In this litigation, Appellants, plaintiffs below, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the statutory scheme by which the state of Kansas funds its public schools. The district court dismissed their suit for lack of standing. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that the Appellants have standing because their alleged injury — unequal treatment by the state— would be redressed by a favorable decision. Accordingly, we REVERSE.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Kansas School District Finance and Quality Performance Act
The Kansas Constitution requires the Kansas legislature to “make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state.” Kan. Const. art. 6, § 6. In 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the then-current school finance system (the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, or “Act”) violated the state constitution because it “failed to make suitable provisions” for funding the public schools. See Montoy v. State,
A few months after Montoy I, the Kansas Legislature passed new legislation that purported to address the Act’s constitutional shortcomings. The Kansas Supreme Court considered the adequacy of that new legislation in Montoy v. State,
After Montoy II, the Kansas Legislature again amended the Act. This latest iteration of the Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-6405 et seq., is the subject of the present litigation. The Kansas Supreme Court deemed the current version of the Act sufficient to bring the system into “substantial compliance” with its prior orders. See Montoy v. State,
The Act attempts to ensure equal per-pupil funding across all school districts according to a complex formula. The formula establishes a “Base State Aid Per Pupil” figure, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-6410(b)(1), which is then multiplied by a given district’s adjusted enrollment to determine the “State Financial Aid,” i.e., the minimum funding that district will receive from the state. See id. § 72-6410(a). Adjustments to a district’s actual enrollment numbers are made according to a series of weighting factors, which take into account such things as the number of bilingual or special education students in a given district; the number and percentage of “at-risk” students in the district; whether the district has unusually high or low enrollment; the transportation needs of the district; and whether a district is operating a new facility. See id. §§ 72-6411-72-6415b, 72-6442b. Thus, for example, a district with high numbers of at-risk students, or high numbers of students requiring bus transportation, will have its actual enrollment adjusted upwards, to help it meet the costs associated with those factors.
The Act requires each school district to levy an ad valorem property tax of 20 mills for school finance purposes. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-6431. The amount of money raised through this local tax is designated the district’s “Local Effort.” Id. § 72-6410(c). If a district’s Local Effort generates less than the level of State Financial Aid to which the district is entitled under the formula above, the State makes up the difference with “General State Aid.” Id. § 72-6416(b). If on the other hand, a district’s Local Effort equals or exceeds the level of State Financial Aid to which it is entitled, the district receives no General State Aid. Id. Any Local Effort in excess of the State Financial Aid target is remitted to the state and used to cover General State Aid distributions to other districts. Id. § 72-6431(c), (d).
The Act also authorizes districts to adopt a “Local Option Budget” (“LOB”), which permits a district to raise extra money by levying additional property taxes beyond the 20 mill minimum. Id. § 72-6433(b). The LOB is capped, however, at 31% of the district’s State Financial Aid
The LOB cap, in some form, has been part of the scheme since the Act was initially enacted in 1992. Initially the cap was 25%. Kan. Sess. Laws 1992, ch. 280, § 29. In 2005 and 2006, responding to the Kansas Supreme Court’s orders in the Montoy litigation, the legislature increased the cap. Kan. Sess. Laws 2005, ch. 194, § 17; Kan. Sess. Laws 2006, ch. 197, § 19. In holding the Legislature’s first corrective attempt at a funding scheme was still inadequate, the state high court noted that “the legislation’s increase in the LOB cap exacerbates the wealth-based disparities between districts.” Montoy II,
B. Procedural Background
Appellants are students, and parents of students, in the Shawnee Mission Unified School District (“SMSD”). They filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of Kansas in December 2010, claiming that the LOB cap violated their federal Equal Protection and Due Process rights, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants named as Defendants, Appellees here, various state officials, including the Governor, the Attorney General, the Treasurer, the Commissioner of Education, and the Chair and members of the State Board of Education (“Appellees”).
According to Appellants’ complaint below, the LOB cap has caused SMSD to reduce its budget and reduce the educational services it provides. SMSD has cut its budget by $20 million over a two-year span, including cutting nearly 100 teachers, and class sizes have increased. The LOB cap has also caused SMSD to announce and begin implementing the closure of certain schools in the district.
Appellants asserted a fundamental liberty interest in directing and participating in the upbringing and education of their children; a fundamental property interest in spending their own money to improve public education in their district, thereby protecting their property values; and a First Amendment right to assemble, associate, and petition for improved public education through increased local taxation. Appellants sought various forms of relief, including a preliminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the LOB cap, a declaratory judgment that the LOB cap violated the Fourteenth Amendment; a preliminary and permanent injunction against the implementation of the planned SMSD school closures, and “such other and further relief’ as the court might find just and proper.
On Appellees’ motion, the district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The district court concluded that because the LOB cap was not severable from the rest of the Act, a finding that the LOB cap was unconstitutional would result in the invalidation of the entire Act. Further, because the district court concluded that Kansas law provided no independent taxing authority for school boards, a favorable decision for the plaintiffs would result in the SMSD school board being unable to levy any taxes at all. The court held that, while under other circumstances the “cap can be challenged,” in this case, “[i]t is only plaintiffs’ desired remedy — striking only the cap, so that the school district retains the right to impose an LOB tax— that does not work.” Dist. Ct. op. at 13 (emphasis added). In other words, the
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction over this federal constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1381. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment, which Appellants timely appealed, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Though the district court ultimately determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz,
This Court reviews a dismissal for lack of standing “de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court.” Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson,
III. DISCUSSION
We pause to emphasize two points. First, whether Appellants ultimately can prove that the state in fact “intentionally underfunds” the Appellants’ district, or that the Act in fact creates classifications without sufficient justification, is beyond
the scope of this appeal. Here we address only the district court’s conclusion that Appellants lacked standing to challenge the LOB cap because their alleged injuries were not redressable. We do not address the district court’s conclusions that the LOB cap was not severable from the remainder of the Act, nor the conclusion that Kansas school districts lack independent taxing authority. As to these latter two points, we believe the district court’s conclusions are premature and we vacate those conclusions for further consideration if necessary. Second, the dismissal for lack of standing came at the pleading stage, not on a motion for summary judgment or later in the litigation. Consequently, Appellants’ burden in establishing standing is lightened considerably. See Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,
A. Standing
We disagree that Appellants’ alleged injuries could not be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits. Accordingly, we hold that Appellants have standing.
The federal judicial power extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III. For a case or controversy to be justiciable, it must involve
1. Injury
The injury alleged must be “concrete and particularized,” and the threat of that injury must be “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers,
2. Causation
The causation prong of Article III standing requires that the injury be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Lujan,
Appellées contend that causation is not met because Appellants cannot identify any specific action on Appellees’ part that has caused them harm. The Court rejects this argument. It cannot seriously
3. Redressability
Even where injury and causation are sufficiently established, Article III standing will be denied unless it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan,
It is this alleged unequal treatment that constitutes the injury. See Ada-rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
Instead, a favorable decision on the merits could redress the Appellants’ alleged injuries. Without prejudging the merits, Appellants could get meaningful relief under a variety of scenarios. Most preferable to Appellants would be an invalidation of the LOB cap coupled with a finding that the cap is severable. See Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating,
The district court reasoned, however, that because Appellants’ “desired remedy” was the excision of the LOB cap alone, and such excision was impossible, Appellants’ alleged injury would not be redressed. Id. But as we have made clear, Appellants’ alleged injury, while flowing from the LOB cap, was not “the inability of the district to raise unlimited funds,” Dist. Ct. op. at 1, but rather the alleged unequal treatment (manifested in, among other things, lower per-pupil funding) that prevented them from even attempting to level the playing field. That Appellants would have preferred to see the LOB cap alone invalidated does not render that injury incapable of redress. Appellants’ Complaint is titled “Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief.” ApltApp. at 43. Appellants expressly sought not only declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the LOB cap, but also “such other and further relief as [the district] Court should find just and proper.” Id. at 61. Equitable relief can take many forms, and at this early stage of the proceeding the court should not assume it will be unable to fashion relief that could remedy any constitutional violation found. Although Appellants repeatedly stressed that they did not seek the invalidation of the entire scheme, only invalidation of the LOB cap, Appellants clearly contemplated the possibility that the entire scheme might be struck. See ApltApp. at 2233 (Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Addressing Severability); 2317-18 (transcript of hearing on motion for preliminary injunction). They did not expressly disavow that possibility, nor did they ever concede that the wholesale invalidation of the Act would mean that their injury could not be redressed.
The standing inquiry, at the motion to dismiss stage, asks only whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a cognizable injury, fairly traceable to the challenged conduct that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Lujan,
We conclude that Appellants have carried their burden to establish the three requirements of Article III standing.
B. Severability and independent taxing authority
As the foregoing discussion of standing makes clear, Appellants’ Article III standing does not depend upon their certain ability to raise funding from within the district. Instead, Appellants have standing because, under the lenient standard applicable at this early stage of the litigation, they have alleged a violation of their right to equal protection that is fairly traceable to the challenged statute, and which would be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits, even if such a decision resulted in the wholesale invalidation of the Act. Standing is established, in other words, regardless of whether the LOB cap is severable from the remainder of the Act.
Therefore, the district court did not need to determine, at this early stage, whether the challenged LOB cap can be severed from the Act, or whether, if not, other Kansas statutes confer taxing authority on individual school districts. Accordingly, we do not reach those questions, and we VACATE those portions of the district court’s order. Only if, on remand, the district court concludes that the LOB cap is unconstitutional, should it then determine whether the cap is severable under Kansas law, applying Kansas’s test for severability as articulated, for example, in Thompson v. KFB Insurance Co.,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Appellants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the LOB cap, regardless of whether the cap is severable from the rest of the Act. The district court’s dismissal for lack of standing is REVERSED, and its conclusions as to sever-ability and independent taxing authority are VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the district court for a consideration of the merits.
Notes
. The Montoy litigation arose out of an earlier challenge to Kansas’s school finance system, which resulted in a series of decisions from the Kansas Supreme Court starting in 2003. For purposes of this opinion, we cite only three of the Montoy decisions, which we call "Montoy I," "Montoy II," and "Montoy III.” (These numbers bear no relation to the similar shorthand occasionally used within the Montoy opinions themselves.)