Peterson v. Martinez

(10th Lora-Solano, 1288, 330 F.3d Premises Proper B. Pervaz, Cir.2003), quoting United States v. to the mismatched With (1st Cir.1997) 1, 118 F.3d place of the to be description and address marks searched, emphasizes the officers’ Garcia inaccuracy well before knowledge of the Here, prongs both this test are their considered choice not the search and photograph description satisfied. The and Obtaining an accurate warrant. to obtain affidavit, of Garcia’s home in the combined may have been the a corrected warrant involved, knowledge agents with the of the choice, since there was particularly better executing enabled officers to locate the so, but the error does not ample time to do premises difficulty without or confusion of the evidence. Re suppression warrant virtually possibility and eliminated the concerning the ad gardless of the error searching wrong residence. See Unit dress, judge clearly intended issuing Brakeman, 1206, ed States v. 475 F.3d the residence for the officers to search (10th Cir.2007) 1211-12 (concluding the ap in the depicted described and warrant knowledge executing sup officers can any was never doubt plication. There plement the information in the warrant to police should about which residence search; reality outweighs any ambiguity). eliminate practical in the warrant. United technical error court in denying The district did not err (10th 498, Dorrough, 927 F.2d States v. suppress. Garcia’s motion to Cir.1991) (“[P]ractical accuracy rather AFFIRMED. the deter precision than technical controls ade mination of whether a search warrant premises to be

quately describes

searched.”). par

The Fourth Amendment’s searches do

ticularity requirement ensures probable of the cause scope

not exceed the Gray PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Bergsgaard, justifying them. See Voss v. (10th Cir.1985). Our 774 F.2d v. “ determining adequacy ‘for of the test MARTINEZ, capaci Alex his official description of the location to be searched City ty Manager Safety for the description is sufficient to is whether Davis, County Denver; James locate executing enable the officer to capacity as Executive his official identify premises with reasonable ef Department Director of Colorado fort, whether there is reasonable Safety,* Defendants-Appel of Public probability premise might that another be ” mistakenly States v. lees. searched.’ United (1984) (”[A]n suppress proof.”); see 82 L.Ed.2d 677 assess- bears the burden States, Simmons United flagrancy police miscon- ment of (1968). L.Ed.2d 1247 He important step in [ex- duct constitutes an therefore failed to show he would be has calculus.”). clusionary rule] Garcia makes police to exclusion even if had failed entitled prejudice no effort to show or intentional obey or instructions the terms of Rule 41 require- the rule or the warrant’s violation of embedded in the warrant. though, proponent even as the of exclu- ments * sion, responsibility doing he bears the so. cur- court substitutes the individuals who The Moore, rently pursuant to Fed. United States v. hold these offices 1994) ("The 43(c). proponent R.App. P. Cir. of a motion to Attorney Suthers, General for John W. Colorado, Intervenor,

the State Fund; Rights Defense Sec

NRA Civil Foundation, Inc.;

ond Foundation;

Buckeye Firearms Citi League; Rights

zens Action Common Amendment; Connecti

wealth Second League; Calguns

cut Citizens Defense

Foundation, Inc.; Gun Owners Civil

Rights Alliance; Hawaii Defense Carry;

Foundation; Illinois Illinois Association; Open Maine Rifle

State

Carry Association; Maryland Is Shall

sue; Oregon Firearms Educational

Foundation; Carry Inc.; Wisconsin

Scope Inc.; Firearms Asso Stillwater

ciation; Virginia Citizens Defense

League, Inc.; Virginia West Citizens Brady League Inc.; Center to

Defense Violence, Amici

Prevent Gun Curiae. 11-1149.

No. of Appeals,

United States Court

Tenth Circuit.

Feb. Monroe, Roswell, GA, R.

John for the Plaintiff-Appellant. Grove, Attorney

Matthew D. Assistant (John Suthers, Attorney General W. Gen- eral, briefs), with him on the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colora- do, Denver, CO, for Defendants-Ap- pellees. Gura, Possessky,

Alan Gura & Alexan- dria, (Mikolaj T. Tempski, VA Second Foundation, Inc., him Amendment with briefs), Curiae, for Amicus Second Foundation, Amendment Inc. (1908), (Robert exception to with 52 L.Ed. 714 Dowlut Bower Matthew briefs), immunity. of the NRA Office Eleventh Amendment him on Counsel, Fairfax, VA, Amicus General to Peterson’s claims With Fund. Curiae, Rights Defense NRA Civil sheriff, the Denver we conclude Brady Lowy, E. Center Jonathan carrying that the of concealed firearms is (Daniel Vice, R. Violence Prevent Gun by the protected Violence, Prevent Gun Brady Center to or the and Immunities Clause. and S. Char- L. Diesenhaus and Jonathan Baldwin, In Robertson v. LLP, Hogan Lovells U.S. tey Quarcoo, (1897), 41 L.Ed. 715 the Su S.Ct. D.C., briefs), Washington, him on the in dicta that “the preme Court stated Curiae, Brady to Pre- Center for Amicus arms is not people keep bear vent Gun Violence. carrying infringed by prohibiting laws 281-82, weapons.” BALDOCK, LUCERO, Before recently, More District S.Ct. 326. HARTZ, Judges. Circuit Heller, 570, 128 S.Ct. Columbia LUCERO, Judge. Circuit (2008), 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 Court Peterson, majority noted that “the 19th-centu- Washing- Gray a resident li- handgun ton, ry question for a concealed courts to consider the held applied (“CHL”) the ex officio sheriff from prohibitions carrying cense on concealed Denver, Pursuant to state Colorado. weapons were lawful under Second law, may issue CHLs sheriffs Colorado analogues,” and ex Amendment or state residents. Colo.Rev.Stat. only to state “nothing opinion in our should plained that 18-12-203(l)(a). application Peterson’s § longstanding taken to cast doubt be denied, Peter- accordingly prompting was 626, Id. at 128 S.Ct. 2783. prohibitions.” Denver sheriff against file suit son to practice nation’s extensive light In of our of the executive director and Colorado’s carry restricting citizens’ freedom to Safety. Peterson Department of Public manner, in a concealed we hold firearms respect with policy that Colorado’s claims activity does not fall within that this violates applicants CHL to non-resident protec Amendment’s scope Second Amendment, Privileges and the Second tions. IV, Article and sev- Immunities Clause of re- same conclusion with reach the provisions. eral other constitutional the Privi- claim under spect court concluded The district Const, Clause, Immunities leges and Department director of executive IV, 2,§ is coterminous cl. which art. to Eleventh Safety is entitled Public claim. As the to travel with no immunity because he has in Supreme Supreme explained Court chal- the enforcement of the connection to Friedman, 487 U.S. Virginia v. Court of con- agree with that lenged statute. We (1988), 101 L.Ed.2d 108 S.Ct. requires law “each sher- clusion. Colorado ‘privileges’ those “it and administer” the CHL implement iff to vitality of bearing on the and ‘immunities’ § 18-12- licensing scheme. Colo.Rev.Stat. entity that a State single a the Nation as 201(3). responsible Because sheriffs residents and nonresidents must accord re- administering the state’s CHL for 64-65, 108 S.Ct. Id. at equal treatment.” the executive director of gime—not and citations (quotations Safety of Public Department —Peterson’s of firearms carrying Because the concealed within the latter do not fall against claims our histo- for much of prohibited been has parte Young, 209 U.S. the Ex activity by that this fails the CHLs issued an individual’s state of ry, we conclude test. § Friedman residence. See Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-12- 213(l)(b)(I). alleges that Davis Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. “primarily responsible administering for § we affirm. the recognition reciprocity and of CHLs I by issued other states.” February Peterson filed suit scheme, statutory As a result of this court the ex officio federal district carrying Peterson claims he is barred from City County of Denver sheriff of the and home, firearm concealed outside of his and the executive director of the Colorado business, place private or automobile in Safety, alleging of Public Department § Colorado. See Colo.Rev.Stat. 18—12— licensing regime for concealed Colorado’s 105. Peterson further notes that the Den- and Im- handguns violates Municipal prohibits ver Revised Code indi- Clause, Amendment, munities carrying viduals from firearms —concealed the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Accord- or not—unless the individual holds a valid ing complaint, to his Peterson is a resident or carrying weapon CHL “is Washington. of the State of At the time private within a pri- automobile or other complaint, he filed his Peterson held conveyance, vate means of hunting or Washington CHL issued the State of protection person’s for lawful of such or issued second CHL the State of person’s person property, another while frequent Florida.2 Peterson is a visitor to travelling.” Denver Rev. Mun.Code 38- Denver, carry seeks firearm when 117(a), (f). (b), & Because Peterson does end, city. that he visits the Towards Pe- property not own or otherwise control a applied terson for CHL with the Denver Denver, generally public and uses transit sheriff, post by a now held Martinez. Pe- visiting, while he claims that he is “com- application terson’s was denied because he pletely disarmed” when in Denver. does not meet the criteria set forth In complaint, his Peterson asserted six § Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-12-203. Peterson al- (1) claims: Martinez leges only violated the Privi- statutory criterion he satisfy leges by does not and Immunities residency. denying is Colorado Clause Peterson a CHL on the basis of non-resi- provides reciprocity Colorado for (2) dency; Davis violated the recognition by of CHLs issued other by and Immunities refusing Clause reci- states, only but provide states that procity to Peterson’s Florida CHL while reciprocity to Colorado CHLs. See Colo. granting reciprocity to Florida CHLs held 18-12-213(1). § Washington Rev.Stat. (3) residents; by Florida Martinez violated provide State does not reciprocity to Col- Equal by Protection denying Clause CHLs, orado and thus Peterson’s Wash- Peterson CHL on the basis of non-resi- ington-issued recognized by CHL is not (4) dency; Davis Equal violated the Pro- recognize Colorado. Nor does Colorado by tection refusing reciprocity Peterson’s Florida Utah CHLs because Clause to (5) reciprocity CHL; respect offered to Peterson’s Florida Both defen- filed, complaint appellees At the time the was these the current even if a different indi- by post offices were held Alvin LaCabe and Peter vidual held the the relevant time. Weir, respectively. Alex Martinez and James pursuant have Davis been substituted to Fed. opening 2. Peterson states brief that he 43(c). CHL, R.App. R.Civ.P. 25 and Fed. P. longer For no holds a Florida but has since reference, ease of we will use the names of been issued a CHL the State of Utah. scheme, and it need not credit by iprocity the Second violated dants by stat- opportunity allegations that are contradicted any meaningful “prohibiting City and arms in the Because Davis was not involved to bear ute. for [Peterson] licensing through reciprocity, Denver County of the administration CHL from ob- precludes [Peterson] Davis scheme court dismissed the claims (6) license”; Both necessary taining or nam- prejudice substituting “without Process violated the Due defendants represent an alternative defendant to ing Privileges and Immunities and the Clause the State of Colorado.” With Peterson from bear- by prohibiting Clause heard, request to be the court Suthers’ licensing scheme. ing through arms 2403(b) § and Fed. held that 28 U.S.C. a declaration requested 5.1(c) provide R.Civ.P. Suthers 18-12-203(l)(a) §§ Colo.Rev.Stat. intervene on behalf of the State of Colora- 213(l)(b)(I) unconstitutional, and an court thus allowed Suthers to do. The of those injunction barring enforcement delayed ruling on Peterson’s intervene and statutes. summary judgment to allow motion for opportunity respond. Suthers an Attorney John Suth- General

Colorado on behalf ers filed a motion dismiss response to Peterson’s motion for Davis, heard.” along “request with a to be ev- summary judgment, presented Suthers no role in that Davis had argued Suthers have ac- permitting idence that authorities reciprocity sys- enforcing CHL Colorado’s regarding cess to far more information tem, shielded from suit and thus was residents than residents other Colorado cited a Amendment. He also the Eleventh submitted an affidavit states. Suthers and a District of Colora- Colorado statute Ostrander, a Detective with from Michael to the state requiring local rule notice do County Office who the Adams Sheriffs challenging attorney general of suit investigations. Ostrander conducts CHL constitutionality of a state statute. See “locally-maintained stated that access 13-51-115; L. D. Colo. Colo.Rev.Stat. absolutely assessing critical to databases is basis, Suthers re- R. 24.1. On Civ. He applicant’s qualifications.” a [CHL] to be heard as to quested opportunity noted, con- example, that misdemeanor for challenged constitutionality of the two alcohol, or vio- involving drugs, victions statutes. an individual for a disqualify would lence argued response However, in Peterson such crimes in Colorado. CHL accept to as true his required municipal court was court prosecuted are often respon- “primarily that Davis is allegation are virtu- court convictions “municipal and administering recognition sible for to statewide or nation- ally reported never by other of CHLs issued reciprocity described a Ostrander also al databases.” request respect to Suthers’ With states.” that a search number of relevant issues heard, he had no to be Peterson indicated would reveal about Colora- local databases intervention, but did objection to Suthers’ con- residents, including: mental do health an ami- object participation to Suthers’ not result 911 calls do tacts or filed a motion cus curiae. Peterson also arrest; driving ten- history aggressive Martinez, against summary judgment for records; dencies; plea juvenile arrest summary for and Martinez cross-moved sen- that result deferred agreements judgment. programs. Ostrander tences or diversion for he is able to screen explained that to granted court the motion

The district but for Colorado residents these issues It concluded that Colorado dismiss Davis. type of access to this that his “lack of the rec- requires sheriffs to administer law “it virtually impossible held other states would concluded that information impossible make it more or less to effec- applicant’s evaluate non-resident [CHL] screening for tively type conduct this background thoroughly enough to deter- applicants.” non-resident Given [CHL] applicant, granted mine that if ninety-day statutory deadline for com- [CHL], danger will not be a or himself pleting investigations, CHL see Colo.Rev. community.” 18-12-206(1), charged § and the fees Stat. separate Suthers filed a for cross-motion accessing background for some states summary judgment largely on the same information, opined: “If I Ostrander were grounds motion, In that discussed above. required process applications [CHL] Suthers characterized Peterson as chal- non-residents, from I do not believe that I lenging permitting both the Colorado consistently eligibility could ensure their to scheme barring and the Denver ordinance carry weapon a concealed under Colorado open carrying of firearms without a law.” response, CHL. In his flatly re- Suthers also submitted an affidavit from jected characterization, arguing Spoden, the James Colorado Bureau of effect, trying, engage “Suthers is in a Investigation’s Supervi- InstaCheck Data open back door attack of Denver’s ban on Spoden largely sor. corroborated Ostran- carry of firearms.” Peterson stated that although der’s affidavit. He indicated that although Suthers “is free to commence his provided national databases some back- own action Denver if he chooses non-residents, ground information so, do this case is not the proper vehicle “many kept solely records at the state Instead, for his attack.” Peterson ex- only level—and available to state or local plained that the Denver ordinance “is highly authorities —are relevant to a unconstitutional,” per se but is Defen- “[i]t applicant’s eligibility.” Spoden not- [CHL] (and Colorado’s) dant’s refusal to allow Colorado, ed that in information associated Plaintiff to obtain a CHL that is unconsti- arrest, summons, with an or criminal tutional.” charge appear would in a database accessi- In ruling on the cross-motions sum- ble to Colorado authorities. Similar- mary judgment, the district court accepted ly, protection restraining orders in civil claims, framing of his stating cases, reports that an individual has been “alleges that Peterson that Colorado’s himself, determined to be a danger to state statutes regarding permits carry juvenile felony adjudications reported handguns, [Colo.Rev.Stat: ] only in the Spoden same database. seq., 18-12-201 et are unconstitutional as that other averred states have similar limi- applied to him.” Noting Peterson applicant tations and thus even if an a had elected not to name an alternative defen- disqualification of type, “state law en- respect dant with to challenging the claims forcement way authorities would have no reciprocity system, Colorado’s the court acquiring information about” a non-resi- held that those claims had been aban- Further, dent applicant. Spoden CHL doned. With to the remaining noted that Colorado CHL holders are claims, the court concluded that Martinez flagged they on a state database if are summary was entitled to judgment. It arrested in flagging sys- Colorado. This privileges determined Peterson’s and tem allows law enforcement to “ensure to immunities/right travel claim failed be- ongoing eligibility holders, of’ CHL but cause the for provide ability background does not “the to need information monitor monitoring law enforcement contacts and was a substantial reason [non-residents’] in Spoden their actual state of residence.” for treating residents and non-residents Stidham, Dunlevy, P.C. v. require- Crowe & residency and that the differently, (10th Cir.2011). However, to that end. substantially related F.3d ment was equal that Peterson’s party concluded of the a making The court an officer state “[i]n residents failed because claim protection enjoin the enforce- defendant in a suit similarly situat- non-residents and alleged of an act to be unconstitu- of informa- differing quanta given the ed tional, plain it is that such officer must As to for the two classes. available tion connection with the enforce- have some claim, the court Amendment the Second act, merely making else it is ment of the scrutiny and conclud- applied intermediate of the party representative him a as a was ad- residency requirement ed that the state, make the thereby attempting and need justified Colorado’s equately parte Young, a Ex party.” state and the holders and monitor CHL evaluate explained have 28 S.Ct. so for non-residents. difficulty doing required are not to have that “Defendants entry judgment, Peterson Following to the unconstitution- ‘special connection’ timely appealed. Rather, state officials al act or conduct. duty to ‘enforce’the particular must have a

II question statute in demonstrated ap consider Peterson’s firstWe duty.” Prairie willingness to exercise dismissing court’s order of the district peal Wagnon, 476 Potawatomi Nation v. Band of a Davis. Our review against his claims Cir.2007). (10th F.3d immunity is sovereign based dismissal does not cite Kempth Kan. v. See Governor de novo. establishing a of Colorado law provision Cir.2008). (10th orne, 833, 841 516 F.3d the executive director connection between jurisdic Amendment is “The Eleventh Safety of Public Department of the unconsented suits precludes tional bar that reciproci CHL enforcement of Colorado’s and arms of against a state in federal court Rather, he contends that the ty regime. Cnty. Rural Water Wagoner the state.” accept required court was district Auth., Dam v. Grand River Dist. No. 2. that Davis Cir.2009). complaint’s allegation true And administering responsible for is, “primarily in all official-capacity “an suit because name, reciprocity of CHLs recognition treated as other than be respects to dis entity,” the Eleventh A motion against issued other states.” a suit immunity may “when provides sovereign immunity based on miss damages “First, are sued party officials [s]tate of two forms. come one Kentucky v. Gra capacity.” official their plain to the may challenge make a facial 159, 166, 169, ham, subject matter concerning allegations tiffs (1985). 87 L.Ed.2d the suffi thereby questioning jurisdiction, addressing a ciency complaint. undisputed It attack, accept court must facial the district are, effect, claims Davis claims as true. complaint in the allegations of the State of Colorado. against an arm allegations Second, may go beyond party a However, the claims argues that challenge complaint and contained in the parte Young, fall within the Ex juris subject matter upon facts which (1908), 441, 714 123, 52 L.Ed. 28 S.Ct. Stephen’s v. St. depends.” E.F.W. diction immu to Eleventh Amendment exception Sch., 1297, 1303 264 F.3d High Indian exception permits “suits nity. That Cir.2001) (10th and citations enjoin al seeking to officials against state type of the first consider federal law.” We violations of leged ongoing 1206 case, accept and thus

challenge accept allegation to the con- allegations factual as complaint’s well-pled trary.

true. Although any Peterson does not cite to

However, to accept “we are not bound provision of imposing duty Colorado law a factual legal true a conclusion couched as 18-12-213, § to enforce Colo.Rev.Stat. he Attain, v. allegation.” Papasan U.S. does note that Davis stated in his motion 286, 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 to dismiss that he a database “maintain[s] (1986) (citation omitted). Peterson’s alle- of states with which Colorado maintains gation “responsible for ad- Davis reciprocity.” statement, Based on this Pe- reciprocity is a bare ministering” CHL argues terson that Davis fits within the Ex legal complaint merely The assertion. parte Young exception because he has states, any supporting without factual alle- “some connection” with enforcement of the gations, legal duty that Davis has a reciprocity provision. 209 § enforce Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-12-213. No- disagree. 441. S.Ct. Davis’ mainte- complaint point legis- where does the to a may provide nance of a database a conve- lative or administrative enactment so em- seeking nient source for sheriffs informa- powering complaint Davis. Nor does the tion reciprocity, relevant to CHL Ex but allege enforcing instances of Davis or parte Young requires a nexus between the ” administering reciprocity system, the CHL defendant and of the chal- “enforcement being otherwise involved in Peterson’s added). lenged statute. Id. (emphasis As attempt recognition to obtain of his out-of- Wagnon, we held in the defendant must state CHLs. particular have “a duty to ‘enforce’ the in question statute and a demonstrated Further, the district court was willingness duty.” to exercise that reject regard correct to Peterson’s claim (citation omitted). F.3d Davis has ing responsibility Davis’ to administer the particular rather, no duty; such sheriffs reciprocity system because even “factual are tasked with enforcing the CHL reci- allegations that ... properly contradict procity system. § See Colo.Rev.Stat. 18- considered document are not well-pleaded 12-201(3). accept facts the court must as true.” Corp. GFF v. Associated Wholesale Gro Our decision in Chamber Commerce cers, Inc., Edmondson, Cir. the United States 1997). (10th Cir.2010), The district court properly took F.3d 742 is illustrative. judicial There, notice of the Colorado Revised we concluded that the Oklahoma Statutes, Coffman, Attorney see United States v. General could be sued under the (10th Cir.1980), F.2d parte which the Ex Young exception Assembly Colorado General provision “instructs of Oklahoma law requiring implement each sheriff to public administer verify eligibility contractors to work 2,” provisions part of this Colo.Rev. for all employees. new 18-12-201(3). § Stat. The holding referenced Our was based on the existence of “part 2” §§ runs from Colo.Rev.Stat. 18- state statute that Attorney directed the 18-12-216, 12-201 to including the CHL General to draft on behalf contracts reciprocity provisions state, found Colo.Rev. prosecute and to and defend civil § Stat. 18-12-213. Colorado law is clear actions on behalf of the state. Id. at 760 (7)). that sheriffs are responsible (citing 18b(A)(3), for adminis Okla. Stat. tit. tering reciprocity system. According Attorney We further noted that the Gener- ly, required the district court was not willingness to al had “a demonstrated to ex- However, protection against we claim he asserted duty.” equal that Id. ercise re- opposite conclusion with to Accordingly, proceed Martinez. we reached the same of portion to a different spect summary judgment whether consider “discriminatory made it a which statute appropriate favor of Martinez was with permanent a or to fire citizen practice” to Peterson’s Amendment respect Second an individual who employing while resident right travel/Privileges to claim and 754, Id. not authorized to work. was (which he con- Immunities Clause claim we respect provision, that With to claims). presents separate tends two Attorney argument that the rejected the grant of We review district court’s represent to non-specific duty General’s summary judgment de novo. See Sim- him Id. proper made a defendant. the state Enters., Inc., Sykes mons v. 647 F.3d to failed plaintiff And because the at 760. Cir.2011). (10th Summary judgment authorizing any to Oklahoma law “cite if, viewing the evidence proper provi- that Attorney General to enforce non-moving most favorable light to under sion,” “claim plaintiff’s we held genuine dispute there is no as to party, of the scope falls provision outside fact is enti- any material and the movant Young parte exception.” Ex of judgment tled to a matter law. See identified A defendant need not be Awmiller, 1211, 1215 v. 354 F.3d Gwinn to fit within challenged in the statute itself Cir.2004). (10th Fin Young exception. See parte the Ex Crutcher, 1139, 1151 v. stuen A Cir.2007). to the en Connection by way an act of may come forcement law, dele state an administrative another Heller, In District v. Columbia en practice gation, or demonstrated 171 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. law provision. But when a state

forcing (2008), Supreme held “that Court to empowers set of officials explicitly one an indi the Second Amendment conferred terms, cannot sue plaintiff enforce its keep arms.” Id. vidual and bear evidence different official absent some in McDonald 128 S.Ct. 2783. And enforce is connected to the the defendant — U.S.-, S.Ct. City Chicago, law challenged law. Colorado ment of (2010), the Court 177 L.Ed.2d 894 reciproci CHL requires sheriffs enforce that “the concluded of the De ty, not the executive director fully applicable the States.” Id. right is Safety. of Public See Colo.Rev. partment Nevertheless, pro- has the Court at 3026. 18-12-201(3). affirm the thus Stat. little precious guidance vided Davis is en court’s conclusion that district restrictions to the standard which immunity. Eleventh Amendment titled to be as- of firearms should possession sessed.

Ill Heller, that the Court determined correctly concluding that After statute, completely challenged which Davis not fall within claims did handguns in the home possession barred Young exception, the district parte Ex be lawful firearm required opportunity allowed court condition, failed inoperable in an kept claims complaint those amend his to assert scrutiny any of the standards “[u]nder Pe- official. against Martinez another consti- applied enumerated that we have Peterson also terson declined do so. rights.” to address dismissal tutional declined rejected application arguing 2783. The Court that the ordinance is unconstitu- scrutiny, tional, rational-basis but declined to se but that it is Colorado’s “refusal lect another standard. Id. at 628-29 & n. allow Plaintiff to obtain a CHL However, 128 S.Ct. 2783. the Court unconstitutional.” Claiming that Suthers opinion stressed that its should not be read attempting was a “back door attack of longstanding prohibitions to “cast doubt on firearms,” open carry Denver’s ban on possession on the of firearms felons and Peterson stated that “this case is not the ill, mentally forbidding or laws proper vehicle for his attack.” carrying places of firearms in sensitive In light of explicit Peterson’s statement government such buildings, as schools proper “this case is not the vehicle” imposing qualifica laws conditions and for an attack validity on the of the Denver arms,” tions on the commercial sale of ordinance, Peterson clearly any has waived which the “presump Court identified as such challenge. See United States v. Zu tively regulatory lawful measures.” Id. bia-Torres, 550 F.3d Cir. 26, 128 n. 626-27 & S.Ct. 2783. 2008) (an waived, issue is rather than for Reese, United States 627 F.3d 792 feited, party when a “deliberately consid (10th Cir.2010), adopted this court a “two- ered the unraised issue and made an inten pronged approach” to Second Amendment it”). tional forego decision to Because the First, claims. we “ask whether the chal- district court accepted Peterson’s formula lenged imposes law a burden on conduct ruling tion of the case in parties’ on the falling within the scope the Second summary judgment, cross-motions for Pe guarantee.” Amendment’s Id. at If terson cannot complain be heard to burden, impose the law does not it is alleged error he himself invited. See does, constitutional. If it then the court DeBerry, United States v. “must evaluate the law under some form of (10th Cir.2005) (“[T]he invited-error scrutiny.” means-end Id. at 801. precludes doctrine a party from arguing proceed analyze We Peterson’s Sec- that the district court erred in adopting a ond Amendment claim under this two-step proposition that party had urged the approach. Our task is complicated, howev- district court to adopt.”). see no rea er, by the posture somewhat unusual son plaintiff that a challenge could not claim. argues Peterson both the statute and the ordinance scrutiny strict is appropriate because he is suit, same but Peterson has made a con “completely disarmed” while in Denver. scious decision not to challenge the consti alleged That complete disarmament re- tutionality of the Denver ordinance. sults from the confluence of two enact- Accordingly, ments: state statute that requires we must conduct our two- applicants CHL legal be residents step Second analysis based on Colorado, 18-12-203, § Colo.Rev.Stat. and the effects of the state statute rather than the Denver ordinance that requires a CHL the combined effects of the statute and the for most open carry, forms of Denver Rev. Reese, ordinance. As we held in “a re- 38-117(a), (b), (f). MumCode & viewing court first asks whether the chal- lenged imposes law burden conduct repeatedly expressed, has how- falling within ever, scope of the that he is not challenging the Denver guarantee.” Amendment’s 627 F.3d at ordinance. After Suthers advocated for omitted, constitutionality and alteration empha- of the Denver ordi- added). nance in his motion for sis summary judg- This case demonstrates the ment, Peterson clarified that he was not need for analytical such an framework. property owned or under may business or on ruling that Colorado seeks a private or “in a automo- of the state. his or her control” to residents restrict CHLs private convey- would means of challenge, in he bile or other this If he succeeds ance”). carry ability of It does not affect the to obtain a CHL free be carry the state. throughout openly non-residents to firearms weapon concealed (however, above, contrast, challenged the had Peterson the state as discussed By ordinance, ordinance, have obtained a may he Rev. Mun. unchallenged Denver Denver carry 117(a),(b), (f), a firearm § allows him & such ruling imposes Code 38— Denver).3 re- maintaining the state’s while openly restrictions carry. specific The on concealed strictions Accordingly, to determine “wheth challenge thus delineates constitutional imposes a on challenged er the law burden par- and clarifies the form of relief proper scope of the falling conduct within the restriction that Amendment ticular Second Reese, guarantee,” Amendment’s Second only the Colorado us. Because is before 800, we first ask whether the 627 F.3d challenged, and thus has been statute provides right Amendment bar, in the case at is at issue the statute carry a concealed firearm. We conclude that statute to the effect of must look we that it does not.4 as- Amendment conducting our Second Baldwin, In v. Robertson sessment. (1897), 326, 41 L.Ed. a Thirteenth Supreme considered Court challenge pair to a of statutes Amendment “a requires that sher Colorado deserting sea- authorizing detention carry a concealed permit iff shall issue 277, 280, 17 326. men. Id. at S.Ct. alia, who,” inter applicant to an handgun noted rejecting challenge, the Court state of legal resident of the Colora “[i]s by many guaranteed of the freedoms 18-12-203(l)(a). § do.” Colo.Rev.Stat. subject to “certain Rights the Bill of bars non-Colo- residency requirement This well-recognized exceptions.” Id. concealed firearms carrying from radoans S.Ct. 326. But see Colo.Rev.Stat. places. in most Thus, and of the 12—105(2)(a) (b) speech the freedom of (exempting from & 18— publication press permit does not possession requirement licensure

the CHL articles, libels, or indecent blasphemous dwelling place or in an individuars “own injury alleged an in fact— standing. He has reject argument appeal on Suthers' 3. weap standing carrying prohibition because he chal- a concealed Peterson lacks on lenged than the ordinance. the statute rather to Martinez's actions on—that is traceable because the Second contends that Suthers by a decision in his be redressed would carry- protect does not Res., EPA, Hydro v. 608 F.3d Inc. favor. Cf. firearms, only injury stems ing Peterson's Cir.2010) (en banc) (setting unchallenged Denver ordinance. from the standing). the three elements of forth standing argument confuses This standing, purposes inquiry. "For merits rely upon did not Although the district court the Constitu- question cannot be whether the tion, summary judgment to ground granting interpreted, protection properly extends Martinez, grant “we are free to affirm right interest. If plaintiff’s asserted to the grounds than summary judgment different test, losing every claim would that were the if the record the district court those used standing.” Initiative want of be dismissed for grounds.” support Stat- such sufficient Walker, 450 F.3d & Inst. Referendum (In re Corp. v. Delutes Stat-Tech Tech Int'l (10th Cir.2006). Because “we must as- (10th Cir. Corp.), Int’l validity,” legal Plaintiffs’ claim has sume the 1995). that Peterson has id. at we conclude injurious publications public rights, right or other most “[l]ike secured private reputation; morals or the Second Amendment is not unlimited. and bear arms people keep through 19th-century the to is From Blackstone the of infringed by prohibiting cases, the laws routinely commentators and courts carrying weapons; pro- concealed the explained right right that the was not a of person put vision that no shall be twice keep carry any weapon and whatsoever in jeopardy prevent does not a second any manner whatsoever and for whatever trial, jury if the first trial the failed upon purpose.” 554 128 S.Ct. 2783. agree, or if the was verdict set aside an example As of the limited nature of the motion; upon the defendant’s nor does right keep Second Amendment car- provision the of the article that same no arms, ry the Court observed that “the against one shall be a witness himself majority 19th-century of the courts to con- impair obligation testify, if a pros- question prohibitions sider the held that on against by ecution him be barred the carrying concealed weapons were lawful time, lapse pardon, by statutory of or under the Second Amendment or state provision enactment. Nor does the analogues.” And Id. the Court stressed person an accused shall be confronted “nothing opinion in our should be prevent with the witnesses him taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohi- declarations, dying admission of or bitions.” Id. depositions of witnesses who have There can be little doubt that bans died since the former trial. carrying the concealed of are firearms (citations 281-82, 17 S.Ct. 326 omit- Heller, longstanding. Supreme added). ted, emphasis early Court cited several cases in support foregoing passage plainly The obiter of the statement that most nineteenth cen- Rohrbaugh dicta. Corp., See v. Celotex 53 tury approved courts prohibitions. of such (10th Cir.1995) (“Dicta F.3d State, (1846) See Nunn v. 1 Ga. statements and opinion comments (“[S]o far as act of 1837 seeks to concerning some rule law legal prop- of suppress practice carrying certain osition not necessarily involved nor essen- weapons secretly, valid, that it is inasmuch tial to determination of the case hand.” as it does not deprive the citizen of his omitted)). (quotation Nevertheless, we self-defence, right natural or of his con- have observed that by “we are bound Su- right stitutional to keep and bear arms.” preme firmly Court dicta almost as as omitted)); Chandler, (emphasis State v. outright holdings, particularly Court’s (1850) (“This La. Ann. right is the when dicta is recent and not enfeebled guaranteed by the Constitution of the by later statements.” United v. States States, United and which is calculated to Serawop, 505 F.3d Cir. incite men to a manly and noble defence of 2007) themselves, if necessary, and of their coun- try, without tendency to secret

Although the advan- Robertson Court’s state- tages unmanly assassinations.”); recent, see qualify does not the Su- Robertson, 281-82, preme also 165 U.S. at contemporary Court’s (“[T]he S.Ct. 326 jurisprudence right people does nothing to keep strengthens enfeeble—but rather and bear arms ... not infringed —the statement carry prohibiting carrying that concealed laws restrictions of concealed McDonald, not infringe weapons.”). do Dissenting Second Amendment Jus- keep Breyer bear arms. As did tice history farther discussed the Robertson, that, opinion carry precise founding-era analogue.... Heller (1822) con- (striking a ban on 91-92 firearm on possession considered bans fel- with a state carry cealed as inconsistent ill mentally longstanding, ons and the to be Nevertheless, provision). constitutional bans yet the current versions of these qnacted banning the states laws “[m]ost (citations century vintage.” of mid-20th in the carrying weapons” of concealed omitted)). century. Kachalsky Cnty. nineteenth of with Fifth agree Circuit in (2d Cir.2012); Westchester, 701 F.3d applying two-step approach Second statutes). n. 21 (collecting see id. at 95 also claims, consider at Amendment we long also histo have noted the Scholars step “whether the law first harmonizes ry carry in this of concealed restrictions the historical traditions with associated Hardy, David T. The Rise & country. See guarantee.” the Second Right” Interpre Demise the “Collective (citations Ass’n, at 194 Nat’l Rifle Amendment, 59 Clev. tation the Second omitted). demonstrates, As the foregoing (2011) in (“Beginning St. L.Rev. carry lengthy concealed bans have histo- 1820s, arising courts State faced issues n. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95 & 21 ry. See laws, early weapons from the interaction of most (noting that states banned concealed carry. Most rul chiefly bans on concealed ” century). carry in the nineteenth Given (footnote ings the bans.... omit upheld Robertson, 281-82, Volokh, dicta 165 U.S. ted)); Eugene Implementing Supreme and the Court’s Right Keep and Bear Arms S.Ct. Self- for and a Analytical “nothing An Framework our admonition Heller that Defense: L.Rev. Agenda, U.C.L.A. Research doubt should be taken to cast opinion (2009) (“This pro tradition [of prohibitions,” longstanding carry hibiting firearms] the concealed 2783, we that Peterson’s conclude go back and the fol does indeed to 1813 step fails at Amendment claim one Second decades, at least in Southern lowing some two-step analysis: Second of our Indiana, states, as as in and border well right Amendment does not confer century the end the 19th carry weapons. such become constitutionality of bans had convincingly ar Peterson does not (footnote broadly accepted.” omit pretty brief, gue reply otherwise. Peter Winkler, Catch-22, ted)); Adam Heller’s not assert a son contends he “does (“The (2009) 1551,1569 L.Rev. U.C.L.A. carry a right to con Second Amendment long to recognize Court was correct challenges weapon,” but rather cealed on concealed pedigree historical bans him of “any prohibition deprives because it than which date back much further carry, to bear arms in meaningful opportunity” by the exceptions recognized the other omitted.) (Emphasis City of Denver. Court.”). history of lengthy Given this However, set forth Sec reasons carry regulation, restrictions on concealed III.A.1, supra, reject that charac- “pre- we qualify “longstanding” and thus tion plaintiffs’ “right terization of Peterson’s Second Amend- to free movement” or affirmatively ment claim. Peterson has “right of migration,” free interstate which any challenge waived to the Denver ordi- protected by or Immuni- open carrying nance’s restriction on the ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment firearms. And we because conclude that Equal and the Protection Clause. Id. at carrying the concealed of firearms falls (quotations Concluding that scope outside the of the Second Amend- “right extended to the to intra- ment’s guarantee, travel,” state as well as interstate id. at properly subject Amendment claim was 100, the court remanded the claim to allow summary judgment.5 the district court to determine whether the challenged policy imposed only a “minor

B travel,” restriction on id. at 102. If the In addition to his Second Amend toll differential was found to be a non- claim, argues that the resi restriction, minor the Second in- Circuit dency requirement violates his right to structed the district court apply strict travel the Privileges and and Immunities scrutiny to the residency classification. Const, Clause, IV, 2,§ U.S. art. cl. 1. The Id. district court treated these claims as one reject We Peterson’s reliance on Sele- in the argues same. Peterson this Although plaintiffs van. in that ease as- was error. He right contends that his to claim, serted a right to travel the claim at grounded just travel claim is not in the issue there bears little resemblance to that Privileges Clause, and Immunities but also by Roe, asserted Peterson. In v. Saenz 526 Privileges the or Immunities Clause of 489, 1518, U.S. 119 S.Ct. 143 L.Ed.2d 689 the Fourteenth Equal Amendment and the (1999), Supreme the Court noted that the Protection Clause. Peterson argues that “right to travel” includes “at least three separate right his to subject travel claim is 500, components.” different Id. at 119 scrutiny. to strict S.Ct. 1518. protects It right the of a of one citizen 1 State to enter and to leave another In support of his assertion that an inde- State, right to be treated aas wel- pendent right to subject travel claim is to come visitor rather than an unfriendly strict scrutiny, Peterson heavily relies on alien when temporarily present in the Selevan v. Thruway New York Authority, State, and, second for those travelers (2d Cir.2009). case, 584 F.3d 82 In that who elect permanent to become resi- plaintiffs challenged a regulation allowing dents, right to be treated like other Island, N.Y., residents of Grand pay citizens of that State. lesser toll to cross the Grand Island Id. Bridge than charged to other drivers.

Id. at 87. The court read the The claim at complaint as issue in plainly Selevan fell asserting a claim that the state violated into category; the first it was on based Heller, 5. laws, As the Court noted in prohibitions the Constitu- tutional irrational prohibits tion separate irrational laws effect."). would have Accordingly, no a stat- apart from the imposed by restrictions regulating carry may ute be uncon- Second Amendment. See 554 U.S. at 628 n. stitutional if it fails the rational test basis 27, ("If required 128 S.Ct. 2783 all that was regardless scope of the Second Amend- right keep to overcome the and bear arms ment. We filings do not construe Peterson's basis, awas rational the Second Amendment asserting challenge, such a however. would be separate redundant with the consti-

1213 visitor” that the “welcome proposition to anoth- place one go from right to “the Saenz, arises right this to travel component noted the Court Id. As er.” freely to travel “right to and Immunities Clause includes from right highway Police, use and to IV); state] [a from v. State Chavez Ill. of Article in- instrumentalities Cir.2001) and other 612, (stating facilities 649 the” state. within commerce terstate prong of “welcome visitor” (quoting United 500-01, 119 S.Ct. protected “expressly travel is right to Guest, 86 S.Ct. States IV, 1 of the Con Clause Article Section (1966)). pre- This is 1170, L.Ed.2d stitution”). that Peterson’s thus hold activity restricted type cisely claim is coterminous right to travel prece- Second Circuit And under Selevan. argument. privileges and immunities intra- dent, purely right extends this Selevan, F.3d at 100 See travel. state Greenburgh, v. Town (citing Williams shall be of each State The “Citizens Cir.2008)). (2d F.3d Privileges and Immunities all entitled to travel claim asserted right The States.” U.S. in the several Citizens to his freedom unrelated Const, this IV, Although cl. art. Saenz, another.” place to from one “go comity” norm clause “establishes he 1518. As states, “speeify[] it does among briefing, in his concedes citizens subjects as to which particular case concerns claim at issue travel jurisdiction coming within one of State wel treated as a “right to be of equality guaranteed of another unfriendly than an visitor rather come Hampshire, v. New Austin treatment.” in” another present temporarily alien when 1191, 656, 660, 43 S.Ct. 95 420 U.S. of the textual basis Although Id. state. (1975). Supreme Court 530 L.Ed.2d of was not leave state right to enter and Friedman, 59, 108 487 U.S. v. Virginia 1518, 501, identified, 119 id. S.Ct. see at (1988), Su- 2260, 101 L.Ed.2d 56 S.Ct. latter that the clear Court made the Saenz to two-prong test set forth preme Court pro “expressly travel is right of to type violates the a statute whether determine of the Constitution” by the text tected First, Clause. IV, and Immunities Article the “first way of sentence activity the restricted 2,” Privileges and Immuni whether is the a court asks which 501, 119 S.Ct. at 526 U.S. ties Clause. that a specifies Accordingly, Saenz of the the livelihood sufficiently basic to on the “wel based

right to travel claim purview to fall within Nation ... as Privileges and is a doctrine visitor” come Clause. Privileges and Immunities Id.; also claim. see Clause Immunities those only with For it (2d Pataki, 75, F.3d 87 Cir. Bach v. 408 bearing and “immunities” “privileges” 2005) to travel right out that (pointing single as a vitality of the Nation on the protections for the a shorthand simply “is accord residents must entity that a State Immunities Clause Privileges and equal treatment. and nonresidents hold relying on Saenz to Article TV” 64-65, (quotations 2260 108 S.Ct. component of visitor” the “welcome omitted). “Second, if the and citations merely “is restate to travel nonresi- deprives challenged restriction IV”), under Article arising rights in- will we privilege, protected of a dents McDonald, grounds, other overruled if it we conclude validate Miller, 3026; F.3d Doe v. 405 S.Ct. to the closely related Cir.2005) is not restriction (citing 700, Saenz [Privileges advancement of substantial state inter- and Immunities is that Clause] (citation 65, est.” Id. at 108 S.Ct. 2260 may a citizen of one State remove to and carry on business in being another without Many of the activities identified subjected in property person or to taxes privileges Court as and immunities are more onerous than the citizens of lat- economic nature. The Court has re to.”). subjected ter State are peatedly pursuit held that “the of a com calling mon is one of the most fundamental However, in the infamous Dred privileges protected by those case, Scott the Court that recog worried Clause.” Building United & Constr. nizing African Americans as citizens would Trades Mayor Council v. and Council of entitle them all privileges and im Camden, 219, 208, 1020, 465 U.S. 104 S.Ct. munities of citizenship, including “the full (1984); Saenz, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 see 526 U.S. liberty ... keep carry arms wher 502, (listing S.Ct. 1518 an out of they ever went.” Sandford, Scott v. state traveler who seeks to “obtain em 393, 417, U.S. 19 How. 15 L.Ed. 691 ployment, services, procure medical (1856).6 And the Court “has never held engage even to shrimp commercial fish that the Privileges and Immunities Clause ing” seeking part protected take protects only (citations economic interests.” Su omitted); privileges) Hicklin v. Orbeck, preme 518, 524, N.H. Piper, 437 U.S. Court 98 S.Ct. (1978) L.Ed.2d 397 (pointing out that the 281 n. 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d Privileges and Immunities Clause forbids (1985); Bolton, see also Doe v. “discrimination against nonresidents seek 179, 200, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 ing trade, ply their practice their occu (1973) (striking residency requirement pation, or pursue a calling”). common abortion privileges statute on and immuni Several other privileges and immunities grounds). ties separate A privi line of cases have concerned differential tax treat leges and prohibits immunities cases ment of non-residents. Lunding See v. states from denying non-residents access Tribunal, N.Y. Appeals 287, Tax 522 U.S. system. the court See v. Miles Illinois 302, 766, (1998) 118 S.Ct. 139 L.Ed.2d 717 Co., 698, 704, C.R. 827, 315 U.S. 62 S.Ct. 86 (“[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause (1942) (“To L.Ed. 1129 deny citizens from prohibits a State from denying nonresi would, other states ... access to its courts dents a general tax exemption provided to if it permitted citizens, access to its own residents....”); Austin, 661, 420 U.S. at violate Privileges the and Immunities (“[T]he 95 S.Ct. 1191 privi fundamental Clause.”); McKnett v. St. Louis & San leges and protected immunities by the Co., R. 230, 233, Francisco 292 U.S. 54 Clause” “an exemption include higher from 690, (1934) (“The S.Ct. 78 L.Ed. 1227 privi taxes or impositions than paid by the leges and requires immunities clause other citizens of the state.” (quotation omitted)); state to accord to Carter, citizens of other states 37, v. 252 U.S. Shaffer 56, 221, (1920) (“One substantially 40 S.Ct. right 64 L.Ed. the same 445 of access to its rights of the intended to by citizens.”). be secured the courts as it accords to its own McDonald, 6. In the Court discussed infringement whether analyzed state has been right protected to bear by arms was under the Due Process Clause of that Amend- Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four- Privileges and not under the or Immuni- Amendment, teenth but declined to consider ties Clause.” 130 S.Ct. at 3030-31. The question the issue rights because "the of the Privileges Court did not address the and Im- protected by the Fourteenth Amendment munities Clause of Article IV. protec- of the Clause’s scope outside the activi many of

Thus, although resi- between Immu “Some distinctions tion. by the protected ties activities, merely reflect the and nonresidents economic dents concern nities Clause of the of step composed one Nation at this is a inquiry fact that relevant regu States, whether simply is and are permitted.” test Friedman individual to the “sufficiently basic activity Baldwin, 383, is 1852. lated at 98 S.Ct. 436 U.S. 64, at 487 U.S. the Nation.” easily Baldwin, livelihood example, the Court omitted). The (quotation 108 S.Ct. could that the state of Montana concluded “was to the clause purpose” “primary nonresi- residents and between distinguish one Nation collection fuse into help licenses: elk-hunting pricing dents Toomer sovereign States.” independent, made Montana distinction “Does the 1156, 385, 395, Witsell, S.Ct. v. U.S. in es- nonresidents residents between (1948). Accordingly, L.Ed. hunting threaten a to elk tablishing access the forma that “hinder distinctions those Privi- way in a offends basic of a development tion, or the purpose, Merely to and Immunities Clause? leges are barred. States” those single Union of the an- provide seems to question ask Comm’n, 436 Fish & Game Baldwin 1852. Because 98 S.Ct. Id. swer.” 1852, 56 L.Ed.2d 371, 383, 98 S.Ct. sport” hunting “is a recreation elk (1978). nonresident’s to the than “a means rather test in a non-economic applied this held, activity “is livelihood,” the Court Geringer, in Nelson v. context well-being maintenance or to the basic not (10th Cir.2002), concluding that 1082, 1090 the Union.” Id. protected Guard in the service National implicate not does Peterson’s claim noted, service, we Such by the Clause. previously recognized privileges United only opportunity “provides carry- The concealed Court. Supreme partici- to volunteer citizens have States ability impact firearm does ing of a country without their defending pate calling or other em- pursue a common lifestyle career and their having to commit Saenz, 526 U.S. at ployment,7 Given the military. Id. exclusively to” the tax conse- in unfavorable result S.Ct. “to over- National Guard importance Austin, 95 S.Ct. 420 U.S. quences, held military power,” we national all courts, access to the or limit his to the livelihood service “basic McKnett, omitted). Fur- Nation.” seeks he contend that does Peterson Nor activi- ther, “imagine few could because we part of firearm as carry a concealed in national participating comparable ties military service. or other Guard National constitute that tend to military service Nelson, at 1090. See people’ ‘one citizens as States United of na- a and mission that we reasons promote sense same largely For National determined that unity,” we tional Second Amendment Peterson’s reject vitality of the “bears on service a con- carrying Guard claim, that we conclude (citation entity.” Id. single Nation as immu- or privilege not a weapon is cealed omitted). dis- As Article IV. under nity protected III.A.2, nation our supra, in Section cussed of the Friedman language plain As the restricting the history lengthy however, fall has many activities suggests, test pursue ability to weapon his affects cealed seeks to argue he 7. Peterson does part employment opportunities. em- weapon as of his carry a concealed carry inability a con- ployment or that Heller, carry concealed of firearms. See IV (“[T]he at U.S. 128 S.Ct. 2783 reasons, foregoing For judgment majority 19th-century courts to con- of the district court is AFFIRMED. question that prohibitions sider held

carrying concealed weapons were lawful LUCERO, Circuit Judge, concurring the Second under Amendment or state separately. analogues.”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95 & Even carry protected were concealed (noting n. 21 states “[m]ost enacted under the Second Amendment or the Priv- banning carrying laws of concealed ileges Clause, yet and Immunities I would weapons” in the century nineteenth affirm. I separately add this to ad- coda statutes). collecting Robertson, And in an vance alternative basis for affirmance. Court included a list of “well-recognized Assuming carry concealed were to be exceptions” to rights enumerated “laws protected clauses, under the stated I none- prohibiting carrying of concealed theless would remain in agree- substantial weapons.” 281-82, 165 U.S. at ment, basis, on an alternative with 326. analytical framework adopted by the dis- carrying Given concealed trict court. firearms has not been recognized as a I apply would scrutiny intermediate right, and the fact that carry concealed both claims to the extent carry prohibited was for resident and non-resi- protected, and would hold that the state dent alike for much history, of our we has carried its burden under that stan- cannot declare activity “sufficiently part dard. As general of its public safety basic the livelihood of the Nation.” interest, Colorado has shown that ensuring

Friedman, 487 U.S. at 108 S.Ct. 2260 CHL qualified holders are under state law Further, Peterson is an important governmental objective. has not explained the manner in which The proffered state also unrefuted evi- prohibitions on the carrying aof concealed dence demonstrating that much of the in- weapon might formation, “hinder the necessary formation to determine whether purpose, the development of a single qualified individual is for a Baldwin, kept CHL is Union.” locally databases, Instead, maintained S.Ct. 1852. and that like hunting the elk Colorado Baldwin, sheriffs do issue not have carrying access to of a such concealed firearm information “is not basic to the to non-resi- n maintenance or dent well-being applicants. In light of the Union.” of law enforce- 98 S.Ct. 1852. Accordingly, officials’ averments that they would privileges effectively immunities claim be unable to determine whether at step one of fails analysis.8 Friedman applicant non-resident qualified to ob- Thomas, McDonald, concurring Justice keep may qualify and bear arms privilege as a concluded that the or Immunities protected under Article IV. Given our conclu- Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "estab- sion in Section III.A.3 that the Second lishes minimum rights, baseline of federal protect Amendment does not the concealed right and the keep constitutional to and bear firearms, carrying of holding our that con- plainly among arms was them.” 130 S.Ct. at carry cealed privilege is not a of state citizen- (Thomas, J., 3083 concurring). Justice Thom- ship not does conflict with analy- this line of expressed as also the view that privileges "the sis. suggest We not do that the and immunities of state and federal citizen- Immunities Clause excludes ship,” protected Second Amend- Article IV and the Four- Amendment, rights; respectively, teenth we "overlap.” carry address Id. at 3085. reading, right Under this to restrictions in the at case bar.

1217 more sure, arguably is 922(g)(8) § To be residency that the CHL, conclude I tain 922(k), at statute § than restrictive to substantially related is requirement Marzzarella, prohibits it in that in issue objective. governmental stated of firearms. types all possession however, § I hand, 922(g)(8) other On the 922(k) it in § that than restrictive is less A of per- class a narrow only to applies ap analysis two-step describing the In large. at public to the sons, than rather in claims Amendment to Second plicable 922(g)(8) § sub- And, regard, that States favorably to United Reese, we cited 922(g)(9), § stat- to stantially similar Cir.2010), (3d Marzzarella, 85 614 F.3d v. Specifically, both in Skoien. ute at issue that concluded Third Circuit in which of fire- possession prohibit statutes “ trigger can Amendment Second ‘the who, persons classes by narrow arms of scru standard particular than one more behavior, are more past their based ‘the upon in part, at least tiny,’ depending, violence. in domestic engage likely to type and the challenged of law type upon ” “Based Reese, at 802. F.3d 627 issue.’ at restriction Amendment that characteristics,” held we these Marzzarel Reese, (quoting at 801 627 F.3d government if the survived 922(g)(8) § omitted). 96-97) (alterations la, at F.3d 614 objective is its “that demonstrate could applied intermedi court Marzzarella The objective is its that one and important constitutional weighing scrutiny in ate to substantially related by means advanced that 922(k), § a statute of 18 U.S.C. ity Reese, at 802 F.3d 627 objective.” that with firearm of a possession prohibits omitted). number, because serial obliterated an “ path United a similar not followed did We by the law imposed burden ‘the Huitron-Guizar, 1164 F.3d firearms,’ v. States possession severely limit right Cir.2012), that handgun (10th noting “[t]he ‘the District Columbia’s as did Reese, venerable, qualified arms, in Heller.” however at issue bear that was ban’ ‘what,’ Marzzarella, ‘who,’ might call the one (quoting by what at 801 F.3d omitted). also Id. at 1166. ‘when,’ ‘why.’” 97) (alterations ‘where,’ We F.3d Skoien, examples of valid F.3d numerous provided United States cited arms: banc), bear Cir.2010) (en approval. right with on the restrictions Circuit, “citing knowingly instance, unlawful case, it is the Seventh “For num- serial constitutional obliterated involving analogous with guns cases receive exceptions, U.S.C.] [18 some with juvenile, rights, concluded bers. A person pas- airline An prohibits handgun. 922(g)(9) possess § [which cannot of a any court a concealed carry been convicted aboard may has not senger who violence of domestic use drug crime dealer may a misdemeanor Nor firearm. subject was firearms] stash.” possessing weapon protect from carry Reese, F.3d scrutiny.” to the (citations With intermediate 641). Skoien, Huitron-Guizar, we (citing challenged statute ap- the Second assumed Marzzarella Consistent “observing] that aliens, and illegal plies held Skoien, court the Reese elimi- but only burdens law here an indi- prohibits which 922(g)(8), U.S.C. on a class by placing, nates protec- subject to a domestic who is vidual upon millions, prohibition a total perhaps firearms, was possessing from order tion rea- gun of any type possessing F.3d scrutiny. 627 intermediate subject to scruti- “intermediate son,” concluded explained: at 802. 1218

ny (cit- would apply.” seem to law, at 1169 and then to determine whether the Reese, 800). ing 627 F.3d at law survives the level of proper scrutiny. Several 700 other F.3d at circuits have 194. adopted following this And remand in two-step, sliding-scale case, the approach Heller with re- the D.C. Circuit has taken spect to Second Amendment the same scrutiny approach: since ask “We first whether Heller was decided. particular Ezell v. City provision impinges upon a of (7th Chicago, 651 Cir.2011), F.3d right protected 684 the Second Amend- Seventh Circuit adopted inquiry ment; does, similar if it then gowe on to deter- Reese, to that enunciated in 627 F.3d mine provision whether the passes muster “First, 800-01. inquiry threshold in under the appropriate level of constitution- some Second Amendment cases will be a al scrutiny.” Heller v. District Colum- ‘scope’ question: Is the bia, restricted activity 670 (D.C.Cir.2011).1 F.3d protected by the Second Amendment B place?” Ezell, first 651 F.3d at 701. If the Second At the Amendment implicated, stage is second of this two-part rigor “the judicial analysis, review will several de- courts have considered pend on how close the whether law the regulation comes to the impacts issue core of the Second Amendment the “core” right right severity of the law’s burden which is often described as that of “law- right.” Id. at 703. Similarly, in abiding, responsible United citizens to use arms Chester, States (4th 628 F.3d 673 defense Cir. of hearth Reese, and home.” 2010), the Fourth applied Circuit a two- F.3d at omitted); see also step inquiry, asking first Ass’n, “whether the con- Nat’l 700 F.3d at (noting Rifle duct at issue was understood to be within “right at the core of the Second the scope of right at the time of ratifi- Amendment” is “the of a law-abiding, cation.” Id. at 680. If the conduct is responsible adult to possess and use protected, the court must select proper handgun to defend his her home and level of scrutiny depending upon the type family”); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Geor- of law being challenged. Id. In National gia, 687 F.3d Cir.2012) America, Inc., Association Rifle (pointing out that Heller focused on “the Fifth Circuit analogized to First Amend- core purpose lawful of self-defense” and cases, holding that “went great lengths to emphasize the

the first step is to special determine whether place that the home—an individu- the challenged ... regulates law private conduct al’s property occupies in our soci- — that falls within scope ety” the Second (quotations omitted)); United States guarantee; Amendment’s Greeno, the second v. (6th Cir.2012) 679 F.3d step (“The determine whether to apply core right recognized in Heller is the intermediate or scrutiny strict to the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to step At the first analysis, of this right.” the D.C. Id. This de exception minimis burden " Circuit held that 'longstanding' regulations adopted has also been by the Second Circuit. lawful,’ is, are 'presumptively they Decastro, See United States v. presumed not to (2d burden conduct within Cir.2012) ("We heightened hold that scope Heller, of the Second Amendment.” scrutiny appropriate regu- as to those Heller, 670 F.3d at (quoting 554 U.S. at lations that substantially burden the Second 2783). 626-27 & n. plaintiff A 922(a)(3) Amendment. Because § only mini- may rebut presumption validity by mally firearm, ability affects the acquire showing regulation issue has subject it is not to any form heightened "more than a de minimis upon effect scrutiny.”).

1219 in of individuals majority vast the governs and home.” of hearth defense arms in use (all not live who do those States the United Heller, at F.3d omitted)); 670 (quotation relatively small Colorado), it burdens in purpose lawful core “the (holding that 1255 in the present of individuals is proportion Amendment” the Second protected notes, Peterson any time. As and state at acquire lawfully to person “aof that by the chal- however, covered individuals handgun, firearm, including a keep a that not demonstrated have lenged home” statute in the of self-defense purpose violence engage in likely to at Ezell, F.3d are more omitted)); they 651 (quotation In con- irresponsible. otherwise secures Amendment or (“[T]he [Second] arms, holding strict the cases trast, of and bear keep several right individual an Amend- a Second right inappropriate is the scrutiny of which component core restric- in- handguns have considered challenge operable possess firearms — See notably in individuals. self-defense, abiding most non-law tions on cluded—for interme- omitted)); (applying United (citation Chester, at 683 F.3d home.” (3d to 18 U.S.C. challenge Barton, in scrutiny F.3d diate States vio- the Second domestic (“At prohibits of Cir.2011) core which § 922(g)(9), law-abiding, fire- possessing of right from is the lence misdemeanants Amendment (same); Skoien, use defense at 64CM1 arms); arms 614 F.3d citizens responsible omitted)); 626-27, 128 at (quotation Heller, 554 U.S. home.” hearth and also of see core (holding “the decision Chester, the Court’s (noting F.3d at S.Ct. 2783 right of is “the of prohibition Amendment” doubt not cast of Second should use and the citizens responsible by felons law-abiding, of firearms “possession (quo- home” hearth and ill”). of in defense arms mentally omitted)). tation reject Peterson’s Nonetheless, I would prohibit not does Amendment state law every Second Colorado argument other- firearms, or re- “law-abiding citizens” possession involving case or dwelling “own wise, individual’s To extent scrutiny. an strict quires owned property or on stan- appropriate may business be place scrutiny strict Colo.Rev.Stat. control.” or her his in the Second under review dard of af- 18-12-105(2)(a). submitted is inconsistent context, position § Peterson’s Huitron-Guizar, not own he does stating that fidavits statement our in Colora- arms, property however private or other to bear home that “[t]he claims he Nevertheless, might law the state one by what venerable, qualified do. § 18- unconstitutional, ‘when,’ ‘where,’ ‘what,’ Colo.Rev.Stat. ‘who,’ call the ” “to ability his 12-203(l)(a), affect Reese not And in we does at 1166. “why.’ 678 F.3d home,” of hearth to a chal- scrutiny defense arms in use intermediate applied right guaranteed to indi- applies 922(g)(8), the core of which § lenge of Reese, 627 F.3d protection Amendment. to a domestic subject viduals only restricts showing It require does order but weapon carry a concealed committed ability to has the order subject 802; see Reese, the home. F.3d at outside See crime. (review- Marzzarella, at 97 614 F.3d also scrutiny level proper selecting the posses- 922(k), prohibits which ing whether Reese, also considered we serial obliterated with an firearm of a sion nar- to a “applies challenged statute scrutiny). intermediate number, under than to rather persons, class of row square contention Nor does Al- at 802. large.” public approval presumptive with Helleds issue residency requirement though the forbidding “laws the carrying of firearms ments subject were to intermediate scruti- in sensitive places such as schools and ny they because did not prohibit “an indi- government buildings.” 554 U.S. at vidual from possessing a firearm in his 128 S.Ct. 2783. Although class of indi- elsewhere, home or whether self-de- vidual burdened is one consideration at fense or hunting, or other lawful pur- two of step the Second analy- Amendment pose”); Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (applying sis, it is not the only one. scrutiny intermediate to a challenge to

Cognizant § 922(g)(9)’s of these prohibition relevant factors and gun possession the statement in Heller by that “the majority domestic violence misdemeanants be- of the 19th-century courts to consider the regulated cause the conduct “is not within question prohibitions held that on carrying the core right identified in Heller —the weapons concealed lawful were under the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen Second Amendment or state analogues,” possess carry a weapon for self- 554 U.S. at omitted)). (emphasis defense” challenge most, triggers, intermediate scrutiny. Reese, (not- See 627 F.3d at 801 C ing that the level of scrutiny depends “at least in part, upon type of law chal- To survive intermediate scrutiny, lenged and type of Second Amendment government bears the burden of showing restriction at issue” (quotation and altera- “that objective its an important is one and omitted)). tions objective its is by advanced means This conclusion is consistent with the substantially related to objective.” few courts that have considered Second Reese, 627 omitted). F.3d at Amendment challenges to carry concealed I agree with the district court that Colora- 'restrictions. Rejecting challenge a to New do, part of its interest in ensuring pub- York’s handgun scheme, licensing the Sec lic safety, has an important government ond Circuit held that “applying less than interest in assessing whether an individual strict scrutiny when the regulation does qualified to possess CHL, a and in moni- not burden the ‘core’ protection of self- toring whether CHL holders maintain defense in the home makes eminent sense their qualifications. I also agree with the in this context and is in line with the district court that the residency require- approach taken our sister circuits.” ment is substantially related to that objec- Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93. And in High light tive in of the record evidence indicat- Boston, tower v. City (1st 693 F.3d 61 ing that less information is available with Cir.2012), the First Circuit held that “laws to non-resident CHL applicants prohibiting the carrying of concealed and that Colorado officials cannot ade- weapons are example of longstanding quately monitor non-residents. restrictions that are presumptively lawful permits under the Colorado law a sheriff Amendment.” Id. at 73 refuse (quotations CHL if “the sheriff alterations has a This reasonable holding plainly belief that incompatible previous documented strict behavior near-strict scrutiny. the applicant Other likely courts have makes it the appli- similarly applied cant will intermediate scrutiny present danger to self or others firearm restrictions that if do not implicate applicant receives permit carry the core Second right. See handgun.” Colo.Rev.Stat. Heller, 670 F.3d at 18-12-203(2). 1257-58 (concluding limitation, This which Pe- that several “novel” registration require- terson does not expressly attack, closely databases locally maintained kept in in approved we objective the parallels to impossible or it less more “would make Reese, towas which screening of type this effectively conduct of people of the hands out firearms keep The applicants.” [CHL] non-resident to for determined judicially been have who categories that explained several physical the affiants to threat a credible pose re- not with member, have are available or who information of family a safety of use, including use, applicants, attempt to to to non-resident spect not ordered been convictions, force crime physical municipal to of use records threaten or would that con- emergency child other partner and health intimate mental an bodily records, cause plea expected to some reasonably be tacts, arrest juvenile undeniably persons in such entered injury, restraining because orders agreements, misusing danger heightened a an in- cases, that pose and determinations civil firearms. ofOne to himself. danger ais dividual a state and alteration that also averred (quotations affiants, Spoden, F.3d at then, objective level, omitted). to “ensure system a one provides At database already been has hold- this case CHL in resident issue of’ eligibility ongoing this court. one” “important that an of concern declared events “flagging]” ers “the state, provide not but does in occur en- chal- law Peterson However, [non-residents’] statute monitor ability to § 18-12- state their actual in not Colo.Rev.Stat. contacts lenges is forcement § 18-12- they 203(2), opined Colo.Rev.Stat. that but officials Both residence.” ap- that a CHL eligi- 203(l)(a), statutory requires which to ensure be able would not ob- The of Colorado. resident be applicants. plicant CHL bility of non-resident are to law challenged behind jectives evidence record the unrefuted Thus qualified is applicant an that ensure law enforce- that Colorado demonstrates continued CHL, to monitor obtain greater have access ment officials Al- issued. is a CHL after qualification to resi- with information level of re- step one objectives are though these non-residents. than applicants CHL dent safety inter- public the direct from moved that establishes further The record 18-12-203(2), I would underlying est appli- non-resident limitations data inter- has substantial that hold Colorado impos- “more or less it make cants would are holders CHL ensuring that in est statutory qualification. ensure sible” Given law. state under qualified this shows that affidavit Spoden’s And important on an rests statutory scheme after a even continues differential data no trouble I have objective, governmental system flagging A state issued. is CHL in- has a substantial the state concluding comes a Coloradoan when sheriffs alerts with compliance ensuring terest her enforcement law into contact statute. for resi- residence; not so this is state residency conclude further I hold would I states. of other dents related” “substantially is requirement requisite evidence establishes this Reese, F.3d objectives. stated chal- relationship between substantial law enforce- Two ensur- objective lenged statute explain- affidavits submitted officials ment indi- by qualified are held ing CHLs locally-maintained “information ing that viduals. assessing absolutely critical is databases do the affidavits complains qualifications” applicant’s a [CHL] a CHL deny him any reason provide information access to” “lack stating that in particular. But complaint misun- clear that non-residency substantially derstands the scrutiny intermediate tailor- related to the objective of ensuring CHL requirement. ing challenged The statute holders qualified under state law be- must substantially be related to advance- cause insufficient information available important governmental objec- as to non-residents the aggregate. This tive, but it provide need not a perfect fit. is so if even we accept unsup- See M. Superior Court, Michael 450 ported assertion that this information gap 464, 473, 1200, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d may not present be in every case. (1981) (in 437 (plurality opinion) conduct- Equally unavailing is Peterson’s conten- ing scrutiny analysis, intermediate “[t]he tion that the residency requirement in- inquiry relevant ... is not whether the sufficiently related the stated interest statute is as precisely drawn it might as because it fails to distinguish between been, have but whether the line by chosen newly arrived Colorado residents and non- ... Legislature the is within constitutional Although residents. limitations”). information on past example, For in reviewing a may activities be minority preference program unavailable for certain to new broadcasting state, residents licenses under in the the the ongoing- intermedi- scrutiny ate monitoring standard applicable applies the rationale equally time, the explained: Court Colorado resident regardless of long how Congressional he has policy does lived in not the assume state. that in every case minority ownership In considering a similar challenge ato and management will lead to more mi- residency requirement, the Second Circuit nority-oriented programming or to the reached the same conclusion in a pre-Hel- expression of a discrete “minority view- ler case. In Pataki, Bach v. the court point” on the airwaves. Neither does it rejected a Privileges and Immunities pretend that all that ap- programming Clause challenge to New York’s residency peals to minority audiences can be la- requirement for handgun licensure. The beled “minority programming” or that court required New York to demonstrate: programming might that be described as “(a) a substantial reason for the discrimi- “minority” does appeal not to nonminori- nation, (b) and a reasonable relationship Rather, ties. both Congress and the between degree the of discrimination ex- FCC maintain simply expanded that mi- acted and the danger sought to be avert- nority ownership of broadcast outlets ed,” 88, 408 F.3d at a standard quite simi-

will, in the aggregate, greater result in lar to intermediate scrutiny. As in this broadcast diversity. case, court agreed that “the State has Metro FCC, Broad. Inc. v. 547, 497 U.S. a substantial legitimate and interest in in- 579, 582-583, 110 2997, S.Ct. 111 L.Ed.2d suring safety general public 445, (1990), overruled on grounds, other from who, individuals conduct, their Constructors, Adarand Pena, Inc. v. 515 have shown themselves to be lacking U.S. 115 S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d essential temperament (1995). or character 158 which Similarly, Rostker v. present should be in one Goldberg, entrusted with a dangerous (1981), L.Ed.2d instrument.” Id. at 91 (quota- the Court approved of omitted). tion and male-only ellipses selective service The court registration fur- requirement ther notwithstanding concluded the fact that New York’s interest “a small number of women could be “extends to draft- ability State’s to monitor ed for noncombat roles.” Id. at good licensees’ character, competency and S.Ct. 2646. On the us, record before it is integrity, including fitness, their mental and im discussing the privileges safe suit. judgment, maturity of composure, IV, Article protected (quota- n. munities Id. habits.” or unsafe “[tjhose protec omitted). stated Court Saenz and citations tions absolute, does the Clause but tions re- residency between fit As of other citizens discrimination bar interest, state’s quirement reason no substantial there where States explanation York’s New accepted court the mere beyond the discrimination to a information flow ongoing “[t]he States.” of other are citizens they fact the licensee’s a result licensing officer (citations 502, 119 S.Ct. community residence particular ato tie strict Rather than quotation reg- State’s element important is an subject claim is visitor scrutiny, a welcome in-state For at 92. ulatory scheme.” challenged “if the following test: noted, is a sub- there residents, court pro aof nonresidents deprives restriction a licens- that higher “likelihood stantially invalidate will court] [the privilege, tected cast to that facts be alerted will ing officer restric that the conclude[s] only if [it] it possess fitness a licensee’s on doubt advance to the closely related is not tion rationale that this agree I Id. firearm.” interest.” state aof substantial resi- ment fit between requisite supplies 2260; 65, 108 Friedman, S.Ct. impor- the state’s and requirement dency v. Kleinsmith see also holders that CHL ensuring Shurtleff tant interest Cir.2009) (“[D]enial of a (10th 1033, 1044 qualified. is immunity to nonresidents privilege Diego, Cnty. San v. Peruta (i) ais substantial there unless invalid court (S.D.Cal.2010), the F.Supp.2d treatment; in the difference reason post-Heller in a analysis adopted Bach’s practiced (ii) discrimination and that Assuming at 1120. Id. challenge. a substantial bears nonresidents “non-residents prevented that restrictions (quo objective.” State’s relationship to the á carry permit for a applying from omitted)). tation the Privi- implicated weapon” Clause, essentially court identical is This standard and Immunities leges scru conclusion Intermediate scrutiny. Bach court’s with intermediate agreed can government interest if the a “substantial tiny had is satisfied state that the limiting important is an objective and its monitoring gun licensees show “that working is advanced objective and those to residents that its one and licenses sufficiently objec to that substantially state was related within primarily means privi The Reese, at 802. interest.” F.3d to that related tive.” requirement tailoring immunities leges and at is- restrictions specific Although the relationship to a “substantial also demands from ways in some differ this case sue Kleinsmith, 571 objective.” the State’s Peruta, agree I and in Bach at issue those formula although the And at 1044. F.3d residency require- courts those an referred in Reese adopted we tion substantially related is for CHL objective, government “important” objective, governmental important “important” terms 18-12-203(l)(a) F.3d Colo.Rev.Stat. thus that interchange used been have “substantial” scrutiny. intermediate survives scru the intermediate referring ably II See, v. Hold e.g., Golan prong. tiny ends (“In Cir.2010) 1076, 1084 er, 609 F.3d court the district affirm also I would intermediate to survive a statute order for assumption even be directed must statute scrutiny, the this implicated is Clause and Immunities an important or substantial governmental .”).

interest... Aracelys TORO, C. Plaintiff-Appellant, above, As discussed I would hold in the alternative that the residency requirement SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF for obtaining a CHL survives intermediate SECURITY, HOMELAND Director, scrutiny. And because Peterson’s Privi- Citizenship Immigration Ser leges and Immunities Clause claim sub- vices, Chief, Appeals Administrative

ject to the same review, form of I would Office, Director, Vermont Service also hold that claim fails even assum- Center, Defendants-Appellees. ing that carrying of a concealed fire- arm No. protected is a privilege. 12-10311. Colorado has shown that ensuring CHL holders are United States Court of Appeals, qualified is an important governmental ob- Eleventh Circuit. jective, and the residency requirement substantially related to objective. Feb. The two other courts that have considered right to travel challenges CHL residen-

cy requirements have reached the same

conclusion, on largely the same basis. See

Bach, (“Because 408 F.3d at 87 we hold

that New York’s interest monitoring

gun licensees is substantial and that New

York’s restriction licenses to residents

and persons working primarily within the

State is sufficiently interest, related to this reject

we Bach’s Article IV

Immunities Clause Peruta, challenge.”); (“The

758 F.Supp.2d at 1120 Court is un-

able to discern a meaningful distinction

between the issues facing the Cir-

cuit in Bach and those at issue here.

Adopting the rationale set forth in

decision, the Court concludes there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to wheth-

er Defendant’s policy violates the

travel.”). Heller notes regulations. concealed See 130 (cit- J., dissenting) sumptively regulatory lawful (Breyer, measures.” S.Ct. at 3132 Heller, Virginia statute that barred ing to an 1847 626 & n. com- “hidden from carrying pistols 2783; see also National Association Rifle observation”); (noting id. mon at 3134 America, Inc., Alcohol, v. Bureau of car- banned States “[flifteen Tobacco, Firearms, Explosives, 700 & F.3d deadly weapons” and other ry pistols (5th Cir.2012) (“Heller 185, 196 demon- era). note, War during post-Civil regulation that a be strates can deemed however, unani- was not view even if it cannot boast ‘longstanding’ Commonwealth, Ky. mous. See Bliss

Case Details

Case Name: Peterson v. Martinez

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Date Published: Feb 22, 2013

Citation: 707 F.3d 1197

Docket Number: 11-1149

Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.