74 S.W.2d 220 | Ark. | 1934
This appeal involves the liability of appellants to appellee for debt which arose under the following circumstances: On April 7, 1926, F. J. Schmutz and wife executed and delivered their promissory note and real estate mortgage securing payment thereof to appellee, W. B. Worthen Company (the amount of which is not here of importance), which note by its terms matured one year after date. On June 1, 1926, Schmutz and wife conveyed the mortgaged property to one Levy, who assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage debt. On November 9, 1926, Levy conveyed the mortgaged property to appellants, who assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage debt. On April 7, 1927, the due date of the Schmutz note and mortgage, upon the application of appellants, the mortgagee extended the maturity of the Schmutz note and mortgage until April 7, 1930. On November 6, 1928, appellants conveyed the mortgaged property to one Keys, who purchased, subject to the mortgage debt, and not assuming or agreeing to pay the same. Prior to the advanced maturity date of April 7, 1930, upon application of Keys, appellee extended the maturity date of said note and mortgage from April 7, 1930, to April 7, 1933. This extension to Keys was granted by appellee without notice to appellants or either of them. From the facts thus adduced, the chancellor determined that appellants were liable for the mortgage debt, and this appeal is prosecuted therefrom.
Appellants' contention is that on November 6, 1928, when they conveyed the mortgaged property to Keys, thereby their legal status to appellee was converted into one of suretyship and that the extension of time by appellee *471 to Keys without notice to appellants discharged them from liability.
It is the settled doctrine in this State that a purchaser of mortgaged lands from a mortgagor who assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage debt thereupon becomes personally liable therefor, and this personal liability insures to the benefit of the mortgagee who may enforce it in an appropriate action. Wallace v. Hammonds,
In the more recent case of Central Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson,
It may be that the doctrine thus announced is contrary to the weight of American authority on this question, but, if such be true, it is equally as important that quasi rules of property be stable and permanent, as that court opinions of all States should be uniform.
No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed. *472