Phila. County Election Bd. v. RaderPhila. County Election Bd. v. Rader
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- Reno
In a summary proceeding appellants were adjudged in contempt by a court of common pleas for refusing to answer questions propounded by the County Election Board of Philadelphia.
The board is composed of the county commissioners, and is charged with certain duties by the Pennsylvania Election Code of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended,
A nomination paper on behalf of the appellant, Rader, as a candidate for city council was presented to the board. An objection was filed to it, which, as we read the notes of testimony taken by the board, raised questions not cognizable by the board under § 976, supra. Hence the board determined to utilize its investigatory powers provided by § 302(i), and designated a date “for an examination and investigation into the signing and preparation of” the paper. Meanwhile a petition was filed in the common pleas court under § 977,
Whereupon the board petitioned the court for an attachment. Appellants’ answers set forth the above facts, challenged the jurisdiction of the board, disclaimed an intention to commit contempt, and prayed for leave to purge themselves by answering the questions if the court held otherwise. The record of the hearing in the court below consists of one printed page in the record. No testimony was adduced against the appellants, but nevertheless the court sentenced “Rader, $100 or thirty days in jail, Carner, $50 or thirty days in jail, Goldenberg, $50 or thirty days in jail, Le Compte, $100 or thirty days in jail.”
Apart from other errors to which no reference need be made, it is apparent that the court adjudged appellants
The board, which is appellee here, would vindicate the sentences under review by reference to a provision of § 304(a), supra: “All subpœnas issued by the county board shall be in substantially the same form and shall have the same force and effect as subpœnas issued by the court of common pleas of such county, and, upon application, the board shall be entitled to the benefit of the process of such court if necessary to enforce any subpœna issued by them.” This means only that an attachment of the common pleas is available to the board to compel the appearance of a witness. To allow the provision to mean more would be an enlargement of the power of the court, already restricted by the express terms of the Act of 1836, supra, and would authorize it, by a vague and at most an equivocal expression, to punish summarily contempts committed before an independent governmental agency. A contempt is an affront to legal authority, an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and while the common pleas courts possess power to punish contempts, as restricted and
Whenever the legislature has made a contempt committed before a board or an official punishable by a summary proceeding in a court, it has defined the offense and the procedure by a clear, explicit, apt, and positive enactment. Invariably, it has denounced the contumacious conduct before a board or officer as equivalent to a contempt of court, and authorized a court to punish it as such. For example, the Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, § 520,
This statute provides punishment for recalcitrant witnesses. The Pennsylvania Election Code (§ 1801,
Appellee relies solely upon Kelly‘s Contested Election, 200 Pa. 430, 50 A. 248 (reported sub. nom. Com. v. Gibbons, 9 Pa. Super. 527) but that case, so far from supporting its position, actually fortifies our view. Gibbons refused to answer questions propounded by examiners appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the examiners certified the proceedings to the court which ruled that he should answer the questions. He peremptorily refused the second time, and when attached for contempt appeared in open court “and read his written answers, refusing to respond to the questions.” Both this and the Supreme Court declined to decide whether Gibbons’ contumacy before the examiners constituted contempt, although they were officers of the court and acting under its authority; instead, they based their adjudication upon his actions in open court and found the requisite power to punish in the Act of 1836, supra. Had appellants refused to answer in open court after they had been summoned by attachment, the Kelly case might have been helpful to appellee.
This appeal from a common pleas court did not involve “either money, chattels, real or personal, or the possession of or title to real property“, and hence, regardless of the amount involved, was not within our jurisdiction. Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, § 7(c), as amended,
Orders and sentences reversed at appellee‘s costs.
NOTE: Some of the Acts of Assembly, referred to in the above opinion, which punish refusal to testify before officers and boards as contempts of court are:
June 15, 1911, P.L. 974, § 4,
The list is not a complete or exhaustive collation of the legislation, and is intended only to provide illustrations of the varying forms by which the power to punish for contempt before boards and officers has been bestowed upon the courts.