy’s house while tort, for the “judicially created gap-filler (2) and way, Cantey Hanger that on the recovery in allowing purpose limited of friends, and family, contacted his rare which a defendant those instances the of de- purpose business contacts dis intentionally inflicts severe emotional a telling he had faming by them Philip the in a so tress manner unusual him to cause sexually transmitted disease recognized theory has victim no other money and emotional distress collect Inc. redress.” Roche Hoffmann-La him, (3) they lied to the and both Zeltwanger, he by telling them that couple’s children 2004). complaint gravamen When the of a not care pay support not and did did child by common-law or stat is covered another Cantey moved Hanger about them. tort, utory IIED is not available. Id. on the summary judgment on this claim alle- Philip the second and third included immu- following ground in addition to the grounds defama- gations supporting nity ground: “Plaintiffs cause [IIED] claims, gravamen those tion and the by laundry list of precluded action is Philip was as a allegations is that defamed by brought other causes action Thus, is not available to result. IIED therefore, and, dis- Plaintiffs should be Cantey as a of action Philip against cause by summary judgment.”12 posed of by trial court not err Hanger, did Cantey granting law, As the first alle a matter id. at that cause action. See Cantey Hanger Nan gation assisted —that Schreiber, 448; Draker v. cy using the children as “bait” advis (Tex.App.-San pet.). Antonio Philip process her to make wait while a appellants’ ninth We therefore overrule way was on the not actionable server —is point. Hanger’s was made because advice Conclusion during representing course divorce, attempting to obtain Having all of first appellants’ sustained an process service of is conduct in which eighth we the trial through points, reverse necessarily engage. must dismissing conspir- court’s order Servs., Ltd., defamation, conversion, IIED acy, Dixon Fin. 2008 WL Nancy, and *8. we reverse at judg- knowing falsity, allegation support appellants' summary cannot reply 12. In its IIED, (3) response, Cantey Hanger ment (1) also states allegation an and because be- action for IIED is barred cause of allegations regarding the children are not ex- supposed attempt cause outrageous unsupported treme and obtain service at times when a is known evidence, they are barred. admissible likely appear; be suspected to be or summary judg- did move for therefore, actions extreme and such were not however, grounds, the trial ment on these so (2) outrageous, petition itself does because we could not—and cannot —consider court anyone allege told See, Co., e.g., Reliance Ins. them. sexually disease and if about transmitted 378; Garcia, did, maliciously and with it it was not done so summary fraud, judgment Cantey trial court’s for conduct as rather than type on the fraud, conduct, which, above, on Hanger conspiracy, the and aid- as stated the ing majority agrees was in abetting only. and claims We remand the course of Can- tey Hanger’s representation Nancy this case to the trial court for further and foreign the proceedings to of an only. attorney. on those claims af- duties We majority The correctly summary firm the states the rule but judg- remainder seems not to apply it: whether Cantey Hanger, litiga- ment for the the remainder tion immunity under an attorney which Nancy, the dismissal order and the generally owes no duty to a non-client for Carney.13 for Vick conduct in the representing course of his GARDNER, J., concurring filed a and litigation own client in focuses on “type the dissenting opinion. of conduct in attorney engages, which the not on whether the conduct was meritori- GARDNER, Justice, ANNE concurring in ous the context of underlying the law- dissenting. Id. suit.” Introduction majority’s Under the reasoning, by mere I respectfully dissent from the majori- pleading labeling just artful about con- ty’s Byrd’s decision as to duct of in counsel the course of represent- conspiracy, aiding abetting alleged opposing party in prior litigation as (and by Appellant Byrd the two corpora- “fraud,” the losing party litigation to the divorce).1 tions awarded to him the can invoke exception for fraudulent or majority agrees “Cantey Hanger’s malicious conduct to avoid the long-estab- preparation of a to bill sale facilitate litigation lished immunity Texas that of an airplane [Nancy] transfer awarded to protects lawyers liability from opposing to in an agreed divorce decree was conduct parties, and the burden is then attorney engages which an discharge to his conclusively disprove to duties to client” and that such conduct pleaded exception in to prevail order on a “foreign to the of an duties attor- summary judgment. This is not and ney.” Maj. Op. majority at 780. But the should not be the law. I would affirm the then concludes alleged same con- favor of “foreign duct was of an duties attor- conclusively because the law firm ney” Byrd alleged because immunity established alleged its intentionally included false infor- conduct that occurred in the course its mation in the Nancy’s bill of sale for air- representation underlying plane to shift tax Byrd, sales litigation divorce and hold that the burden “fraud,”

which Byrd labels as Byrd plead then shifted to offer alleged conduct was thus also proof raising an issue of fact that his suit outside the course Cantey Hanger’s rep- exception falls within the fraud liti- resentation of underlying gation immunity, which he failed do. litigation. divorce Id. duty attorney immunity No based on

I agree holding, cannot with either both Byrd’s of which focus solely own conclu- Byrd first argues that the fraud sory labeling Cantey Hanger’s alleged by Cantey Hanger in assisting Satterwhite, apparent 13. See Jacobs v. As the context within this "Byrd” (Tex.2001). opinion, I use the name to describe Philip Byrd individually appellants or the col- lectively. 784 Nancy days ten of the awarded to within purchaser her to occurred airplane

sell final, Cantey that of As the was date the decree. Id. after the divorce representation of Hanger’s adversarial “non- attorneys Nancy as the representing when litigation divorce ended Nancy in the Hanger’s it signing” party, Cantey was finalized, thus that the decree was in decree responsibility, ordered the immunity entitled to not in the course of its continued and thus Byrd to because its conduct liability from docu- representation Nancy, of to draft the in the of its not course was committed ownership ments for transfer of the Nancy litigation.” “in the representation Nancy.2 light to In airplanes awarded Byrd’s argument majority accepts The by majori- I foregoing, puzzled am the repre- Hanger’s adversarial Cantey that drafting that ty’s statement of documents Nancy ended when the divorce sentation of after airplane for transfer and sale of summary signed. But decree was by it had awarded to been conclusively other- judgment record shows required by, decree and had “was wise. with, nothing Maj. Op. to do the decree.” acknowledges Byrd Cantey Byrd’s (quoted Even at 780-81. affidavit represent against to continued response in by majority) support of his Rica) (who in after Byrd now resides Costa Hanger’s to motion for by was finalized its the divorce decree judgment acknowledges the trial court $150,000 to awarded ongoing efforts collect in the de- ordered divorce decree, assisting in her in to in the cree to draft the documents to effectuate in judgment for that amount recovering in airplane question for transfer a hen Byrd’s bankruptcy, filing Byrd to sign. Byrd the house awarded decree. general persons rule is that cannot sue the privity with

Moreover, Byrd majority both and the See, e.g., legal malpractice. for ex- the divorce acknowledge decree Elliott, Barcelo attorneys “non- pressly ordered the for the (Tex.1996) (holding lawyer that a owes signing” parties to draft the documents client). duty only For over care to his con- necessary effectuate transfers years, Texas held courts have after templated in the decree the decree finalized, attorneys “practice their including “documents neces- are authorized ownership airplanes” their clients and in- sary profession, to transfer advise Peden, Oshman, P.C., Greenberg, Siegmyer & opposing 2. That conduct of counsel occurred 01-06-00696-CV, filing or after rendition of No. *9 before actual of suit 20, 2008, immunity judgment (Tex.App.-Houston Dist.] does not defeat Mar. [1st denied) (mem. repre- pet. op. reh’g) (attorney counsel for conduct course liability misrep- senting party litigation. held from for an adverse immune Assocs., opposing party satis- v. Jones resentation to secure Renfroe denied) award); (Tex.App.-Fort writ faction of arbitration Lackshin v. Worth 14-03-00977-CV, (no against attorney Spofford, ob- 2004 WL of action No. cause taining garnishment against (Tex.App.-Houston at *3-5 [14th writ of 7, 2004, (mem. facts); denied) op.) Sept. pet. Dist.] debtor based on inaccurate see also LLC, Corp. Funding, (attorney for mak- FinServ Cas. held immune Settlement (S.D.Tex.2010) arrangements charging and col- F.Supp.2d fee (law lecting op.) held fees to wife on credit cards in firm immune hus- filing conspiracy seizing band’s name before divorce action as of fraud or attorney’s legal part representa- exe- property not debtor writ of action was owned Servs., suit). impending judgment); tion of wife in cution after Dixon Fin. Ltd. defense, terpose any supposed clearly defense “was lawyer adversarial” and making legal duty” without themselves liable for dam “owed no to opposing litigant), 271, denied, 1152, 32 ages.” Bayless, 1097, White v. S.W.3d cert. 531 U.S. 121 S.Ct. (2001). 2000, (Tex.App.-San pet. Antonio 148 275-76 L.Ed.2d 970 denied) (affirming be exception litigation “Fraud” duty owed no to adverse cause immunity party representation in the context of majority recognizes The litigation) (citing Kruegel its client in that whether a 343, cause 345 of action for fraud exists in Murphy, (Tex.Civ.App.- 126 S.W. favor of 'd)). 1910, An attorney may against Dallas writ ref non-client an represent ing opposing in any rights party litigation assert of his client’s without focuses in, on the being personally damages type engaged liable for to the conduct not on West, See Bradt v. whether the opposing party. 892 conduct was meritorious. See Servs., 56, *9; (Tex.App.-Houston 746548, Dixon Fin. 2008 S.W.2d at [1st denied) 1994, 288; Renfroe, 947 (attorney writ not sub S.W.2d at see also Dist.] Taco Cracken, ject liability opposing attorney 528, under Bell Corp. F.Supp. 939 (N.D.Tex.1996) (mem. (Fitzwa part cause of action for conduct as of 532-33 op.) J.).3 ter, in representing litigation); dispositive question client Morris v. in deter 946, Bailey, (Tex.Civ.App.- mining type 398 947 by S.W.2d of conduct the attorney n.r.e.). 1966, attorney’s Austin writ ref 'd is whether the part conduct was of the discharge of his duties in represent stated, law, Simply under Texas attor ing opposing party in the context of neys opposing cannot be held liable to litigation foreign or was to the duties of an parties “wrongful litigation conduct.” attorney, not whether the conduct Bradt, 287-88; Renfroe, 947 892 as by pleadings characterized is fraud at 71-72. Any contrary policy Bell, (cit ulent. Taco 939 F.Supp. 532 crippling would act as “a severe and deter Bradt, 72). Instead, 892 S.W.2d at rent justice ends of because a liti majority Byrd’s allegations focuses on gant might be denied a full development of is, knowing intentional and in his case if his attorney subject were clusion of false in information a bill of sale liability threat of for defending his client’s avoiding to assist in tax liabili sales position to the best and fullest extent al Thus, ty. Maj. Op. at 780-81. in cases law, availing lowed his client of all exception attorney’s which fraud to an White, rights to which he is entitled.” 32 litigation immunity recognized have been 276; S.W.3d at see Mitchell v. Chapman, are few. 2000, (Tex.App.-Dallas 10 S.W.3d denied) (in

pet. (op. reh’g) Supreme suit un As the in Hong, Court Chu v. stated, litigant against attorney successful op actions brought “[F]raud cannot be case, ponent in prior affirming summary against an opposing attorney litigation in favor of attorney ground as reliance in those circumstances is un- relationship lawyer between and third reasonable.” 249 S.W.3d n. 19 Toles, client”); 3. See also Chapman Toles 113 S.W.3d Children's Trust v. Porter L.L.P., (Tex.App.-Dallas pet.) (holding Hedges, attor ney’s denied) representing App.-Houston pet. client in divorce [14th Dist.] merit, litigation, (holding even if frivolous or without under Texas law it is the kind of [by opposing long party] controlling "is not actionable as conduct that is in whether fraud part discharge may against opposing attorney, as conduct was be actionable meritorious). lawyer’s representing duties in her not whether conduct is Martin, (Tex.2008) McCamish, (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] (citing denied)).4 2005, pet. Appling v. F.E. Inter- Brown & Loeffler (Tex.1999)). ests, A conclusion disagree majority’s I with the has no claim generally non-client Byrd alleged that because for fraud lawyer litigation opposing Hanger misrepresented Nancy’s status litigation because a the course used her married name manager and justifiably rely oppo- on his or her cannot shift supposedly the bill of sale in order to lawyer’s representations or silence nent’s even if Lucy Leasing, tax sales McCamish, true, 991 alleged as a matter of law. Cantey Hanger’s rendered that reliance is not (stating “foreign at 794 conduct to the duties of an attor- S.W.2d Assisting ney” or non- in the circumstances here. representation the justified when drafting a in documents for transfer client place takes in the adversarial disclosure airplane, assisting of title of an the client Chapman see litigation); context of Chil- selling in an awarded to the client in asset (affirm- Trust, at 441-42 dren’s 82 S.W.3d cash, allowing the divorce for needed the con- ing summary judgment on fraud and name, client to use her married and even spiracy by opposing party because avoiding liability are assisting her tax law firm’s actions were undertaken dis- “foreign to the duties of an attor- not acts Mitchell, client); to its charge of its duties in which ney.” type Each is a of conduct (same). 10 at 811-12 attorney typically engages discharg- an Servs., client. Dixon Fin. duties to his of fact as to fraud No issue (noting at *7-8 that at- WL exception an as torney cannot be liable to a third office, requires profes- that “the conduct not attorney’s litigation immunity skill, training, authority sional of an “qualified” immunity It absolute. is a attorney”). attorneys may be held liable for fraud that in only narrowly but in certain defined agree Nor can I that the conduct independent stances based on actions tak type of the that is scope attorney’s legal en the outside exception qualified immunity an representation of a client or based on con commission of fraudulent or independent attorney. of an foreign duct duties scope malicious acts “outside the of [the West, 01-09-00425-CV, See Elliott v. No. legal representation law firm’s] (Tex.App.-Hous at *3 (citing Alpert, client.” Id. 178 S.W.3d pet.) 406). ton Mar. no applied [1st Dist.] cases that have that Most (holding attorneys could be lia op.) fraudulent business exception involved only schemes, actions if their con litigation. ble fraudulent Likover v. II, Ltd., scope legal duct was “outside the of [their] Terrace Sunflower representation “foreign (Tex.App.-Houston client” or [1st Dist.] 1985, writ); attorney”) (citing Alpert the duties of an see also Poole Houston (1882). Crain, James, P.C., Co., Ry. & 58 Tex. Caton T.C. subject by attorney may misrepresentation An non-client under Re- 4. be 552). (Second) attorney's § No negligent misrepresentation if the statement Torts such Byrd justifiably justifi- relied manifest awareness of a non-client’s claim is made here any able information that was false information communicated to reliance on false attorney by Cantey Hanger, intent that the him nor could such furnished with McCamish, rely. justified of the adversarial non-client 991 S.W.2d at reliance be because so (allowing negligent relationship. cause of action for nature of their Id. distinguishable attorney’s Those cases are because conduct at foreign issue was not litigation. neither involved Poole involved to the duties of an occurred an an scope representation conduct of on behalf of of his client in in rerouting shipment insolvent debtor a litigation against context of the non- client, goods bogus via a firm a fictitious bill of change does not merely based contrary lading shipper’s labeling order to conclusory pleading by stop delivery, the Su- the non-client the attorney’s conduct preme “foreign Court characterized as constitutes “fraud.” This is because char Poole, attorney.” the duties of an 58 Tex. acterizing attorney’s repre conduct in at 137. Likover senting involved fraudulent rights “his client’s as fraudulent scheme for renovation and sale of an does change the rule an attorney Likover, apartment complex. cannot be held liable for discharging his Subsequently, at 469-72. the same court duties to his plaintiff client. A ... should that decided Likover distinguished that not be ‘salvage allowed to an otherwise involving case one conduct of an at- merely by untenable claim characterizing ” torney in the course of litigation, noting Servs., it as tortious.’ Dixon Fin. 2008 (citation 746548, omitted) that Likover allegations had “involved that WL at *9 (quot attorney ing JDC, assisted clients in fraudulent Stonehenge/Fasa-Tex., Miller v. L.P., (N.D.Tex.1 461, business schemes and did not con- involve 993 F.Supp. 464 998)).6 duct taken in the context of litigation or proceeding.” another adversarial Dixon A Cantey Hanger defendant such as Servs., 746548,

Fin. 2008 WL *9.5 that moves for a traditional summary judg- “type” in of conduct which the at ment negate must either at least one ele- is, torney was that engaged, whether the ment of the plaintiffs theory recovery, Querner v. Byrd Rindfuss, 76; 5. also litigation. relies 966 of his own client in Id. at see 661, (Tex.App.-San Kivell, 01-10-00040-CV, S.W.2d 663 Antonio also Jurek v. No. denied), which, turn, pet. in relied on Likover (Tex.App.-Houston WL 2011 at *4-6 proposition attorney and Poole for the that an 21, 2011, (mem. Apr. pet.) op.) Dist.] no [1st litigation can be liable for fraud con (affirming summary judgment opposing text. But neither Likover nor Poole involved by plaintiff counsel on fraud claim based on Moreover, litigation conduct in the context. during failure to disclose existence of will the San Antonio court held the beneficia mediation); Armstrong, Bosch No. 01-08- presented raising ries evidence fact issues as 00847-CV, 2009 WL at *3-4 attorney engaged to whether the in fraud 11, 2009, App.-Houston pet. [1st Dist.] June by conspiring the beneficiaries with denied) (mem. summary op.) (upholding judg the executor to convert assets as well as attorney ment for on claims for malicious privity whether the with was or defamation, fraud, prosecution, and abuse of duties, fiduciary owed the beneficiaries there process by plaintiff against opposing counsel by placing production the burden of to estab Servs., underlying litigation); Dixon Fin. exception attorney’s immunity lish the to the (upholding 2008 at *9 on the Id. beneficiaries. at 670. conversion, judgment on claims for abuse of Bradt, plaintiffs alleged 6. In claims for process, conspiracy by fraud and to defraud conspiracy maliciously prosecute, mali- plaintiff against underly opposing counsel prosecution, cious intentional infliction of Malek, ing litigation); Alexander v. No. 01-06- distress, emotional tortious interference with 01156-CV, (Tex.App. 2008 WL at *3 relations, contractual under the 6, 2008, pet.) Houston Mar. [1st no Dist.] Texas Tort Claims Act. 892 S.W.2d at 65. (affirming summary op.) judgment on upheld summary judgment The court for the attorney's representations claims based on opposing attorneys, disallowing recovery date). regarding opposing party trial against opposing counsel on cause ac- arising representation tion for conduct out of (hold Trust, 32 at 442 Phillips Inc. v. Petro- Children’s S.W.3d Burger, “Moore” (Tex.1972), Co., matter once defendant established as leum S.W.2d ele- conclusively prove each plead of law that actionable conduct ment of an affirmative defense. Walker representation undertaken in course of (Tex.1996) Harris, client, plaintiff burden shifted to to raise (holding defendant landlord established con fact issue sufficient facts show law, negating matter element “duty” as exception immunity). fell duct within claim); City Hous- plaintiffs see also that the view consistent I believe better Auth., Basin ton Clear Creek summary judgment practice with Texas’s (Tex.1979). It is well is, Austin, as held our sister court so, that once the movant has done settled Cantey Hanger once established as a the burden shifts to the non-movant to matter that its conduct was within of law produce creating evidence a fact issue on representation of its client the course of its of the movant’s affirmative de- an element underlying litigation against divorce Walker, on its defense. fense or own Byrd, it established its affirmative defense a matter law and that immunity they have have varied in how Courts Byrd plead the burden shifted to exception handled an such as fraud present raising evidence a fact issue re in the tradi attorney’s litigation immunity is, exception, garding fraud tional context. Some of fraud to Han counter-defense have must courts held ger’s affirmative defense. immunity as a matter of both establish its yet did not have to file another motion of a disprove applicability law and summary conclusively dis judgment to exception immunity to the such as pleaded Byrd’s Reagan fraud claim. See prove Toles, Compare a matter fraud as of law. Austin, 2938823, Nat’l Adver. 2008 WL of (defendant firm 113 S.W.3d at 911-12 law (holding at *8-10 burden shifted to non- conclusively attack merits of and ne must excep to of fact to movant raise issue as gate arguable pleaded by fraud claim immunity; attorney tion did not to movant immunity); plaintiff exception as to Men prove negative); have to a see also Zeif (Tex. 781, Fleming, doza v. 41 787 S.W.3d Nowlin, 804, man v. 807-08 (same), 2001, pet.) no App.-Corpus Christi 2010, (Tex.App.-Austin pet.); no Palmer v. Austin, Reagan with Nat’l Adver. Inc. of (Tex. 431, Corp., 728 435 Enserch S.W.2d 03-05-00699-CV, Hazen, v. No. 2008 WL n.r.e.) App.-Austin (citing writ ref'd (Tex.App.-Austin July at *8-10 936-37). Burger, “Moore” 492 S.W.2d at (mem. (non-movant 29, 2008, pet.) op.) Contrary majority’s to the characteriza- excep had burden to raise of fact on issue Cantey Hanger’s tion of for tradi- motion immunity to of to defeat tion I summary judgment, tional do not read its immunity) on based Byrd’s plead- motion based on failure of Bank, as (citing v. Eckman Centennial Sav. (Tex.1990) ings to state a cause of action. (op. 784 675 S.W.2d motion, to attached evidence its reh’g) Burger, and at “Moore” Lackshin, Byrd responded with his own sum- 936-37)); at WL judgment consisting evidence of his mary (noting differing applied by *3 burdens sale, the bill copy affidavit and a of of holding plaintiff some courts and non-mov- out, majority points was required plead ant failed which as the to and to by Pleadings struck the trial court. are showing sufficient facts that he fell within evi- exception immunity); Chapman competent fraud to (Dallas), transfer, Sys. violating duty Inc. non- dence. Laidlaw Waste direct Wilmer, client, City qualifying negligent misrepresen (Tex.1995); tation, Sav. Hidalgo Surety or other any may claim non-client Ass’n, 548-44 Loan attorney); assert see also Orte 1971). Thus, assuming Byrd even Prods., Inc., Again ga Young No. H-12- pleaded exception fraud as an to attor (S.D.Tex. *9 ney immunity, rely plead he cannot on his 25, 2012) July op. reh’g) (plaintiff ings to claim that he met his burden any misrepresentation did not allege create producing evidence to a fact issue. upon or her client which he relied Byrd’s affidavit averred that he never re execution); in connection with writs from Cantey Hanger ceived the documents FinServ, (com F.Supp.2d Lucy Leasing, to on behalf sign trans plaint merely challenged merits of actions airplane Nancy to ferring as ordered attorneys executing by failing writs to (although according the divorce decree investigations perform af proceeding him, Cantey Hanger’s position that he receiving property ter notice did them), to sign refused and that belong to it plaintiffs, allege did not airplane never transferred the discharge attorneys’ actions not within Nancy completed registration its in her client). duties name, airplane leaving registered still Byrd candidly admits in his brief that Byrd’s corporation, Lucy Leasing. Maj. airplane question, two worst, along with Op. at 778-79. At failure to others, was awarded to and now draft documents transfer her, question first, belong to that she is free to with plane and as do wishes, transferring airplane them as she he sisting although purchaser by to a directly signing bill “believes” that assisted sale, of sale in her name as “man Nancy married bill preparation of the he instead, ager,” be hypothetically extent, could mal if is unable to ascertain to what Hanger but no practice, Cantey duty owed any, even Cantey involved Byrd. care Byrd, sale. well majority, as acknowledges also that the divorce decree Byrd I would hold that has neither al responsible any makes ad valo- leged presented raising nor evidence taxes, “liens, assessments, rem or other issue of fact that he excep is entitled to an charges per- due or to become due on the attorney immunity tion to the doctrine for property Maj. Op. sonal awarded her. to” He alleged fraud. has not an intentional at 778. it is appears Since misrepresentation alleged to him responsible for sales tax any thus bill of or that he relied sale detri airplane, appear sale it would any ment bill falsity Byrd’s remedy Phelan, against Nancy by en- sale. Easton v. No. 01-10- 01067-CV, forcement *9 divorce decree recov- 10, 2012, App.-Houston ery any liability, sales tax May [1st Dist.] no such which pet.) op.) (holding yet charged Lucy has allegations pe Leasing, be tition, true, alleged charge if may facts that would other be incurred supported finding independent Lucy have as a of the sale Leasing result airplane.7 fraudulent actions such as a fraudulent Byrd alleged why has Nor he would not transferred to when he did not receive airplane sign have known that the not been ten had transfer documents within against the fraud action

Because upon alleged conduct based its

Hanger is representing of its discharge duties underlying di- Byrd in the

Nancy against Byrd has litigation,

vorce because raised an of fact sufficient

alleged or issue excep- claim as an for fraud

to establish I would hold immunity,

tion Byrd’s of fraud

immunity bars claim as their Cantey Hanger as well and abet- conspiracy aiding

claims of involving regarding

ting same of the same and bill of sale

the transfer I concur the remainder of

airplane.8 affirm opinion and would majority’s in fa-

the trial court’s all causes of as to

vor Byrd. pleaded by

action ASSOCIATES,

STOVALL

P.C., Appellant CENTER,

HIBBS FINANCIAL

LTD., Appellee.

No. 05-12-00303-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court

Dallas.

Aug. 2013. O’Quinn, decree, true, claim); why days see also Kline v. after the if such be Lucy Leasing helpless he was the owner of (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] signed, title to after the decree was to transfer denied) (absence fiduciary duty writ Nancy himself. plaintiff party defeated aid between and third abetting fiduciary claim breach Mut. Young, Ernst & L.L.P. v. Pac. Life denied, defendant), cert. 515 U.S. Co., (Tex.2001) (fail Ins. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 829 necessarily ure of claim fraud defeated (1995). abetting aiding dependent conspiracy and

Case Details

Case Name: Philip Gregory Byrd, Lucy Leasing Co., LLC, and PGB Air, Inc. v. Vick, Carney & Smith LLP, Cantey Hanger LLP, and Nancy Ann Simenstad

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Aug 1, 2013

Citation: 409 S.W.3d 772

Docket Number: 02-11-00468-CV

Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.