*1 stay 12,1987, The May entered on by is hereby Court dissolved. ZAPPALA, JJ.,
LARSEN and dissent. A.2d
In re Petition of Patricia A. HUGHES. Harry
In re Petition of P. JANNOTTI.
Supreme of Pennsylvania.
Argued May 1987. Decided Oct. *2 Jurikson, Philadelphia, for petitioner. Mark Morris, Philadelphia, respondent. John W. NIX, C.J., LARSEN, FLAHERTY,
Before zappala McDermott, hutchinson, PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION THE OF COURT FLAHERTY, Justice.
The question fundamental raised case whether Constitution, Article Section 7 of the Pennsylvania prohibits those who have been convicted of “infamous crimes” from holding public office in Pennsylvania, should applied to bar the election a candidate for office who was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to obstruct interstate Act, commerce violation of the Hobbs 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). follow, For the reasons that we hold that it does. §
Harry Jannotti awas member of Philadelphia City Coun- *3 during cil the when FBI was pursuing its “ABSCAM” investigation corruption of government. in The investiga- tion was carried by out undercover FBI posing men as agents of a fictitious Arab sheik who was interested suppos- in to edly immigrating the building United States and a multi-million dollar hotel in Philadelphia. order to facili- interests, tate these the agents of the sheik willing were to pay money exchange in for the votes and/or inter- friendly government cession of officials on the sheik’s behalf. Weinberg, One swindler,” described a “career was employed the FBI to by “spread the word” the of sheik’s interests willingness and his to for pay help advancing part those interests. As Philadelphia of the phase of AB- SCAM, Weinberg Criden, Philadelphia called one a lawyer, and hired him arrange to meetings between the sheik’s representatives government and willing officials to receive money exchange for influence.1 Among meetings the which Criden for arranged the undercover agents was one Jannotti, with Harry an influential of member Philadel- phia’s City Council. Before Jannotti met actually with the prosecuted 1. Criden himself was later for procuring his role in cor- rupt officials. project him of the hotel agents, FBI Criden told undercover $10,000 in to him cash. pay sheik’s intention and of the Criden, to the Jannotti went meeting After his with representatives, meet the sheik’s Hotel with Barclay project, the hotel good of his will toward assured them meeting. Jannotti $10,000 in cash at the end of the received he for the project that would vote agents told the sheik’s it, Appeals summarized and, Third of as the Circuit Court no [municipality he that there would be “gave assurances obstacles, if would be any, or that the obstacles imposed] Jannotti, States v. manageable.” United F.2d (3rd Cir.1982). facts, guilty was found the basis these Jannotti
On under the Hobbs to obstruct interstate commerce conspiring 1951(a), United Act, sitting jury 18 U.S.C. § of Pennsylva- for the Eastern District States District Court charged the substantive violation nia.2 Jannotti was with act, but conspiracy the Hobbs Act as well as violate he on the count because only conspiracy was convicted {actually interfering interstate conviction with substantive commerce) affect actually act requires the defendant’s commerce, which, case, impossible, in this interstate his were fictions. project since sheik and hotel verdict, granted court Jannot- After of the trial entry in its entirety set verdict of the jury ti’s motions to aside the his granted judgment motion jurisdiction lack en sitting, Appeals, The Third acquittal. Circuit *4 verdict, banc, reversed, the reinstating original jury thus subse- panel Appeals of the Third Circuit Court and The on appeal. affirmed reinstated conviction quently panel stated: part: provides, pertinent
2. The Hobbs Act obstructs, delays, way degree affects com- any or or Whoever in commerce, commodity any attempts or merce article or the movement conspires so do ... shall by robbery or to or extortion or $10,000 twenty imprisoned not more than be fined than not more years, or both. 1951(a). U.S.C. § government’s We find that the evidence established over- that the whelmingly enthusiastically accepted defendants bribes. There simply no credible evidence that defendants were reluctant to take the money. To defendants, contrary, the evidence shows the each of official, them an elected boasting power their and their corruption.3 Jannotti,
United States v. (3rd Cir.1984). 729 F.2d Jannotti to imprisonment was sentenced six months and $2,000. However, fined he decided to again run for petition office and filed a city for nomination for councilman. Thereafter Patricia A. Hughes petition filed a in the Court Common of Philadelphia objecting Pleas to grounds the Jannotti nomination on the had Jannotti been convicted of an “infamous crime” and that under the he Pennsylvania Constitution was barred from holding pub- lic office. The Common Pleas Court held that Jannotti’s conviction crime,” was not an “infamous dismissed the Hughes petition with and prejudice, ordered that Jannotti’s name placed on the primary appeal, ballot. On Common- wealth Court reversed and held that Jannotti’s conviction for a “involving was crime receipt payments relating to his performance of the powers duties and of his public office,” thus, that the conviction was for a crime which was tantamount bribery, which has been defined as “infamous.” May 12,1987
On stayed the Order of Common- wealth Court and directed the parties address the ques- tion of whether an allowance of appeal granted should be question and the of the merits of the Argument case. 15,1987, heard on on May May 1987 we an entered Order affirming Court, the order of Commonwealth 516 Pa. 90, 532 A.2d 298. This Opinion is filed in support of the Order of May
3. The plural court’s reference is to "defendants" in the because Jannot- Schwartz, ti George was tried with president one Philadelphia then Council, City accepted exchange who promised also bribes in future intercession on behalf of the sheik. *5 Constitution, Article Section Pennsylvania
The 7, provides: of of embezzlement convicted hereafter person
No crime, shall infamous or other bribery, perjury moneys, holding of Assembly, capable the General eligible to be in this Commonwealth. profit trust or office of any thus, conviction falls is whether Jannotti’s The question, II, Section 7. of Article prohibition within the challenges poses which Jannotti significant The two him from that his federal conviction bars the determination he in are that crime Pennsylvania office holding public “infamous”; that secondly, was not was convicted of him against of case included the facts the federal although bribe, of he was not convicted he took a evidence that therefore, from on barred office may he not be bribery, bribery of conviction. the basis observed, the evi- District Court As the United States of payment money received a dence that Jannotti in federal only evidence undisputed.4 Additionally, to ob- support conspiracy a conviction case would Act under the concerned struct interstate commerce Hobbs exchange in for official of this receipt money Jannotti’s The must have concluded jury, favors. federal therefore exchange support- money that Jannotti received the this, Had not found ing they the sheik’s business interests. conspiracy factual basis for the there would have been no conviction. that he not asserting may is correct in
Although Jannotti grounds that he was convicted from office on the barred (since violation of the he was convicted bribery, Act, his conviction bribery), the facts underlying Hobbs not relevant, nonetheless, considering his convic- are whether 4. The District Court stated: receipt payments, dispute is no about the defendants' There compel, permitted, although it did the infer- not and the evidence paid exchange for the payments represented bribes ence that the using positions pave the official their defendants’ assurances project. way completion expeditious of the Jannotti, (E.D.Pa.1980). F.Supp. United States v.
tion was for an “infamous” crime meaning within the *6 II, although Article Section 7. This is so because the term self-defining, “infamous crime” is not language when the II, Article Section 7 enumerates crimes of bribery, embezzlement of public moneys, and perjury, followed by crime,” the words “or other infamous the necessary impli- cation is that the three enumerated crimes are “infamous.” Therefore, if the facts underlying Jannotti’s conviction a support would for bribery conviction under Pennsylvania law, conviction, then Jannotti’s federal however it may be law, named in federal would be for an “infamous” crime. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code “Bribery defines in offi- political cial and matters” as follows: (a) Offenses defined.—A is person guilty of if bribery ... solicits, he accepts agrees ... or to accept from another: (1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the deci- sion, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion a public servant, as party official or by voter the recipient;
(2) any benefit as decision, vote, consideration for the recommendation or other exercise of official discretion recipient in a judicial, legisla- or administrative proceeding; tive or
(3) any benefit as consideration for a violation legal known as a duty public servant official. party 4701(a). 18 Pa.C.S. The facts underlying Jannotti’s feder- § al conviction would constitute a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. 4701(a)(1)in that accepted Jannotti benefit pecuniary § consideration for his vote and exercise of discretion as a public servant.
Thus, although Jannotti not convicted was he bribery, was convicted of a crime the essence of which bribery, was bribery phrase is encompassed “other infamous hold, therefore, crime.” We that the facts underlying Jan- notti’s conviction for conspiracy to violate the Act Hobbs compel the conclusion that his crime was “infamous” within meaning of Article 7 of the Pennsylvania Section Constitution. few deci- although there have been that argues
Jannotti
crimes,”
case-
what
“infamous
defining
sions
his conviction
require the conclusion that
is
law there would
crime,
the relevant
either because
infamous
not
an
con-
strictly
and its terms must be
provision
165,
As to the
construction of the terms
strict
In
Greenberg,
re S.M.
we
provision,
guided by
tional
are
411,
(1971),
442
This held that an infamous crime long being which the of person incapable rendered convicted or which disqualify per- witness “The offenses juror. evidence, same, are when of the give son to convicted treason, falsi ... every species crimen felony, falsehood, the charge which and affect involve Commonwealth justice." administration of Shaver, (1842). suggesting S. 842 Without W. & modern that this is inclusive for the sufficiently definition era, in holding we no hesitation that the federal have using clearly crime of the mails to defraud within ambit of the Shaver classification.
In re S.M. Pa. at at Greenberg, A.2d 372-73. case, Similarly, in this difficulty we have no in concluding of conspiring federal crime to money take exchange for official favors is within the ambit Shaver. fact, present case is even more than compelling for here the Greenberg, crime committed while Jannot- ti was in office and it was related to his official duties.
There is something incongruous, light of the facts conviction, led to Jannotti’s his petitioning Court to declare that he is fit constitutionally to hold public office. The purpose a constitutional restriction disallow- ing one who has the public abused trust from holding public office explained by is well the Supreme Court of our sister Delaware, state provision which has a constitutional similar our provides: own. Delaware’s constitution No person who shall be convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury, crime, or other infamous be eligible shall to a seat in either House of the General Assembly, capable holding trust, any office honor or profit under this State. Constitution, II,
Delaware Article Section 21. In explaining the significance section, of this the Supreme Court of Dela- ware said:
To fully understand the of Art. operation it is § its necessary purpose. view, examine In our it is provision, a character essentially mandating can- that all *8 didates for possess high qualities. State office moral It is provision not designed a to punish an offender. While an conviction of infamous crime does imply not that an incapable functioning offender is a respected and productive member of it is society, irreversible evidence that the offender does not possess requisite the character for public office. It to important emphasize that we are not concerned here with the of compassion standard which govern daily interpersonal should relationships. deal, We rather with a norm established our Constitu- tion govern question, for those who seek to us. Without it is a demanding norm. Peterson, 1080-81 A.2d ex rel.
State Wier (Del.1976). Supreme with assessment of the agree
We the fully govern “those who seek to us” Delaware that demanding to constitutional norm. subject should be a public the Elected officials are entrusted with wel- public the highest and that trust with duty-bound fare are to treat care, independence and informed honesty, standards of are to act in the interest of the judgment. They charged themselves, to they obligated and are main- public only, not the and the disintereat- reality appearance personal tain their duties. When affecting they edness matters did, norms, and depart from these as Jannotti commit involving dishonesty in office which criminal acts government, will they affect the honest administration to are not “infa- not then heard that their crimes say 7. mous” the of Article Section meaning within Affirmed.5
NIX, McDERMOTT, C.J., LARSEN, and ZAPPALA, JJ., addition, join. and HUTCHINSON J., HUTCHINSON, concurring opinion files a ZAPPALA, NIX, C.J., LARSEN, McDERMOTT JJ., join. concurring files opinion.
PAPADAKOS
a
HUTCHINSON,
concurring.
Justice
I
interpreted,
be-
join
Properly
I
majority opinion.
the
Pennsylvania
limit
provision
lieve it does not
questions, three of which we
at least
additional
Jannotti raises
four
fourth,
clearly argued. The
they are not
decline to address because
may
of a candidate's
priori
whether
an a
determination
a court
make
office,
af-
qualifications
be answered in the
must
argument con-
facts of
Jannotti’s
firmative on the
this case.
Jones,
(1984), plurality
trary
Constitution analogous crimes to those which would have crimes to been law, grounds at common such disqualification brib- or conduct is criminal under law. ery, Pennsylvania which how we define expansively The determination of should the necessary class of “infamous” crime is not to this decision is, believe, open issue by and I an left the majority. C.J., NIX, LARSEN, McDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ., concurring opinion. in this join
PAPADAKOS, Justice, concurring. case, I agree proposed disposition While with the of this I write separately express my concern over the lack of the easily to define the majority with term specificity II, applied “infamous crimes” as in 7 of Article Section the Pennsylvania Constitution. There are other consid- special I erations must our encompassed juris- which believe by on prudence this subject. great regret With I foresee a public continuation criminal conduct officials by implicates public trust and I public confidence. believe it is essential that we state plainly equivocation and without nature “infamous whose crimes” commission by public officials will permanently deprive public them office.
I hold would that a conviction rendered anywhere United States based criminal upon any conduct which in- volves the violation a public trust officer an constitutes crime” purposes “infamous of Article Section of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
I Constitution, reach this conclusion based on how- ever, by analyzing the forms of infamy at common law and their relevance to today’s public conception trust. The most form recent an defines infamous crime in terms of Under punishment. laws, federal and certain state the determinant factor is the punishment" which may be cases, imposed. fact, Federal held have that an infamous crime is one which the punishment labor, is for hard Moreland, United States v. U.S. S.Ct.
101
as
(1922),
imprisonment
penitentiary
a
700
or
L.Ed.
States, 117 U.S.
Mackin v. United
county jail,
to a
opposed
777,
(1886), or
imprisonment
The of a state to for power prescribe qualifications moreover, in is entrenched the statutes and the deeply common law of this and there exists little country, very disagreement among jurisdictions person that a convict- ed of disqualified holding an infamous crime is to be from public office.2 legal
As indicated
our
sources on
majority opinion,
while somewhat
have
main-
subject,
sparse,
consistently
32,
See,
Anderson,
(1955);
example,
v.
212 Ga.
Upon here, clear, the point being short, examined I am that in addition simple authority there are good and sound reasons within the analytical framework the common law to hold that an infamous crime includes criminal acts which transgress general duties owed to a office such a as to way manifest a baseness that fatally implicates the future credibility the officer. *12 context, this it me equally apparent legal that our norms require courts to remove officeholders and disqualify seekers from I future elections. need not draw further attention to the obvious predicate for this conclusion: our entire government framework surely would unravel the face of trust crumbling proven dishonesty public administration. VI, 4, provided
3. Under then Art. it was that "All officers shall § hold they their office on the condition that behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction misbehavior office or any language Pennsylva- infamous crime.” This derived from the 1838, VI, Zavada, nia Constitution of § Art. Commonwealth v. 551, (1935) 26 Leg.Reg.R. Pa.D. & C. 30 Luzerne 185 it was decided treason, persons guilty felony, found common law all species ineligible any public of "crimen falsi” were to serve in office. See, Lewis, Forgery is also an "infamous crime.” Wilner v. 13 Pa.D. & 560, (1929). Dauphin County C. 33 35 104
lastMy major concern is to reemphasize the constitution- right al of a sovereign state to exclude from its offices persons convicted of infamous crimes a federal court or issue, sister courts. On this there is a dearth of case law that, which has held uniformly providing that the classifica- tion of the crime meets state requirements for disquali- civil fication, a state is free to act against those who have been convicted in either federal courts or the courts of sister states. Persons have been rendered ineligible to vote or hold state office for federal convictions of federal tax evasion, funds, embezzlement of federal mail conspiracy, assault, robbery, violation laws, of federal liquor etc.4 Under I analysis, see no need to indulge in a some- what strained effort establish a state crime equivalent of a federal conviction in order to provide a upon basis we can exercise our own sovereign right to qualifi- establish cations for If holding office. we choose to maintain the of our purity public life by giving full recognition to convic- tions in foreign jurisdictions, that is our affair as a simple exercise of our sovereignty. One’s fitness for public office is tainted equally by the crime of conspiracy, whether that conviction is rendered by a federal court or a sister jurisdic- tion. The state constitution has its own force as a breeder of values and a and, manifestation of sovereignty, as funda- mental law it mandates that we judge for ourselves wheth- er persons we want stigmatized by other courts to serve in Pennsylvania. I judge that dowe not. case,
In this
official of this state was convicted of
a federal crime which involved criminal conduct violating
his public trust. The nature of that violation constitutes an
example:
Todd,
91,
4. For
Arpagaus
State ex rel.
v.
225 Minn.
(1947);
Evans,
N.W.2d 810
State ex rel.
v.
79 N.M.
Chavez
(1968);
Haubrich,
P.2d
State ex rel. Dean v.
248 Iowa
(1957);
Thornton,
Hulgan
N.W.2d 451
205 Ga.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 1987.
Decided Oct. 1987.
Reargument Denied Feb.