235 N.W. 15 | Minn. | 1931
1. The injured girl, Lila Peterson, was 15 years of age. She was a sophomore in the high school at Minnesota. On April 29, 1929, a little after four in the afternoon, just as school closed, she left the high school, which faced an east and west street at the south of the school grounds, and went across to the south curb to arrange for a ride home, five or six miles in the country, in an auto used by a student living in her neighborhood. There were eight or ten automobiles, used by the students living in the country, parked next to the school side of the street, facing west, and fewer were on the south side facing east. She arranged for the ride and started on her return to the north side, going a little northwesterly, to join the girls with whom she had parted. The defendant Arvid Miller had his auto parked facing west on the north side of the street and farther east. He was a high school student. He started west and came into collision with the girl. She was struck on her right side by the left front fender. He claims that he was within the north half of the street and had the right of way. She *534 claims that she was a few feet north of the south curb when struck, just a step or a few steps away from the auto where she had been.
The evidence sustains a finding that the driver was on the southerly or left-hand side of the street. The uniform highway traffic act requires the driver to keep on the right-hand side. L. 1927, p. 563, c. 412, § 9, 1 Mason, 1927, § 2720-9. There was much evidence that he did, and it might occur to many that the preponderance was so; but the fact was for the jury, and its finding is sustained. The statutory requirement is for the benefit of others on the street, and if the driver violates it responsibility follows for the proximate result of his delinquency, which we conveniently call negligence. Schaar v. Conforth,
2. Aside from the effect of the statute, the evidence sustains a finding that the boy was negligent in failing to avoid an injury. The street was 37 feet wide. The autos on each side occupied a space of five or six feet. He took his car from where it was parked and started west. He says he did not see the girl but that she ran into the car. He thinks he was going ten miles an hour. She was thrown eight or ten feet to the southwest. His car ran on 50 feet west. The school was just out, he was one of the school boys, and he knew the conditions. School grounds are warnings to auto drivers. Naturally enough he would look most to his right; but his seat was on the left, and there were autos parked at the southerly curb. Even if he kept on the right-hand side of the street and though he had the right of way, he was not absolved from the duty of keeping a lookout and exercising ordinary care toward those on the street. Saunders v. Yellow Cab Corp.
3. The defendants claim that the girl was negligent as a matter of law and that her negligence proximately contributed to her injury. The claim is that the facts bring the case within the rule that looking she must have seen and not seeing she did not look; therefore either she saw or did not look. Her testimony is that she had her foot on the footboard of the car which was parked at the south curb, that she looked both ways and then started across, somewhat northwesterly, and was hit when she had gone a step or two; and it appears that she was hit on the right side by the front end or corner of the fender. We cannot say as a matter of law that the injured girl was guilty of contributory negligence. She had a right to use the street, and if she was on the south side of the center it cannot be said that she must have anticipated that a car going west would come on the south side. The case is not within Sorenson v. Sanderson,
4. There remains the question whether as a matter of law the injured girl was guilty of contributory negligence or fault or delinquency, in not observing the statute, so as to prevent a recovery. It was upon the ground that there was such negligence that the court granted judgment notwithstanding.
The uniform highway act of 1927, 1 Mason, 1927, § 2720-18(c) provides:
"Every pedestrian crossing a highway within a business or residence district at any point other than a pedestrian crossing, crosswalk or intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the highway." *536
Recently in considering this statute in Saunders v. Yellow Cab Corp.
"The fact that plaintiff was on a part of the street where it was the duty of pedestrians to yield the right of way to automobiles, under 1 Mason, 1927, § 2720-18(c), did not make plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Day v. Duluth St. Ry. Co.
There was a like holding in Hollander v. Dietrich,
On the going down of the remittitur both cases stand for judgments on the verdicts.
Judgments reversed. *537