164 N.W. 42 | N.D. | 1917
Lead Opinion
This action is one maintained by the plaintiff against the defendant on the ground of negligence. The complaint is in the ordinary form, and alleges the negligence of the defendant and its want of due care and attention to its duty in that the defendant conducted itself so carelessly, negligently, and unskilfully that by and through the carelessness, negligence, and fault of said defendant and its servants, it provided, used, and suffered to he used an insufficient, defective,, and unsafe switch, frogs, and connecting appliances on said switch leading from its main line on Eleventh street North near the intersection of Third avenue North in said city of Eargo, into the defendant’s car barn.
The bill of particulars furnished the defendant by the plaintiff, and which is a part of the complaint, is as follows:
“Pursuant to demand by defendant for a bill of particulars served upon plaintiff on December 31, 1915, demanding that said allegations in paragraph 4 of plaintiff’s complaint be made more definite and certain, said allegations reading as follows: 'That at all times hereinabove mentioned the said defendant conducted itself so carelessly, negligently,, and unskilfully that by and through the carelessness, negligence, and default of said defendant and its servants it provided, used, and suffered to be used an unsafe, defective, and insufficient roadbed, unsafe, defective, and insufficient switches, frogs, and connecting appliances at its said switch leading from its main line on Eleventh street North near the intersection of Third avenue North in said city of Eargo, into said car barn, all of which it had notice, but the said defects and the dangers attendant thereupon were unknown to the said plaintiff,’ we respectfully submit the following:
“1st. That the roadbed was unsafe, defective, and insufficient in this, — that the defendant’s track at said point was not properly laid, or, if in the first instance said rails were properly laid, they had become through use and wear and tear unsafe to the knowledge of defendant; that said rails and joints were loose and insecure to such an extent that the weight of defendant’s car in passing over the same would cause said rails to depress and sink and become springy and unlevel;*448 and were not laid upon a proper foundation; that said defendant’s roadbed was otherwise unsafe, defective, and insufficient.
“2d. That the switches, frogs, and connecting appliances at said ¡switch, as alleged in the complaint herein, were unsafe, defective, and insufficient in this, — that the same had become worn, broken, and unsafe for use; that they were not modern appliances used for such purposes ; that said switches, frogs, and appliances were not equipped with .springs to make them safe and secure for traffic; that for defendant’s convenience and through the negligence of the defendant, the said ■defendant used or caused to be used in connection with said switches, frogs, or appliances a common piece of gas pipe which was loosely inserted between the rails for the purpose of holding said switches, frogs, •appliances in place; that the cars in passing over said switches by reason of their weight and otherwise crushed and flattened said gas pipe, and caused the same to slip out of place and throw said switch an improper time while defendant’s car was passing thereover; that said .switches, frogs, and connecting appliances were otherwise unsafe, defective, and insufficient.
“3d. That the plaintiff by furnishing this bill of particulars in no manner waives any of his rights under his complaint herein, but ■expressly reserves all rights thereunder, and as a part hereof the plaintiff does hereby refer to and make a part hereof his complaint herein, in no manner limiting the scope thereof, and does hereby further except to the right of the defendant to the bill of particulars as demanded.”
The plaintiff alleges that he has suffered great and permanent injuries external and internal, and great mental and physical pain and ■distress, and is prevented from attending to his duties as aforesaid, and alleges that he has spent large sums of money for medical attendance and nursing, and has lost all the wages he otherwise would have ■earned, and will continue to be subject to all the foregoing, all to his damage in the sum of $25,000.
Defendant by way of answer sets up a general denial to the allegations of the complaint and bill of particulars, admitting only that it is a ■corporation operating street cars propelled by electricity at the point mentioned in the complaint and other places in the city of Fargo. The ■answer further contains allegations by way of defense, setting forth the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the carelessness and
The material facts in the case are in substance as follows: Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant to recover for personal injuries. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a street railway conductor, and his duties were to assist in the operating of street cars in the capacity of a conductor. While plaintiff was engaged in the operating of such street ear in the capacity of conductor, and riding in the rear vestibule of the car as it approached the switch in question, and partially passed thereover, the front wheels of the car passed over the switch and continued on the main track, but when the rear wheels were about to pass over such switch the car left the track and the plaintiff was thrown from such car to the ground. The case was tried in the district court before Honorable Charles A. Pollock, Judge, and a jury. At the close of the testimony the court, upon the motion of the defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff, principally on the alleged ground and theory that the motorman, who also assisted in the operation of such car, and the conductor of such car, the plaintiff herein, were fellow servants, and that it was negligence of the motorman which was the proximate ■cause of the injury, and on the theory that the plaintiff was a fellow servant of the motorman. The defendant contends for that reason it was not liable for any injuries resulting to the plaintiff by reason of the negligence, if any, of the motorman.
The case is one of much importance, necessitating not only the -analysis of the law concerning fellow servants, contributory negligence, assumption of risk by the servant, the negligence of the motorman, and the negligence of the defendant, but also the analysis of court machinery, in order to determine what are the provincial rights, duties, and privileges of the court, and what are the provincial rights, duties, and privileges of the jury, in cases involving matters of both law and fact.
In order to protect the employee from the rigidity of such rule which had been carried to a great extent, different states of the Union found it necessary to enact legislation dealing with this subject, all of which is similar to, or of the same nature and effect as, our § 4804 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, which is as follows: “Every common carrier shall be liable to any of its employees, or in case of the death of an employee, to his personal representative for the benefit of his widow, children or next of kin, for all damages which may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways, or works.”
The defendant claims that said section is unconstitutional, being in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which is as follows: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
We are clear that § 4804- in no way violates the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Such section is a law which the legislature of this state had full authority to enact and prescribe. As we have seen, many of the various states of the Union have a law similar in nature and effect to our § 4804, among which may be
The statute of Iowa on the same subject is of the same nature as the one in Kansas. It was upheld by the supreme court of the state of Iowa, and an appeal was taken from the judgment of the Iowa supreme court to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment upon the same principle that such law in no manner conflicted with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The title of the case was Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1176. It would appear to be conclusively decided, therefore, that laws of the nature of those we are considering which are passed by the various legislatures are con
In connection with the law of fellow servant, we may also refer to our statute upon contributory negligence, one of the defenses in this action being contributory negligence. Section 4805, Compiled Laws of 1913, is as follows: “In all actions hereinafter brought against any common carrier to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, where his contributory negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross in comparison, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.”
The law as expi’essed in sxxch section to some extent relieves froxn evils which have resulted from the doctrine of contributoxy negligence. The doctxfine of contributory negligence is not grounded in common sense, and is really in conflict with the laws of human nature. A person in normal condition and being of sound mind, that is, having the power to distinguish between right and wrong, and having the power to know that which will benefit his body and that which will injure it, — would not voluntarily place his body in a place where it could be injured. If, for instance, an employee engaged in assisting in the operation of a saw in and about a sawmill should, while performing his duties, have his arm severed from his body, it can hardly be said that he would willingly or voluntarily do any act which would
What is a true measure of ordinary care which should be exercised by a servant under a given state of circumstances is a question fraught with great difficulty. Different persons possess very different qualities of mind. One person’s mind in case of danger may be clear, his decision as to what is best to do in a moment of extreme danger may be instantaneous, and he may act with great promptitude. Another person under the same circumstances may possess a mind, slow to act, and may be subject to indecision and inability to decide in a moment or a short space of time what is proper and safe to do, and the best and safest manner in which to act in order to protect himself. One person may be of an observing turn of mind; hardly anything can transpire within his range of vision which he does not observe and make mental note of. Another may lack this quality almost entirely. One person may he of a cautious character and almost continually, apprehensive of danger, while another may be largely deficient in this quality; and so we might proceed to point out many other qualities which exist in different degrees in different individuals, and that which would be a standard for ordinary care in one class would hardly answer the same purpose in another class. If a servant in the discharge of his duties in which he is injured can at all be said to be guilty of contributory negligence in view of the natural law that each will strive to protect his body against injury resulting in pain, disfigurement, and lack of future full enjoyment of the use of the different members of the body, such as the arms and the limbs, and the great inconvenience which ensues from the loss of any such members, it can certainly be said to be only slight contributory negligence, or the failure to use •ordinary care to the best ability of the servant injured, to a slight degree, so we think that possibly the legislature had some of these
Another question which the defendant has raised is that it claims not to be a common carrier. Common carriers are such as are defined by § 6235, Compiled Laws of 1913. Such section is as follows: “Everyone who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or merchandise is a common carrier of whatever it thus offers to carry.” The defendant is a street railway company of the city of Fargu, operating its lines of street railways upon the streets of the city of Fargo, and extending them from Fargo to the city of Moorhead in the state of Minnesota, and its principal business is conveying passengers from point to point upon its lines for hire. Such street railway company is therefore a common carrier. See Smith v. St. Paul City R. Co. 32 Minn. 1, 50 Am. Rep. 550, 18 N. W. 827, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 220; Watson v. St. Paul City R. Co. 42 Minn. 46, 43 N. W. 904. In the case of Watson v.
In the ease of Gunn v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 34 N. D. 418, 158 N. W. 1004, this court in an exhaustive opinion held that § 4804 was constitutional on the ground that the character of the work performed by Gunn belonged to an extrahazardous class, and was connected with the physical operation, of the railroad. Considering the occupation of a conductor of a street car, we conclude that the
There is still another theory which would permit the plaintiff to maintain this action, and that is that § 4804 is not limited to railroads or other corporations, but includes all common carriers. This language of the statute would seem not only to include all kinds of railroads, including street railways, but also any other common carrier who undertook to convey persons or property from place to place for hire. The statute itself nowhere says it shall be limited to railroads or extrahazardous occupations in connection with the operation of railroads, but its language includes common carriers, without any specified degree of the hazard of the occupation or duties performed by the employees for such common carriers. The language of the section is exceedingly plain, and would seem to be susceptible of but one construction; that is, that it applies to all common carriers. It was within the discretion of the legislature to pass such a law, and the United States Supreme Court in the case of Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161, quoting the opinion of the lower court, said: “It is simply a question of legislative discretion whether the same liabilities shall be applied to carriers by canal and stagecoaches, and to persons and corporations using steam in manufactories.” See also Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Pierce v. Van Dusen, 69 L.R.A. 705, 24 C. C. A. 280, 47 U. S. App. 339, 78 Fed. 693; State v. Northern P. R. Co. 36 Mont. 582, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 134, 93 Pac. 945, 13 Ann. Cas. 144; Honorable Isaac F. Redfield, chief justice of the Vermont supreme court, in the case of Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dec. 625, said: “The police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property, within the state.” And in the same case he says: “There is also the general police power of the state by which persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state, of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was,
Section 4804 is not unconstitutional as being in conflict with § 11 of our Constitution, which provides that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” Such law is uniform in its operation as to the class, persons, or corporations affected; neither is such law unconstitutional as being contrary to § 20 of the Constitution of North Dakota.
The court below, in laying its foundation as a basis for its authority in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, endeavored to incorporate therein the philosophy of certain mechanical laws. The court, however, in its effort to apply mechanical laws, signally failed for reasons which we will endeavor to point out. The court below made use of the following langua'ge: “Mr. Swanson testified they were going 3 miles an hour when the accident happened. There is other testimony really showing that he was going from 8 to 10 miles an hour by those who were present to see. That would be a question of dispute. Now, gentlemen, to determine upon this motion I must consider that this car was going at the rate of 3 miles an hour, not to exceed 4. Now, we are up against a few laws of mechanics here. Three miles an hour a man walks, as you are walking, practically 3 miles an hour. The average man walking will walk 3 miles an hour. If this car was going 3 miles an hour it would be going only as fast as the ordinary man
We see, therefore, that the court justified its position in the first instance by invoking the application or philosophy of the laws of mechanics, but later in the statement from which we quoted the court seemed to have lost sight of the laws of mechanics, and instead thereof applied or substituted therefor “just simple plain sense;” and basing his analysis, not upon mechanical laws, but on the rule of plain sense, the court finds, “If the rear wheels had run off the switch, or, in other-words, if the car jackknifed, the car would probably stop right where-it was.”
It is quite evident that the court could in this case have reached no> conclusion which could be based upon the application of mechanical laws. Mechanical laws are certain in their operation. Laws of mechanics are not based upon uncertainties. Before an application of the laws of mechanics can be made, the fundamental quantities must be known, or at least some of them must be known from which others, may be determined. Bor instance, to- determine the momentum which the car in question possessed, it would be absolutely necessary to know the weight of the car and the velocity which it traveled, for momentum is the product of the weight or mass and the velocity. In this case-neither the weight of the car nor the velocity which it traveled were known. Consequently, two of the fundamental quantities were lacking with which to proceed to arrive at a mechanical truth or to demonstrate-a mechanical fact or law. Nothing is known as a fact in this case about
The trial court directed the verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff in this case. In other words, the trial court did not submit the questions of fact to the jury. The court is the medium or instrument through which litigants seek to have their rights, whether personal or property, litigated. The district court is the court to which litigants apply for the purpose of trying the issues of both law and fact. Such a court is composed of a judge and jury. It takes both a judge and a jury to make up such a court. The judge alone is not the court; the jury alone is not the court; hoth together constitute the court. The powers and duties of the judge and jury of such court are entirely separate and distinct. It is the exclusive duty of the judge to interpret the law of the case. It is the exclusive duty of the jury to pass judgment upon the facts of the case. The judge cannot invade the province of the jury. The right to a trial by jury is preserved to litigants in actions at law by the Federal and our state Constitutions, and in an action at law where the amount corresponds with that specified in the Constitutions as a minimum for which a trial hy jury may be had, it is the right of the litigants under the Constitution to have a trial by jury,
In the case at bar the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant against the plaintiff in the case, notwithstanding there was a conflict of testimony concerning material facts. Por instance, there was testimony showing that the car in question was going 3 miles an hour, and other testimony showing that the car was going from 8 to 10 miles an hour. How fast the car really was going was one of the questions of fact to be proved. There was a conflict of testimony as to the speed of the car. The speed of the car was a material fact to be proved in the case, as it went to the question of contributory negligence. That such disputed question of fact was not submitted to the
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially). The plaintiff brings this action to recover damages against the defendant by reason of its alleged negligence and failure to construct and keep in proper condition a circular switch joining the two lines of street railway on which the plaintiff was employed as a conductor. It is said that by reason of some defect in the circular switching, or by reason of plaintiff running the car too fast, it ran off the track and he was injured.
The action is based on chap. 203, Laws 1907, — the Fellow-Servant
“Sec. 1. Every common carrier shall be liable to any of its employees . . . for all damages which may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents or employees, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways or works.
“See. 2. In all actions . . . against any common carrier to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, . . . the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, where his contributory negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross in comparison, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.”
Clearly the case involved the question of negligence and contributory negligence, which by the plain words of the statute was for the jury, and not for the court. Judgment reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the result and in the syllabus.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially). I concur in a reversal of the judgment and in the principles of law announced in the syllabus. I agree with Mr. Justice Grace that § 4804, Comp. Laws 1913, does not violate the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor has it been shown that it violates any other constitutional provision, either state or Federal. I also agree that the defendant is a common carrier and within the provisions of this section, and that the plaintiff was engaged in work of such character as to bring him within the statute. I am also of the opinion that under §§ 4804 and 4805, Comp. Laws 1913, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were in this case for the jury. I express no opinion upon the other matters discussed in the majority opinion.