OPINION
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on December 4, 2000, pursuant to an order that directed the parties to show cause why this appeal
On December 15, 1996, plaintiff entered into a subcontract with Providence Construction, Inc. (Providence Construction), by which plaintiff would perform exterior rehabilitation work on ten properties on Adelaide Avenue in Providence. The original amount of this subcontract was $605,-418. The plaintiff commenced work in January 1997, and the work proceeded through March 1997, during which time Providence Construction paid plaintiff the amounts indicated on monthly invoices. Over the course of the construction, seven change orders were made to the subcontract between plaintiff and Providence Construction, resulting in an adjusted contract price of $980,940, according to plaintiff.
In April 1997, plaintiff continued to perform work on the property and submitted an invoice for that month’s work. Payment was not made, and plaintiff ceased working on the project on May 9, 1997, and thereafter terminated the contract. At the end оf May, plaintiff sent new invoices to Providence Construction for the months of April and May, but again was not paid. The plaintiff did receive from Providence Construction payments of $24,000 in June and $26,000 in September 1997, but received no payments thereafter. The balance owed to plaintiff was in excess of $100,000, although the precise amount was one of the issues that the parties disputed.
On August 7, 1997, in аn attempt to obtain the balance owed under the subcontract, plaintiff recorded notices of intention to file mechanic’s liens with the recorder of deeds for the City of Providenсe with respect to each of the ten subject properties and mailed these to defendant with a cover letter dated August 19, 1997. There is no evidence in the record that the notices were mailed by means other than regular mail. On December 5, 1997, exactly 120 days after the recording of the notices of intention, plaintiff filed a motion in the Superior Court to enforce the mechanic’s liens and mailed ten notices of lis pendens to the office of the recorder of deeds. The notices were recorded in the land evidence records on December 8,1997.
After a nonjury trial, the trial justice denied defendant’s motion for entry of judgment as a matter of law, entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and enforced the hens in the amount of $169,919, plus costs and attorneys’ feеs. The defendant appealed.
On appeal, defendant raised the following issues. First, plaintiffs mechanic’s hens were “void and wholly lost” because G.L.1956 § 34-28-10 requires that notices of lis pendens be filed in the record of land evidence within 120 days from the date of the filing of the notices of intention. In this case the notices were mailed to the recorder of deeds on the 120th day from the date of thе recording of the notices of intention, but were not recorded until the 123rd day. Second, plaintiff did not send the notices of intention to file its mechanic’s hens to defendant by prepaid registerеd or certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by § 34-28-4. Third, one of the lots upon which a hen was to be placed was misdescribed in the notice of lis pendens. The defendant also argued that thе parties had stipulated on the record that the amount owed was $149,919, not $169,919 and that therefore, if we consider the mechanic’s hens to be valid, the amount of the judgment should be changed.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the mailing of the notices on the 120th
This Court’s standard of review of a trial justice’s decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law is well established. “Without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, the trial justice must consider the evidence in the light most fаvorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. * * * ‘If, after such a review, there remain factual issues upon which reasonable рersons might draw different conclusions, the motion for [judgment as a matter of law] must be denied, and the issues must be submitted to the jury' for determination.’ * * * This Court applies the same standards as the trial court when reviewing the decision of a trial justice on a motion for [judgment as a matter of law],”
Gallucci v. Humbyrd,
The mechanics’ liens statute “attempts to deal with the familiar dilemma of placing the burden of expense upon one of two individuals who are generally blameless.”
Faraone v. Faraone,
Here, the notices of lis pendens were required to be filed in the land evidence records on December 5 at the latest. This requirement was not met because the notices were not filed until December 8. Moreover, § 34-28-4(a) provides in pertinent part:
“any and all liens claimed or that could be claimed under §§ 34-28-1, 34-28-2 or 34-28-3 shall be void and wholly lost to any person claiming under those sections unless the person shall * * * mail by prepаid registered or certified mail, in either case return receipt requested, a notice of intention * * * to the owner of record of the land at the time of the mailing * * (Emphases added).
Again, thеse requirements are also expressed in clear, unequivocal, and mandatory language and therefore must be complied with strictly. It was plaintiff’s burden at trial to establish that the notice of intention was sent by certified mail, yet the record is devoid of any evidence that it did so. Accordingly, plaintiffs liens were “void and wholly lost” for failing to meet this requirement.
The defendant cited Faraone for the proposition that:
“Even though [the mechanics’ liens stаtute] is in derogation of the common law and therefore calls for strict compliance with its requirements * * * it nonetheless should be construed to carry out its purpose of ‘ * * * afford[ing] a liberаl remedy to all who have contributed labor or material towards adding to the value of the property to which the lien attaches.’ ” Faraone, 413 A.2d at 91 (quoting Kelley v. Dunne,112 R.I. 775 , 778-79,316 A.2d 341 , 343 (1974)).
This rule of construction, however, does not aid plaintiff here because the relevant language of the mechanics’ hens statute is clear and unambiguous. “ ‘It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret thе statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’ ”
State v. DiCicco,
The plaintiff cited
Faraone, Kelley,
and
Frank N. Gustafson & Sons, Inc. v. Walek,
For these reasons, the trial justice erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff. We sustain the appeal on these bases and need not address the defendant’s othеr arguments.
In conclusion, therefore, the defendant’s appeal is sustained, and we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court, to which we remand the case with our direction to enter judgment for the defendant.