177 A. 700 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1934
Argued December 14, 1934. This is an appeal from a judgment on a case stated. It has to do with the construction to be given the Act of June 12, 1931, P.L. 548,1 amending section 1 of the Act of April 19, 1889, authorizing appeals from assessments *134 of taxes to the courts of common pleas, and providing for the payment of the taxes appealed into court and for the disposition thereof. Both of these acts were expressly repealed by the Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, — see pp. 883(41) and 891(88) —, and superseded by Sec. 518 (p. 877) thereof, but as that act took effect only on September 1, 1933 (Act of May 17, 1929, P.L. 1808), it does not apply and as its provisions are practically the same as the laws then existing it was intended as a continuation of such laws and not as a new enactment (Sec. 105).
The facts as stated for the judgment of the court may be summarized as follows:
1. The board of revision of taxes fixed the assessment for taxes for the year 1933 on premises 230 S. Hanson Street, Philadelphia, at $90,000. The owner, Mollie Kaplan, on January 5, 1933, appealed to the court of common pleas, the appeal being filed to No. 5285, December Term 1932 of Common Pleas No. 2.
2. On June 29, 1933, Mollie Kaplan paid to the prothonotary of the court $2,497.50, the full amount of the taxes assessed, calculated on said assessment of $90,000. The following notation was made by the prothonotary *135 on the docket to said number and term: "June 29, 1933. $2,497.50 paid into court as per Act 1931, P.L. 548."
3. No notice of such payment to the prothonotary was given to the receiver of taxes, the School District of Philadelphia, the board of revision of taxes or the city solicitor, other than such, if any, as might be inferred from the entry of record. At the time the payment was made to the prothonotary no application was made to the court, nor did the court allocate and direct to be paid over to the proper authorities such amounts "as shall appear to said court to be reasonably free from dispute," as directed by the Act of 1931, supra. It does not appear in the case stated whether Mollie Kaplan in taking her appeal, complied with the Act of 1889, as amended by the Act of 1931, supra, and filed a petition signed by her or her agent or attorney, setting forth the facts of the case, as directed by said act, or if she did, what valuation, if any, she placed as the fair and reasonable value of said real estate for taxation purposes. As it does not appear in the case stated we cannot assume it: School Dist. of Sharon v. Boyle Est.,
4. Said appeal came up for hearing before said court and on January 16, 1934, the court entered a decree nisi, which was made final on February 1, 1934, sustaining the appeal and fixing the fair market value of the property for taxation for the year 1933 at $85,000; and directing the City of Philadelphia to pay the costs. At the time of the hearing neither the court nor counsel for the city and school district were informed of the payment made by Mollie Kaplan to the prothonotary, and of the costs in connection therewith. *136
5. On February 1, 1934, in pursuance of a petition and decree presented by counsel for Mollie Kaplan, without notice to opposing counsel, the court directed the prothonotary to distribute said fund of $2,497.50 previously paid him, as follows:
To Mollie Kaplan, $138.75, being the amount of the tax paid on the $5,000, reduction of assessment.
To Joseph Kaplan, her attorney, $5.75, being the statutory attorney's fee and cost of filing the appeal.
To the prothonotary, $36.10, being composed of docket costs, $6.12, and poundage, $29.98.
To the receiver of taxes for Philadelphia, $2,316.90, being the taxes on $85,000 valuation, $2,358.75, less costs and poundage as above $41.85.
6. The receiver of taxes, school district, board of revision of taxes and city solicitor had no notice of such petition and decree of distribution until February 5, 1934, apart from such, if any, as might be inferred from the entry of record. On that date the prothonotary requested the city solicitor to sign a receipt for $2,316.90 called for by said decree.
7. The payment to the prothonotary on June 29, 1933 was made two days before the first penalty on 1933 taxes came due on July 1, 1933. Under the statutes and ordinances relating to 1933 taxes, one per centum a month was added thereto for nonpayment on the first days of July, August, September, October, November and December 1933 and January and February 1934, and interest at the rate of six per centum per annum began on January 1, 1934.
8. As of February 5, 1934, when the prothonotary presented to the city solicitor his check for $2,316.90 the taxes for 1933 on said premises at the reduced valuation of $85,000 were, as computed by the receiver of taxes according to the statutes and ordinances aforesaid, as follows: *137
City tax registered .................... $1,659.98 Interest ............................. 16.60 Penalty .............................. 16.60 $1,693.18 ---------
School tax registered .................. 864.02 Interest ............................. 8.64 Penalty .............................. 8.64 881.30 ---------- --------- Total .................................... $2,574.48
9. The receiver of taxes received said payment of $2,316.90 and credited the same on account of the amount shown due as aforesaid, after agreement of counsel for all parties in interest that such receipt should be without prejudice to the legal right of any party in interest.
10. The difference between $2,574.48 and $2,316.90, to wit, $257.58, consists of interest and penalties on the reduced assessment in the total amount of $215.73; prothonotary's commission or poundage charges, $29.98; prothonotary's docket costs, $6.12; costs due Mollie Kaplan's counsel, $5.75.
The question submitted to the court for its determination was: "Did the payment to the prothonotary, as of the above court, term and number, under the facts as above set forth, on June 29, 1933, of the sum of $2,497.50, stop the running of interest and penalties imposed by statute and ordinance on real estate taxes, city and school, for the year 1933, on the reduced assessment of $85,000?" If decided in the affirmative then judgment to be entered in favor of Mollie Kaplan, that payment of the sum of $2,316.90 was in full satisfaction of city and school taxes for 1933 on 230 S. Hanson Street. If decided in the negative, then judgment to be entered in favor of the City of Philadelphia and School District of Philadelphia in the sum of $215.73, the interest and penalties aforesaid, together with the prothonotary's poundage charges of $29.98. *138
The court entered judgment on the case stated in favor of Mollie Kaplan. The City of Philadelphia has appealed.
It is unquestionably the law that "tax laws are to be construed most strictly against the government and most favorably to the taxpayer, and a citizen cannot be subjected to a special burden without clear warrant of law": Husband's Est.,
The Act of 1931, supra, was for the relief of the taxpayer, but it was not intended to create a hardship to the city nor interfere with the collection of the taxes needed by the city to carry on its government. If possible, it should be so construed as to benefit the taxpayer without injuring the city. It can be, by interpreting it as above. The taxpayer has only herself to blame if she is required to pay the penalty and interest, due under the law to the city, for she could have avoided it, at least to the amount `reasonably free from dispute' by presenting her petition to pay the money into court and setting forth the facts necessary to permit the court to carry out the consequent directions of the statute. As the case stated is drawn, we need not decide more than this.
The assignment of error is sustained. The judgment is reversed and is hereby entered, in accordance with the case stated, in favor of the City of Philadelphia and School District of Philadelphia and against Mollie Kaplan in the amount of $215.73, with interest from August 23, 1934, together with the prothonotary's commission or poundage charges of $29.98. Costs on this appeal to be paid by appellee.