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Petition of RMG
454 A.2d 776
D.C.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 States, Lee til trial. United They cussed at contend D.C. argument.4 oral (1978). App., 385 A.2d Reversal is tape recording prearrest nego- that a of the warranted, however, only where there is videotape tiations and a arrest scene ap- substantially prejudiced error which has improperly were admitted into evidence be- Id. at 164. In pellants’ rights. light of our prejudicial cause were and they unfairly that themselves holding tapes were not in ad- they because had not been disclosed unfairly prejudicial, considering that de- vance to defense counsel. have requested fense counsel could a recess Both were tapes potentially highly tapes they to hear and view the before were prejudicial, permitting the inference that so, jury, to the but did not do and played appellants extremely dangerous were there confu- bearing in mind both that was guilty simply the inference that were they a for request discovery sion as to whether they because refused to submit to arrest government had made and that been However, immediately. tapes because only recently videotape, had obtained the value, had least as cor probative some at judge we conclude that did not evidence, roborative because their actual admitting tapes abuse his discretion in prejudicial impact probably was minimal into evidence. (since tapes were cumulative of other sum, no the trial court committed re- evidence), judge gave and because the trial any alleged respect. versible error jury, (Record instruction to the cautionary Affirmed. 1077-78), trial we conclude that judge did not abuse his discretion admit

ting tapes despite prejudi their possible

cial effect.

Regarding the failure

government tapes to disclose the to defense trial, appellants rely

counsel in advance of of the Petition of In the Matter upon which allows a de Super.Ct.Cr.R. R.M.G. and E.M.G. fendant his own recorded state discover evidence, ments as the video and real such J.H., Jr., Appeal et al. tape, government’s which is within the cus No. 79-747. Assuming appellants had tody. Appeals. Court of request made a for all such discover District of Columbia proper dis (which government able materials Jan. 1981. Argued disclosure in putes), assuming late 29, 1982. Decided Dec. require the instant case did violate 16, the trial purposes ments and of Rule apply sanctions had discretion un- withholding evidence government’s (1979); v. Unit Williams Appellant argues 408 A.2d 370-71 two additional errors. Hines States, denying D.C.App., A.2d ed the trial court erred He asserts that show, required admitting Appellant as acquittal into has failed to and in his motion for evidence, grounds money jewelry of insufficient taken from reversal on evidence the produced government no point, evi “the has him when he was arrested. On the latter might jewelry mind argues money which a reasonable were dence from he beyond fairly guilt reasonable doubt.” properly belonging to ADE. infer never identified as Likewise, Frendak, supra no ample there was reject at 371. There was We both contentions. admission of the linking appellant discretion in the Hines abuse of evidence circumstantial upon money jewelry his from Hines taken at the ADE of- to the events which occurred custody arrest, established question, since a chain and there is evi- fices on the date showing had been taken that those items dentiary support element of the of- for each Hines, Jennings codefendant Lee identified and since his fense of which he was convicted. See carrying ADE States, property D.C.App., Hines had been 431 A.2d v. United States, D.C.App., property. (1981); Frendak v. United *4 Karpoff, Va.,

Julian Arlington, with whom Stafford, Alexandria, Bobby Va., B. was on brief, appellants.

Benjamin Saulter, F. D.C., Washington, for appellees. NEWMAN, Judge,

Before Chief FERREN, Judges. MACK and Associate FERREN, Judge: Associate petitions for competing case of child, we a trial adoption of black review petition granting court decision denying grandparents child’s black parents. Ap- petition her white foster factors, the trial court plying all relevant adopt both families suitable found child, race factor concluded but black scales in favor tipped the grandparents. race, among other fac

Although tors, between deciding can be relevant competing petitions for the stat- approval. mended At the foster mother’s factor, insistence, however, ute expressly incorporating Department noti- it, well application as the trial court’s fied the child’s natural father of the pro- objected. must survive “strict He scrutiny,” posed adoption. order His own comport E.M.G., with the equal protection require- stepfather, mother and R.M.G. and ment of the Constitution. conclude that petition adopt then filed a D. The natu- the statute on its face withstands constitu- Department ral father consented. The tional challenge but that the trial court’s grandpar- Human Resources studied the application is not sufficiently precise and, ents’ withdrawing sup- home its earlier ac- satisfy judgment the Constitution. The port of parents’ petition, the foster recom- cordingly must be reversed and the case grandparents’ mended approval peti- remanded for further proceedings. tion. hearing petitions begin- At the both on I. AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 27, 1979, April the court received ning PROCEEDINGS following evidence: The foster 22, 1977, D. was September born have four other children —three natural and unwed, parents. By black teenage, fourth, male, by adoption. They a black

time, Cleveland, Ohio; her father lived in military family, living racially are a on a mother, Washington, her In early D.C. base with inte- integrated military racially give D.’s mother decided to January grated schools. When asked about up signed papers her relin- race, of another problems raising child quishing parental rights. did not tell She the foster mother testified that she and her *5 his the natural father. Nor did she tell begun pro- “an affirmative husband had stepfather, appellees mother and R.M.G. gram” adopted with their male child. For and E.M.G. example, pre-school she had obtained black 6, 1978, books for their son. January Department history coloring On and testified, “I make sure he knows that placed Human Resources D. foster She J.H., long who are he’s not white. I don’t care how he parents, appellants J.H. and black, beautiful, us, he’s and he’s white. The foster mother realized almost lives with healthy. that D. was not D. and he’s ours.”2 immediately from nausea and diarrhea suffering was and her grandmother The child’s natural old, and, although more than three months hearing. at the The husband also testified moreover, D., weighed only pounds. (all eight has children a grandmother and, lethargic according to Dr. extremely youngest previous marriage) of whom Ganter, psychiatrist, Robert a child showed hearing. time of the She also was 14 at the During signs mental retardation. two of whom reside grandchildren, has nine however, nur- year, parents next D.’s foster (one younger a few months at her home is mental good physical tured her to and D.). grandmother is em- Although than health.1 home, she testified that outside the ployed of absence to be 26, 1978, D. she would take a leave April a few months after On them, grandmother Both the came to live with J.H. and J.H. filed with the child. wanted to they De- her husband added that adoption. Initially, petition her, D., care for were able to they Resources recom- raise that partment Human that, although testified adoption hearing April The foster mother also Dr. 2. 1. At the adjustment period adopted “had an son had had “bloomed enor- her Ganter testified that D. mously” by a “high average he was seen in his life” at which time was of to above problem psychologist, not with his average intelligence.” his “was trial court conclud- The color, adoption. parents’] He was con- but with his “As a direct result of foster [the ed: efforts, love, given he special birth to him. Now the child vinced that I had affection and progressing adopted, good he’s prospered present health.” knows he was beautifully.” to her state G_ grandchildren reside in the they show her their that desired to G_ love. Mr. and Mrs. are both home. placed If the is in her baby employed. worker, Doris Kirksey, social testified leave of care, plans she take a absence on Department behalf of Human im- to be with the child. The Court is D.’s place- Resources. She recommended pressed with affectionate nature grandparents ment with her “based on the premise G_family that the best for a of the to sac- place willingness child ... Kirksey with blood relatives.” Ms. dis- rifice. come any might counted harm that to D. paramount con- any In family.

from removal from her foster She In the best interests of child. cern is assessment, part, based her advice should consider an regard, Court psychiatrist, of her agency Dr. Frances them Among of factors. are: array Welsing. age 1. The the child. Welsing testi- trial asked Dr. stability adopting family 2. nutshell, fy person. position, Her in a seeking adoption. and reasons for always was that cross-racial will Financial and other resources avail- 3. very be harmful child and —at family. the adopting able to be discouraged. empha- least —should She Existence of love and affection be- 4. sized that a non-white child would encoun- persons involved. tween particular ter difficulties in a white home upon reaching Dr. Welsing adolescence. any. relationships, Blood if 5. made her recommendation to the Depart- Race. 6. ment of Human having Resources without other Any significant factors. met the family. J.H. of Dr. Welsing’s Most important It equally Court testimony problems concerned the of cross- weigh past, these factors in terms of racial adoption in a broad societal context. present and future. Dr. response Welsing, the foster very young— It is seen the child expert, Jay called their own Dr. F. years young less two old. In her life than Pepper. He ger- identified several factors already undergone significant she has mane adoption. agreed He *6 changes. Ac- probably and traumatic considered, should respect but expert testimony, these cording to to the attitudes of particular family the shifts record- changes permanently or are petitioning adoption. Welsing, for Like Dr. ed it Similarly, agreed the mind. is Dr. had not Pepper met J.H. and J.H. setting changes family that sudden After reciting procedural the of history parts or vital of one’s environment other case, the trial following the court made the emotional distress uncertainty, can cause findings and conclusions: regard insecurity. Having and sense of H_and wife, Colonel his Cauca- case, history predicta- for of it the this sians, children, of presently have four one in the life of this change ble another Black They whom is a child. are adopted of degree injury will cause some child middle-income, stable, affectionate her. harm to travel family likely unit who will to some becomes, question given pivotal The degree military of father’s because the alternatives, evaluated now the available They clearly career. love child in future, pru- decision is what question. best interests? being the child’s dent stable G_family The is a Black G_is are clear. Both of this case aspects Some Mr. of modest means. family concern for shown love and families have G-, her the second husband of Mrs. reasonably Both families child. having first husband died. She has stable; H_family greater has children and also has nine eight

raised At two resources. grandchildren. least financial adulthood, regard relationships, With to blood etc.—would likely accentuate points. evidence indicates that it is a factor these vulnerable The but Court does Thus, family not conclude such a could certainly not conclusive. in the not sus- love, affection, is, tain stability, question absence of itself. Rather there not a better The traits, relationship other blood alternative? supportive Court is concerned that little medical or right parent- alone no special confers scientific attention has been devoted to ing. question Yet should also be problem. The Court is concerned weighed in the interest of tradi- H_s that, fault, without stand to tion, intangibles. culture and other family. lose a beloved member of their question important. of race is It However, our test the best remains inter- interesting experts ap- that all the who est of the child. It is believed apply- peared agreed in this matter that not considered, ing all of the factors to be on the sub- enough work has been done evaluating in terms of ject as it However pertains adoption. future, past, present appro- that the that race is a unpleasant, would seem alternative is of the child priate adoption problem which must be considered and G_family. ignored should not be or minimized. Conversely, there are not conclusive abso- 1, 1979, On June the trial court lutes to be drawn on the basis of race. It granted grandparents, E.M.G. and seem, however, entirely reasonable R.M.G., “Interlocutory Decree of grows that as a child older the ramifica- Adoption,” which the decree stated At problem tions of this would increase. final on automatically “shall become [De love and stage, notwithstanding a later 3, 1979], unless it shall in the inter cember affection, questions identity severe good have been set cause im aside arising from the and race most 6, 1979, par the foster shown.”3 On June probably would evolve. In the world at ents filed a Motion For “Supplemental large, as the circle of contacts and rou- Findings Additions Amendment widens, adjust- tines there are countless of Fact.” The trial court denied the motion 3, 1979, ments which must be made. Given the 12, 1979, July on June and on also case, circumstances in this the child’s stay motion for a parents’ denied foster present relatively status is secure and filed a pending appeal.4 The foster future, timely appeal interlocutory carefree. in each of its of the June 1 adolescence, decree on June 1979.5 stages childhood, young — stay 16-309(c), dissolving anticipating an order 3. Under D.C.Code the trial § —filed Court, petition stay Supreme for a court could not issue a final decree of September 1980. As until had months with her which was denied on the child lived six argument January adopting parents. permits The statute the date oral — *7 which, interlocutory parties informed this court court to enter decree —counsel for both an parents. terms, by that D. remains with the foster its will become final after six months good unless the order is set aside for cause Id., 5.Interlocutory appealable during period. to this shown the interim 16— orders § specified 309(d). only conditions court under certain 1973, applicable in this case. See D.C.Code Nonetheless, although ll-721(a)(2). parents petitioned 4. The foster this court for a § stay properly adoption pending appeal. was labeled as an “inter of We court’s order the order order,” id., 16-309(c), (d); 21, They locutory petition August note see § denied the appealable supra, petitioned rehearing we conclude the order for en banc. On October 3 1973, order, 11-721(a)(1), 19, 1979, stay § of the trial court’s as a final D.C.Code we issued a finality. practical pending of See while under the doctrine order further order of this court Corp., Gillespie petition. August Steel 379 U.S. v. United States we considered the en banc On 310-311, 308, 11, 1980, 148, 152-53, petition rehearing 13 L.Ed.2d for 85 S.Ct. we denied the 19, (1964); stay Industrial Loan of v. Beneficial en banc but did not lift the October 199 Cohen 541, 1221, perhaps Corp., 93 L.Ed. U.S. 69 S.Ct. foster 337 1979. Counsel for the —

783 16-309, 1973, id. statute, simply the § ITS II. THE STATUTE: CONSTRUC- AND APPLICATION TION states: adoption for “shall contain” petition may A a or court enter final (b) ... [T]he petition- races of the

information about the adoption of when it interlocutory decree see D.C. adoptee, prospective er and the is that: satisfied “the 16-305(4) (5),6 and unless Code § physical- is prospective adoptee (1) The or adoptee is an “the prospective adult” mentally, otherwise suitable for ly, and parent” spouse a of the natural petitioner is by petitioner; the adoption Id. adoption. to who the consents give is fit and able to (2) petitioner the statute, The adoption 16-308.7 Supp., § adoptee proper home prospective the take race therefore, the court permits education; and and account, provide although it does not into will best be for the (3) adoption the the is do it. any guidance to how court adoptee. Instead, of prospective interests the legislative history. Nor does the address, name, (2) age, Rachal, D.C.App., business or em- the (1949); 1202, Rachal v. (1980); Bearstop Bearstop, petitioner, ployment and the name of A.2d of the (1977). any, petitioner; D.C.App., employer, But for 377 A.2d 407-08 if of the the court, supra, stay note 3 (3) relationship, any, prospec- the issued this see if the the of the to remove D. from her foster home petitioner; order adoptee to the tive irreparable harm to both D. and her threatened religion prospective (4) the race and of the Rachal, (order deny parents. foster See parents; parent adoptee, natural or or his ing rights parent threatened both visitation religion petitioner; (5) of the the race and harm). irreparable parent It and child with prospective adoptee (6) the date that contrary be to the best interests of the residing petitioner; and commenced her into new for child to allow to settle may (7) any change be de- of name which then, assuming prob no six and months sired. adoption developed lem final, and the decree became any above facts is unknown to of the When appeal taking an of the allow order petitioner petitioner, shall this state away “The child danger from her earlier environment. any facts is known When of the above fact. justice by delay” denying in this Commissioner, child-plac- aor licensed to the clearly against outweighs any situation concern policy ing agency as a matter of social piecemeal “the and costs re inconvenience petitioner, them to the disclose declines might contrary view” which lead us to a con may an disclosed to the court in the facts 152-53, Gillespie, supra clusion. 379 U.S. at by the exhibit filed Commissioner or Finally, appellants S.Ct. at 310-311. because agency more one with the court. If than thirty appeal days filed of the trial this within joins petition, require- petitioner in a “Motion Amendment court’s denial their apply to each. ments of this section Fact,” Findings of appeal To And Additions Of provision originally Congress enacted the timely. II(a)(1) D.C.App.R. is and (Pub.L. 16-214 § 1954. See D.C.Code (1954)). 7§ 68 Stat. ch. 272 No. provides: 16-305 § 6.D.C.Code Supp., provides: 16-308 § 7.D.C.Code person petition A for the filed prospective adoptee Investigations under or of the shall be oath affirmation when petitioner titling spouse par- and shall be petitioner thereof sub- of natural or adult parte stantially “Ex in the as follows: matter ent. petition - dispense investiga- with the adoption.” petition exhibits an- or the tion, interlocutory report, provid- decree following in- nexed thereto shall contain the chapter when: ed for formation: adult; (1) prospective adoptee is an or sex, date, name, (1)the place of birth (2) petitioner spouse is a of the natural names, adoptee, prospective of the addresses, prospective adoptee parent par- natural residences of the parent to the natural consents except ents, petitioner, if known adoption. joins petition for adoption proceeding consented above, (2) specified in In the circumstances *8 by to placing agency, or a licensed child- Commissioner petition not contain the information need names, addresses and by specified concerning religion may of the natural not residences (4) (5) subparagraphs of section 16-305. forth; set 784

Only reported two juris- decisions in this their race or religion on adoption peti- diction address the question of race in an tion, alleging that the statutory require- adoption proceeding. In Adoption In re of ment was unconstitutional. Id. at 738. We Minor, 99, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 228 F.2d 446 Minor, cited In re Adoption of a supra, for (1955) (interpreting predecessor statute), the proposition that race can be a relevant the court held that the trial court improper- factor, DeF, 3, In re supra at 739 n. but we ly had denied a stepfather’s petition black declined to address the constitutional issue. to adopt, consent, with his wife’s his wife’s We noted that there was no real of white son. The rejected court parties’ race or the merits of peti- court’s reasoning that the white child tion; thus, we approved adoption if as “ ‘might lose the social status of a white the petition had been amended with the ” man adoption reason’ of his by a black. information the required. statute Id. at 100, Id. at 228 F.2d at 447. The court 739-40.9 reasoned: neither the summary, adoption statute can adoption Nor denial of the rest on a itself nor the interpreting provide cases distinction between the “social status” of much guidance as to whether race may be whites Negroes. There be rea- relevant to an adoption, consistent with the race, sons why religion, a difference especially in an adoption con- Constitution — may have relevance in adoption proceed- accordingly present test. Petitioners a new ings. But factor alone cannot be challenge, alleging constitutional broadly determining decisive in the child’s wel- “equal protection doctrine of the permit ignore fare. It does not a court to prohibits Constitution the use of skin color- all other relevant considerations. Here defined race as a relevant issue in an we think those other considerations have adoption.”10 101, controlling weight. 228 F.2d [Id. (footnote omitted).] at 448 III. STRICT OR INTERMEDIATE open possibility The court thus left SCRUTINY? race could be relevant an adoption deci- sion did specify but not what circumstances Supreme Over the years, Court might its use.8 justify has held that a statute which on its face takes race into is constitutionally

More account recently, expressly con- suspect scrutiny.” firmed and must receive “strict adoption. the relevance of race to DeF, (1973), In In re D.C.App., Regents University 307 A.2d 737 of California v. Bakke, 265, 290-91, 2733, couple, wishing adopt mixed-race 438 98 S.Ct. U.S. race, J., 2748, (1978) (Powell, child of mixed refused indicate 57 L.Ed.2d 750 an- however, proc Bolling, Fifth due 8. The court remanded with directions that the Amendment grant petition equal protection. trial court id. at ess contains an element 101, 448, noting 228 F.2d at “that all the evi- Moreover, “it would be unthinkable that the dence relevant to the ‘best interests’ of the impose duty same a lesser Constitution firmly points child in the direction of required on the Federal than Government” 7, .. ..” Id. at 101 F.2d at 448 n. 7. n. 228 equal protection clause of the the states 500, Fourteenth Id. at 74 S.Ct. at Amendment. Burton, 960, F.Supp. 9. Cf. Pedersen v. 400 963 case, Accordingly, purposes of this 694. (D.D.C.1975) (three-judge court) (per curiam) equal there is no distinction between material (statute requiring marriage applicants license protection Fourteenth and the Fifth under the identify unconstitutional). their race is Valeo, See, e.g., Buckley Amendments. v. 424 statute, applied We review the 1, 612, (1976); U.S. 46 L.Ed.2d 659 S.Ct. equal protection here terms the laws. Wiesenfeld, 636, Weinberger v. 420 U.S. 638 n. Amendment, note that Fifth which is “[t]he 1225, 2, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 95 S.Ct. n. Columbia, applicable in the District does States, (1975); Obregon D.C.App., v. United equal protection contain an clause as does the denied, (1980), A.2d 202 n. 1 cert. applies only Fourteenth Amendment which (1981). L.Ed.2d 422 U.S. S.Ct. Bolling Sharpe, the states.” 347 U.S. S.Ct. 98 L.Ed. 884 As discussed in

785 Bakke, 362, supra 438 at 98 at nouncing judgment court) (hereafter U.S. S.Ct. Florida, Powell, J., White, McLaughlin (Brennan, J., joined by v. Mar opinion); 2784 283, 287-288, 184, 191-92, Blackmun, 379 85 JJ., concurring U.S. S.Ct. shall, and (1964); Bolling Sharpe, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 v. judgment part dissenting part) 499, 693, 694, 497, 347 74 98 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. Brennan, J., (hereafter opinion) (quoting States, (1954); 884 Korematsu v. United Gunther, Court, Supreme 1971 Term— 216, 193, 194, 214, 323 65 89 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. Evolving In Search of Doctrine Foreword: result, (1944). 194 As a racial classifica Model for a Newer Changing on a Court: A if only tions will be held constitutional Protection, Equal 1, 8 86 Harv.L.Rev. governmental shown to advance a interest (1972)). Blumstein, that is v. “compelling,” Dunn however, recently, in the context of More 330, 342, 995, 1003, 405 92 S.Ct. 31 U.S. remedy plans action intended affirmative Richardson, (1972); 274 v. L.Ed.2d Graham discrimination, concluded past four Justices 365, 375, 1848, 1853, 403 29 U.S. 91 S.Ct. “benign” permit that racial classifications (1971), “overriding,” Loving L.Ed.2d 534 of review be an intermediate standard 1, 1817, 11, Virginia, v. 388 87 U.S. S.Ct. general scrutiny strict the more tween 1823, (1967); McLaughlin, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 “rational test.11 Fulli ly applicable basis” 288, supra 192, at if 379 85 at U.S. S.Ct. Klutznick, 448, 519, 448 100 love v. U.S. particular use of is “necessary” race 2758, 2795, (1980) (Mar 902 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d Bakke, supra 438 accomplish purpose. that J., Blackmun, shall, joined Brennan and by J., 305, (Powell, 98 2756 U.S. at S.Ct. at JJ., (hereafter concurring judgment) Griffiths, 717, 722, opinion); In re 413 U.S. Bakke, Marshall, J., supra 438 concurring); 2851, 2855, (1973); 93 S.Ct. 37 L.Ed.2d 910 2782, 357, 361-62, 98 2784 U.S. at S.Ct. at 342, Dunn, 405 at supra at 92 S.Ct. U.S. (Brennan, J., opinion).12 the inter Under 1003; 196, McLaughlin, at 85 supra 379 U.S. justify allegedly mediate an approach, S.Ct. at 290. The Court said on a has important racial classification “an benign occasions, moreover, number of a purpose and articulated for its use must be necessary classification can be to serve a (Bren 2784 shown.” Id. at 98 at S.Ct. compelling governmental only interest nan, J., it must opinion). specifically, More “precisely when le tailored” achieve its important gov a purpose be serves Doe, - U.S. gitimate purpose. Plyler v. prescribed objective ernmental to which the -, 2382, 2395, 102 72 786 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d substantially use related of race (1982); Dunn, at at accord 405 U.S. situation which —in contrast with usual 1003; Redhail, 92 at S.Ct. Zablocki v. invoked —does when 374, 388, 673, 682, 434 U.S. 98 54 S.Ct. id., ...,” re group “stigmatize[ any (1978). ] L.Ed.2d 618 As a some consequence, a that one race is flecting “presumption members of the Court have noted Professor “the putting inferior to another” or that, given Gunther's the sever observation racial hatred weight government behind ity scrutiny, racial classifications 357-58, survive; 98 at generally “ scrutiny separatism.” do not such Id. at S.Ct. ” (Brennan, J., opinion); and fatal in fact.’ accord Fulli- theory ‘strict Klutznick, Recently, Supreme Court referred to 12. Fullilove v. 448 U.S. applying (1980) upheld test follows: “In rational basis 65 L.Ed.2d 902 S.Ct. Equal statutory requirement of the federal Protection to most forms of state Clause 10% action, public projects we thus seek funds local works assurance awarded for enterprises. minority business the classification issue bears rela set aside some fair Bakke, legitimate public Regents U.S. tionship purpose.” Plyler v. of the Univ. Cal. (1978) Doe, - U.S. -, 2382, 2395, struck 57 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. S.Ct. program re down a serving school admissions medical L.Ed.2d 786 entering percentage of seats in class minorities. *10 786

love, supra 519, 100 448 U.S. at at S.Ct. 2795 erence under state civil service system (Marshall, J., concurring).13 against allegation of gender-based discrimi- nation); Washington accord v. Seattle acceptance This of benign racial classifi ——1, School District No. -, U.S. 102 cations, intended to further governmental 3187, S.Ct. 73 (1982); L.Ed.2d 896 Crawford that, interests compelling, while not - Angeles v. Los Education, Board of id., “important,” “substantial,” Plyler, -, 3211, 102 U.S. S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 948 supra 2395, 102 S.Ct. at reflects the inter (1982). proceed, I accordingly, to apply mediate or scrutiny “middle-tier” which the traditional, strict standard of Court review. developed years a number of earlier sensitive, to address not inherently but sus pect, gender, classifications such as Craig v. IV. STRICT SCRUTINY OF THE Boren, 190, 197-99, 451, 429 97 U.S. S.Ct. STATUTE, ADOPTION AU- AS 457, (1976); 210, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 id. at 456 — 97 THORIZED AND APPLIED. (Powell, J., at 463 concurring); S.Ct. see The cases I have concerning found Mississippi University Hogan, for Women v. use of race in an adoption statute do not - U.S. -, 3331, 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d discuss whether advancement of a child’s (1982), and, 1090 recently, more alien chil best interest “compelling” governmen is a dren. Plyler, supra. generally See L. See, tal interest. e.g., Adoption In re of a Tribe, American Constitutional Law 16- § Minor, supra; Drummond v. Fulton County 30, (1978). at 1082 Department Family & Children’s Serv Court, however, A has not ices, (5th 563 Cir.1977) (en banc), F.2d 1200 accepted this intermediate review standard denied, 910, 3103, cert. 437 98 U.S. S.Ct. 57 benign any classifications of sort. (1978); McKeithen, L.Ed.2d 1141 Compos v. But even if that applicable standard were F.Supp. (E.D.La.1972) 341 264 (three-judge in the context of affirmative action to rem court); Davis, Beazley v. 92 Nev. edy discrimination, past as four Justices though, P.2d 206 Implicitly, urged, have I applicable would not find it in courts treat it as I agree. such—and context, a family-law where racial classifi then, question, critical par is whether the cations over the years par have resulted in race, ticular use of ap authorized and ticularly vivid examples of invidious dis plied, is “necessary” precisely thus —and crimination. See Part IV.B.l. infra. I enough “tailored” —to achieve the child’s

therefore scrutiny conclude that strict best interest. here; required statutory recognition race as a factor to be weighed in an A. Authorization of Statutory the Race proceeding exacting the most “call[s] Factor judicial examination,” on ground first, turn, statutory authoriza “[rjacial and any ethnic distinctions of sort earlier, As tion. noted the statute does not Bakke, are inherently suspect,” supra 438 bar cross-racial which of course (Powell, J., U.S. at 98 S.Ct. at 2748 Adoption would be fatal. In re of a See opinion). It follows that this “racial classi 448; Minor, supra at 228 F.2d at Com fication, regardless purported motiva Thus, pos, supra at 268. the racial classifi tion, is can presumptively invalid and be sustainable, all, only cation is if because at upheld only upon an extraordinary justifi among it is one a number of relevant fac cation.” Personnel Administrator of Mas Minor, 256, 272, Adoption supra tors. In re sachusetts v. Feeney, U.S. 448; 2282, 2292, Drummond, (1979) supra S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d at 228 F.2d at (up 1204-05; held pref- Compos, supra Massachusetts lifetime veterans at at 266. addition, Bakke, benign purpose, gram.” supra 13. In to survive at 98 S.Ct. at 2784 Fullilove, J., scrutiny, may “single[] (Brennan, opinion); intermediate out accord J., represented political (Marshall, those least well concur- S.Ct. at process benign pro- ring). to bear the brunt of a own adopted parents of their is, however, Whether important

There race, often find it diffi- adoptees factor, or another if is to a relevant caveat: identity.15 a sense of to establish cult it, weight either properly court cannot *11 context, this has at least “Identity,” in with presumptively i.e., or automatically — “belong- components: (1) a sense of three against out or regard to evidence —for (2) community; and family a stable ing” in so would add a adoption. cross-racial To do confidence; feeling a self-esteem and of policy to evaluation racially discriminatory enable the (3) “survival skills” that a of the child’s best interest. As conse with the world outside cope child to contest, petitioners quence, adoption in an therefore, identity, One's sense of family.16 a head race would receive particular an perceptions of oneself both includes require start, to the contrary constitutional being. adop- While and a social individual is “pre that use of race —which ment adoption attitudes toward the parents’ tive affirmatively be invalid” —must sumptively influence on child are not the and their 272, justified. 442 at 99 Feeney, supra U.S. child, af- parental attitudes do these 266; 2292; cf. supra see at Compos, S.Ct. at extent, fect, a whether significant Kramer, 359, In 297 Marriage re of N.W.2d will secure and confident child feel (in “no (Iowa 1980) custody proceeding 361 may Because race community.17 warranted assumptions automatically are atti- parental be relevant to these highly can a factor identity”; racial race be tudes, expert 17 see note —as relev only if there is some “demonstrated parties of both confirmed —it witnesses ancy”).14 to the issue of child’s larger relevant DeF, supra at 739. interest. See In re best becomes: whether thus among statutory authority to consider conclude, signifi- in a accordingly, I the factors relevant without prospects where cant number instances preference any party, for the race of can evaluated, adoption are those who “necessary” ever be for a determination of a recommendation deci- responsible for Appellants say child’s best interest. it Department sion—social workers be, protec- cannot alleging “equal Resources, expert witnesses Human prohibits tion trial, doctrine Constitution be and the trial court itself —will not the use of skin as a rele- adoptive color-defined race on an adequately able to focus adoption.” vant issue in thus on the agree identity, cannot child’s sense of interest, considering with that best without unqualified statement. child’s 555, (1977); emphasize again 50 L.Ed.2d 450 14. It is useful here once U.S. 97 S.Ct. that, 229, 240, statutory Davis, inquiring Washington a racial 96 whether v. 426 U.S. “necessary” (1976). a classification to advance 48 597 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. interest, “compelling” governmental we are dealing inherently presump suspect, with an C.A.B., D.C.App., 384 A.2d 679 In 15. See re classification; thus, tively party invalid City Dep’t (1978); of Vital Mills v. Atlantic would has the who sustain the classification Statistics, N.J.Super. A.2d 646 372 148 scrutiny. proving burden survives strict (1977). generally Sorosky, & See A. Baran A. where an osten This contrasts with situation (1979). Adoption Triangle R. Pannor, action, statute, sibly or other state race-neutral impact disproportionately aon has a adverse Adopting Across 16. J. Ladner, Mixed Families: minority. statute or action Such a (1977). 284 Boundaries Racial not, discriminatory depending invidiously or situation, underlying purpose. on its Id.; Shapiro, L. & D. Grow party Transracial who invalidate the statute has Adoptive Today: Adoption discriminatory Views pur proving Parents the burden of Feigelman, (1975); Silverman & pose. Rogers Lodge, - U.S. -, Social Workers v. 102 Adoption 3272, 3275-76, (1982); Affecting of Minor- 1012 Some Factors S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d Feeney, Children, (1977); R. ity of Mass. v. 554 Personnel Administrator Soc. Casework 2282, 2293, Adoption 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. & H. Simon Altstein, Transracial (1979); Village Arlington L.Ed.2d Corp., Heights Metropolitan v. Hous. Dev. race. Statutory authority for the court equal protection does not end our in- take account, therefore, race into can be quiry; although general proposi- a—as critically important proceedings. race, factor, tion —the use of as one may be When among considered a number of fac necessary to serve the best interest of the tors, evidence, on the basis of without auto child, there is risk also that this classifica- matic presumptive preference for an tion may be invoked in a racially discrimi- race, adoptive parent of particular Thus, fashion. natory there remains the criterion does not reflect a “racial slur or significant question whether the racial clas- stigma” against group. any United Jewish statute, sification in the as applied Organizations Carey, 144, 165, 97 430 U.S. particular case, in this precisely enough 996, 1009, (1977) (plu S.Ct. L.Ed.2d tailored to the child’s best interest to sur- Drummond, rality opinion); see supra at *12 scrutiny, vive strict or suffers instead from 1205. It is a markedly criterion that con generalized application a more possibly impermissible trasts with the use of race reflects invidious discrimination. facially both in discriminatory statutes18 application and in neutral therefore turn to facially statutes —some re race,19 ferring to others masking provide perspective in statute. To exam- not20— —to vidious discrimination in the law ei ine the risk of invidious discrimination —I ther as or as enacted21 administered.22 begin with an historical look at the exercise judicial discretion, race, applied to sum, an inherently suspect, pre- indeed adoption custody proceedings. and child invalid, sumptively racial classification in is, adoption statute in a constitutional sense, necessary compelling to advance a 1. Perspective Historical governmental interest: the best interest of Thirty years ago, Supreme Court of the child. It thus strict survives scruti- Washington awarded the chil- custody of unusual, ny result that is as racial classi- —a dren of a black father and a white mother go, fications but not precluded. simply they to the father because resembled Application

B. Judicial of the Race Fac- him: tor love question We do the mother’s for her But we have always The fact statute does children. stated, cases, not per primary se reflect an unconstitutional denial in divorce that our See, 1, 369, 1627, Virginia, (1967) e.g., Loving 18. v. 18 L.Ed.2d 830 388 U.S. 87 U.S. 87 S.Ct. 1817, (1967) (struck (struck provi 1010 S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d down California constitutional law); Virginia antimiscegenation forbidding down Strau sion state interference with unfet 303, Virginia, every der v. 100 person West U.S. 25 L.Ed. 664 to decline to tered discretion of (1880) (invalidated jurors limiting state law to property any person); sell or lease real to Her males). white Texas, 475, 667, nandez v. 347 U.S. 74 S.Ct. 98 (1954) (systematic per exclusion of L.Ed. 866 See, 385, Erickson, e.g., 19. Hunter v. 393 U.S. jury sons of Mexican descent from service as 557, (1969) (invalidated 89 21 L.Ed.2d 616 S.Ct. commissioners, jurors, petit jurors); grand city requirement charter of voters 1064, Hopkins, Yick Wo v. 118 U.S. 6 S.Ct. approve any dealing must ordinance with hous- (1886) (ordinance prohibiting 30 220 con L.Ed. race, ing religion, discrimination on the basis of struction of wooden laundries without Martin, ancestry); or Anderson v. 375 U.S. license; licenses to all 200 licensors denied (1964) (invalidated 430 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d applicants granting while them to 79 of Chinese requiring amendment to Louisiana election law applicants). 80 non-Chinese designation of nomi- each candidate’s race on ballots). papers nation See, e.g., No. su 21. Seattle School District See, e.g., Washington Reitman, Hunter, supra; 20. v. Seattle School Dis pra; supra; Ander -1, -, son, trict No. U.S. 102 S.Ct. supra. (1982) (affirmed invalidation of L.Ed.2d 896 stop statewide initiative intended to school Wo, See, Hernandez, e.g., supra; Yick su mandatory busing purposes for board’s use of pra. integration); Mulkey, of racial Reitman v. children, however, adoption agencies, were still unre-

concern is the welfare of the agency, ceptive Georgia to the idea. One duty brought We owe that to children all court, race, responded in 1954 to a Child example, regardless into a divorce citing color, League study by Welfare of America girls, creed. These unfortunate anti-miscegenation statute: own, state’s through fault of are the no their marriage. A prohibit “Our laws interracial a broken marriage victims of a mixed in a child reared home will much They home. have a better apt will and want different meet rightful place to take opportunity their person parents’ his or marry her society they brought up among if agen- not his own.”27 Other Ward, background, people. their own [Ward deferred cies concerned about —and were 143, 144-145, Wash.2d 216 P.2d community against prejudice (1950).]23 to— adoption.28 views, Abhorring many professionals such began discourage the mid-1950’s An intent interra validity of cial sustainable rationale marriage statutes24 and court decisions25 not a statute. barring many implementing cross-racial place Loving, supra. willing to adoption agencies became Nor is even well-inten protect against black children in white homes.26 Southern effort a child corn- tioned *13 Calling “unfortunate,” beyond adoption language a the 1950’s—has 23. this —well Washington expressed appeals history segrega- part state court of of a much broader of been Supreme mandating belief of country, separation its that Court Wash- of in this tion ington again if the family. would overrule Ward issue generally See D. the races within the Tucker, came v. 14 before the court. Tucker (2d ed. Bell, Race, Racism American Law 53-81 & 454, 455, 789, Wash.App. (1975). 542 791 P.2d Grossman, 303; Note, 1980); supra 25 note at Custody Disputes Following the of Dissolution See, (1950); e.g., 24. 9:422 § La.Rev.Stat. Tex. Marriages: the 97, Best Interests of Interracial (Vernon 1969) (re- art. 46a 8 § Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. 19 J. L. Child or Judicial Racism? Fam. pealed 1973). Both statutes were declared un- (1980-81). Most states have barred 97-104 McKeithin, Compos See constitutional. F.Supp. 341 marriage point his- some in their interracial tory, at Gomez, (E.D.La.1972); 264 In re 424 Miscegenation Applebaum, see Statutes: (Tex.Civ.App.1967). S.W.2d 656 Problem, A and Social 53 Geo. Constitutional reported 49, (1964) (identifying 25. Most court in this area decisions 41 L.J. 50-51 & nn. 5-15 custody, concern not use miscegnation which at one time had states Annot., generally decisions. 57 See A.L.R.2d -laws; article 19 still had them at time the custody 678 Even the number of cases When, years ago, published). fifteen sparse. suggest Several commentators have miscegenation Supreme stat- Court declared that, judicial ed in the absence of statute Loving, supra, 16 unconstitutional utes decisions, the common law tradition was marriage. prohibited Id. states still against mixing family. races in See Gross 5, 87 at 1820 & n. 5. 6 & n. S.Ct. man, A Race as a Child Different Color: Custody Adoption Proceedings, Factor in 28.Grossman, 324, supra reported 25 at note 303, Note, (1968); 17 Buffalo L.Rev. 309-10 following comments: 228, [Adoption ], in Iowa 40 234-35 L.Rev. Iowa adoption presents than or- “more Interracial Note, Matching (1955); & n. Racial difficulties, long dinary so there risks Adoption for the Hard Dilemma: Alternatives prejudice.” so much remains Acceptance Place, (1978-79). 333, n. 43 341 may 17 J.Fam.L. community “highly im- why reported Another be few reason there portant.” minority 1954 is children decisions before adoptive couple must consider “ramifica- The tions, placed through not been formal have relatives, church, friends, neighbors, generally systems. See su J. Ladner, children, community.” pra own note 16. strongly opposed “tradi- because of are We Grossman, generally supra 25 at note 26. place- tion, community accept such unable 318-25; & D. L. Grow Shapiro, Black Children— repercussions.” generally, fear of ments Study Adoption A of Transracial White Parents: placement a white child in of a colored (1975); 16 at note 56-71. J. Ladner, complications, many “es- home would lead to pecially” when he reaches adolescence. Grossman, supra empha- note 25 at 323. 27. opposition response to cross- size because review, equal munity prejudice proper justification, protection purposes, a sin- itself, exercise of trial court gle discretion? decision.29 This is suggest not to that such concerns motivated apply we When the abuse-of- rather, point, the trial court here. The is to discretion standard review without re very illustrate that there is a real risk of concerns, gard to constitutional we check to discriminatory application misuse —of a—of be sure that the trial court has exercised its racial classification in an adoption proceed- range permissible discretion within the would be ing. simply ignore We naive alternatives, based on all relevant factors possibility commonly based on the improper and no factor. See Johnson v. hope shared times changed. States, have D.C.App., United 398 A.2d Thus, (1979).30 where race is a factor for the trial We then evaluate whether “substantial” consider, supported by decision rea appellate court of judi- review id.,31 soning, “drawn from a firm factual cial discretion under the statute must be as foundation” in the record. Id. at 364.32 We exacting scrutiny as our of the statute it- noted, however, the exigencies have self. do not much permit trial sometimes elabo support discretionary ruling. ration in Judicial Review of Trial Discre- Court Thus, depending on “the Id. at 365. nature tion being made and the determination other reported concerning Unlike cases rendered,” context within which it was racially statutes administered in discrimina- court, appellate necessary, if examine “may see note 22 tory ways, supra, we do deal reasoning upon the record and infer here with a demonstrable pattern prac- the trial court made its determina How, then, tice. the appellate does tion.” Id. at 366.33 30. The 29. See In re 32. “An informed 31. “[T]he abuse if the stated reasons can abuse of requires A.2d Kreischer, vant factors of foundation. 587 n. er the trial court’s action was within the App. Milligan supports the trial court’s action.” Id. the Beazley v. based ex rel. er the trial court’s abuse of discretion factor, at factor, ably .... 2, permissible 365 decision maker failed to consider a relevant be discerned for 361-62 (1976); support the conclusion.’ 208 The court upon (citation omitted). appellate Myers and whether the reasons whether he discretion if no valid reason is that the trial court’s determination v. (1976) (per curiam); appellate 302 n. 3 Davis, 450 Pa. 293 N.W.2d (Iowa 1980); Davison, Just pertaining and drawn from a firm factual Marriage Commonwealth v. alternatives” based on “all rele- court “must determine wheth- Myers, choice reviewing as reasoning is substantial and court should 352, *14 Nev. relied must 244 it, trial court’s action is an to the among 468 Pa. 299 A.2d 243 Edel v. ... Kramer, determine ‘whether Pa.Super. the decision for do not rest upon ” 545 P.2d ex pending decision so also it is an the alternatives Commonwealth 795-96 Johnson, inquire Edel, 134, given reason- rel. Lucas an improper 360 A.2d 255, 97 Mich. given N.W.2d upon wheth- (1973); (1980); range supra 367 be an v. 33.We omitted). specific the at 850-52. Boston Television U.S.App.D.C. tute man v. trial ord the of tion as the nature review must viewing ation the anism for ing confronted and the context within dered. highly structured review for abuse of discre terminations. Administrative decisions cally an discretion do Determinations appellate language in the midst of trial counsel should and infer the administrative role. amassing court an unwarranted have stated the (1977) factual of reasons agency’s If needs easily a trial court’s exercise United produced evaluating made its of the determination ], Nonetheless, court should take of the decision predicate.” [383] even depend. as do most administrative de of a record not submit committed to the trial court’s determination would States, [D.C.App., be, may situations reasoning upon which the upon trial, Corp. though to do so in review at determination, with it. point 392-94, judicial Consequently, for take which a structured The trial both the such which it was v. Id. at 364 See, e.g., Greater that do not admit in full as follows: and the enumer examine the example, themselves to a provides mech FCC, supra pains to ensure 444 F.2d usurpation formality cognizance of being made trial judge, discretion, see 378 (citations is often consti Berry in re judge [841] A.2d typi ren rec rul of of detailed, through no It follows that case, be In this there can court, ruling on the findings and conclusions will the trial written question that the thinking acted within for able to its petitions explain the trial court be (“range its discretion proper scope the clarity with sufficient assure process Moreover, alternatives”). permissible data for effective review. needed relevant factors all the court considered Johnson, at (quoted supra at 364-65 fac improper and no by statute prescribed Moore, D.C.App., 31-32); *15 supra. given responsibility But our (3) significant the regard; how this use inherently suspect strict of an scrutiny between the families racial differences classification, of a racial with the burden all factors relevant when the it, note the who would sustain see party together. are considered must that and thus supra, party, we hold step concerning taking the first itself, for af- the trial court accountable identity,34 prob court must evaluate the ev- judgment firmatively justifying related family’s each supra, able effect of respect. Feeney, material ery See belonging 2292; child’s sense attitudes on the Compos, 442 U.S. at S.Ct. child’s community,35 family supra at 266. Mikelson, Marriage 299 N.W.2d founda- See In re that record reflect both the 35. does (Iowa 1980) (comparing reasoning actions of behind the discretion- 673-74 tions and the adoptive parents (footnotes prospective, ary white omit- two decision. at 365-66 [Id. toward ted).] had made terms contributions each develop helping of ra- sense foster child black supra accompanying text. 15-17 & *16 38. our not, children, adopted black must whether or disagree understanding opinion, I not of our do is, taught ways be “survival skills”—that to pref- proposition there can be “a with the that cope with in discrimination encountered the sup- adoption that erence for intraracial family. capable world of outside the To be ported by 805-806. evidence.” Post at skills, teaching family survival the itself must sturdy enough up any prejudice be to stand to saying explicit would not in it Marriage 39. The court was it encounter. See In re of Mikel son, supra supra were if there at J. at rule out a cross-racial 674; Ladner, 215; Grossman, supra petition 25 at 333-34. See also note the one at issue. Chimezie, Adoption Transracial of Black Chil- factor, an and manifested tipped rely race the in favor on irrelevant the factor decision weighing thoughtful process. D.’s See John grandparents.40 of black a son, appar The fact that race supra at 365. decision, I the court’s examining trial favor tipped appel- the decision in of ently First, con- following: note the the court not, itself, lees, supra, see does in note it three-day hearing during ducted a Drum suggest discriminatory result. See and observed the demeanor of witnesses mond, supra at 1205. evi- thorough assured a of presentation Third, as as it dence, analysis, the court’s far including expert testimony on the (neither by testimony of of record. general goes, supported the racial issue aspects Johnson, at supra seek- 364.42 expert was familiar with the families See ing Thus, the court adopt). presumably therefore, court, obviously The trial each family’s possible had before it best did nec concerned and not was careful and issue, as personal presentation on the racial result. essarily impermissible an reach fami- possible well as the best case each with Nonetheless, correctly beginning while expert concerning views ly based on the focusing step as to race analytical the first adoption generally. effects race on of identity, of the child’s sense growth on of specific findings (reflect

Second, the dis court no expressly court the made above) as questions of listed ing it the kinds claimed that could draw “conclusive race; be to affect this likely “the how would as to it referred to absolutes” up, respec child case,” growing “ap particular in this while black total circumstances and families of J.H. and J.H. tively, in the all of the factors to be considered” plying Furthermore, aside R.M.G. (each discussed) the “and of E.M.G. and of which court makeup racial reciting facts about the question past, in terms of evaluating not sum, the court did articulate family, future.”41 In the court of each present, and analysis required by steps comparative concentra specifically dogmatic eschewed in compare how the race, rele two and three: families openly tion on discussed all the respective accommodate child, of fami their abilities to (age stability vant factors race, resources, significant racial differences ly, financial and other love how factors affection, not families are when all relationship, race), blood did between the ques- court, analysis correctly noted that the critical I in its understand above, adopted quoted prosper full in the found D. if in text to have whether could tion not equally loving pre- toward parents question families stable her foster —a grand- the child. The court further found the improperly, sumptively, fa- would have parents preferable respect rela- with to blood family appellants instead: What vored —but prefer- tionship; the white foster were presents the better under all circumstances also able financial resources. The court alternative, problems identity given affected predictable change in found “it is that another by race? H_to life the G— of this child [from family] degree injury or will cause some 42.Also, har- has accused the court of no one harm As taken to- to her.” to these factors boring discriminatory we intent. Because therefore, gether, apparently was claim G.s’ inherently suspect classifi- with deal to, than, equal less or at best somewhat cation, however, question in- of trial court as the The court turned to race H.s’. thus issue, directly be if a as would tent is not apparently factor. determinative facially involved. statute were neutral colleagues agree dissenting I do not with our Thus, although supra. direct evidence note all rele- trial court found ... “[t]he discriminatory intent would relevant race, equi- factors, other vant than were judicial application of the statute show that poise.” Post at 796 n. 1. scrutiny, strict absence not could survive not conclude 41. When the court said it did help establish that does not such evidence itself,” not sustain “could precisely tailored of race was trial court’s use is, not a is there added that “the respect, In this the child’s best interest. alternative?”, question did better rhetorical Drummond, analysis disagree a view that racial differences reflect at 1205. nega- automatically presumptively be— tive —a context, Rather, every factor case. *17 relevant to the adoption are to- vant adoption, considered does not deny equal pro- gether.43 tection of the However, laws. court, in granting the petition of R.M.G. Because the race factor is determi D., E.M.G. to adopt did not articulate here, native see supra, note 40 I conclude its analysis of the race factor in sufficient the trial court’s analysis pro did not detail to assure a reviewing court that the vide the reasoning and detail necessary to application factor, of that conjunction assure a reviewing court that the evalua with the other considerations, relevant tion of race was precisely tailored to the precisely tailored to the best interest of the best interest of the To repeat, child. Nor, course, child. appellate effective review when race is a critical fac in a position to any dictate result here. tor, this court needs to understand exactly Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment how the trial judgment court made the of the trial court and remand the case for to race that it did: whether as a precisely further proceedings consistent with this analyzed determination, based on carefully opinion. thought through comparisons of the parties So ordered. evidence, drawn from record or as a more generalized conclusion that race always fa petitioners

vors (here the same ap race MACK, Judge, Associate concurring: pellees) judgment reflecting an imper —a joining In disposition ordered missible intellectual shortcut. Judge Ferren, I find it necessary say in my is, not, own words what and is this,

In a issue ease such as where there here. is every indication from the trial court’s that, analysis but race, for considerations of outset, At the I see no need to reach the might different, decision have been any constitutional equal protection. issue of Cf. determination as to race that is not precise DeF, In re D.C.App., A.2d 737 ly comparative articulated on a basis will The Adoption mentions race and Statute fail to survive scrutiny. strict Given the religion only as factors to be supplied along trial court’s opinion, which could be read to with other petition information in a say that appellants J.H. —the —were adoption. D.C.Code 16-205. It § race, slightly favored but for see note 40 require give does not the court these supra, an articulation of how close the race whatever;1 any factors consideration necessary is will be to assure this court, only provides that the after the con- court that the is constitutionally jus result sideration of the and other evi- petition Otherwise, tifiable. the risk that race will dence, when it may enter a decree is satis- be misused is too high, even when there is fied that is suitable for adoptee no reason to believe the trial court is inten petitioner that the is fit and able

tionally discriminatory. education, provide proper home and and that will be for the best

V. CONCLUSION We adoptee. interest of the Id. 16-309. § statute, summary, explicit statutory with its are thus not faced with a scheme recognition of rele- among separating persons solely the factors on the basis rely analy- exclusively have noted earlier that under the circum- the trial court’s own case, especially stances of this because of sis. nature, its constitutional there is no basis for us reasoning to “examine the record and infer the DeF, supra, cited for the 1. While In re has been Johnson, the trial court used.” at 366. proposition race is a relevant factor stronger by pointing This conclusion made adoption proceedings, it has not been held rele- expert out that none of the witnesses made the purposes. vant for This court constitutional comparative analysis required kind of here. issue in that declined to meet the constitutional Thus, analysis there is no of record which we case. say adopted. could the trial court We must

795 very of issue confirms (see Loving Virginia, racial v. statement the classifications 1817, 1010 388 87 18 in S.Ct. L.Ed.2d fact. all other factors are U.S. this “[W]hen (1967)), program or an affirmative action of competing between sets equipoise” [as of preference on basis allegedly giving the a consideration that prospective parents], the (see Regents of classifications race per the on the basis of se tips scales Bakke, 438 University of California v. U.S. “potential that future hard- (with reasoning (1978)). 98 57 L.Ed.2d 750 S.Ct. questions identity “prob- or of would ships” Therefore, be to tempted may however one adoptions) ... from interracial ably evolve” issues, re-argue I interesting constitutional in the nature of is of course a consideration may doing may from so. Instead I refrain nothing A presumption. presumption a agree, my with both of col- magnanimously, upon probabilities than based guess more a leagues that the is constitutional statute Bazemore, 7) upon n. (see supra at 1382 — add, I think uncharitably, that do not here, that, not have been con- probabilities arguments their are relevant.2 clusively established. required I in this think that reversal we custody proceeding, In a or court, unwittingly, case because the trial not concerned with the best interest of are employed impermis- the factor of race as an concerned, we generally; children are rath- Davis, presumption. sible In v. Bazemore THE er, with best interest of child. banc), (1978) (en 394 A.2d D.C.App., my colleagues quibbling While are about upon we that a presumption held based and “intermediate scruti- scrutiny” “strict custody sex a no in parent place of has reaching age a little school un- ny,” girl proceedings. suggest, pre- I a Similarly, the only parents der care of she has sumption upon based of com- solely race Judge with agree even known. Because I peting place sets of no would-be has a Ferren that a trial court faced such In adoption proceedings. both instances task, jus- affirmatively must “Solomonic”3 weighing court is the best interest of a every respect, its material tify judgment particular child—an interest in which the particu- human factor of As we for a paramount. love is I reverse remand Bazemore, noted determination, a “norm is ill suited” for taking into consider- larized and must be making that determination it bearing uniquely upon factors this ation made “upon specific relating evidence adjustment development child’s includ- that child alone.” at 1383. Id. significance giving recogni- “full ing already tion to a unit existence.” think, moreover, I do not the fact that Walcott, 246, 255, Quilloin v. U.S. See speak not in terms court did (1978). L.Ed.2d S.Ct. a presumption, might the fact it least, For this I would down- purpose, have “ex- upon testimony relied of an on to the emphasis signifi- race pert” (who parties) grade had met the made never a it deserve.4 ruling presumption. its rest more than cance should Mohammed, my 2.If the statute is to be read as tant state interest. Caban 1760, either it, S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 297 colleagues 441 U.S. read I would find unconstitu- agree parties’ tional. While I that the attitudes relevant, very toward race be I do Kings See 1 3:16-28. per neces- think that a racial classification se is sary accomplish purpose protecting agree is a most difficult 4. While can adoptee. of an interest decision, my discussion of brother Newman’s Supreme brings has adoptions mind a similar context Court the risks of interracial Congress speech quote held in a state stat- that sex-based distinctions the farewell (black) adoptions impermissible post-Civil governing un- con- ute last War of the protection George equal Representative Four- H. gressmen. der clause of the White suggestion (1852-1918), (replying best interest of to the teenth Amendment. might colleague set- be child resort must determined without Society along gender-based when do tled sentimental lines distinctions which inflexible impor- Cruelty shall to Animals for the Prevention relation to some not bear a substantial *19 ing weighing process implicit the in the NEWMAN, Judge, dissenting: Chief reasoning, and expressed thereby court’s proceeding, In this the trial court con- concluding that its consideration of race competing adoption petitions sidered the pre- have been “insubstantial.” The may a black and her grandparents child’s natural remedy remanding for further scribed found — parents. white foster The trial court proceedings probably do no harm. It that, where of other factors totality the —will record, is clear from the and trial opinion child, equipoise,1 were in the interests of the however, improper that there was no con- D.G., likely by be better served more remedied, sideration of race to be and it is adoption by an intraracial than an interra- will unlikely opinion that a wordier make it was more cial one. This factual conclusion if unusually than the easier to detect and overturn abuses and adequately supported by addressed to the sub- future. thorough testimony they when occur in the must ject. ensuing adoption order the therefore be sustained unless Constitu- THE TRIAL I. THE NATURE OF taking tion note of the races prohibits COURT’S DECISION limited parties involved even for the court, prospective sets of In the trial both by addressed important purpose and an to adoptive parents opportunity had that weigh possibility trial to court: evidence bear- present any and all available adoptive parents

racial differences between interest would ing on how the child’s best adversely and child affect2 the latter’s the alternative by I think it be affected either of development future and welfare. does not re- is clear that effects of including potential Constitution placements, quire ignore a court to racial differences differences, mitigat- any and factors child, between prospective parent thorough hearing, After a ing those risks. must be the extent that such differences judge such fac- the trial court was able judge in that best inter- observed order to financial re- respective tors as the families’ est. child, sources, relationships with the blood custody away the effect of a shift However, managed has temporary custody, family with family tak- judgment by overturn the trial court’s love and care that stability, and the sort of view of ing overly what I think is an stilted provide.3 disregard- family expected each could be the relevance of race to race, factors, equi- difficulty were in be- other than of the difference relevant overcome lambs) majority’s reading poise. tween lions and observed: Even if the correct, reach the same record were I would my Virginia good But what friends of do will results, analytical Bible, I here. do says with that He created for God Again, all men of one flesh and blood? we having adoptions might insist on one race —the lion clothed Advantages that interracial vicious, strength, great with and with de- adoptions conceivably over intraracial have propensities, while the other interest, structive by promoting if raised the child’s best weak, natured, inoffensive, good and use- However, parties, would also be relevant. heterogene- ful —what will he do with all the adoptions it is not contended animals, way ranging ous intermediate all are, superior things equal, to intraracial other lamb, pure pure on from the lion to the found ones. See infra at 798. plantations every Southern State Union? Negro Cara- Davis, Lee: The [Brown, by trial court as 3. Race was considered van (1941).] merely factors and relevant one of numerous conclusive factor. not as a determinative or majority has that the trial court’s 1.The stated race, factors, intimation in the trial There is not the least other than examination of all family family judge’s opinion fit “slightly otherwise favored” the white foster granted “tipped as can never be the decision different race the race factor race, regardless against adoption by grandparents.” of the same favor of D.’s black Thus, is not disagree decision its fitness. the court’s Ante at 793 & n. 40. I with found, prohibiting state action with cases trial court inconsistent characterization. controlling automatically gives di- portions quoted opinion its shown these 781-782, custody majority, decisions. that all mension ante son, coloring history my for a black books good position unusually was in an The court children, by Ebony out Jr. put family, H. book respect to the judge he’s not white. time sure he knows that for some make custody had they already had us, Moreover, long he lives with they have I don’t care how basis. temporary black, beautiful, he’s child, who, par- he’s unlike he’s adopted another thus had before ents, is black. The court ours. by the steps taken

evidence of affirmative evidence, the court weighed all this Having potential mitigate some of the parents to other as a fact that considerations found *20 adoption. in an interracial arising problems the in race between than the difference efforts Q. particular made you Have were parents adoptive and one set of child main- heritage, his black to cultivate equipoise.4 in house- your of that in presence tain the then turned to a consideration The court hold? differences effects of racial possible of the an affirma- definitely began We A. child, and concluded parents between to live with Jeff came program tive when in the of adverse effects possibility that the us. the in favor of family tipped H. the balance you? with Q. long How has Jeff been on conclusion was based family. This G. us when he the testimony, came to live with which expert A. Jeff considerable old, with us so he has been evi- eight days part. was recites in It is majority opinion August. in six He’ll be six nor the court years. parties almost neither the dent that Indeed, when lightly. this issue approached military, in say, being the Needless testimony indicated that her a social worker socie- thoroughly integrated in a we live of Dr. Wels- based on the views largely than accepting you and much more ty, re- the court agency psychiatrist, the ing, find in most civilian communities. would testify person. in Welsing that Dr. quested guidance of friends and associ- Through opinion on expert facts and weighing After husband, at the my chaplain ates of that conclu- sides, the court observed both of our chapel go where we to church —one efficacy of interracial data on the mag- in sive chaplains gotten is black —I have lacking.5 adoption is azines, pre-school I have black some 99, ty Minor, favored the Adoption U.S.App.D.C. considers that the balance thus In re of a 97 McKeithin, (1955); Compos 341 228 446 v. without consideration F.2d white foster Gomez, (E.D.La.1972); interpretation F.Supp. family’s testimony. 424 264 In re This 1967). (Tex.Civ.App. While some S.W.2d 656 But even if one assumes best debatable. at be a rele courts have held that race can never consideration exists before that such a balance proceeding, custody in vant factor efforts, then mitigating those efforts are Davis, 81, 83, azley P.2d 92 Nev. 545 along impact separately, with the Be considered DeLander, 206, (1976); 37 208 DeLander v. child, parents and between the racial difference 14, 1968), (Cal.Super.Ct., Aug. U.S.L.W. 2139 Since proper be the same. result would view, by adopted the better and the view totally parents cannot efforts of even the best case, in this is that race be con court problems, potential for future eliminate the proceedings. a relevant in such sidered factor tip See infra still the balance. factor could County Dept. of Fam See Drummond v. Fulton 799. at 1200, Services, ily 563 F.2d and Children’s denied, (5th Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. 1205-06 especially empirical acute data is lack of 5. The 910, 3103, 1141 L.Ed.2d 437 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 57 years, regards adolescent the crucial as Farmer, (1978). Misc.2d Farmer v. 109 parents typically between the relations strain (Sup.Ct.1981). 439 N.Y.S.2d 590 important forma- in the and are and children date, self-concept. healthy all of To tion noted, agree majority does not As I have 4. pre-adoles- major focused on have the cents, studies except the race factor that all considerations most those researchers and thus even Ante 793 n. balance. substantial were adoption concede sympathetic to interracial Evidently the evidence it assumes that regarding the ultimate jury identity is still out that the healthy regarding a racial and cultural viability placements. J. by of such ignored Ladner, Mixed interracial context was following com- 249 considering and care that the love court Families age of the typical: of the family. majori- “In view provided ment be each would adoptions is a sci- among superior While there debate social that such tend to be adoptions, about interracial viability entists intraracial all other factors Rather, parties no adoption,6 including equal. concerns dispute one— herein which the expert degree and their witnesses —contends fact of a racial differ- study, give major shortcoming possible adoptions. children in the This is a is not case, answer to the whether white definitive parents where the court context instant problem parents successfully prospective can deal that either found set of identity.” Adoption Shapiro, provide good of racial As Grow & would home for the child. Parents, observed, of Black Children White issue in such a case Child (1975) cited as [hereinafter whether Welfare Shapiro, Adoption ]; Grow & see also L. Grow but is not a better “successful” whether there & D. Parents 233- alternative. Shapiro, Black Children White (1974) cited as Shapiro [hereinafter successfully & Finally, none of the studies has Grow Family Experiences Jackson, B. Inter-Racial I]; controlled for non-racial variables. It has often (1976); R. Simon & H. Adoption Altstein, adopting been observed that cially interra- Adoption (1977) [hereinafter Transracial higher to rate tend than others factors H. cited R. Simon & Simon & Altstein I]; resources, age experience as financial such Follow-Up Adoption: Altstein, Transracial A conviction, religious parenting, and educa (1981) cited as Simon & [hereinafter *21 Altstein II]; I, supra; D. Robert tion. See Simon Altstein & Jones, Adoption On Transracial of Black Chil son, in Interra Parental Socialization Patterns dren, (1972). 51 156 Welfare Child Adoption, (1974), in cial abstracted 35A Disser However, age subjects the of is not the the Denis, (1975); St. 5553 G. Int’l tation Abstracts only the in limitation on value of the studies Minnesota; Adoptions Self-con Interracial in resolving the issue at Most are based hand. cept Rearing and Child Attitudes of Caucasian exclusively par- largely the or on interviews of Children, Negro Adopted Who Have Parents question- ents rather than direct or observation (1969) abstracted in 30A Dissertation Abstracts I, ing of the children. & Shapiro See Grow problems special ra of Int’l 2633 The supra; L. & D. Shapiro, Transracial Grow identity may coping and thus be cial skills (1975) cited as Today Adoption [hereinafter or to the effect of underestimated obscured due supra; Shapiro Jackson, & B. Simon & Grow II]; a favorable overall other factors result in II, supra; C. Zastrow, Altstein Outcome findings misleading are assessment. Such Black Children-White Parents Transracial here, where, applied to a as the when situation (1977); Adoption, Shapiro, Grow & Adoptions superior, alternative not but interracial is found consequence, supra. tend to As a the data equal, as to nonrace factors. parents’ experience the rather than reflect child’s, whereas it is the best interest latter’s 5; supra note 6. See Grow Shapiro Grow & & I, govern placement must decision. II, 5; supra supra note note Shapiro Jackson, B. spectre of ob- These studies also raise the 115-26; S. E. at Klibanoff & Klibanoff, Let’s to bias. Most have chosen server who (1973); J. Ladner, 115-26 Adoption Talk About undoubtedly adopt a child of another I, 5; 5; supra supra note note Simon & Altstein prior belief in not have done absent a would so II, 5; supra A. A. note Sorosky, Altstein Simon & Moreover, viability adoption. of interracial Triangle 202- & R. Adoption Pannor, Baran, efficacy responses reflect own as their on their 5; Chestang, (1978); supra note 04 C. Zastrow, reasons, responses parents. are For these their Adoption, 17 The Dilemma of Biracial Soc. rosy picture likely paint overly to Chimezie, (1972); Transracial 100 Work, experience and the the child. See effects on Children, Adoption 20 Soc. Work 296 of Black Chimezie, Shapiro Bold But & Irrelevant: Grow Irrelevant, Chimezie, (1975); but Bold Adoption, Transracial 56 Welfare Child 5; Adoption, supra note note 5; Chimezie, & Shapiro, Grow (1977) Bold cited as [hereinafter and Not So Shapiro, Not So Bold Irrelevant], Grow & But Irrelevant, (1975) [herein- Welfare Child in studies The measures of “success” some Bold]; Shapiro, Not So cited as Grow after & light specific too broad to shed on the are much Else, 5; Jones, supra Racial and note Jones & development aspects of child and socialization Adoption, Issues Cultural likely adversely Welfare in an Child to be affected that are Simon, (1979); of Racial An Assessment 373 Awareness, adoption, learning “sur- such as interracial Self-identity Preference, coping See Grow vival skills” for with racism. Among Adopted Chil- Non-White supra; White supra; Shapiro Shapiro II, & I, Grow & 43-57; dren, at W. supra; Soc. Oct. supra; Problems, Jackson, II, B. & Altstein Simon Identity Allen, of Racial Adoption, The Formation supra; C. Zastrow, Shapiro, Grow & By Moreover, Adopted White Parents supra. category Black Children (1976), of “successful” range abstracted 37B placements covers broad from the Abstracts Dissertation 5; Robertson, supra (1976); note exceptional. D. Int’l to the borderline mediocre to the Denis, supra St. note 5. Thus there is little of the relative G. Id. indication interracial, compared to intraracial success of ence presents risks which are not otherwise ents. But when all other factors are in present, possibility and the to those equipoise, extent which risks of an adverse ef- fect, steps reduced on the matter how small how unlikely, be affirmative no or permit would suffice to part parents.7 judge As to two researchers tip balance in the direction of in- sympathetic have said, traracial alternative. accepted

it that the inra- still is found as The trial court facts “[a]t feasible, preferable adoption, cial when later stage, notwithstanding love affec- adoption. the transracial basic tion, questions identity arising severe adoption was about transracial probably and race most all, at whether worked what large, would evolve. In the world at as the Bold, Shapiro, extent. & Not So widens, [Grow circle of contacts and routines there supra note adjustments 88.] countless which must be It concluded that the child’s made.” inter- outspoken Even the most of in- advocates ests served probably better see terracial who it as a means of equal G. family. Given balance other addressing place- fact that need factors, is adequately sup- conclusion minority ment of has his- homeless children ported permissible if it is to conclude that torically outstripped number minori- any potential there is adverse effect from ty adoptive parents, do contend the interracial alternative. That indis- there problems is no risk of social putably Accordingly, the case here. Rather, psychological adjustment. they upset if it is result below can be consti- contend that the hazards can be reduced impermissible any tutionally give weight level, a manageable and that racial differ- *22 to on the whatsoever adverse effects child ences should therefore not as an stand abso- to racial differences between herself related However, lute to adoption.8 barrier most and parents. her agree adoption authorities intraracial preferable.9 II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF hazards of adoption interracial THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION be exaggerated, should not but neither they inevitably should be ignored. An im- Scrutiny A. The Level of precise prediction about the effects of an placement Supreme interracial must be made in the A majority of the United States. circumstances, all standard of agreed context of relevant in- Court has “benign” op- to be as cluding any mitigating par- scrutiny applied efforts Bold, 5; among profes- supra Shapiro, a & Not So 7. There is broad consensus note Grow adoptions pose prob- position supra intraracial sionals that interracial note 6. The present preferable when other factors are lems not in the intraracial In context. survey accepted among organi equal generally one social workers involved child even placement, percent among primary functions it is to found that interracial whose zations II, adoptions promote as an alternative Shapiro are riskier. Grow & supra Sixty-nine place percent disagreed 50. children. See Simon & note at hard Alt II, up supra “Growing at note 70-74. with the statement in our stein current-day society is as difficult for a black contrast, adopted by point of view in a black as in a home.” Id child home white opinion adoptions intraracial —that preferable 51. generally regarded should not identity respect formation sociali- I, 5; supra note Shapiro 8. See Grow & & Grow rarity comparative a zation of child —is 5; II, supra supra note B. note Shapiro Jackson, among commentators. social researchers 5; supra note S. Klibanoff & E. J. Klibanoff, 6; Else, supra Jones & note 5. I, 5; supra supra note Simon Altstein Ladner, & Ladner, 5; at 124—25. See also II, supra note 5; note J. note Ches & Simon Altstein supra. note 6 6; cited at Shapiro, Adoption, the other authorities tang, supra note & Grow posed to “invidious” racial respect classifications.10 to the distribution of burdens and However, justices at least four are of the among benefits racial groups. Indeed, the attempt that racial classifications that view use made of race in this case should be even to remedy past the effects of discrimination open objection less than that in Bakke stigmatize particular do not racial There, and Fullilove. the racial classifica- subject group exacting scrutiny are to less tion provided benefits to an identifiable Thus, than other racial classifications. class, to class, the detriment of another subjected of the plurality Supreme Court the purpose of remedying present ef- program designed medical school to assure Here, fects past discrimination. the con- the admission of a specified number of mi- sideration of race seeks not to improve the students, nority to an intermediate level of position any particular racial group, but scrutiny, scrutiny instead of the strict test. simply protect the best interests of the Regents of the University of California v. child, of whatever race. Bakke, 265, 359-61, 438 U.S. 98 S.Ct. However, the majority quickly dismisses 2783-2784, (1978) (Brennan, L.Ed.2d the possibility that the consideration of ra- J., White, J., Marshall, J., J., Blackmun, cial differences made in this case could concurring judgment part qualify scrutiny for intermediate as a be- dissenting part). See also Fullilove v. nign use ground of race. It does so on the Klutznick, 448, 517-19, U.S. S.Ct. that, context, in the adoption “racial classi- 2758, 2794-2795, 65 (1980) L.Ed.2d 902 the years fications over have resulted in J., (Marshall, Brennan, with whom J. and particularly examples vivid of invidious dis- J., Blackmun, join, concurring judg- crimination.” But this Ante at 786. dis- ment). these While cases involved affirma- tinction is clearly posi- inconsistent with the action, tive opinions authors of the cited tion Supreme plurality taken Court neither implied stated nor affirm- favoring scrutiny. They pro- intermediate ative action could qualify benign as a use of posed intermediate in a in- scrutiny case a racial classification. volving alleged race discrimination in ad- Employing the same use of analysis, the public higher mission to a institution of race in this case require application does not education. No one who recalls the last scrutiny the strict standard. As in twenty-five years history of this Fullilove, Bakke and indicia of normal country possibly believe that could universi- First, benignancy present. ty is not an area “where racial admissions *23 use stigmatize of the racial factor does not years classifications over the have resulted particular words, racial In group. other particularly examples in vivid of invidious the use adoption proceeding of race in this discrimination.” The fact invidious was not presumption based that one occurred, uses of race and continue to have another, place race is inferior to nor does it arise, persuasive reject- is not a reason for weight bigot- of the behind racial ing in scrutiny clearly intermediate be- ry separatism. judge The trial used nign possibility case. If the of invidious many weighed race as one of factors to be all discrimination in the same context is interests, calculating the child’s not best necessary that is to bar intermediate scruti- as insuring purity a means of or of the fact that the actual ny-regardless separation. clearly benign— of race was consideration That scrutiny possible. then such is never Secondly, though the consideration of remedial, place too extreme an im- purposefully approach race was not neither pernicious benign important were its and effect uses of purpose pediment to majority prefers scrutiny 10. The of this court to state intermediate in that context. Until issue, [Supreme] one can- of the has Court as a whole addresses the Court “[a] scrutiny accepted presume simply this intermediate standard for be- not that intermediate Indeed, rejected (or adopted). nign more which one will be racial classifications to opposed. rejected than Justices are on record in favor must add that neither has the Court color position standing consciousness. Unless and until the difficult of in her achieved, promised equality judging land of racial shoes and what is in her interest. it is capacity unrealistic to blind ourselves to color in If the child had to decide for her- self, prevented such she would not be certainly instances. taking note of the different race of Moreover, the consideration of race in proposing adopt those her. When the prejudiced this case differs from behalf, court does the same on her there is separationist approaches taken in cases re- no indication invidiousness that necessi- majority’s per- ferred to “historical level scrutiny. tates strictest spective” in at least two re- fundamental spects. only among Since one factor This situation should also be distin- many, many adoptions guished will be from one in which a standard that permitted. ostensibly improper This is not a classification en- makes no use of race is races, tailing separation which would in a being way by subverted race-conscious be “invalid without more.” Yick Regents apply Hopkins, those who it. Wo v. Bakke, v. University supra, California S.Ct. 30 L.Ed. 220 U.S. (Brennan, (1886), at 2782 example, provides apt U.S. S.Ct. an illustra- J., Second, concurring). tendency to any applications tion. That case involved reduce the number of interracial families is to operate licenses commercial laundries. purely non-racial, incidental non-sepa- the official criteria granting While for the rationist purpose: promote the best in- of applications license made no reference to terest of each adopted child. race, in practice, the authorities denied li- granting censes to Orientals while them to The difference between cases which white owners of similar facilities. If it required application race-consciousness appeared case that the trial scrutiny strict and the present case is criteria, manipulating court was non-racial well by Loving Virginia, illustrated benign and appropriate race-conscious 1817, 18 U.S. 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1010 factors, so goal, achieve an invidious Loving, Supreme Court struck down strict scrutiny applied should be and the Virginia’s statute, anti-miscegenation ultimate result would no doubt be reversal. made it a crime for a white and non-white person marry. The state contended that that, espoused conclude under the view the statute should be regarded as non-invid Supreme at least four justices, Court equal ious because penalties placed were on consideration of race in this case is “be- any person engaging in an interracial mar Therefore, nign” rather than invidious. riage, rather than the non-white may justified by showing it serves spouse. The Court looked beyond this fa “important,” “compelling” gov- rather than cade of neutrality recognized objectives, ernmental and is “substantially purpose sole and function of the statute to,” to,” related rather than “necessary separate was to the races. Since state objectives. achievement of those had no non-racist and compelling purpose in preventing, consenting adults of different B. Scrutiny Constitutional *24 races from marrying, the statute violated Court’s Decision equal protection. The selection of the appropriate level of

Here, contrast, purpose pre- and case, is scrutiny not determinative in this dominant effect of the court’s action is le- since the consideration of necessary race is gitimate compelling: protection of the to the compelling govern- achievement of a significant child’s best interests. It is also mental comports interest and thus with that only proposed one side of the equal protection interra- even under the strict scru- cial consenting parties: See, Griffiths, consists of tiny standard. e.g., In re the H. family. The child is not of 717, 721-22, 2851, 2854-2855, consent- U.S. 93 S.Ct. ing age, and therefore it is the court which 37 (1973); L.Ed.2d 910 v. Richard- Graham son, 365, 375, 1848, 1853, do they where not have to deal with that U.S. S.Ct. (1971); McLaughlin twenty-four day. 29 L.Ed.2d 534 v. Flori kind of division hours a da, 184, 196, 283, 290, U.S. 85 S.Ct. aspect identity problem Another of the is at L.Ed.2d interest child possibility may experience that the protection prospective adop- of the stake — tee’s best interest —is indeed loyalties” grows as she “conflict older. compelling, If she identifies with the culture of her majority dispute. fact does not which she feel isolated from her heritage, may is, fact, Ante at 786. It state If family. family, she identifies her justify granting interest that can of an always her skin color will be there to re- adoption petition. of her In origins.12 mind her others words, may caught

A degree permis- of race-consciousness other child be- interest, nei- accepted by sible to the achievement of that tween two cultures and white parents Even if the foster potential hardships because certain future ther.13 ability to the when the are of a were to nurture the child’s parents child arise able black, finding they herself as there is little perceive different race. trial court’s amply prevent feelings that such risks exist is than could do to the ambivalent more turn, later in rejection may experience trial she supported by testimony. conclusion, testimony and the addressed to life.

it, virtually support find unanimous in the strong identity, sense of In addition to literature on the research and social science develop learn to cer the black child must subject. of how she Regardless tain survival skills. by family, of interracial is identified herself or her she

Some risks person socie development identity by involve the child’s will be identified as a black identity), experience and cultural self- will racism. (including ty inevitably esteem, develop minorities surviv belonging and a sense of Blacks and other racism, coping considerations which the al skills for with such family —relevant expressly, or recognizes legitimate pass and im- can to their children they example. possibility importantly, that more unconscious portant. problem One 6, at 101-03. E.g., Chestang, supra herself as black note may perceive child attempt develop person.11 an as a black Parents of interracial families identity them, There evidence at trial that the foster to learn these lessons and then teach recognize that this is would make efforts to alleviate this but most authorities parents learning directly Even if the child made av/are an inferior substitute for possibility. however, prob- other J. su identity, minority Ladner, of her black role models. 255; 6, might develop. Chestang, supra lems The child would then note pra note at with the fact that she is differ- claim cope have to Few white even 102-04. expert As one of the parents. supra ent from her can teach such skills. J. they Ladner, witnesses in this case testified: a third of study, In one note at 115. af out, parents did not undertake “I’m If a child has to start different. The two to teach them. firmative efforts being deprived I’m that child is special,” did, predominately did so thirds who strong healthy concept self books, materials like through secondary in an environment they could have certainly ing caught “I development two cultures: importance has between of such 11. The people, Joyce accepted by by sociologist emphasized white Ladner: couldn’t have been been easily healthy integrated personality world involves into a black “A and I couldn’t fit best, having concept because, my though trying a stable of self as one’s I was even identity.” group (black) supra things individual as well as a out.” Ladner, still didn’t work supra Else, J. note at 104. See also Jones & note at 158. Ladner, case, present In the note at 378. supra note at 19. 12. B. Jackson, testimony impor- expert court heard larger acceptance tance to the child of community. *25 27-year-old black woman who was 13. One five, adopted by a white woman when she was that comes from be- describes the ambivalence 209-15; supra note at 16-17; Ladner, 5, J. rather than which is the nor by example, supra note at 39-43. When Zastrow, 5, C. mal method of socialization. & Alt Simon II, see a child whose race is differ- 5, people also J. some supra at 18. See stein note parents, they tht of his assume he ent from at 115-16. Ladner, supra note product child or the of a illegitimate is an experienced by The racism blacks in this marriage they multi-racial —circumstances society may be encountered even more of- disapprove people of. Other overreact may ten in interracial families. Those by blacks well-meaning way, commenting in a on how undoubtedly op- attitudes are with racist adopt minority it is to a child. wonderful bigot- to interracial families. Acts of posed well-intentioned, however such reac- But of a different ry may upon be visited child emphasizing the effect of to the tions have regardless race than his adoptive parents, “different”, that he is and can lead to child Jones, supra of the child’s own race. note Jackson, supra of isolation. B. note a sense family may at 163. children in Other Thus, adopted at 13-14. while all chil- the targets Chestang, also become of slurs. they with the cope dren have to fact that supra Certainly possibil- note at 103. adopted, adoptee may are interracial ity experiences, of such traumatic even more difficult experience have an effects, their attendant bears psychological since his status is evident to the world at However, on the child’s best interest. large. emphasized cannot be too that the strongly The child at times feel that no-one opposing mixing desires of those are feelings understands his confused about weighed, to be balance. parents or his pain being his natural at existence of such significant only desires is course, every names.... called Of child they in that may lead to acts directed growing pains at times and feels suffers against the child that affect his adversely But the black no-one understands. or her interest. The fails to at- adopted visibly child is different significance distinction, tach any to this give those he loves this can him a stating flatly that “a well-intentioned ef- complex cope more situation to with. [Id protect fort against child community at 14.] prejudice proper justification, [not] itself, for an decision.” Ante at sum, consciousness racial differ- 789-790. That is so only if con- the “effort” the adoptive parents ence between and the sists barring adoption. But by society’s compelling child is necessitated there is no reason for failing weigh fostering interest the child’s best inter- effect of prejudice on the child’s best inter- est. The trial court took note of race est as one factor among a multitude. required so far as to ascertain the child’s interest, its concern explaining both about Since black children in interracial fami- problems identity, related to and to rela- lies may be even more exposed to racist family. tions with the world outside the Its blacks, attitudes than other their need for findings problems fact that such exist and survival skills is more acute. White par- the child’s best interest would there- ents, however, tend to be less equipped being equal fore —all else furthered pass on those —be skills. at See discussion home, well supported by the G. evidence supra. It is ironic and unfortunate of record. those black children most in need of surviv- al skills are in environments which are III. FLAWS IN THE MAJORITY’S least able to provide them. APPROACH Racial slurs are not the only kinds of Overly A. An Narrow View Rele- public reaction that pose problems for the vance of Racial Differences to child and his family. range respons- Best Interest Child’s wide, es is and serves as a recurrent re- forth, minder that the child is “different” from his set there are a number already As family. See B. be- Jackson, respects note in which racial differences *26 for more calling classification the is a racial and child affect parents tween However, scrutiny Equal under the Pro- majority than minimal interest. the latter’s If, the example, all that relevant as tection Clause. treats all factors it considers attitudes about had addressed were concept identity. court subsumed race, to the race of without direct reference Moreover, is reason to wonder how there to the race of the parties has relation actually race factor majority’s much the child, ground no for the there would be enumerating ques- In to do with race. In scrutiny. in strict majority engage the focus is explored, that should be tions satisfied, the court’s finding scrutiny of the strict par- attitudes and behavior limiting proc- be read as ents, they opinion environment in which cannot and on the to, than, other albeit related seg- local schools are ess to factors (e.g., live whether the trial, race itself. regated). These were addressed no one doubts that are relevant. they overly result of an paradoxical A second scientists, the But the that social it the race factor is that narrow view of witnesses, courts expert ultimately effect of to the require attention whether, notwith- grapple have to with is there is no even when identity race on of intentions and standing very best of a race parents petition by prospective are part parents, efforts on the of the there If attitudes than the child’s. different the interracial context potential problems in were environment the extra-familial in the intraracial expected kind not the racial factor analysis, dominate the be permitted case. The court should any adoption. overlooked could not be case, conclude, that such as it did in this States, D.C.App., 398 Johnson v. United See pa- persist degree risks to some even when wheth- (1979) (In ascertaining A.2d rental environ- attitudes and external commit- has been er an abuse of discretion words, the ment are favorable. In other relevant whether all ted, criterion is one simply by issue is not exhausted considera- considered). Yet neither been factors have environment; tion of attitudes and a differ- raise race nor the court prospective parents parents ence in race between and child is of are of the all involved as an issue when independent significance. common simple: The reason same race. expect not to lead us experience Yet the sense and majority saying close to comes single- in the identity problems in the race-related viability differences relative sup- evidence context, expert only interracial and 'race uniracial families are Accordingly, when com- coincidentally ports related to racial that view. indirectly petitions differences, and intraracial peting interracial possible due to a statistical cor- if the hardly surprising it is relation presented, between the race and favorable regarding discussion the court’s attitudes or external environment. focus of family. But However, ante at there is no is on the race involvement, there would family’s basis for excluding from consideration the context, absence of more direct In this influence of race. While the no issue. family intraracial majority influence, mention de-emphasizes specific I do obviously race not believe court’s discussion opinion its can be read as elimi- prob- potential nating finding reflects a evaluation. pertain do not the court lems identified If instead were read opinion family. to that degree any significant as reducing the race factor to attitudes regarding race, ease, about was evidence there environmental conditions bearing on each set relations, and concern paradoxical re- the love The H. sults would child. for the follow. The reason this would have toward court is attitudes positive faced emphasized with a constitutional issue is their culture, had al- that the trial directly took the race of child’s race and raising of an- parties into exhibited why ready account. That is there been *27 other black child in family.14 approach their Both Thus the more evenhanded is to take note of the fact-that there are some families the opportunity present any had to respects adoption in which interracial and all evidence regarding respective their presents potential problems that are not child, including abilities to raise the atti- significant in the intraracial context. See having tudes related to race. But con- just II B To supra. section reiterate one facts, including sidered all non-race example, family, in the uniracial race does treatment that each would family give a serve as constant reminder to the child, the court petitions concluded that the large world at and the child that he is had equal merit.15 Thus the trial court adopted. positive Thus while the attitudes parties concluded that the race of the and environment of the interracial family tipped balance, slightly. however relevant, are by way mitigating some of If the really race factor has little to do problems, it would be difficult regard to with the race of parties, majority as the them eliminating entirely, as all risks much appears believe, to then it would not be making supe- less the interracial alternative unusual to find identity, that a child’s in- rior approach as to this factor. This is cluding racial would be more identity, se- supported by the record evidently and was cure in an placement interracial than ah court, adopted said, which intraracial one. The majority proposes thus Notwithstanding affection, love and se- [N what appears, superficially, at least to be a questions vere identity arising fair and approach, neutral in which neither the adoption probably and race most interracial nor adoption intraracial is pre- large would evolve. In the world at ... ferred. The majority “the court can- says adjustments there are countless not properly weight factor], race either must be made. [the or automatically presumptively i.e., with- above, — As discussed the social researchers— regard out against evidence —for or even those who advocate interracial alter- To adoption.” cross-racial Ante at 787. generally accept premise natives — where an intraracial do otherwise racially would “add a discrimi- placement is available natory policy” and give the intraracial and other factors are it equal, preferable. is adoption a “head start.” Id. If such lan- Not even appellee’s expert witness contend- guage simply means that the courtijs not to placements general, ed that interracial rule out interracial adoption, inject per- the H. family particular, superi- would be sonal disapproval of adoption, or or as far as race-related considerations give racial weight differences an undue as concerned. compared factors, with other it unobjec- is If an approach taking poten- account of tionable. But the prescription clearly tial problems associated with interracial incorrect if it means that the court cannot “preferénce” amounts to a for in- give weight that, things evidence other entirely permissi- traracial it equal, intraracial adoption tends to further legiti- ble one. is no less preference Such a morey a child’s interest than interracial preference parent mate than a for a ytwo adoption. put To such relevant facts into adequate or for re- the balance is not evidence To of bias. If, in guise sources to raise the child. contrary, their exclusion give “head majority’s framework neutrality, start” to the interracial rules preference out of order a for intrara- alternative.16 policy favoring petitioners 14. See at 40. tion for a black However, white ones or vice versa. if the ma- supra. 15. See note 3 jority’s statement meant that a court cannot petitioners’ take note of whether race is the majority 16. The later states that the race factor child, regardless same as that of the of what preference must be considered “without for the be, particular happens I would any party.” race of Ante at 787. I concur in disagree in the text. for the reasons elaborated Certainly justifica- this conclusion. there is no discretion, evidence, ining the trial court’s exercise of supported by cial proper finds that no factor adoption by against it introduces bias and no factor was ignored, improper preju- family. just black intraracial It is considered. How then does arrive at considera- legitimate dicial to eliminate a considera- conclusion that trial court’s illegitimate one. tion as it is introduce an requires tion the “racial factor” reversal? *28 by so that the court’s indicating It does Perspective” B. The “Historical “substantial,” reasoning may not have been gets sug- track in majority The off the a firm foundation.” and “based on factual prejudiced that the gesting possibility view, the suggestion the that my In either the or bad faith use of race bears on reasoning regarding the use of face court’s case. The remedy result or in this implausible, but is anything was substantial case law majority statutory reviews Although clearly belied the record. is as founded today rightly recognized that presented lay considerable parties as- unjust racial inaccurate attitudes or testimony addressing the merits of expert Indeed, histori- sumptions. Ante at 788. adoption at their own initia- an interracial racial atti- the law has cally reflected tive, requested trial court and received A. generally of those in power. tudes expert Rather than testimony. additional Higginbotham, In of Color the MatteR ruling, the court granting an immediate court’s (1978). For there is one example, decision until it had had a further reserved that conclusion mixed race children weigh to Its writ- opportunity the issues. will have a opportunity ... much better devoted more discussion to race ten order society if rightful place to take their in great It took care any than to other factor. own they brought among their up possible out that it considered the point Ward, people. 36 Wash.2d [Ward only to be effects of interracial (1950).] 216 P.2d basis of a among not the many, one factor say, Needless to in the proposition concur that rule. It identified the concerns per se appellate vigilant that in courts must be adoption by the G. led to the conclusion that correcting they i.e., such oc- prob- instances whenever preferable, would be adjustment is slightest cur. But there indica- and social psychological lems of years if the arise in the adolescent improper preconceived might tion that attitudes This adopted. were alternative assumptions factual the decision interracial influenced expert clearly indicated below; explanation indeed, squarely is every indication to that effect was credited. testimony to the contrary. fact that discrimina- short, every indication is that tory uses not a have occurred is reasoning, regards particularly court’s reason to uses. legitimate eliminate entirely restrained, issue, thoughtful, the race explained A, As supra, II section word, serious: substantial. history does not apply a refusal to justify the court’s factual foundation” for “firm intermediate benign considera- scrutiny to present clearly reasoning conclusions tion of race. it bear on the Neither should testimony. record That in extensive application of the standard that is chosen. on that reasoning was in fact based court’s C. Trial Court’s Substantiality of the the court’s amply indicated record Consideration Differences of Racial risks reference Between Parents and Child adolescence, fruition and to come to family. Although with the acknowl- relations world outside majority does not edge no basis for otherwise. supposing some There is appropri- of the that it is reasons ate to take petition- note of of the the race Rea- D.Seeing Less in Trial Court’s ers, it compelling nonetheless decides Actually Than There soning Was interests Accord- justify to race. attention ingly, authorization its statutory majority apparently recognizes, As the reached, all, by consideration In exam- can if at conclusion upheld. race is departing procedure from the normal But the treats the trial court’s majority of discretionary the review trial court rul if it opinion as constituted the court’s rea- States, ings. supra, In Johnson v. United rather than soning process merely post hoc we drew a fundamental between distinction it. Inexplicably, evidence of degree of explanation ordinarily re support proposition cites Johnson as for the quired of a trial expected court and that that the court’s attention to the race issue agencies administrative review of their presumed must be be limited to the respective exercises of discretion. As aptly words contained in its order. It relies on a explained Washington Public Interest quoted impractical observation that Commission, Organization v. Public Service expect explanation a detailed of decisions D.C.App., (1978), 393 A.2d 71 cert. denied during rendered trial. But this fact is ex- nom., sub Potomac Electric Power Co. v. as an plicitly example why cited one Commission, Public Service U.S. flesh reasoning eye out court’s with an (1979), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 182 review neither im- record. Johnson stated nor *29 of agency action under the District of Co plied looking to the record to fill the lumbia Administrative Procedure Act and expressed interstices in the court’s reason- similar statutes providing for review of ing precluded except in the case of deci- agency requires action a rather detailed sions in the midst of trial. statement of findings reasoning. For a reasons, number of majority several of which are What the seems to suggest case, discussed in that it is both feasible and that trial court decisions are presumptively necessary require to extensive written ex be treated the same manner as admin- planations agencies. from Agencies exist in exigent istrative decisions: unless there are large part they because can the sort develop making circumstances it impractical for the specialized expertise policy in a narrow lengthier opinion, trial court to deliver a area that the courts legislative and the reviewing court must read the court’s words branch are unable to do. The records in pristine isolation from the record such cases are also often voluminous and they According based. to the highly technical. Without rather detailed majority “Because the trial court’s decision explanation, reviewing court may be at a comfortably here was rendered after trial loss to understand sig the decision and the general justification ... for requiring nificance of the data in the record. us to ‘examine the record and infer explained Johnson, As we it usually reasoning’ the trial court used ... is not neither necessary nor feasible to require present mind, here.” Ante 791. To my such detail in judicial the case of review of the fact that the decision in this case was definition, decisions. By such matters are period deferred until after a of reflection is judicial within the sphere, rather than con- dispositive of whether we look to fined to specialized Indeed, expertise. The record. trial court could have ren- reviewing court is the source of the authori- orally dered its decision at the conclusion of rulings tative that guide the trial court’s 52(a). the evidence. Super.Ct.Civ.R. judges, discretion. Trial agencies, unlike paradoxical majority’s The result of the ap- deliver final judgments and numerous in- proach would be to make reversal of a terlocutory rulings on daily basis. We opin- decision —as embodied in the court’s thus concluded in Johnson that a trial court likely ion—more if it is made in written need not lengthy exposition make a written period form after a of reflection than when reasoning. of its Accordingly, if the trial spot. is rendered on the court opinion alone will not pur- suffice for majority also states that the Consti- poses judicial review, this court can looking search the tution this court prevents record and infer the court’s rea- soning based on applicable legal understanding stan- the trial record as an aid in dards and the results reached. knowledge Id. reasoning. my court’s To concedes that the first judicial authority whatsoever for case. there is no cases, likely Personnel “how race is to af- proposition. step evaluating The cited — Feeney, development of Massachusetts v. fect the child’s sense Administrator 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 identity” 99 S.Ct. satisfied. Because of the U.S. —was McKeithen, (1979), Compos case, posture step— of this the third unique (three F.Supp. (E.D.La.1972) judge be- judging significant “how differences court), support proposition at most respect the families to racial tween [with the constitu- party seeking uphold the factors relevant identity] are when all tionality of state action bears burden together” are considered —also review of that during subsequent judicial cannot serve as a basis for reversal. The demonstrating that the action sat- action the race factor fa- trial court found that appropriate isfies the level of constitutional family, and that all other vored the G. Nowhere scrutiny. dispute. That is not in Therefore in this equipoise. factors were in imply do the cited state or that a passages as to magnitude case the differential constitutionally pre- reviewing court is ever absolutely factor is of no conse- the race examining a trial court’s rea- cluded from slight, no matter how quence; any weight, soning light of the trial record. tip the balance. could suffice to bear in mind that this important It is Thus, according majority’s to the frame- simply is not a case in which the trial court work, should depend the need for reversal of its deliberation. announced the result step is satisfied. on whether the second An explanation economical but clear compare the court step requires This contends, If, resort *30 given. majority as the family. in each identity how race will affect to the record is in order to con- necessary major- how the I am at a loss to understand proper a deci- firm that the court rendered court’s conclusions ity suggest can that the sion, fleshing it is out the only by way comparison based on a may not have been (viz., cer- explanation given: that was that factor, this parties respect of the with to problems expected tain which would not be not have been reasoning may and that its arise dur- might in the intraracial context particular for a searching “substantial.” adoption ing adolescence in the interracial poten- that the explicit tree —an statement consideration). under in the H. which could arise problems tial in the uniracial G. expected were not family that there is a agree majority with the to have lost family majority seems inferring ingo limit on how far we should —the standing it is the of the fact that sight push But to reasoning from the record. enterprise entire a forest. The midst of to necessary this constraint as far as is is adoption petitions competing the judging decision in this overturn the trial court’s family how each comparing a matter It us to requires case strikes me as absurd. each factor and then respect with to rates evidentiary the tear the court’s words from placement preferable is determining which We should they grow. context from which I dare- thought have overall. I would that, uprooting surprised by be —and as well— judge would have say the trial ground court’s decision from and taken as elementary was so this sustaining gives life, it it from prevent we all involved that it was unneces- given by itself. proposition court to state the sary Majority’s Implementation E. But if an statement opinion. explicit its Procedure Step Three required, supplied by it was trial court: majority’s However, accepting even review and its three does not conclude interra-

approach judicial Court to [an considering family race cial such as the could not step procedure for H.’s] is, why to see itself. Rather is context, it is difficult sustain required in this be there not a better alternative? thought reversal to however, finds the lack of majority, adoption by then concluded that The court It findings was a “better alternative.” ... as to how family the G. “specific clearly more imagine is difficult words black particular to affect likely families comparison a of the two conveying families to be fatal.17 in the H. & G. child” as to the racial factor. However, the effort to dis- Ante at reading opinion judgment A line of the from a “generalized” line a tinguish of the families comparison reveals that the in- inquiry concerning “particularized” both substantial respect race was misleading. before it dividual began and based on the record. The court on the quite plausible seems approach This by referring expert its discussion to the surface, distinction blurs supposed but the dis- testimony joining experts’ closer examination. Of considerably on re- may there is not more conclusive course, family is of that “this the statement adoption. search on the relation of race would be true race than D.G.” different It is evident the discussion followed families. many adoptive great potential predictions on such as the ex- was founded virtually any is true of other But the same on what is known perts give could based including emphasized those relevant fact their about and on integrated majority (e.g., living in an in- knowledge particular parties integrated attending neighborhood, conclu- volved. The court noted “no posi- have school). That such factors sive absolutes are to be drawn on the basis “generalization” tive effects is no less seem, however, entirely of race. It would of inference that the type than the grows reasonable that the child older the as Indeed, goal predic- criticizes. where of this would in- problem ramifications tion of future conditions such how crease.” It is clear that “the ramifications aby given child’s interests will be served problem” of this refers to social and psycho- any pro- evidence has adoption, piece no logical associated with interracial risks possible bative value unless it is relate above in- beyond those that past experience adoptive of other here in adoptions general. The succeed- ing Only (general- sentence then can one infer explicitly indicates that families. positive took into account the atti- ize) of this experience therefrom that *31 tudes and efforts which would tend to miti- Thus there is likely is to be similar. gate problems: stage, those “At a later testimony reliance on nothing suspect about affection, notwithstanding love and severe experi- on from the “generalization” based questions identity arising from the similarly families who are ence of other adoption probably race most including ways, situated in relevant issue, evolve.” Having identity stressed the and child. parent differences between the court then referred to relations decision is adoption The fact people family, saying, outside the “In the prediction generali- on inevitably based large, world at as circle of contacts and way: in another it important zation is widens, adjust- routines there are countless specific on the extent to which places limits ments which be types must made.” Both course, one findings meaningful. can be Of considerations were clearly upon founded piece of evidence individu- could recite each ample more than I find record evidence. in futility it would be an exercise ally, but that, implausible the majority’s assertion value to attempt to attach a discrete while ample support present, record is .Rather, what a court each bit thereof. may trial court not have intended to rest its is to look at all must do in such situations on that evidence. It was not reasoning judge the interrelated the evidence and for the recite the testi- necessary court to whole, the broad conclusion arriving having disregarded at the risk of mony, balance, that, pre- one alternative seems by this court. Emphasis supplied. 17. adoption presents certain risks to a child’s majority’s the others. The dis-

ferable to welfare, when may mitigated though cussion of the factors to be considered be will no adoption proposed interracial by special part not eliminated efforts on the trial provide guidance useful doubt I think this factor parents. of the finding But I whether judges. question among many and should included judge in opinion such as that trial others relevant to the child’s best interest. will insufficiently this case to be detailed that, this, as where It follows a case such effect independent have a further and equipoise, other factors are in the interra- decision- improving quality result. race- may sway cial factor Since matter, making. practical As a the most per- consciousness in this limited context is for the provide guidelines we can do is to missible, judgment and the court’s discretion, our re- place court’s and then supported by child’s best interest liance on the trial court to arrive at fair erroneous, the re- clearly evidence and not case, In this the court devoted judgments. sult should be affirmed. space more to the discussion of the race it while We must live in the world as course, it any issue than to other factor. Of as it be. we strive to make it should say more. But what it did could have said demonstrating succeeded in that race was entirely limited and

considered There was no indication that

proper way.

countervailing favoring losing evidence

party was excluded from consideration.

CONCLUSION require Constitution does not a court ROBINSON, Appellant, Timothy L. to blind affecting itself realities a child’s interest, best even when those depend facts on the respective races of the STATES, Appellee. UNITED child. What inis the best interest child is a factual be resolved No. 81-1137. the trial court. We cannot require that Appeals. Court District of Columbia courts, even indirectly, find facts contrary to their view of the evidence. That a ma- 15, 1982. Sept. Submitted jority of panel of this might have Dec. Decided drawn different conclusions from the evi- dence concerning

general and the partic- G. and H. families in

ular is not a basis for reversal. While os-

tensibly accepting propositions, these

majority’s opinion may be read as circum-

scribing the consideration to be given to

race, to an unjustifi- extent which I think is

able. Probably more significantly, the ma-

jority has narrowed its examination of the

court’s reasoning so as to see less than is

actually there. The result is to lead the astray from the relatively

straightforward posed issue by this case:

whether is constitutionally permissible

and appropriate for a court give any

weight to evidence that an interracial notes cf. Moore v. is limit Thus, inquiry the focus of our tor. (1978) (detailed, A.2d written reasoning the court’s ed to whether cases); Ut findings required custody all “substantial,” at based id. sufficiently 1167, 1170 D.C.App., v. 364 A.2d ley Utley, record, id. on a “firm factual foundation” O’Meara, (1976) (same); D.C. O’Meara scrutiny. withstand strict at (1976) (same). This App., 355 A.2d accordingly must turn on whether here ease decision Because the trial court’s trial, not written decision itself demon comfortably after trial court’s was rendered during presures subject, example, properly analyzed for strates that the court 365; trial,” issue, see note “the midst of id. and answered the critical racial asked justification requir- supra, general precisely then tailored its use questions, and ing us record and infer to “examine the of this particular of race to the best interest used, trial id. at reasoning” the court child. present importantly, not here. Even more turn, first, analytic I to the therefore because nature of constitutional race that steps questions respecting requiring application trial court’s decision — to address. expected trial court should of race manner tailored to precisely in a take the trial court’s exercise up then child’s best interest —there no room and conclusions findings discretion —its appellate reasoning court to infer themselves. did may the trial court have intended but appellate To do so would invite state. Steps and Proper Analytic Relevant creation, and racial approval, Questions As to Race analysis may not —have taken —or case, par- place. ordinary In the where in an When race is relevant court’s discretion ty challenging trial contest, make a court must abuse, risks proving has the burden of family’s three-step (1) how each evaluation: appellate court deference to develop the child’s likely to affect Johnson, minimal, long court are as the identity, including ment of a sense 30-33 supra, criteria are met. See notes compare identity; (2) how the families

Notes

notes identity). cial confidence,36 self-esteem and and the 4. child’s Trial Court’s Analysis: Findings ability to cope problems outside the and Conclusions family.37 Relevant questions bearing on case, present In the the trial court obvi- concerns, one or more of these for example, ously was thorough, conscientious and prop- would be: To what family extent would the erly treating race as only one of several expose the child to others of her own race relevant considerations. After reviewing through the immediate family? Through the other concerns specified statute, family friendships? Through neighbor- race, court took the first analytic step as to Through hood? school? What other efforts beginning with the proposition —for will the family likely most make to foster there was support testimonial “race —that the child’s sense of ra- identity including — is a problem which ... should ig- not be cial and identify cultural self-esteem? —and nored or minimized.” The court carefully To what extent has family associated noted, however, that, “[ejonversely, there itself with efforts to enhance respect are not conclusive absolutes to be drawn on the child’s race and culture? To what ex- basis race.... The Court is con- tent has family reflected any prejudice cerned that little medical or scientific atten- against the race of the child it proposes tion has been problem.” devoted adopt? But the generally Court then found that “as When the court takes the step grows second child older the ramifications of this increase,” the analysis comparing problem the families —it ques- and “severe — hardly would be if the answers to surprising identity arising tions of from the adoption questions prospective parents these favor and race most probably would evolve.” As the same race as the But even a consequence, child.38- the court concluded that ra- true, when that it cial possible parent is also differences between and child prospective parents of a different race weighed negative should be as a factor in very positive ratings ques- receive on these evaluating adoption.39 The court then an- so, decision, tions. If analytic step preceded by third nounced its a rhetori- —how significant cal “The question: racial differences are when Court does not conclude all relevant factors are such could not sus- together taken a[n interracial] —be- Rather, is, comes especially important; question for in that sit- tain itself. is there uation the racial an- may present factor such not a better alternative?” The Court close understand it will not have swered in the affirmative. determinative, significant, perhaps impact although court to have concluded factors, together, may it would if racial differences between the other taken have parent family, the white foster simply slightly child were deemed favored wholly negative standing adopt, given equal factor. at least Note, dren, (1975); Serv., Racial 36. See 227 Pa. Greene v. Catholic Social Soc.Work 589, 590, Super. (1973) Matching Adoption 306 A.2d Alterna and the Dilemma: (white girl seeking custody woman black Place, 17 J.Fam.L. tives for the Hard to considered her “different and of a lower moral (1979); supra 360-61 R. & H. Simon Altstein, black”). fibre because she was note at 89-107. 37. See J. note 16 at 284. All Ladner, Thus, colleague’s contrary dissenting

Case Details

Case Name: Petition of RMG
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Dec 29, 1982
Citation: 454 A.2d 776
Docket Number: 79-747
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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