108 F. Supp. 3d 1352 | N.D. Ga. | 2015
OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. unlawfully accessed their computers from a remote location and collected private information stored therein. The Plaintiffs allege that Aspen Way accomplished this by means of a program which it installs on the computers before leasing or selling them to its customers. It is before the Court on the Defendant Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 25] and the De
I.Background
The Defendant Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. — a Montana-based franchisee of the Defendant Aaron’s, Inc.
The Plaintiffs Michael Peterson and Matthew Lyons — residents of Colorado and Oklahoma, respectively
II.Legal Standard
A plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the Complaint give rise to a plausible claim for relief.
III.Discussion
A. GCSPA
The Defendants argue that the GCSPA does not apply extra-territorially. And thus, according to the Defendants, because all of the alleged unlawful acts took place outside of Georgia, the GCSPA claims must be dismissed. Generally, Courts may not “assume[ ] ... that the [legislature of Georgia] attempted to enact legislation having an extraterritorial effect.”
In response, the Plaintiffs argue that, based on Georgia’s choice of law rules, the GCSPA may apply. This misses the point. The Court is determining whether the statute, by its text, provides a remedy for the wrongful acts alleged by the Plaintiffs. Thus, the question is one of statutory interpretation: does the GCSPA provide a remedy for culpable acts and subsequent injuries that took place outside of Georgia? The Eastern District of Michigan confronted a similar issue when it had to determine whether the Michigan Builders’ Trust Fund Act applied to projects located outside of the state of Michigan. Prior to addressing the issue, the court noted:
It is necessary to set forth the distinction between conflict of laws principles and statutory interpretation. A conflict of laws inquiry is necessary only if there are two relevant forums with divergent laws. This occurs only if the court determines that both forums’ legislators intended their law to apply to the situation. In other words, the court interprets both forums’ laws; if both apply, the court moves on to a conflict of laws determination. Here ... it is only necessary to engage in a statutory analysis to determine the scope of the [Michigan Builders’ Trust Fund Act] — i.e., to see if the [Michigan Builders’ Trust Fund Act] applies.10
The Plaintiffs then argue that the class members they seek to represent live in a number of states, and possibly even Georgia. This may be true, but the question here is whether the Plaintiffs Peterson and Lyons have stated a plausible claim for relief under the GCSPA. Because they have not, their GCSPA claims against all of the Defendants must be dismissed.
B. Common Law Invasion of Privacy
The Plaintiffs assert a common law claim for unreasonable intrusion of seclusion. The “ ‘unreasonable intrusion’ aspect of the invasion of privacy involves a prying or intrusion, which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, into a person’s private concerns.”
[T]he Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant leased a computer to her without informing her that the computer was equipped with software-that would allow the Defendant to monitor the Plaintiffs activities. The Plaintiff further alleges*1356 that the Defendant accessed financial information, personal information, and even images of the Plaintiff at her computer. These are allegations of potential intrusions on privacy that would be “offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.”14
In response, Aspen Way argues that it installed PC Rental Agent on the computers it leased/sold in order to “track down a lost or stolen computer or a computer whose lessee was in default” and that this does not constitute “an unreasonable ‘intrusion.’ ”
However, the Court must still determine whether the Plaintiffs have asserted a plausible common law invasion of privacy claim against Aaron’s, Inc. The Plaintiffs do not allege that Aaron’s, Inc. installed PC Rental Agent on their computers and/or used PC Rental Agent to collect their private information. According to the Amended Complaint, the Defendant Aspen Way — an independently owned and operated business — engaged in these acts.
First, the Plaintiffs argue that Aaron’s, Inc. is liable because it conspired with Aspen Way to access the Plaintiffs’ computers and collect their private information. To “recover damages based on a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that two or more persons combined either to do some act which is a tort, or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort.”
The Plaintiffs then argue that Aaron’s, Inc. aided and abetted Aspen Way’s surveillance of its customers, and is thus liable for tort claims asserted against the latter. Georgia courts “recognize the principle in the law of torts that persons-acting in concert under [certain] situations may be liable for the acts of others.”
In response, Aaron’s, Inc. contends that Georgia law does not recognize “aiding and abetting” liability for a common law invasion of privacy claim. They claim that, in Insight Technology, Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC,
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendant Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 25] and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendant Aaron’s, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 26].
. Compl. ¶ 9.
. Compl. ¶ 47.
. Compl. ¶ 41.
. Compl. ¶ 47.
. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.
. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even' if doubtful in fact).”).
. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
. See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (A "plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Marty, 197 Ga.App. 642, 643, 399 S.E.2d 260 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Accu-Tech Corp. v. Jackson, 352 F.Supp.2d 831, 834 n. 5 (E.D.Mich.2005) (emphasis added).
. Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 705, 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991).
. Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc., 312 Ga.App. 365, 369, 718 S.E.2d 532 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Sneed v. SEI/Aaron’s, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-982-TWT, 2013 WL 6669276, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 18, 2013).
. Aspen Way's Mot. to Dismiss, at 13 (emphasis added).
. Compl. ¶ 40 (“Once PC Rental Agent is installed on a Lease-Purchase computer, it permits the installer — -in this case Aspen Way — to remotely install and or activate over the Internet the ‘Detective Mode’ feature.”) (emphasis added); Compl. ¶ 66 ("Plaintiffs are attorneys who took ownership of several computers through a lease purchase agreement with Aspen Way ... in order to conduct business for their law firm.”) (emphasis added).
. McIntee v. Deramus, 313 Ga.App. 653, 656, 722 S.E.2d 377 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id.
. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. School of Visual Arts of Savannah Inc., 219 Ga.App. 296, 297, 464 S.E.2d 895 (1995).
. The allegations referenced by the Plaintiffs in their Response Brief are insufficient. The Plaintiffs alleged that Aaron's, Inc. promoted PC Rental Agent to Aspen Way. Pis.' Resp. to Aaron's, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 9. But this does not mean that Aaron’s, Inc. and Aspen Way reached an agreement whereby the latter would use PC Rental Agent to collect the Plaintiffs' private information. Thus, this allegation does nothing to render the Plaintiffs' conspiracy allegation plausible.
. Gunder's Auto Ctr. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 422 Fed.Appx. 819, 821 (11th Cir.2011).
. Madden v. Fulton Cnty., 102 Ga.App. 19, 21-22, 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).
. Id. at 22, 115 S.E.2d 406 (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id.
. Compl. ¶ 37.
. Compl. ¶ 38.
. Compl. ¶ 57.
. Compl. ¶ 38.
. Compl. ¶ 59.
. 280 Ga.App. 19, 633 S.E.2d 373 (2006).
. See id. at 23, 633 S.E.2d 373.
. See id. at 24, 633 S.E.2d 373.