Phelps v. HamiltonPhelps v. Hamilton
In this appeal, plaintiffs-appellants seek review of the district court‘s dismissal of their
BACKGROUND
The forty plaintiffs in this case are members of the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas who are involved in anti-homosexual protests and picketing in Shawnee County, Kansas and other locations within and outside the State of Kansas. The plaintiffs initiated this
The district court addressed plaintiffs’ claims in three orders relevant to this appeal. First, on June 28, 1995, the district court granted the State‘s motion to dismiss the action against it on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend to include the name of the state court judge in charge of the criminal proceedings. Second, on July 14, 1995, the district court granted defendant Hamilton‘s motion to dismiss based on the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court entered its judgment dismissing the action on July 17, 1995. Finally, on August 31, 1995, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions for relief, entering judgment on that order on September 11, 1995. The plaintiffs then filed their notice of appeal on October 10, 1995.
In this appeal, the plaintiffs raise three principal arguments: (1) that the district court erred in abstaining under the Younger doctrine; (2) that the district court erred in dismissing this action without conducting a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a prelim
Prior to addressing the plaintiffs’ arguments, we consider sua sponte the jurisdictional question of whether the notice of appeal was timely filed under
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal
The first question we must address is whether the thirty day period for filing a notice of appeal under
In the present case, after the district court granted both defendants’ motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a “Motion for New Trial, Amendment of Judgment, Relief from Judgment, to Alter, Amend or Modify Judgment, to Set Aside Judgment and/or for Reconsideration and Renewed Motion for Stay of State Court Criminal Proceedings.” See Aplt‘s App. vol. V, at 1232 (Motion dated July 25, 1995).3 After considering the plaintiffs’ arguments under both motions, the district court on August 31, 1995 denied the plaintiffs’ motions in a four-page “Order“. See id. at 1257-60 (Dist. Ct. Order dated Aug. 31, 1995). Shortly thereafter, on September 11, 1995, the district court entered a separate “Judgment” reaffirming its August 31 order.
While this court has not directly addressed the question of whether the denial of a post-judgment motion covered under Rule 4(a)(4) abrogates
II. Younger Abstention
In response to defendant Hamilton‘s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court ruled that it would abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), because the plaintiffs failed to establish that this case fell within the bad faith and harassment exception to that abstention doctrine. The plaintiffs appeal this ruling, claiming that the district court erred because their complaint alleged prosecutorial bad faith and that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to defeat defendant Hamilton‘s motion to dismiss.
We review de novo the district court‘s decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir.1995) [hereinafter Phelps I] (citing Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Oklahoma ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir.1989)). In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts, except in the most exceptional circumstances, must dismiss suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against pending state criminal proceedings. 401 U.S. at 43, 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 750, 754-55. The Court based this restraint on notions of comity and federalism, which require that federal courts respect state functions and the independent operation of state legal systems. Id. at 44-45, 91 S.Ct. at 750-51. In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass‘n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Court set out a three-part test for determining whether a federal court should abstain in favor of a state proceeding. Before a federal court abstains, it must determine that: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to present the federal constitutional challenges. Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521.
The Court also recognized in Younger and its companion case, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971), that a federal plaintiff may overcome the presumption of abstention “in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown....” Perez, 401 U.S at 85, 91 S.Ct. at 677. According to Younger, the irreparable injury must be ” ‘both great and immediate.’ ” 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243, 46 S.Ct. 492, 493, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926)). Moreover, the “threat to the plaintiff‘s federally protected rights” is only irreparable if it “cannot be eliminated by ... defense against a single prosecution.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751. There are three factors that courts have considered in determining whether a prosecution is commenced in bad faith or to harass: (1) whether it was frivolous or undertaken with no reasonably objective hope of success; (2) whether it was motivated by the defendant‘s suspect class or in retaliation for the defendant‘s exercise of constitutional rights; and (3) whether it was conducted in such a way as to constitute harassment and an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, typically through the unjustified and oppressive use of multiple prosecutions. See Phelps I, 59 F.3d at 1065.
According to our decision in Phelps I, on which the district court in this case relies, it is the plaintiff‘s “heavy burden” to overcome the bar of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment. Id. at 1066. Once the plaintiff makes an initial showing of retaliato
The plaintiffs first disagree with the district court‘s use of the standard articulated in Phelps I, arguing that they should not have been required to demonstrate bad faith beyond that alleged in their pleadings. However, the Supreme Court has held that once the complaint is filed in a
The plaintiffs’ second contention is that the district court erred in ruling that the bad faith exception to the Younger doctrine did not apply in this case. While the plaintiffs do not dispute the initial application of the Younger doctrine to their claim, they do contend that the bad faith exception to the Younger doctrine should apply to defeat abstention. Specifically, they contend that the evidence demonstrates that: (1) defendant Hamilton and her husband have frequently communicated personal animosity and hostility toward the plaintiffs; (2) defendant Hamilton made statements in her campaign for district attorney that she would prosecute the plaintiffs; and (3) the plaintiffs have been subjected to a substantial number of prosecutions indicative of retaliatory animus.
After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case, we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the bad faith exception to the Younger doctrine should apply. In fact, several of the plaintiffs’ arguments are similar to arguments previously made by one of the plaintiffs and rejected by this court in Phelps I.
With regard to the plaintiffs first argument, this court held in Phelps I that “demonstrating a history of personal animosity between the prosecutor and the [state court] defendant is not, by itself, sufficient to show that a prosecution was commenced in bad faith.” 59 F.3d at 1067. As to the second argument, we noted in Phelps I that statements made by defendant Hamilton in the course of a political campaign related to a political debate over law enforcement. “To view these statements as indicative of bad faith or harassment in subsequent prosecutions would intervene into prosecutorial discretion in case selection and chill political debate during campaigns for prosecutor.” Id. at 1068. In considering the plaintiffs’ final argument, we note that while defendant Hamilton has filed 20 cases against members of the Westboro Baptist Church since she has been in office, during that same time she
III. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit against defendant Hamilton on abstention grounds, the court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in which they sought enjoin the underlying state court prosecutions. The plaintiffs now argue that the district court erred in denying them a full hearing on their request for a preliminary injunction.
We review a district court‘s denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dep‘t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir.1997). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir.1982).
The question of whether to preliminarily enjoin an ongoing state court proceeding is precluded after Younger abstention is applied. As pointed out by the First Circuit in Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633 (1st Cir.1996): “When Younger applies, the district court must refrain from reaching the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims and, thus, there is no real possibility—let alone a likelihood—that the plaintiff will succeed in the action. A fortiori, there can be no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. at 637. It would be illogical for a federal court to preliminarily enjoin a state court proceeding when it is required to abstain from reviewing the state court proceeding altogether. Thus, the district court correctly refrained from conducting a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
IV. The Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend their Complaint
The plaintiffs’ final argument is that the district court erred in dismissing the State of Kansas as a defendant without allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to substitute the name of the state judge hearing the underlying state cases. Because we conclude that our abstention holding moots this issue, we do not proceed to the merits of the plaintiffs’ argument.
The constitutional mootness doctrine is grounded in Article III‘s requirement that federal courts only decide “actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). “Generally an appeal should be dismissed as moot when events occur that prevent the appellate court from granting any effective relief.” Thournir v. Buchanan, 710 F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir.1983). The central question in determining whether a case has become moot is whether “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
In the present case, the Younger abstention doctrine requires that this court and the district court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under Younger. We also affirm the district court‘s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and dismiss as moot the plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court‘s decision denying their motion to amend their complaint.