5 Pa. Commw. 329 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1972
Opinion by
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) denying the appellant, Philadelphia Electric Company’s (Company), motion to dismiss the PHRC’s own complaint for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. By virtue of PHRC’s certification of its opinion that its order involves a controlling question of law, we
The complaint initiated by and before the PHRC alleges that the Company has violated Section 5(i) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of October 27, 1955, P. L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §955 (i), by engaging in racially discriminatory practices (1) in withholding from blacks the services of its home economics department, (2) in applying more stringent rules relating to security deposits and exacting greater amounts of such deposits from blacks, and (3) in terminating service for non-payment of bills more quickly and for lesser delinquencies in black neighborhoods. The Company contends that all of these complaints relate to rates and services, that jurisdiction of such complaints is vested in the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and that PHRC has no jurisdiction. We are informed that the home economics department is not conducted on premises of the Company but by telephone and visitation by Company employes to customers’ homes. The PHRC does not contest these facts or contend that all of the activities complained of are not in the area of rates and services. It contends only that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §951, et seq., confers jurisdiction in it. We have concluded that the PUC does have exclusive jurisdiction of rates and the services here in issue and that the Legislature has given no jurisdiction to PHRC in the premises.
Section 11(a) of the Act of March 31, 1937, P. L. 160, as amended, 66 P.S. §462(a), confers upon the PUC the power and imposes upon it the duty to administer the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, as amended, 66 P.S. §1101 et seq. That
“ ‘Rate’ means every individual, or joint fare, toll, charge, rental, or other compensation whatsoever of any public utility, or contract carrier by motor vehicle, made, demanded, or received for any service within this act, offered, rendered, or furnished by such public utility, or contract carrier by motor vehicle, whether in currency, legal tender, or evidence thereof, in kind, in services or in any other medium or manner whatsoever, and whether received directly or indirectly, and any rules, regulations, practices, classifications or contracts affecting any such compensation, charge, fare, toll, or rental.” Section 2(19), 66 P.S. §1102(19).
“ ‘Service’ is used in this act in its broadest and most inclusive sense, and includes any and all acts done, rendered, or performed, and any and all things furnished or supplied, and any and all facilities used, furnished, or supplied by public utilities, or contract carriers by motor vehicle, in the performance of their duties under this act to their patrons, employes, other-public utilities, and the public, as well as the interchange of facilities between two or more of them. . . .” Section 2(20), 66 P.S. §1102(20).
The Public Utility Law contains fulsome interdictions of discrimination in rates for whatever cause, as follows: “No public utility shall, as to rates, make or grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, corporation, or municipal corporation, or subject any person, corporation, or municipal corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreason
Concerning service, Section 402, 66 P.S. §1172, requires : “No public utility shall, as to service, make or grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, corporation, or municipal corporation or subject any person, corporation or municipal corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any. unreasonable difference as to service, either as between localities or as between classes of service, but nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit the establishment of reasonable classifications of service.”
The. Public Utility Law provides complete opportunity for complaint of discrimination. Section 309, 66
The provisions of the Public Utility Law imposing regulatory duties on the PUC are so comprehensive and detailed that the courts have consistently held that that Commission was intended to be the sole agency for the regulation of these immense, complex, essential and necessarily monopolistic business enterprises. As a corollary, the courts have steadfastly repulsed efforts of all other interests including, untypically, the judiciary itself, to intrude upon the areas committed to the PUC. They have without exception and from earliest time held that the regulation of utilities upon the subjects covered in the Public Utility Law is vested solely in the PUC; Rochester Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Beaver Valley Water Co., 68 Pa. Superior Ct. 122 (1918); Panther Valley Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 8 (1918). That matters within its jurisdiction must be determined by it, even to the exclusion of the courts in the first instance; Klein-Logan Co. v. Duquesne Light Company, 261 Pa. 526, 104 A. 763 (1918); Hickey v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 122 Pa. Superior Ct. 213, 184 A. 553 (1936) ; Lansdale Boro. v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 403 Pa. 647, 170 A. 2d 565 (1961); Einhorn v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 410 Pa. 630, 190 A. 2d 569 (1963). That townships and boroughs may not intrude; Duqesne Light Company v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A. 2d 287 (1954); Willits v. P.U.C., 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 62, 128 A. 2d 105 (1956); Lansdale Boro. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. That counties may not interfere; Chester County v. Philadelphia Elec
We do not declare, despite the great body of law referred to, that utilities are immune from regulation by other agencies. Indeed, the PHRC clearly has power to complain, investigate and adjudicate alleged discrimination in employment practices of a utility under Section 5 of the Human Relations Act (43 P.S. §955), since this is clearly conferred. We hold only that we are bound to approach with circumspection the PHRC’s contention that it may hear complaints and make orders concerning the rates and services of public utilities, so long exclusively committed to PUC regulation.
PHRC contends it is given jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on its own charges that the Company discriminates in giving advice on home economics, in requiring security deposits and in terminating service for failure to pay bills; and that if it decides that discrimination in those activities is occurring, to order the Company to change its practices. It so contends although deposit and termination practices are engaged in in accordance with rules and regulations filed with and approved by the PUC and although all of the allegedly discriminatory activities of the Company are
As we understand PHRC’s position, however, it is that the Company maintains offices, that these offices are open to the general public, and that the Company solicits the patronage of the general public at its offices; ergo every activity in which the Company engages is subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Legislature has defined the term “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” as follows: . . any place which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but not limited to inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the entertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or. rest, or restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises, buffets, saloons, barrooms or any store, park or enclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold, ice cream parlors, confectioneries, soda fountains and all
The Company’s offices where business is solicited and merchandise sold are unquestionably places of public accommodation. But there is no charge here that PHRC’s constituents are denied the privileges of the company’s stores and local offices. It is plain to us that the Legislature means a place of public accommodation to be a physical location to which the general public is invited to do business. It did not intend to confer jurisdiction upon the PHRC of all activities of any person who maintains, without suggestion of discrimination, a place of public accommodation. To accept the latter construction requires either' a wilful misreading of clear written language or an oracular power to divine legislative intention not given to courts. It would further confer upon PHRC the jurisdiction to
The Order of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission denying Company’s Motion to Dismiss is set aside and the Commission’s Complaint is dismissed.