delivered the opinion of the court.
There is so little dispute concerning the facts of this controversy, that there is substantially nothing for the court to do but to determine whether thereon a judgment ought to have been entered for the plaintiff. Of this there can be no question.
The principal discussion tendered by the appellants in support of their contention that the case ought to be reversed, is based upon the testimony contained in the record. What the court assumes to be the facts disclosed by the record will be stated without argument or attempt to justify the results deduced from the evidence of the witnesses. This will be ample to determine the rights of the parties, and a fuller his
So far as concerns the main recovery, this judgment is abundantly justified by the record. It cannot be successfully controverted that the case shows in addition to what has already been stated that Pettit & Company acted on behalf of Mary Thalheimer in procuring the apparent execution by Mrs. Mills of the mortgage security and of the note which was the evidence of debt. Whatever their relations may have been originally to Mrs. Mills as negotiators of the loan, they assumed with reference to Mary Thalheimer, under the circumstances of this case, such a relation as compelled them to exercise reasonable care and prudence in the transaction of the business, so far as it related to the making of the instruments. It is undoubtedly clear that where such a relation is assumed, and the party is thereby charged with the duty of
The circumstances of the transaction justified Thalheimer in his reliance upon the brokers in procuring the instruments, and he rightfully assumed that they had exercised due care and caution in seeing that they were signed by the individual to whom the loan was ostensibly made. That Pettit & Company were imposed upon by Joseph Pettit, through whom the business was done, affords them no defense. Undoubtedly that fact shows that their connection with the transaction was entirely free from suspicion and the stain of dishonesty, and that they were imposed upon by the man whom they trusted to transact the business on their behalf; but since he was their agent, and Thalheimer cannot be charged with his conduct or neglect, it is their misfortune that they must respond to the damages which Mary Thalheimer sustained.
In entering the judgment, the court permitted the recovery of interest on the money paid at the rate of eight per cent from the 19th of February, 1887, to the date of the recovery. This part of the judgment cannot be sustained. Ever since the case of D. S. P. & P. R. R. Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. 1, it has been settled that interest can only be recovered in this state in the cases enumerated in the statute. Wherever the plaintiff’s right of action must take the form of a judgment for damages resulting from the wrong or negligence of a defendant, interest may not be included in a verdict, unless the case be brought within the priniple laid down in the Omaha and Grant Smelting and Refining Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41. Since this is true, it is evident that there is nothing in the statutes regulating the matter of interest in this state which warrants the recovery of interest by the plaintiff.
There are no other errors of sufficient gravity to require a discussion, or which, if sustained, would require a reversal of the case.
Affirmed.