50 Wash. 361 | Wash. | 1908
This action was brought to recover the possession of certain personal property, or its value. The case was tried upon its merits to the court and a jury, and upon such trial a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and judgment followed for $341. The defendant appeals.
It is argued that the complaint is fatally defective because it contains, “(1) no allegation of demand; (2) no allegation of ownership at the time of demand; (3) no description of the goods; and (4) no allegation of venue.” It is true the complaint contains no allegation showing that the property was at that time located in Kitsap county, where the action was brought, and it is also the law that the court would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter unless the property was within the jurisdiction of the court. But the appellant did not stand upon his demurrer. The jurisdictional facts could have been proved at the trial, and for aught 'that appears here, that fact, and all other necessary facts omitted from the complaint, were fully established by proofs at the trial. This court said, in Green v. Tidball, 26 Wash. 338, 67 Pac. 84, 55 L. R. A. 879:
“The statute directs us to disregard any error or defect which does not affect a substantial right of the adverse party*363 (§ 4957), and to determine all causes upon the merits thereof, disregarding all technicalities, and to consider all amendments which could have been made as made (§ 6535). When, therefore, a cause has been tried upon its merits, as if upon pleadings sufficient in form and substance, in which the complaining party has not been misled, and has had full opportunity to present his case, some substantial wrong, some failure on the part of his adversary to aver or prove a material matter necessary on his part to be averred and pro\en in order to entitle him to recover, must be shown, before this court is warranted in reversing and remanding a cause for a new trial. A mere defect in pleading is not such a cause. It must not only be defective, but must have operated to the substantial injury of the complainant before that result can follow.”
In Gritman v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 41 Wash. 77, 83 Pac. 6, we followed this rule, and added: “The same reasoning would prevent this court from dismissing the case after trial, even though the demurrer should have been sustained in the first instance.” This rule has been followed in other cases. Richardson v. Moore, 30 Wash. 406, 71 Pac. 18; Irby v. Phillips, 40 Wash. 618, 82 Pac. 931; Lang v. Crescent Coal Co., 44 Wash. 267, 87 Pac. 261; Hester v. Stine, 46 Wash. 469, 90 Pac. 594.
The appellant in this case does not appear to have been misled in any particular. He had a full opportunity to present the merits of his case to the court and the jury, and we have no doubt that, if any jurisdictional or other fact necessary to the respondents’ cause was not fully established at the trial, the record would be here to show the error.
No prejudicial error appears here, and the judgment must ‘ therefore be affirmed.
Hadley, C. J., Crow, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.
Rudkin and Root, JJ., took no part.