11 Cal. 22 | Cal. | 1858
Terry, C. J., and Field, J., concurring.
This was an action of trespass—or in the nature of such an action —brought by plaintiff, Phelps, against defendants, for wrongfully and unlawfully taking away certain goods and converting them to their own use. The complaint further alleges that at the time of this taking and conversion, the plaintiff was a merchant and doing a prosperous business; that the goods constituted nearly all his stock in trade, and that the taking of the goods has thrown him out of business, and nearly ruined his fortunes.
To this complaint defendants demurred, assigning several causes of demurrer—none of which were well taken. The complaint states— unnecessarily, it is true, but harmlessly—in ;the commencement, that the defendants are indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000; but this does not make it an action on contract, for the body of the complaint shows very clearly the cause of action to be a trespass, out of which this claim for money proceeds. There is no misjoinder, because there is but one count and one claim; the claim to recover, or to aggravate the damages—as it may be construed—or for special damages, arising fronnnterruption of business, though not stated with sufficient particularity or definiteness, is not specifically demurred to on that ground. The damages might or might not be enlarged for this cause, according to the circumstances. If the trespass were “ willfully and wrongfully committed,” as the complaint charges, the jury might go beyond the actual value of the goods taken and give compensation for the loss of business, credit, etc., if these injuries were properly stated. But as the demurrer does not specifically object to the generality of the statement in this respect, the Court was not bound to notice the defect, which is of matter of form.
On the trial, it appeared that defendant, Owens, sued out an attachment against one Gove, in the hands of Webster, Deputy Sheriff of San Joaquin. Owens gave Webster a bond of indemnity after this levy, on the requisition of the Sheriff. The officer levied the attachment on this property as subject to the process, and Owens, having subsequently obtained judgment in his suit against Gove, sued out execution, under which Webster, the officer, sold the goods. The goods brought at the sale $1,492 42. There is some discrepancy in the proofs as to the actual value of the goods. The goods were claimed as the property of the plaintiff, who claimed to have bought them of Gove prior to the levy. The main question contested before the jury was, whether this sale to the plaintiff by Gove was or was not fraudulent; and the defendants’ proof, as usual in such cases, was mostly circumstantial. The jury returned a verdict of $1,800.
It seems that there was no circumstance of wantonness or oppression on the part of the officer shown in this case. It was only, if made out, the common case of a levy by the officer upon the property of a party, when that property was not subject to the levy. The Court were asked by the defendants to instruct the jury that the defendant, Webster, is not responsible in damages beyond the value of the property, at the time it was seized under the attachment, and interest on such amount from the time of seizure up to the time of the verdict. This instruction was refused to be given without, and was given with, this qualification, that they might find any damaged the party proved he had sustained.
The complaint claimed no other damages than for the taking and conversion, unless the latter clause of the complaint be considered as a claim for damages for the injury—beyond the value of the goods—to the business of the plaintiff as a merchant. But these last damages, if so stated as to be admissible of proof, could only be awarded in cases of willful and wanton trespass, or trespass marked by some circumstance of malice, oppression or fraud, and of this, as we intimated, we see no evidence in the record.
“ So it has been decided that when trespass is brought for personal property and no circumstances of aggravation are shown, the action is to be regarded as one of trover, and the value of the property with interest furnishes the- measure of damages.” (Brannin v. Johnson, 19 Maine, 361; Smith v. Sherwood, 2 Texas, 460 ; Row v. Story, 2 Barr, 191; Thomas Irell, 1 Iowa, 470)
Mr. Justice Baldwin (in Pacific Insurance Company v. Conrad, 1 Baldwin, U. S. C. C. R., 138) so fully states and so ably supports the true rule of recovery in this class of cases, that we feel justified in quoting at some length from his opinion. “ The rule which ought to govern jurors in assessing damages for injuries to personal property, depends much upon the circumstances of the case. When a trespass is committed in a wanton, rude, and aggravated manner, indicating malice or a desire to injure, a jury ought to be liberal in compensating the party injured, in all he has lost in property, in expenses for the assertion of his rights, in feehng or reputation; and even this may be exceeded by setting a public example to prevent a repetition of the act. In such cases there is no certain fixed standard ; for a jury may properly take into view not only what is due to the party complaining, but to the public, by inflicting what are called in law speculative, exemplary, or vindictive damages. But when an individual, acting in pursuance of what he conceived a just claim to property, proceeds by legal process to enforce it, and causes a levy to be made on what is
“ It has long since been well settled that a jury ought in no case to find exemplary damages against a public officer, acting in obedience to orders from the government, without any circumstance of aggravation, if he violates the law in making a seizure of the property. In the case of Nicoll against the present defendant, Judge Washington instructed the jury that they might give the plaintiff such damages as he had proved himself to be justly entitled to, on account of any actual injury he had proved to their satisfaction he had sustained by the seizure and detention of the property levied on, but that they ought not to give vindictive, imaginary, or speculative damages. The affirmance of his charge makes it the guide for us in this case. Our true inquiry, then, must be, What damages have the plaintiffs so proved themselves to be entitled to ?”
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.