108 Wis. 572 | Wis. | 1901
The first ground upon which it is sought to reverse the order appealed from is that the complaint shows upon its face that the publication in question was a newspaper report of a “ judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding authorized by law, and of some public statements in the course of such proceeding,” and as such privileged under sec. 4256<z, Stats. 1898. That section reads as follows:. “ The proprietor, publisher, editor, writer or reporter upon
Neither the scope nor constitutionality of this'law is argued by the appellants. It is simply asserted that the matter published comes within the purview of the law, and the argument presented is in support of that view. If this argument is well founded, then the question suggested would properly be for consideration; if not, then the alleged libelous article must be considered, tested, and disposed of under the settled rules of law governing such matters.
We find no difficulty in the determination of this point. The chief reason urged by appellants in support of their position is that it nowhere appears in the complaint “ that the report in question is not a true or is not a fair report of this public official proceeding.” The difficulty with this contention is that the article in question is not, and does not pur
2. The second ground of error is based upon the claim that the complaint does not state a cause of action as against the defendants Ilsley, Tweedy, and Rublee, who were directors of the defendant corporation. We have held that the publication in question was libelous, and therefore actionable. All persons engaged in publishing and circulating a libel are responsible therefor, and may be proceeded against either jointly or severally. Newell, Slander & L. 240; Belo v. Fuller, 84 Tex. 450; Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis. 133. Officers, stockholders, or members of a publishing corporation are not liable for a libelous publication simply because of official position or membership, unless they come within one of the exceptions hereinafter named. Their liability, if any, springs from their active agency in producing and circulating the libel. But if it be shown that they in any way aided, assisted, or advised its publication or circulation, or that their duties as officers or agents of the concern were of such a character as to charge them with the performance of functions concerning the publication and circulation of the paper, such duties being of such nature that the law implies that such officers or agents knew or ought to have known of the publication, they are liable, and cannot defend on the ground merely that they did not know about the libel until after it was published. This was distinctly held in Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis. 133, and the cases and text-books sustaining the proposition are there cited.
It is elementary law, as applied to code pleadings, that a complaint will not be overthrown on demurrer unless it is wholly insufficient. Every reasonable intendment is to be
The real question, therefore, is whether, by a fair and reasonable construction of all of its allegations, the complaint charges that these defendants caused this publication merely in the sense that they carried on the business affairs of the corporation, or whether, as such officers, they had adopted a policy for the corporation in opposition to the street-railway ordinance, and of abuse and defamation of plaintiff, and whether it may be reasonably inferred therefrom that the publication in question was made in consonance with and pursuant to the policy so adopted, so that it can be said their action comes within the rule of law stated. It is not claimed that the complaint shows that the directors, as such, were charged with duties with reference to the publication
Construing the complaint with that liberality which the law demands, and indulging in every reasonable intendment to support it, we reach this conclusion: The defendants, who constitute the majority of the board of directors, had caused the corporation, through its newspaper, to adopt a policy of bitter opposition to the adoption of the proposed ordinance; that in following out this line of policy they had caused violent and inflammatory articles to be published
It is in the respect heretofore suggested that the complaint herein differs from that in Simonsen v. Herold Co. 61 Wis. 626, and is, therefore, distinguishable from it. It is not to be understood that such directors are responsible merely because they have, by official action, caused the corporation to adopt a policy of opposition to the ordinance and critical of plaintiff. Such policy must be shown to be one of vilification and libel, and it must appear that the publication in question was made pursuant thereto, or that they actually advised or counseled this specific act; else they cannot be held liable.
By the Oowrt.— The order appealed from is affirmed.