*1 150 Elizabeth Marie the Matter of the Petition
In Hauptly Change Marie Her Name to Elizabeth Howard. 25, 1974.] Filed June 674S124.
[No. Shula, Hill, Sherwood P. Indiana Liberties Robert J. Civil Union, Indianapolis, Hauptly, Portland, J. Or., Denis John Moore, Annapolis, Md., appellant. Sendak, Colker, Attorney General,
Theodore L. Robert F. General, Attorney for State of Indiana. Assistant Givan, to transfer from before us We have opinion opinion Appeals, an which rendered Court of reported N.E.2d appeal by petitioner denial of is an from a below *2 34-4-6-1, change petition provided her for a name under IC seq. Stat., Supp., Burns Ind. Ann. et 1972 3-801 § Appellant Hauptly. is married to Denis Her maiden petition name was Elizabeth Marie filed her Howard. She change her her name from to her married name maiden name. hearing
A was on had revealed her which that request change husband concurred in for of name. ' Hauptly hearing that, among at Mrs. testified other things, unhappy she was with the Hauptly heritage. identity appeared felt hid her true and She quite proud be her maiden name back- and the ethnic ground represented. which it She not testified she was seeking change perpetrate any- the name in order to on fraud identity or to one hide her escape from creditors or to identification for criminal action. hearing evidence, finding
After the trial court rendered judgment as follows: “The Court finds the Petitioner maiden abandoned her name when Petitioner and her married. husband were The Court further dignity feels that her sense exist- ence as an not impaired; individual are that the use of dignity husband’s is not an affront to her and sense individuality; of curtailed identity neither her ambitions or are by using therefore, is, her married name. It Judgment of this the Order Court Petition Judg- Hauptly hereby of Elizabeth Marie denied. ment.” change quite permitting Indiana statute name is The simple reads as follows: “The circuit in the several state counties change
may petition.” persons application by of natural names 34-4-6-1, Stat., Supp., IC Burns Ind. Ann. 3-801. peti- requirement statutory in Indiana that the
There personal any particular other reason than his tioner establish change is, course, of name. There desire change restriction that a should common law permitted in order to defraud others activity. Name, hide criminal Am. Jur. 2d See 57 judgment attacked appellant has matter, seen fit to attack but has also in this trial court states of name in that she providing for a concept equal protection by denying the statute violates name to a married woman. language of the Appellant misconceives the statute. imagination distinguish purports to between no stretch perons. married or unmarried the sexes or part appellant also in one of her states that she brief practice profession as a under forced to nurse Hauptly, her embarrass name of much to husband’s *3 portion another brief observes In of her ment. she right quite correctly a that a woman has common law citing name, a other in name than married to do business Kipp Emery (1908), 154 P. 17. case v. Cal. 97 legal requirement any person go fact, no that there is In legal change The through a establish of name. change merely provides orderly for an statute record in order avoid future In the absence confusion. person change statute, may ordinarily of a at his name legal any proceedings. person will without The need long change adopt another This done so name. as the 2d, purpose. of name is not done for a fraudulent 57 Jur. Am. Name, today. 10. This is state of the law in Indiana taking prevent an that would has no Indiana judicial appear order. would name without assumed any person obvious to of reasonable should be a matter which knowledge society. intelligence that our is common within occupations quite persons in and like often entertainment stage public under present themselves to the an assumed or name, regardless they which name retain of their marital subsequent at practice status times. This is a which has been long accepted readily including by public understood However, any the bench and persons, bar. at one of time these any or in society fact member our who wishes to make public legal of a change, may advantage record take only duty Indiana statute. upon The trial court filing of such a is to determine that there having fraudulent intent involved. found, Once so hold we judicial that it anis abuse of deny discretion any application change for a of name under the statute.
The personal State its brief ap- makes a attack on the pellant is a claiming she married woman, because that reaction to her maiden name is an insult to her husband and point at one characterizes her as “a kind oddball.” It is true that under the common by law and tradition in coun- this try a married woman assumes the of her husband. surname 2d, Name, Am. However, Jur. nothing we find in the doing law that states that in so married woman in gives up right person sense as a
anyone might change his. else argues also State appellant since the mother
of a child that her decision to might her name cause
embarrassment to her We child. cannot see how as a matter of law this can bearing have on the case. certainly There is positive no direct or evidence regard, speculation and the mere the State occur justify sufficient to the trial court’s appellant’s petition. denial of appellant fact mere requirement chooses from the deviate common law husband justify of her does not the name use the State’s *4 terming any public purpose her “an oddball” do we see nor right by denying her the tó served be such a deviation from clearly in record the case norm. reveals there is part appellant. or ulterior motive the vicious the prefers simply discloses she her father’s surname to readily testimony in conceded her husband. She expect daughter in a future she would should she bear concerning daughter possibly position to take the same Hauptly name when married for desire retain she regain appellant many of the same reasons the seeks to now maiden name Howard. foregoing reasons, is to transfer For granted. trial is reversed. court C.J., con- DeBruler, J., concur; Hunter, J.,
Arterburn, opinion; Prentice, J., opinion. dissents curs with with
Concurring Opinion holding completely in ma- I concur of the Hunter, agree singular jority opinion. However, with the I am unable reaction judicial my Brother restraint exhibited Givan in allegations brief: baseless contained within State’s facing answering the “Instead several issues and through arguments State, appellant, well-reasoned its Attorney General, instead, viciously without has appellant personality basis, by method of ing the same of the attacked the and character person. greedy referring her as a sick and research- response certainly than much easier is argument logical if forming rebuttal, law 2.) (Appellant’s Brief, Reply p. available.” throughout argument, points the State’s various At charges following groundless appear in a sort character Hauptly: of Mrs. assassination claiming privilege that “Perhaps woman’s 6) (Page argument use reason.” she does
an have believes that fact reasonably that she can inferred “It publi- family of the should breadwinner . that she cized husband has been all know emascu- so that will 7) family.” (Page the head that she is lated Hauply’s indicating need was perhaps Mrs. . “. . competent psychiatrist.” of name but for a 10) 9 and (Pages *5 “Namely, a woman, unhappy sick and confused and unsatis- marriage, fied with unable to wants determine what she (Page 10) to do her life.” with 10) “. . . (Page because was a kind of odd ball . .” . filing a hospitalization] computer claim for “[In the probably fail to company function and pay the on refuse grounds hospitalization the liable for 11) family policy.” (Page a mistress under the terms of a matter, As a theoretical emotional reactions divorced are law, my from the reluctantly but'I must rule confess adverse reaction cannot be restrained here.
Dissenting Opinion majority opinion I dissentfrom because Prentice, grant I see petition. mandate in the statute first section provides statute1 circuit court
1. Change CHAPTER 6 of Name. 34-4-6-1 Petition circuit [3-801]. court.—The circuit in may change
the several counties of this state the names of na- persons application by petition. tural 1852, 5, R.S. ch. [2 1, p. 238; 1969, 41, 1, p. Acts § ch. § 32.] [3-802], Petition, petition 34-4-6-2 where filed.—Such be filed county person with the circuit court of in which such resides. 5, p. 1852, 2, 238; 1969, 41, 2, p. [2 R.S. ch. Acts ch. § § 32.] the last of which in for printed printed as 34-4-6-3 [3-803]. Notice thirty ch. [3] court, therein 209, 1, such weekly publications [30] § and change, or, indicated. p. days prior published published if no 619.] weekly publications newspaper applicant [2 to the in the nearest by publication.—Upon petition being in some R.S. day county 1852, thereto shall newspaper when such printed ch. wherein said give shall be 5, 3, p. 238; therein, notice thereof some § petition general circulation, published adjoining in a petition shall be heard Acts newspaper by at least county, is filed three 1943, filed Publication, proof, copy 34-4-6-4 [3-804]. order filed.—Proof publication required in this of the act shall [34-4-6-1—34-4-6-5] by filing copy published notice, be the affidavit of a disinterested such made verified person, proof and when such made, publication proceed court shall hear such and deter- petition and make such order and mine said decree therein as to just 1852, 5, 4, seem court shall reasonable. R.S. ch. [2 § p. 151, 1, 447; 1969, 41, p. 238; 3, p. Acts ch. ch. Copy copy of decree as 34-4-6-5 decree evidence.—A [3-805]. changing court, person, of such natural “may” change added). providing (Emphasis names. After procedure followed, to be the fourth section provides proceed to determine “shall hear and that the court make therein said such order decree added). just (Emphasis such court and reasonable.” shall seem language Legislature makes it clear that the intended grant privilege warranted. where circumstances individual must be
It is who concerned with general state, society institutions his name. its governmental also deal it. shudder to think must with I *6 confusion business records that must be revised and the and result, appel- ultimately merely to accommodate that will the caprice. most lant’s unorthodox legal right compel
There constitutional inherent to no change notwithstanding right name, sanction a the at for long law to a it common assume new name so as is not illegal a purpose. assumption fraudulent or mere a name, legal thereof, opposed different as sanction casts upon others, if little burden because others are free recognize not, they it or This the as is not case when wish. change given the has been the sanction of a court decree. Recognizing are circumstances under which that there change warranted, not- legally sanctioned a Legislature provided burdens, withstanding attendant its making responsibility doing, placed for it In so for such. the circuit courts. of “reasonableness” in determination statute, should petitioner, that a under the to me It is clear establishing “just it and reasonable” the burden have merely petitioner granted and not majority intent, as the fraudulent is without and desires hearing provided? Surely the Otherwise, a why is holds. thereof, the clerk of such court shall seal certified under person, such the name of a evidence of sufficient be change having made, court this state. [2 been B.S. 4, 1969, 41, p. p. 238; 1852, 5, ch. 32.] Acts ch. something than encompass more “just reasonable” words second-party Further, absence of in absence of fraud. discerned? intent to be intervention, a fraudulent how discretion, if a decision, is the court’s where Under change my I says, have petitioner “I want intent?” fraudulent
The decision of the trial court resulted from exercise discretion, simply a of sound and not abuse. was determina- desiring change petitioner for tion that the reasons of the thereby of name did not warrant the inconvenience “just upon society. be inflicted the state determination, petitioner’s and reasonable” because the stated desiring change whimsey nothing reasons for indicate but why psychological quirk. and an unusual I know of no reason the law should be concerned with such trivia. desiring
Petitioner’s stated reasons for were follows: Marriage equal require
“1. partnership is an one and to partner give up a identity been her name which has years, against will, require male it of the partner places additional burdens on the female which negates marriage. equality Requiring mandatorily “2. female her sur- *7 dignity. is an affront to her dealing Impairment individuality “3. when with
public. Impairment professional pursuits—studied “4. practical a licensed under the
trained as nurse surname Howard, practice Hauptly. but must now “5. Diminution of self-confidence. recognition profession Lack of “6. in theatrical in that performed
petitioner marriage, under prior the name of Howard to pursue however, future, and intends to in the recogni- ‘Hauptly’ past the use will vitiate phonetically tion of the name Howard and in addition is displeasing purposes. for theatrical ‘Hauptly’ “7. The name heritage masks the ethnic
petitioner English-Irish. which is “8. Petitioner’s work practical as a re- licensed nurse quires wearing tag of a name ‘Hauptly’ with the name pronunciation family which has caused confusion in heritage petitioner deprived feels has she been opportunity heritage. to discuss her own legal “9. contemplating pursuit Petitioner toward a degree legal and feels that her career be ultimate will seriously affected in that her achievements and work will judged relationship not be her own merits but on the practicing her with husband he will also be since law. “10. To to able use of her thereby would be the name choice petitioner happier person improve make relationships family not but rest with with the public. presently any “11. Petitioner in default of debt obligation; contemplating any or has never nor is filed action bankruptcy; granting of her in serve organization any person or or defraud or deceive thing right, property or deprive other the same organization might person said value which entitled.” think that State’s counsel do not
I warranted referring appellant in his brief as an How- “odd ball.” assuming viewpoint ever, upon true surnames is a personality, apparent reflection of it is me that very minority. is one of a small people fortunate most their are content with legal names, today’s decision because mandates the change any person’s upon petition, absent a show- ing name, may change of fraudulent A intent. husband his notwithstanding objections; may his wife’s and she may change her’s without his consent. A child his name although something parent, from that of either different residing dependent upon minor he them. with village may legally his name drunk to that *8 village judge, whore circuit court could judge’s to me It seems that of the wife. her’s to strange very people very keep track of difficult to become unjust should have sanction indeed that the law authorizing notwithstanding results, unreasonable “just provides only for an order seems reasonable.”
Note.—Reported
at
Bobby Lee Jones Indiana. v. State 573S91. Filed June
[No. 1974.]