History
  • No items yet
midpage
Peterson v. Peterson
434 N.W.2d 732
S.D.
1989
Check Treatment

*1 concern, cross-examination, complains a sur- deal of that Satter now ett, secured Agent Peter- strategy performance from DCI of Hackett’s prising admission that Petersen believed years to the effect sen some thirteen after trial and the truth. Fur- to be Satter’s statement died. Memories have after Hackett has ther, his testified that statement Satter concerning faded the actual occurrence Thus, since Petersen was the truth. events which culminated Satter’s convic- contended Satter’s Satter had both and Hackett is not here to defend his tion truth, and since there statement was the performance. Trying to establish whether testimony had failed a no that Satter was as- Hackett’s actions constituted ineffective concerning his polygraph examination death, greatly sistance is hindered statement, jury that the could deduce leaving nothing record us with but a cold fact true. This is the statement was in testimony (including and the of others Sat- proposition that converse of Satter's himself, ter who has a vested interest poly- relative to a portion of his statement tarnishing performance) by Hackett’s to the graph examination would indicate legitimacy to determine the of his which poly- another jury that Satter had failed earlier, given tactics. As stated the state testimony on that graph due to the lack exists, I of the record as it am convinced noted: subject. The habeas court performance that Hackett’s did not fall be- to do [Wjhat Attorney Hackett was able required low that which was of him as an to have one of the State’s effect was attorney Any at law. assertion to the con- witnesses, Delbert Petersen DCI chief trary simply supported by is not the record. Agent, veracity of Exhib- corroborate I affirm the circuit court. would my opin- it 21 It is statement]. [Satter’s regarding ion that Hackett’s actions Sat- I am authorized to state that Chief statements were of a

ter’s written joins WUEST in this dissent. Justice legitimate trial tactic. allega- Satter’s tions are not sufficient to overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s con- range

duct of rea- falls within wide assistance, in oth- professional

sonable words,

er does not constitute action might not be considered solid trial added.)

strategy. (Emphasis It should also be noted that an interest- PETERSON, Plaintiff Hackett, ing attorney colloquy between Appellant, place in Satter and the court took chambers original trial. the close Satter’s participated asked if had When Satter PETERSON, Gregory A. Defendant the trial of his case in connection with Appellee. picking replied jury, Satter “Yes.” No. 16070. Further, approved jury as it Satter selected, having and admitted to been con- Supreme Dakota. Court South throughout concerning sulted the trial May 1988. Considered on Briefs questions and decisions that were made. he felt When asked whether Jan. Decided your attorney “that has done a tremendous replied job you,” for Satter “Yes do.”

Finally, it should be noted that at the original attorney

time of the trial Hackett having highly respected lawyer,

was a trial

practiced thirty years. He was known tenacious advocate with wealth observe, experience. great

trial with a

733 Hagen Wilka, Karen E. Schreier of & Falls, plaintiff P.C. Sioux for appellant. and Gary Pashby Boyce, Murphy, McDo- Greenfield, Falls, well & Sioux for defend- appellee. ant and BRADSHAW, Judge. Circuit Janey (Janey) appeals Peterson judgment terminating right to receive Gregory (Grego- from A. Peterson ry), increasing $500 $665 support Gregory obligat- amount of child addition, pay month. In Janey ed each petitioned attorney has this court for fees appeal. We affirm the trial court and deny Janey’s request attorney fees. FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY Janey Gregory on Au- were married 12, gust Megan, 14 who is now old, old, years Ryan, years now marriage. marriage were to this The born until, lasted for seventeen because of misfeasance, Gregory’s Janey instituted an action for divorce. 2, 1985, May Janey granted

On judgment divorce. The and decree of di- gave custody Megan Ryan vorce Janey, decreeing Gregory pay month, child, per for the of the children. trial court concluded further should receive one-half of the property during marriage amassed through joint parties, efforts of the property cent of the had been and the circumstances particular Gregory by donated to his father. reasonably could have reached such a ” received, property also conclusion.’ Havens v. Henning, 418 award, $115,063 in cash. She ob- thus (S.D.1988) (quoting Davis award, tained a total after deduct- Kressly, 78 S.D. 107 N.W.2d 5 ing liabilities, $329,858. Finally, *3 (1961)). mind, this With standard in we provided following court decree the lan- upon analysis embark an of the issues in guage: this case. (Gregory) pay (Janey) is ordered to to alimony the sum of month for ISSUE seven-year period starting with the first entry judgment month after the DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN TER- herein, seven-year period, ... after said MINATING GREGORY’S RESPONSIBIL- (Gregory) pay (Janey) shall to $500 ITY TO FURNISH ALIMONY FOR JA- month, years ... for an additional 10 NEY? during 10-year period unless last (Janey) remarries, dies or at which time cease, portion alimony of the shall DECISION (emphasis supplied) Janey an seeks affirmative resolution of Gregory petitioned the trial court to by this issue advancing three alternative judgment extinguish amend its divorce assertions: duty provide his alimony to when he (1) language That the of the trial court’s Janey learned that had remarried on Au- alimony award indicates implica- 1,1987. gust Janey resisted and countered Gregory’s tion that duty pay to alimo- adjust upward with a motion to the amount ny Janey would not cease if remar- support Gregory of child required to during ried the initial seven pay. following parties’ divorce; judge granted The trial both motions. (2) That alimony award was an inte- Gregory’s monthly support obligation gral part of the property settlement and, increased from pursuant to $665 segment decree; of the divorce ruling to our in Marquardt Marquardt v. (S.D.1986), by Rempfer, 396 N.W.2d 753 (3) extraordinary That circumstances ex- obligation pay alimony was cancelled. ist, i.e., Janey’s new husband is un- Janey has asked us to these her, review two require able to which first, rulings, contending, lower court that perpetuation of alimony pay- her the trial court Marquardt, misconstrued ments. and, second, that the trial court misinter- These contentions will be addressed seri- preted SDCL 25-7-7 when it in- failed to atim. clude Gregory’s gross certain items in in- Marquardt, In supra, opined we come in determining support. “ ‘[p]roof spouse that receiving As appeals, with all it necessary, at the spousal support payments has remarried outset, to applicable delineate the standard prima establishes a requiring case facie of review. It is settled law South Dako- the court to terminate the pay ta that this court will not disturb an award ments recipient unless [the alimony support, or child or a division of payments can extraordinary circum show] property, unless clearly appears it that the stances justify continuation of the trial court abused its discretion. Guindon ” payments.’ Guindon, N.W.2d at 754 (quoting v. 256 N.W.2d 894 “ Bauer, Bauer (N.D. We have v. often said this court must ‘not 1984)). By adopting determine stance, whether reject would have we [we] original made an ruling, like but whether ed the automatic termination espoused rule judicial mind, we think a in view of the law in Voyles Voyles, (Alaska 644 P.2d 847 1982), agreement These ment or divorce cases.1 automatic decree and other provides payor spouse have ali- which that the jurisdictions allowed will termination continue, despite remarriage, pay alimony, irrespective if mony recipient spouse’s parties’ agreement remarriage, or the decree of the or evidence that the parties provided that the flow of intended that the alimonial expressly obli- unimpeded gation past remain the date was to would survive Here, remarriage. payee spouse’s remarriage. recipient spouse’s since Ja- exception ney has the amount urges adopt this in this shown neither of evi- us to required agreement dence nor an that ali- case. mony would remarriage, continue after her compre- repeat, fully We must order argument collapse. argument, gist hend language Next, succeeding pertinent the alimo- argues alimo *4 ny ny award: part award an intrinsic of the prop was erty segment settlement of the divorce de pay (Janey) is ordered to as

(Gregory) cree. It is in this state well settled that $1,000 per alimony the sum month alimony support money allowances of starting seven-year period a the with marriage for the wife children of a are entry judgment first after the month subject to revision and amendment when herein, seven-year period, After said ... See, change. e.g., conditions Matthews v. (Janey) (Gregory) pay shall Matthews, 115, 22 71 S.D. 27 month, for an additional 10 (1946). However, rule does not apply this 10-year during period this last unless property rights parties insofar as of the are remarries, at dies or which time (Janey) Holt, cease, 671, 84 concerned. Holt v. S.D. See alimony portion this of the shall (1970). Consequently, 176 N.W.2d 51 Ja- (emphasis supplied) ney alimony is, asserts that the award in provide language Since fails to that this fact, settlement; part property the if alimony payments Janey will end remar- therefore, it cannot be modified. re We years, during ries the first seven fuse to this contention on the countenance clearly implies that “it that re- maintains basis of the before us. facts marriage operate to terminate ali- does Lien, (S.D. In Lien 420 N.W.2d 26 v. (em- mony years.” seven during the first 1988) II),2 payments, we held that {Lien phasis supplied) This assertion is without were, though “support,” in denominated as merit. fact, part property of a division between Voyles the exception reliance on such, parties. they were the As not ter- misplaced Voyles exception, the because Marquardt. minable under We reached terms, only applies its where there is an to the husband’s insis- that conclusion due express alimony that sur- statement is to tence, trial, payments the be that labeled notwithstanding remarriage vive of the avoid “support” so that he could the ad- recipient in a spouse. Silence de- divorce attendant to a consequences verse tax total voluntary agreement, cree or a as to property. cash award of remarriage, falls occurrence of short of a reading II, specific apparent It is Lien alimony declaration that will en- deciding recipient supra, re- whether an spouse dure the event the when Ehrenworth, is, reality, portion a alimony v. 187 award of marries. Ehrenworth 342, settlement, N.J.Super. (1982); property a scruti- 454 A.2d 895 Lord Thus, decree, Shaw, parties language nize the divorce supra. v. to a it, must, encompassing and the end divorce to avail circumstances themselves parties.3 deviation, sought by the Af- Voyles point to either a state- to be achieved Shaw, Lien, (S.D. (Utah e.g., 278 N.W.2d 436 1.See v. 682 P.2d 2. See also Lien v. Lord 1979) (Lien I). Burr, 1984); (Minn.App. N.W.2d 644 Burr v. Bloom, 1984); Bloom v. Van 196 Neb. Van employed analysis 3. For a case in which we (1976). 246 N.W.2d 588 negotiated voluntarily property perusing when opposed agreement, to a divorce settlement conducting ter this examination in following passage, extracted opin- from the case, present we are left ion in Nugent Nugent, with convic- (N.D.1967), tion that award was not a capsulizes our view of Ja- disguised property settlement. ney’s assertion: do not believe that such factors [W]e Here, provided the divorce decree the husband’s fault caused the di- [that parties’ title, right, receive the vorce, that the wife contributed to the Karen’s, (a interest and to Inc. retail household while the husband obtained a store), residence, family personal medical degree, and that the wife’s new home, property situated within the a 1978 provide husband was unable to for her in wagon, paid station to be previous same fashion as her mate] cash within six months of the date of the extraordinary constitute circumstances decree. This amounted to property a total justify as would the continuation of the was, award of The cash award alimony payments in this judge’s words, [wife] in the trial necessary to having voluntarily elected to marry an- “effectuate the division.” other, who respon- now must assume the Based on language, it is obvious that sibility for her support. money, periodically paid not the alimo- Additionally, we ‘illogical have said “it is ny, integral of the property spouse unreasonable’ that a should re *5 necessary settlement accomplish to eq- an support ceive present spouse from a and a uitable division of property. wording spouse former at the same time.” Mar decree, coupled divorce with the quardt, supra at 754. See also Wolter v. divorce, circumstances of the indicates that Wolter, 183 Neb. 158 N.W.2d 616 monthly payments made Gregory to Shima, (1968); Marriage 360 N.W.2d support were for her and were not (Iowa 1985). accomplish meant to equitable an property Thus, division. Janey’s contention of Since has extraordinary shown no must also fail. prima circumstances to rebut facie requirement alimony terminate, should brief, In her Janey also attempts to we hold that the trial court was correct and alimony label her “rehabilitative.” As did not abuse its discretion in terminating such, says, may she it not be terminated. Janey’s alimony. opinion Since we are of the that the rule in Marquardt, supra, applies alimony, to all ISSUE II regardless classification, of its and because by Janey the cases cited factually are dis DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS tinguishable, argument is also without APPLICATION OF SDCL 25-7-7 TO THE merit. FACTS OF THIS CASE? position final under this ali DECISION

mony issue extraordinary is that circum require stances exist which the continua In addressing issue, Janey asserts alimony payments. tion of her Janey ar that the wrongly trial court refused in- gues profited that since she has not eco Gregory’s clude in monthly gross income nomically marriage, from her second she certain items listed as income on Gregory’s needs the style to live in the return, 1986 federal income tax and that prior which she had become accustomed the trial court abused its discretion when it Gregory. divorce from In one of her established the child obligation for affidavits, Janey says marry that “I did Gregory, obligor with a net monthly Timothy August 1, 1987; W. Johnson exceeding income Janey complains however, income, together my with that the increase the amount of monthly support, child provide not sufficient to insufficient; child was Gregory my for me and two minor children.” The claims that the increase was unwarranted. Malcom, decree, see Malcom v. 365 N.W.2d 863 earnings from the correctly Worthington cluded the trial court

We rule that 25-7-7, Ronning that it acted interpreted Enterprises. Grego- SDCL it its discretion when contrast, urged within bounds ry, by the trial court to monthly Gregory’s increased monthly gross delete from his income the obligation. Worthington property funds from the Ronning Enterprises, thereby reducing his the lower Janey argues $8,213.16. first, monthly not consider- net income to The low- by, its discretion abused (but actually re- money Gregory never ing earned er court determined that had a ceived) put back into by Gregory income, gross excluding monthly the two second, business, and, by award- family receives, money ap- sums of he never mathematically at a lower ing a sum that is $5,029.00, monthly or a net proximately given income than that percentage of net $3,212.00. Thus, judge, the trial the statute. income brackets under other though cognizant Gregory’s unreceived income, monthly gross in- refused to include it when he com- defines SDCL 25-7-7 include, pertinent part, Gregory’s monthly gross amounts puted come to income. following sources: received from the whole, Reading 25-7-7 as a as we SDCL (1) paid employee to an Compensation (see Bruning Jeffries, services, called personal whether (S.D.1988)), we are unable to hold that commissions, or salary, wages, bonus interpreting judge the trial erred designations; other terms, 25- statute. Pursuant to its SDCL (2) or profit business Gain obligor’s monthly gross in an 7-7 includes included, farming usually profession, only income those amounts received income; self-employment called Here, obligor. Gregory did not receive the Interest, dividends, rentals, (4) royalties income, rental or interest he was without gain from invest- or other derived guide disposition of this in power to *6 capital ment of assets .... come, expenditure the of the income and Furthermore, 25-7-7 states that SDCL these did not inure to his benefit. With rentals, “[g]ross royalties, from income ... foundation, a we hold that the trial facts as sources, profits are the net or other of his discre judge acted within the bounds filed as gain any on or all schedules shown tion when he refused to include within income tax obligor’s federal Gregory’s monthly gross income rental and he is any returns for business with which Gregory’s income listed on federal interest goes The statute on to associated ...”. tax return. income may disal- provide that the court allow or Janey remonstrates that Additionally, obligor’s monthly deductions from an low his when judge the trial misused discretion which, although on the gross income listed support to at an of child he arrived amount return, not obligor’s income tax do federal monthly net paid by Gregory, who has a be of cash. require the disbursement disagree. exceeding income We present Gregory’s 1986 In the obligor with a confronted with an When lists, among return oth federal income tax $1,500, greater than monthly net income items, rental income from a truck er net Minnesota, judge trial use a discretion which Worthington, and inter stop requirement Ac that it have tempered by income from a contract for deed. est evidence, Gregory never re cording to the evidence. a sound basis in the available monies; instead, they these were ceived 311 Henning, 418 N.W.2d Havens v. See in reason keep stop the truck utilized is to include an This discretion repair. Consequently, Grego state of able needs of the chil- appraisal of the realistic avers, nothing funds added to his ry these ability satisfy obligor’s dren and the income. court must requisites. these Id. The trial par- condition of both consider the financial below, Janey implored proceedings In the ents, including spouse. the mother’s new Gregory’s court to determine net the trial $4,514.66, Bruning, supra. in- monthly income to be which 738 requires possessed sufficient specifically 25-7-7 evidence

SDCL that, discern, law, monthly if income exceeds he could as a matter of net $1,500 level, support child the amount of Gregory’s support obligation should level, no appropriate be at an shall to the be elevated level established less may support amount of be Hence, instance trial court. we find no abuse of $1,500 level. The required than that discretion, judge’s and the trial determina- support payments of be requires statute tion shall stand. for the of two tween $462 $495 $1,500 level. lower children at III ISSUE month,4 support of $665 court ordered required JANEY, the amount at the which exceeds AP- IS AN UNSUCCESSFUL $1,500 This is all that SDCL 25-7-7 PELLANT, level. ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY require a requires. The statute does not FEES ON APPEAL? analysis percentages but

mathematical ap requires be at an rather DECISION level, propriate less than that be authority accords us SDCL 15-17-7 The trial required at level. attorney to' award fees in divorce cases on mere court must do more than a mathemat Hersrud, appeal. also Hersrud v. 346 See extrapolation ical from the table SDCL (S.D.1984). Attorney may N.W.2d 753 fees Havens, supra. 25-7-7. regardless granted appeal, be judge had access to the affida- The trial them, party requesting success of the un Gregory Janey, as do we. Ja- vits of faith, party proceeded less that has in bad an enumeration of ney’s affidavit contains brought unjustified or has a frivolous or Likewise, monthly expenses. the children’s Peshek, action. Peshek v. See affidavit, Gregory, in his outlines his cur- (S.D.1980); Foss, 323 Foss v. 83 S.D. situation, including rent financial (1968). Since we are con N.W.2d present monthly gross and net incomes. appellant, cerned here with an unsuccessful The conclusion of the trial court that the strong case must exist to warrant an support of the children should be raised to assignment attorney fees. See Struck adequately supported by month is Struck, (S.D.1987) contention that record. J., (Morgan, concurring specially). “provide is not sufficient to for me must, deciding We whether we have my misguided. minor children” is two *7 case, presented such a “consider been with parent, custodial The is for the by party, owned each the rela children, and it should it is for be incomes, liquidity tive of the assets and pay family expenses ap- sufficient party unreasonably either in whether Also, portioned to the children. the remar- spent creased the time on the case.”6 Janey riage Janey of and the income of Struck, 383; supra at Hautala v. Hauta factor to her husband5 a deviation be ' (S.D.1988). la, 417 N.W.2d 879 25-7-7; considered the court. SDCL Bruning, supra. case, Janey gross In this receives a $1,666, monthly including wages income of showing, evidentiary

This allied with the income, employment, rental in- trust finding judge’s general Gregory trial come, and investment income. Her hus- enough Janey each have income and monthly Megan band also receives income of adequately provide resources to for $1,666, Ryan, judge plus employment some convinces us that the trial benefits. 4. Gregory pays following also for the items for 6.These factors differ from those we examine premiums reviewing judge’s the benefit of the children: insurance when a trial decision whether month, skiing camp expenses, of expenses, See, Cole, $148.00 attorney e.g., to allow fees. Cole v. expenses. and airline present gross and her husband earn a $3,332.00, monthly plus some em- (rent utilities). ployment benefits Janey’s reliance monthly exception income of-hand on the in gross Their combined $3,332. Janey’s Voyles Voyles, the case of 644 P.2d 847 approximately amounts to (Alaska 1982). majority marital home As the of the former has correct assets consist court, $127,000, noted, of her ly by adoption at the remainder valued * $70,000, rule, proceeds Marquardt rejected Voyles settlement of has cash $39,000 of her Having from the sale rule automatic termination. re proceeds Karen’s, jected predicate, in Inc. last two then interest how can ex may liquid ception upon by Janey? considered assets. We relied items be be Such liquid these recognize depletion that a reliance fail out-of-hand. should interest result in a deduction of assets will result, however, I concur in the because Janey. income to judge, arriving that the trial in believe income, monthly termination, ex- Gregory gross correctly has his decision on relied cluding money sums of he never In Marquardt two on our decision. his find- receives, ings fact, (who He and his two broth- judge the trial had also stop Worthington, decree) in dispensed ers own the truck entered the divorce with Minnesota, in Peterson Re- Janey’s argument implied an interest C.C. continuation Co., promissory remarriage stating: note of alty beyond Co., in and an interest from Peterson Oil remarriage Court intended that the [T]he Grego- Enterprises. though Ronning Even only of the Plaintiff would be one factor gross monthly income than ry has more determining alimony in whether liquid. assets are Janey, none of his prior terminate to the end of seven would alimony and intended that unreasonably in- Finally, party neither continue unless Defendant could would spent appeal. the time on the creased prove change justi- of circumstances to petition for attor- Janey properly filed a fy alimony prior to the termination fees, taxes, On the basis of ney and costs. years. end of seven ease, considering in and after the facts specifically He found: then matter, equities of the we are of the extraordinary no cir- Plaintiff has shown opinion such an is not war- allowance justify so as to the continua- cumstances Therefore, petition ranted. is de- following remarriage. alimony tion of nied. supports A of the record that find- review HENDERSON, JJ., ing. Janey MORGAN and seeks continuation of part apparently and concur in result a man who concur because she married part. support her the manner to which cannot granted The trial court she is accustomed. JJ., MILLER, SABERS and dissent protect in child some increase part. and concur in result in the children but declined to rescue In from her own decision. BRADSHAW, Judge, for Circuit agree him. with *8 Justice, WUEST, disqualified. Chief HENDERSON, in (concurring Justice part, in MORGAN, (concurring Justice concurring part). in in part; result part). in concurring in result ALIMONY majority opinion with in the I concur myself conceptually marrying to Without in the affirming the increase respect to “prima language, facie” Marquardt however, only I concur support; can child holding “support” and the Lien II that of of on the issue termination in the result “support” not but is of a alimony. division, settlement I concur in result with alimony. My holding opinion in respect to the issue of termination With my for reject Marquardt I out- dissent in is alluded to alimony, simply would of * (S.D.1986). Marquardt By Rempfer, Marquardt v. 2d 396 N.W. 753 740 Essentially,

specific rationale. affecting a woman sions the lives of children and might support man, fathers, well obtain from one mothers and by rigidity of analysis but should not in mathematical nor, obtain from two of percentages; man, equivalent the same time. need he decide the One one fate of human beings by woman, sterile, a support. Clearly, extrapolation one mathematical of ta upon should bles foisted him swing be terminated and the trial court so a new mood in II, Namely, pursuit held. In America. participate, Lien I did not as I golden goose disqualified myself funding, of federal parties Legis our because two lature Dakota, shattered the were from constitutional Doctrine Western South where Separation Donohue, my judicial exists, Powers.* district and knew the Here, 284-85. parties trial court did not err in many years. disqualified my- raising the child II, because the chil believing self Lien my mind was dren grown had older and their needs had state, not in the free open due to some increased. The judge recognized trial personal knowledge of the factual back- appellee was the Director of Job Service ground, precluding totally thus objective for the State of South Dakota and found review.

that he had a (undisputed sizeable income monthly gross $5,029per month). CHILD SUPPORT At support, month child this con matter, In this I concur in result. stitutes approximately of the net in 16% Support, state, Child in this has under- come of the father. He has business inter gone radical, a philosophical dramatic ests. Not many ago, too moons this Court change with the advent of newly re- held that a decision of the trial court would vamped SDCL analysis by 25-7-7. For an be if reversed the trial court acted a rigid guidelines author of the new and manner which amounts to an abuse of dis “ a violation of the principle constitutional cretion defining ‘a discretion exercised to separation powers, Sharp Sharp, see v. purpose end or justified by, and ” 443, 422 (S.D.1988) N.W.2d 448-49 clearly against, reason and evidence.’ (Henderson, J., dissenting); Bruning v. State, Fall River County Dryden, Jeffries, 579, (S.D.1988) N.W.2d 582-84 (S.D.1987)(citations omit (Henderson, J., result); concurring in ted). This is state, well-settled law in our Getman, Donohue v. 283 going back to Herndon, Herndon v. (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring spe- N.W.2d 917 I would limit the cially). holding on child to be that the trial court did not abuse its discretion without deigning Not change to our judges trial alluding any interpretation correct into (read schedule, schedule-automatons SDCL 25-7-7. When discretion is divested plug facts, push button, some out judge, trial sup and a schedule of answer), comes the choosing but rather port is substituted therefor which he judicial imbue them with discretionary pow- abide, theoretically how can a trial springing er experience, clothed with judge discretion, abuse his within a table of power, constitutional and blood cells stimu- support, which has already stripped him of lating brain, I join in affirming the his discretion? Fall River County, 409 However, increase in support. it is N.W.2d at 651. Thinking poem, of an old upon this basis: His Honor did not abuse learned as a struggling student who feast discretionary power. His Honor be- ed on the likes of Khayyam, Omar Robert longs judiciary to the right and has the Service, Edgar Poe, Allan I muse: a full participant be in the Doctrine of *9 law, Separation Make not, keep of new but Powers. He some old. need be- Legislature says so, cause the silver, make deci- Those are gold. these are * above, my minority writings Since Circuit, in the I take Paul Kean of the Second Judicial Piatt judicial (fully appreciating Shelton, notice 79-643, that this Court No. County, Div. Minnehaha thereby) Dakota, is not being bound of SDCL 25-7-7 South day via Order dated the 28th of by October, Presiding Judge held unconstitutional Gene In this the trial court found that wine, laws, like new New made gross monthly the defendant’s income was and refine. Age will mellow $5,029 approximately per month and that test, the that have stood Doctrines monthly he had additional Time, change, surely are best. and $1,301.50 Worthington, from the Minnesota fade, go gray, Though memory hair stop Ronning Enterprises truck and a law, decay. good never knows Some project which the court refused to consider. original Joseph Parry, author of Credit to per The court awarded month as the $665 Friends,” lyr- poem “New Friends and Old support. total child This award was unrea- Or, as ics from have borrowed. whence sonable the defendant’s net month- because put it: “The old that is J.R.R. Tolkien ly income in this case is at least the twice wither, Deep roots are not strong does not monthly amount of the net income of the Tolkien, frost.” The Fel- reached the yet support father in and the child Havens (2d 1965). ed. lowship Ring, of award is month less. $3.00 speak, the abuse of principles those do Of failing The also erred in to address court Separa- of test and the Doctrine discretion financial needs of the minor the current preserve I would both tion Powers. disregarding the income of children judges, keeping discretion with our trial $1,301.50 Worthington and Ron- from eye upon thereby casting jaundiced estab- ning Enterprises projects. majority through the lishing support by child approves the trial court’s omission opinion Equity rigidity analysis. mathematical “Gregory did not on the claimed basis ex- springy employ to mathematical is too income, rental or interest he receive the trapolation of tables. power guide disposition was without income, expenditure of this and the ATTORNEY FEES income did not inure to his benefit.” None con- fully I concur with the statements any real in of these statements have basis opinion. majority tained in the proof in the record to fact and there is no support positions. Gregory did re- these SABERS, (dissenting in Justice the rental or interest income and he ceive concurring part). in in result disposition power guide had of this support income, expenditure the child award I dissent because and the of the income inadequate under the evidence wholly inured to his benefit. this record. 25-7-7 does not exclude these SDCL 25-7-7, obligor’s items, when

Under SDCL it includes them. As indicated $1,500 the cir- monthly income exceeds majority opinion net SDCL 25-7-7 defines include, its discretion gross perti- court must exercise monthly cuit income to obligation. This setting support child part, received from the fol- nent “amounts unfettered, (2) must have profit but lowing discretion is sources: Gain or (4) Interest, Havens v. in the evidence. profession, a sound basis div- business (S.D.1988). In idends, rentals, Henning, royalties gain or other de- petitioned assets; Havens, parent capital the custodial rived from investment child opin- increase the father’s majority court to As stated in the ...” further remaining minor chil- obligation ion, goes provide for two that the the statute on to may The circuit court found that the fa- allow or dren. disallow deductions monthly obligor’s income ther’s net monthly gross obligation income, which, although increased the listed on the obli- gor’s month or total per child return, federal income tax do not challenged require The award was award $668. disbursement of cash. Even if the increased net upheld because of these funds were keep utilized to the truck divorce, since the stop income the father in a reasonable repair, state of he living, increased cost of and the increased income, received the guided he the disposi- raising they get cost of children as older. income, tion of this expenditure and the *10 Clearly to his benefit. income inured (Anderson) WILSON, qualify as a under the

does not deduction Karon J. obligor and an should not be able to statute Appellee. Plaintiff and simply obligations by uti- avoid his lawful lizing repairs. the funds to make (Bill) WILSON, William Defendant 3, Exhibit the 1986 individ- United States Appellant. father, tax return is ual income even No. 16148. startling. more Line 17 of D Schedule $335,070. long-term gain net shows Supreme Court of South Dakota. forty percent ($134,028) Only figure of this appears is to tax and line 13 as subject on on Briefs 1988. Considered Oct. capital gain. This, other in- “taxable” Decided Jan. $207,068which, an IRA come totaled after $2,000 $12,000 deduction for alimo-

ny adjust- in a resulted “taxable” income $193,068. gross

ed In other

words, the may taxable income have been $200,000,

under but the real income for $400,000.

1986 was almost

For court to limit the child $332.50

award month child is seem, Strange may

incredible. as it poverty

amount near the line for one

person. It is even more incredible when

one considers father’s real income for

1986 was I would reverse and to the trial properly

remand court to recon-

sider with accordance

South Dakota guidelines law and the set join

forth in SDCL 25-7-7. I also Justice

Morgan part in that of his concurrence in part regarding

result in termination ali-

mony. addition,

In I grant petition would attorney’s fees in the sum of Malcolm,

accordance with Malcolm v.

MILLER, part, (dissenting Justice con- part). in result in

curring join Morgan Justice of his

special writing that result concurs in the dealing with of alimo- issue termination

ny. join Justice Sabers’ on the child dissent

support award issue.

Case Details

Case Name: Peterson v. Peterson
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 11, 1989
Citation: 434 N.W.2d 732
Docket Number: 16070
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.