66 P. 623 | Kan. | 1901
This was an action in ejectment brought to recover possession of lots 1 and 2, block 40, city of Garnett. On August 25, 1884, George W. Iler, the owner of lot 1, and L. K. Kirk, the owner of lot 2, executed and delivered to defendant Edward Davis their title bond, by the terms of which the obligors therein agreed, upon the payment of twenty dollars cash, and the further sum of thirty dollars on or before the 1st day of January, 1895, to convey the premises to Davis. By the express terms of this title bond the time of payment was made of the essence of the contract. Davis also agreed to pay the taxes on the property. t
On April 13, 1897, plaintiff purchased the property from Iler and Kirk and received a deed therefor. On the 15th day of April, the defendant, Edward Davis, assigned his interest in and delivered to plaintiff the title bond which he had received from Iler and Kirk. Plaintiff redeemed from tax sale and paid the taxes due on the property. Upon demand made, defendants refused ’to yield possession of the property, when this action was brought. Defendants had judgment and plaintiff brings error.
That the time of payment of the purchase-price of real estate may, by express stipulation in the contract of sale, be made of the very essence of the contract, and when so made is to be respected and enforced by the courts like any other stipulation between the parties, is settled. (Mo. River, Ft. S. & G. Rld. Co. v. Brickley, 21 Kan. 275; Grey v. Tubbs, 43 Cal. 359; 1 Beech, Mod. Cont. § 620.) That time was so made of the essence of the contract in this case, and that defendants for a period of more than twelve years after default in the payment of the remainder of the purchase-price held possession of the property without payment or tender of payment, and without any justification or excuse for not making payment, is admitted. It fol
The fact that plaintiff, before bringing the action, received an assignment and delivery of the title bond from Davis, if material, certainly placed Mm in no worse condition than if the bond had remained in the hands of Davis. It conferred no new right of defense upon Davis, imparted no new vitality to the bond.
It follows that the judgment is wrong and must be reversed.