12 Wis. 698 | Wis. | 1860
As I dissented from the judgment pronounced in this case, so I dissent from the order the appellant’s motion for a rehearing. I am unwilling that anything should transpire, from which my assent to either the judgment or order should he inferred, and having some reasons which I am anxious to urge against both, I avail myself of the opportunity thus afforded for that purpose. On the former occasion (9 Wis., 87), I confined my remarks almost entirely to the words of the statute, endeavoring to show therefrom that the construction given by the majority of the court was false and erroneous. At this time it will be my principal purpose to endeavor briefly to show the same thing by applying to the question under consideration, some of those well settled rules and principles of statutory construction, which are so often resorted to by courts to aid in arriving at the true intention of the legislature, and which are founded quite as much upon external facts and circumstances connected with the law as it stood before the passage of the statutes, and of which courts take notice in considering them, as upon the words of the statutes themselves.
The great object in construing statutes is, to ascertain what was the true meaning and intention of those who framed them; and although the words used may be said to be the principal, yet they are not the only means of determining such meaning and intention. Of those rules derived from surrounding facts and circumstances growing out of the previous, state of the law, a primary and most important one is, to consider the mischief intended to be remedied — the defect for which the common law did not provide. This rule involves an inquiry into the law as it was at and before the time when the statute was made. By the common law, an indigent debtor could be compelled, in satisfaction of his debts, to part, not only with the necessary comforts, but with the most meagre means for the support of life. This rigorous and unrelenting system fox enforcing obligations, was felt to be a great social and political evil. ■ Beside the misery and suffering which it brought upon the debtor and his family, it was often injurious to society at large, by rendering them not only useless, but sometimes burdensome members
Foremost among those things which were considered requisite to the comfort and happiness of the debtor and his family, and to the good order and welfare of society, though, owing to the slow growth of liberal ideas, not always the first to receive legislative care and attention, was a home — a suitable place of residence, with its appurtenances, in which he and they might remain, unmolested by the importunate and pinching demands of his creditors. Accompanying this were the wearing apparel, household furniture, and necessary provisions for himself and his family, his library, the necessary domestic animals, teams, vehicles, and utensils of husbandry; and, to a limited amount, the tools and instruments of labor of the mechanic or artisan, the stock of the tradesman, and the library and implements of the professional man, all of which, together with other needful and proper .articles, the legislature, by other sections of the act, has most wisely and beneficently provided for and protected. Eeyond depriving debtors of these, there was no complaint. Aside from them, nobody had regarded it as a hardship that property of whatsoever character or description, should be taken and disposed of to satisfy debts which the owners had refused or neglected to pay. Nobody had murmured because stores, warehouses, shops, mills, factories, and all other buildings and structures designed and used for trade, commerce or manufactures, and houses, lands and all articles of personal property, not enumerated in the above specifications, were liable to seizure and forced sale on execution. The payment of debts has always been regarded as a duty of ¡erimary obligation, and its enforcement has been the principal object of almost all civil proceedings. The general course of legislation has been to facilitate the means of collection, and advance the remedy, and not to impede or retard them. The legislature did not intend to relieve debtors from the discharge of this duty, or to interfere with the general power to compel its performance. But,
I say that if the effect given to the act in this case be that which the legislature intended it should have, then have the legislature done or attempted to do all these things, and the statute is to that extent unconstitutional and void, and ought to be so declared by this court. For if the defendant in this case can be thus permitted to withdraw from the reach of his
A store or other place of business, is not one of “ the necessary comforts of life.” If it be, then are all things over which man exercises dominion and control, and the expression becomes unmeaning and idle. By it I understand those articles of property which all the inhabitants of a state or community must alike have and use, in order to the moderate enjoyment of life according to their age and sex, and the nature and custom of the country in which they live. Such are those which I have above enumerated, and which the legislature have, by their language, jsointed out and exempted.
It is an unwholesome law. By enabling faithless debtors to withhold, of their abundance, that which justly belongs to their injured creditors, it breaks down and destroys the sane-
The amount of property which it is thus made to exempt, is excessive and unreasonable. This objection is self-evident. It is noticed and admitted in the majority opinion of the court. They say “that the grossest abuses find sanction under its provisions, in many cases every day.” It is broadly sustained by the facts of this case. Here property, of the clear value of $15,000, and the annual value of $1,500, not pertaining to the necessary comforts of life, not tools, or implements of physical or mental labor, nor articles of trade, and not that whereon or whereby the defendant must exercise his productive skill and industry for the present or future subsistence of himself and his family, is declared to be free from seizure or sale for the satisfaction of his debts. While owning this amount and kind of property, he is told that the payment of his debts and the fulfillment of his contracts with his fellow men is a mere matter of favor, which he may extend to or withhold from them at his pleasure, and that, in case of his refusal, there is no power in the law to compel him. The plaintiff is at the same time told that his remedy for the recovery of a just demand, little exceeding one-fifth part of the value of the property, rests in entreaty only, and that the laws afford him no redress for the defendant’s noncompliance. And this is done by affirming a principle which would enable the defendant to hold property of the same kind to many times the same amount and value, without changing his legal position, or that of his creditors. Such a doctrine can never receive my sanction.
In my opinion such laws are prohibited by the foregoing provisions (section 9 and 17 of Article I) of the constitution. These two sections must be construed together, and so that both may stand and accomplish the objects intended. They
It is possible to say of section 9, that its concluding words, “conformably to the laws,” give to the legislature a discretionary power to provide such remedies and prescribe such forms and modes of proceeding to obtain justice as it pleases; and that under them, it may, at its option, without supplying others, abolish all remedies, and annul all the means by which rights are to be ascertained and justice administered.
It seems obvious to me that such was not the meaning which the people intendfed should be attached to these words; and unless it is, and there is thereby expressly granted to the legislature, an unlimited power to deal with remedies and the course of justice ■ as it pleases, I am not among those who can subscribe to its omnipotence, or yield that it is absolute and without control with regard to either. The framers, after having by the preceding portions of the section frilly expressed the leading objects of it, evidently introduced these words as a constitutional affirmation that every person must seek his remedy and obtain justice in conformity with, or agreeably to, “ the laws” which must be enacted for those purposes. The nature and qualities of those laws are fully prescribed. They must be such as will afford every person a certain remedy in them for all wrongs or injuries which he may receive in person, property, or character^; and such that by them he may obtain justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay. After having, so far as the laws were concerned, secured to each individual such a remedy and such a measure of justice, they bound him to seek them pursuant to those laws, and in effect said, he must do so “ conformably to” them, and in no other way. These words, then, instead of operating as an extension of the powers of the legislature, are in reality a restriction of the natural rights of the citizen. Laws complying with the'require
It may also be said of section 17, that the legislature are the sole judges of its provisions and of the laws which are to be passed under it, and that it is for them to determine what are the necessary comforts of life, and whether the laws are salutary and healthful, and what is a reasonable amount of property to be exempted from seizure and sale for the payment of debts. But if it be admitted, as upon both principle and authority I think it must, that all positive prescriptions contained in constitutions, statutes and other instruments, imply a negative of everything inconsistent with them, then it seems to me clear that the power and duty of the courts, in proper cases, to construe and give effect to the section, and to see that the will of the people as expressed in it is carried out, and not infringed or defeated by the legislature, is as unquestionable as in any other case of legislative usurpation. For it would be useless for the people to give positive directions upon this or any other subject, and to prescribe the manner in which those directions are to be carried out, thereby limiting the legislative authority, if in any such instance the power of determining finally the extent and meaning of such directions, and the validity of their acts with reference to them, resided solely with the legislature. Such power would defeat and render nugatory all the restrictions and limitations on the authority of the legislature, and the people would be compelled either to submit to the usurpations or to assume the powers of government, whenever its ends were in any manner perverted. It was never intended, upon the passage of an act repugnant to, or in violation of, the constitution, that either course should be pursued — that the people should yield to a despotism, or reduce themselves to anarchy; but the design was, through the agency of the government itself, to provide proper modes for remedying such evils. Hence the separation of the gov
From this two-fold or connected view of the niischiefs to be remedied, and the provisions of the constitution which concern them, the true intention of the legislature, I think, becomes more apparent. We thus see, side by side, not only the evils themselves, and the views which the people took of them, but also the nature and extent of the remedy which they intended to provide. It brings to our assistance another rule or maxim of statutory construction, which it is always of the first importance to observe, and which is, that we are never to presume that the legislature would intentionally infringe the provisions of the constitution, or violate the rights of the citizen. Such presumption is only to be overcome by the plain and manifest language of the act; and if the language be susceptible of a construction which is consistent with it, the act must stand; but if not, then it must fall. Where usurpations do take place they are not presumed to occur with deliberation, but are considered as the results of mistake or inattention, or of the dominion of the passions over reason, in times of political struggle. Starting then with this presumption, it is the first object of the courts to reconcile the acts of the legislative body to it, and, failing in this, they are to declare them void. Applying this rule to the facts of this case, and the true construction of the act becomes very evident. By the constitution the legislature had no power to exempt stores or other places, purely or principally devoted to trade or business. By the act they have not said that such property should be exempt; but, on the contrary, their
Having thus, from tbe previous condition of tbe law, and tbe language of tbe constitution, learned tbe evils complained of, and tbe intended mode of redress, we are made acquainted with, tbe true reason of tbe remedy, or, wbat is tbe same thing, of tbe law itself. We are possessed of tbe ideas in wbicb it originated, and by wliicb its language was dictated. And unless, from some unknown cause, its language be clearly repugnant thereto, we are to so construe it that its results will conform to those ideas. We are to enter into, and be governed by, its spirit and reason, and tbe motives of those who enacted it. But as it is not contended by any one that there is anything in the language itself wbicb conflicts with tbe general objects of tbe act as I have stated them, I need not dwell longer here.
This brings me to another rule, tbe consideration of wbicb has led me seriously to doubt tbe correctness of one position wbicb I took on tbe former occasion, wbicb was, that tbe construction of tbe principal part of tbe building in question for a place of business, and tbe appropriation of tbe same as such by tbe debtor to tbe use of others, operated as a waiver or forfeiture of bis right to claim any portion as Ms homestead. Tbe rule to wbicb I refer is, that we are to give such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance tbe remedy, and avoid inventions and evasions for tbe continuance of tbe mischief, and give force and life to tbe cure and remedy. Heydon’s case, 3 Co. Rep., 7. Upon further reflection on tbe facts of tbe case in connection with this rule, I am satisfied that I was in error, and that tbe law as laid down in Rhodes et al vs. McCormick, 4 Iowa, 368, is correct. It will be remembered that tbe building was erected some years before tbe indebtedness to tbe plaintiff accrued, and that Rooney’s occupancy of that portion used as a dwelbng bouse, dated back to tbe time of its completion. So far as that portion is concerned, no change in its use or occupancy has occurred from that time to tbe present. His possession was not fraudulent in its inception. No element of dishonesty entered
A very strong, and to my mind conclusive argument against tbe position of the majority of the court, that tbe occupation by the debtor of any portion, however small, of a building as a place of residence, makes tbe whole building a
In my opinion tbe motion for a rehearing should be granted.